The transnational ethnic networks developed by North Korean defectors are factors in the (de-)bordering of North Korea. Ethnographic fieldwork in two destinations—London and Los Angeles—demonstrates, first, that through their practices of financial and social remittances, the defectors have proved that North Korea’s border control is porous, and second, that the defectors have developed global and regional networks to challenge North Korean sovereignty. In the interaction between the defectors’ daily lives and the geopolitical environment, these geopolitical ethnic networks play important roles. This contribution to the debate on borders and defectors encourages us to shift our attention from nation-states’ laws and policies on border-crossers to the agency of the border-crossers themselves.

This article examines how truth commissions (TCs) contribute to promoting accountability, and argues TCs generate two horizontal accountability relationships. First, TCs hold state agencies accountable. Second, recommendations made by TCs can generate a relationship of horizontal accountability between the governing regime and the state agencies towards which the recommendations are directed. Next, I present the case of the 1994 Zonal Commissions in Sri Lanka, and to assess their contribution to accountability, I compare the evidence collected against evaluative criteria. The results show that while the commissions produced answerability, recommendations compiled in the final report were not implemented. The findings show long-term effectiveness of TCs may depend on senior officers within the state apparatus in addition to political leaders.

Truth commissions (TCs) have become a recurrent mechanism for states to deal with and address past human rights violations. This article argues that TCs generate accountability relationships at three different stages. Before their establishment, TCs generate vertical accountability relationships between civil society and the state. During the period between their establishment and the release of the final report, TCs hold state agencies horizontally accountable. In their final reports, TCs put forward recommendations capable of generating horizontal accountability between the governing regime and the state agencies towards which the recommendations are directed, and vertical accountability as civil society pushes the governing regime to implement these recommendations. This article suggests criteria for evaluating how truth commissions contribute to promoting accountability.