

# 북한의 미래와 국제협력

*The Future of North Korea and  
Global Cooperation*

*L'avenir de la Corée du Nord et la  
Coopération Mondiale*

일시 및 장소

2009년 3월 13일 (금) 09:00~18:00  
소공동 롯데호텔 3층 사파이어 볼룸

DATE & LOCATION

March 13, 2009 09:00~18:00  
Sapphire Ballroom (3F), Lotte Hotel Seoul

주최

주한 캐나다 대사관  
서울대학교 통일평화연구소

CO-HOSTED BY

Embassy of Canada  
Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, SNU

후원

주한 호주 대사관 / 주한 영국 대사관 / 주한 이탈리아 대사관

IN PARTNERSHIP WITH

Embassy of Australia / British Embassy / Embassy of Italy

## 프로그램

- 09:00-09:30 등록
- 09:30-09:35 개회사 : 테드 립만 캐나다 대사 (북한 겸임)
- 09:35-09:40 축사 : 이장무 서울대 총장
- 09:40-10:00 기조 연설 : 전국무총리 이홍구
- 10:00-10:15 휴식

### SESSION 1 한반도의 비핵화

사회 : 김병국 교수 (고려대학교)

- 10:15-10:45 제1발표 : The DPRK Nuclear Challenge in Context  
웨이드 헨틀리 교수 (브리티쉬 콜럼비아 대학교)
- 10:45-11:15 제2발표 : 북한의 비핵화 지원 방안  
전봉근 박사 (외교안보연구원)
- 11:15-12:00 토론  
안드레이 램코프 교수 (국민대학교)  
전재성 교수 (서울대학교)
- 12:00-13:00 오찬

### SESSION 2 북한의 경제개발과 국제적 지원

사회 : 김병연 교수 (서울대학교)

- 13:15-13:45 제1발표 : A Paradigm Shift on Economic Assistance in North Korea: What Can EU Do to End an Endless Game?  
로젤라 이데오 교수 (트리에스테 대학교)



- 13:45-14:15 제2발표 : 북한 경제지원에서의 6자회담 비참가국의 역할  
장형수 교수 (한양대학교)
- 14:15-14:45 제3발표 : Energy Assistance to the DPRK: Options,  
Negotiating Styles, Outcomes  
피터 헤이즈 박사 (노틸러스 연구소)
- 14:45-15:30 **토론**  
윌터 클리츠 박사 (나우만 재단)  
서두현 과장 (통일부 통일정책국 경제분석과)
- 15:30-15:45 **휴식**

### SESSION 3 국제협력, 평화, 그리고 북한 인권

사회 : 제니스 린 마셜 박사 (UNHCR 대표)

- 15:45-16:15 제1발표 : Global Cooperation, Peace and Human  
Rights: A Practitioner's Perspective  
존 에버래드 대사 (전 북한 주재 영국대사)
- 16:15-16:45 제2발표 : 북한 인권과 6자회담 비참가국의 역할  
김수암 박사 (통일연구원)
- 16:45-17:30 **토론**  
서창록 교수 (고려대학교)  
유남영 상임위원 (국가인권위원회)
- 17:30-18:00 **정리 및 결론**  
박명규 소장 (서울대학교 통일평화연구소)
- 18:00-20:00 **참석자 만찬 (초청자)**

# Program

- 09:00-09:30 **Registration**
- 09:30-09:35 **Opening Address** : Canadian Ambassador Ted Lipman
- 09:35-09:40 **Congratulatory Address** : Dr. Lee Jang Moo, President of SNU
- 09:40-10:00 **Keynote Address** : Mr. Lee Hong Koo, former Prime Minister
- 10:00-10:15 **Coffee Break**

## SESSION 1 Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

**Moderator** : Prof. Kim Byung Kook, Korea University

- 10:15-10:45 **Presentation 1 : The DPRK Nuclear Challenge in Context**  
Dr. Wade Huntley, Director, Simons Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Research, Liu Institute for Global Issues, Univ. of British Columbia
- 10:45-11:15 **Presentation 2 : Assisting North Korea to Denuclearize**  
Dr. Jeon Bong Geun, Sr. Research Fellow, Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security
- 11:15-12:00 **Discussion**  
Prof. Andrei Lankov, Kookmin University  
Prof. Chun Chaesung, Seoul National University
- 12:00-13:00 **Lunch**

## SESSION 2 Global Assistance in North Korea's Economic Development

**Session Introduction by H.E. Massimo Andrea Leggeri, Ambassador of Italy to Korea**

**Moderator** : Prof. Kim Byung Yeon, Seoul National University

- 13:15-13:45 **Presentation 1 – A Paradigm Shift on Economic Assistance in North Korea: What Can EU Do to End an Endless Game?**  
Dr. Rosella Idéo, Professor, University of Trieste

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- 13:45-14:15 **Presentation 2 – Building a Multilateral Mechanism for Global Assistance to North Korea**  
Dr. Zang Hyoungsoo, Hanyang University
- 14:15-14:45 **Presentation 3 – Energy Assistance to the DPRK: Options, Negotiating Styles, Outcomes**  
Dr. Peter Hayes, Director, Nautilus Institute for Security & Sustainable Development
- 14:45-15:30 **Discussion**  
Dr. Walter Klitz, Country Representative, Friedrich Naumann Foundation  
Mr. Suh Doo Hyun, Director, Economic Analysis Division, Ministry of Unification
- 15:30-15:45 **Coffee Break**

### **SESSION 3 Global Cooperation, Peace and Human Rights in North Korea**

**Session Introduction by Mr. Jonathan Knott, Chargé d’Affaires, British Embassy Seoul**

**Moderator :** Dr. Janice Lyn Marshall, Seoul Representative, UNHCR

- 15:45-16:15 **Presentation 1 – Global Cooperation, Peace and Human Rights: A Practitioner’s Perspective**  
Amb. John Everard, former British Ambassador to the DPRK
- 16:15-16:45 **Presentation 2 – North Korean Human Rights and the Role of Non-Participating Members of 6 Party Talks**  
Dr. Kim Soo Am, Sr. Research Fellow, Korea Institute for National Unification
- 16:45-17:30 **Discussion**  
Dr. Yoo Namyong, Standing Commissioner for DPRK Human Rights, Korean National Human Rights Commission  
Dr. Soh Changrok, Dean of GSIS, Korea Univ.
- 17:30-18:00 **Summary & Conclusion**  
Dr. Park Myoung Kyu, Director, IPUS
- 18:00-20:00 **Dinner** (for participants only)
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# Programme

- 09:00-09:30 **Inscriptions**
- 09:30-09:35 **Discours d'ouverture par** – Ted Lipman, Ambassadeur du Canada en RDC (République de Corée) et en RPDC (République populaire démocratique de Corée)
- 09:35-09:40 **Discours de félicitations par** – Dr. Lee Jang Moo, Président du SNU
- 09:40-10:00 **Discours principal par** – M. Lee Hong Koo, Président, Ancien Premier Ministre de Corée
- 10:00-10:15 **Pause-café**

## SÉANCE 1 La dénucléarisation de la péninsule coréenne

**Modérateur :** Dr. Kim Byung Kook, Professeur, Korea University


- 10:15-10:45 **Présentation 1 – Le défi nucléaire nord-coréen en contexte**  
Dr. Wade Huntley, Directeur, Simons Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Research, Liu Institute for Global Issues, Univ. of British Columbia
- 10:45-11:15 **Présentation 2 – Aider la Corée du Nord à se dénucléariser**  
Dr. Jeon Bong Geun, Chercheur attaché supérieur, Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security
- 11:15-12:00 **Discussion**  
Dr. Andrei Lankov, Professeur, Kookmin U  
Dr. Chun Chaesung, Professeur, relations internationales, SNU
- 12:00-13:00 **Déjeuner**

## SÉANCE 2 L'assistance mondiale dans le cadre du développement économique en Corée du Nord

**Séance introduite par S.E. Massimo Andrea Leggeri, Ambassadeur de l'Italie en RDC**

**Modérateur :** Dr. Kim Byung Yeon, Professeur d'économie, SNU


- 13:15-13:45 **Présentation 1 – Un changement de modèle en matière d'aide économique en Corée du Nord: Comment l'UE peut mettre fin à ce jeu interminable**  
Dr. Rosella Idéo, Professeur, University of Trieste

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- 13:45-14:15 **Présentation 2 – Créer un mécanisme multilatéral pour l'aide mondiale à la Corée du Nord**  
Dr. Zang Hyoungsoo, Hanyang University
- 14:15-14:45 **Présentation 3 – L'aide énergétique en Corée du Nord: options, styles de négociation et dénouement**  
Dr. Peter Hayes, Directeur, The Nautilus Institute for Security & Sustainability, Centre for the Pacific Rim, University of San Francisco
- 14:45-15:30 **Discussion**  
Dr. Walter Klitz, Représentant de pays, Naumann Foundation  
M. Suh Doo Hyun, Directeur, Division économique d'analyse, Ministry of Unification
- 15:30-15:45 **Pause-café**

**SÉANCE 3 La coopération mondiale, la paix et les droits de l'homme en Corée du Nord**

**Séance introduite par M. Jonathan Knott, Chargé d'Affaires, l'Ambassade Britannique à Séoul**

**Modérateur :** Dr. Janice Lyn Marshall, Représentante de pays, UNHCR

- 15:45-16:15 **Présentation 1 – La coopération mondiale, la paix et les droits de l'homme: Le point de vue d'un pratiquant**  
Amb. John Everard, Ancien Ambassadeur du Royaume Uni en RDPC
- 16:15-16:45 **Présentation 2 – Les droits de l'homme en Corée du Nord et le rôle des pays non-participant aux Pourparlers à Six**  
Dr. Kim Soo Am, Chercheur attaché supérieur, Korea Institute for National Unification
- 16:45-17:30 **Discussion**  
Dr. Yoo Namyoung, Conseiller permanent pour les droits de l'homme en RDPC, Korean National Human Rights Commission  
Dr. Soh Changrok, Doyen de l'école supérieure des études internationales, Korea Univ
- 17:30-18:00 **Sommaire et conclusion**  
Dr. Park Myoung Kyu, Directeur, IPUS
- 18:00-20:00 **Dîner** (servi aux participants et aux invités)
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# 목 차

## 제 1 주제 한반도의 비핵화

The DPRK Nuclear Challenge in Context ..... 3

웨이드 헨틀리 교수 (브리티쉬 콜럼비아 대학교)

북한의 비핵화 지원 방안 ..... 21

전봉근 박사 (외교안보연구원)

## 제 2 주제 북한의 경제개발과 국제적 지원

A Paradigm Shift on Economic Assistance in North Korea:  
What Can EU Do to End an Endless Game? ..... 33

로젤라 이데오 교수 (트리에스테 대학교)

북한 경제지원에서의 6자회담 비참가국의 역할 ..... 41

장형수 교수 (한양대학교)

Energy Assistance to the DPRK:  
Options, Negotiating Styles, Outcomes ..... 51

피터 헤이즈 박사 (노틸러스 연구소)

## 제 3 주제 국제협력, 평화, 그리고 북한 인권

Global Cooperation, Peace and Human Rights:  
A Practitioner's Perspective ..... 81

존 에버래드 대사 (전 북한 주재 영국대사)

북한 인권과 6자회담 비참가국의 역할 ..... 83

김수암 박사 (통일연구원)





*SESSION 1*

## 한반도의 비핵화

Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula  
La dénucléarisation de la péninsule coréenne







# **The DPRK Nuclear Challenge in Context**

**Presentation to**

**“The Future of North Korea and Global Cooperation”**

**Co-hosted by**

**The Canadian Embassy in Seoul &**

**&**

**The Institute for Peace and Unification Studies (IPUS)  
Seoul National University**

**Seoul, ROK  
March 13, 2009**

**Wade L. Huntley**

**Simons Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Research**

**Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia**

*Draft Paper – Not for Citation – Comments Welcome*

## **Introduction**

Over the past two decades, engagement with North Korea by the United States and the rest of the world has waxed and waned. This vacillation is evident even just in the past year or so, in which the Six-Party Talks process has produced both optimistic progress toward disabling Korea's nuclear facilities and negotiation stagnation combined with new North Korean threats to resume missile tests and/or nuclear weapons development.

This essay places the seesawing conflict over North Korea's nuclear ambitions into wider context to consider its implications for broader East Asian relations. After a review of the basic developments in the country's nuclear program, the essay summarizes three categories of wider consequences. The essay then sketches an initial theoretical framework offering tools to transcend overly simplistic assumptions concerning both DPRK motivations and policy response options. Finally, the essay takes up the question of how the Six-Party Talks process may contribute to reducing nuclear threats and enhancing security cooperation in the region more broadly, and what role Canada and other states or non-governmental actors might constructively play to promote positive outcomes at both levels.

## **North Korea's Nuclear Program**

North Korea's nuclear aspirations have been problematic since it first joined the NPT in 1985. The country is believed to have been accumulating plutonium since 1986, principally utilizing its 5 megawatt-electric reactor at the Yongbyon nuclear site. The nearby plutonium separation plant is thought to have separated up to 10 kilograms of plutonium prior to 1992.

Discharge of the reactor's core in 1994, witnessed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), provided almost 8,000 irradiated fuel rods containing an estimated 27-29 kg of plutonium. This action helped escalate confrontation over the inability of the IAEA to reconcile evidence of past North Korean activities with its NPT obligations. The crisis culminated in the 1994 US-North Korea Agreed Framework. Under this agreement, North Korea shut down the Yongbyon nuclear and its nearby plutonium separation plant, and stored the fuel rods in sealed canisters monitored by the IAEA.

The Agreed Framework did successfully freeze North Korea's plutonium-based nuclear program, but it never succeeded in resolving discrepancies of past North Korean activities or in removing known spent fuel from the country as ultimately intended. Hence, North Korea was able to restart this program when, in October 2002, charges that the country was undertaking a second, uranium-based nuclear effort led to the collapse of the Agreed Framework and to North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT and ejection of the IAEA.

In early 2003 North Korea restarted the Yongbyon reactor and began reprocessing the plutonium stored at the Yongbyon site. North Korea is now believed to have reprocessed most of the 8,000 fuel rods, yielding between 20 and 28 kg of weapons-usable plutonium. In April 2005 North Korea again shut down the Yongbyon reactor to collect a new supply of spent fuel, reprocessing of which likely provided up to 15 kilograms more of weapons-usable plutonium.

The number of nuclear weapons this stock could produce depends on the amount used for each device, which depends on the desired yield of the explosion and the technological competence to use the material efficiently. If North Korea is assumed to have only low technological capability,

equivalent to the US at the creation of its first nuclear weapons, and further assumed to be developing a relatively larger number of lower-yield devices, its current stock of separated plutonium is enough for about 4 to 13 weapons.<sup>1</sup>

### **Plutonium Reprocessing**

Plutonium Produced		Plutonium Reprocessed	
When	Amount (kg)	When	Amount (kg)
Before 1990	1-10	1989-1992	0-10
1994	27-29	2003-2004	20-28
Spring 2005	0-15	2005-2006	0-15
<b>Total</b>	<b>28-54</b>		<b>20-53</b>

### **Nuclear Devices (low tech requirements)**

Desired Yield (kilotons)	1	5	10	20
Required Plutonium (kilograms)	3	4	5	6
Maximum NK Nuclear Devices	5-17	4-13	3-10	2-8

In September 2005, negotiations in the Six Party Talks aiming to curtail North Korea's re-emergent nuclear program reached agreement on a joint Statement of Principles, articulating consensus addressing both goals and means.<sup>2</sup> North Korea committed itself to end efforts to produce nuclear weapons, give up its "existing nuclear weapons," rejoin "at an early date" the NPT, and resubmit to IAEA safeguards, including readmission of international inspectors to its nuclear facilities. The statement also included a US affirmation that it had no intention of attacking the DPRK and no longer had nuclear weapons deployed in the ROK.<sup>3</sup>

The Statement of Principles, however, fudged language concerning trenchant practical differences. Within hours, divergent US and North Korean national statements exposed continuing deep divisions on several issues (particularly concerning North Korean retention of civilian nuclear facilities). This divisiveness enabled US hard-liners to push for new pressure tactics, including US sanctions curtailing Pyongyang's access to overseas bank assets that particularly fueled animosities. In this stalemated climate, North Korea on July 5, 2006, undertook a series of missile tests triggering widespread alarm and a UN Security Council

<sup>1</sup> David Albright and Paul Brannan, "The North Korean Plutonium Stock Mid-2006," Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), June 26, 2006 <<http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/dprkplutonium.pdf>>; Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "North Korea's nuclear program, 2005," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 61:3, May/June 2005 <[http://www.thebulletin.org/article\\_nn.php?art\\_ofn=mj05norris](http://www.thebulletin.org/article_nn.php?art_ofn=mj05norris)>.

<sup>2</sup> United States Department of State, "Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks Beijing, September 19, 2005" <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/53490.htm>>.

<sup>3</sup> This was the first-ever formal US statement that it had no nuclear weapons deployed on the Korean Peninsula, marking one of the few significant exceptions to the US policy to "neither confirm nor deny" specific nuclear weapons deployments. Personal correspondence with Hans M. Kristensen; c.f. Kristensen, "The Neither Confirm Nor Deny Policy: Nuclear Diplomacy At Work," working paper, August 2004 <<http://www.nukestrat.com/pubs/NCND.pdf>>. Security assurances to North Korea are salient given the history of US nuclear threat-making, up to and including naming North Korea in the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The classified review was soon obtained by news media; substantial excerpts are available at <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm>>.

condemnation; and then on October 9, 2006, test-exploded a nuclear device, bringing the situation to a new nadir and eliciting the strongest UN Security Council action against North Korea in half a century.

Before testing its nuclear device, North Korea gave China about 20 minutes warning, and reportedly indicated the yield would be about four kilotons. While this is small by historical “first test” standards, it is consistent with estimates of the likely size of the devices North Korea would fashion.

But preliminary estimates of the explosion's actual yield from seismic monitoring ranged from 0.5 to 0.8 kilotons, suggesting that the test was not entirely successful – a fizzle. Speculation that it was not a nuclear test at all was never well grounded – why simulate a failure? Subsequently, air samples collected a few days later detected radioactive debris, confirming the explosion was nuclear.

A more likely explanation for the low yield is that North Korean technicians did not achieve the precise timing needed for triggering the implosion-type design required for plutonium detonation. Or, North Korea may not have wanted to use up too much of its limited plutonium supply (4 kg could be up to twenty percent of its stocks). Technicians may also have had concerns about the test site successfully containing a larger explosion.

**Parameters of the Test**

Attempted Yield (purported)	4 kilotons
Plutonium Utilized (est.)	4 kg (~8-20%)
Actual Yield (est.)	<1 kiloton

**Previous First Tests (Plutonium)**

Country	Date	Yield (kt)
U.S.	July 16, 1945	21
USSR	Aug. 29, 1949	22
Britain	Oct. 3, 1952	25
France	Feb. 13, 1960	60
India	May 11, 1998	12

Crucially, all parties to the Six-Party Talks recognized that the nuclear test did not dramatically alter the basic situation, enabling a tactical consensus around a measured reaction to the test that in turn supported the otherwise surprising early resumption of progress in the negotiations. That progress produced the implementing agreement of February 13, 2007, restoring momentum toward the negotiated solution to Korean Peninsula nuclear conflicts outlined in the September 2005 Statement of Principles.

The terms include the shut down of the research reactor at the Yongbyon site in exchange for shipments of fuel oil, similar to the provisions of the Agreed Framework. Eventually North Korea is to verifiably dismantle all nuclear weapons capabilities, receiving further energy aid, release from economic sanctions and normalization of political relations.

But the deal doesn't replace the 1994 Agreed Framework, which mapped a never-completed course to complete denuclearization of North Korea. The new deal does not reverse North Korea's NPT withdrawal and does not immediately deal with the existing stockpile of reprocessed plutonium. It leaves those developments to future – and undoubtedly difficult – negotiations.

Whereas the Agreed Framework was mainly a bilateral accord, the new deal involves commitments by North Korea's key regional neighbors included in the Six Party Talks – China, Japan, South Korea and Russia. But implementation of the Agreed Framework energy provisions was vested in the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO), which enlisted the active support of South Korea and Japan; its Executive Board also included the European Union, and nine other countries (including Canada) joined as members. At the diplomatic level, the Six Party Talks is a more genuinely multilateral process. But the Bush administration at times hid behind this multilateralism to avoid direct negotiations with North Korea – despite support for such direct dealings by the other four parties. Indeed, the US-DPRK bilateral meeting in Berlin in January 2007, separate from the Six Party Talks process in Beijing, was a key encounter that set the stage for resuming the current process. So while in some respects the new arrangement is more inclusive, in others it does not return the situation even to where it was in 2002.

## Consequences

The collapse of the Agreed Framework in 2002 was a watershed. From 1994 to 2002, North Korea's plutonium-based nuclear program was contained. By most public accounts, the suspected uranium-based program was (and remains) not nearly as close to producing usable fissile material. After 2003 there were no direct restraints on North Korea's nuclear ambitions, and its current plutonium stocks remain in Pyongyang's hands.

In short, with the unleashing North Korea's plutonium-based nuclear program, a critical threshold was crossed, shifting the status quo fundamentally. Since 2003, all of the implications of a nuclear North Korea have been at hand. The 2006 nuclear test aggravated, but did not create, these consequences.

Ramifications of North Korea's nuclear acquisitions to date can be organized into three categories:

**Nuclear Proliferation** A major concern is that North Korea's reinvigorated nuclear program gives it the potential to export fissile materials, nuclear weapons development technologies and expertise, or even completed operational weapons. This is the consequence of a nuclear North Korea that many in the world take most seriously. The Bush Administration long emphasized this concern; it was perhaps that administration's most genuine "red line," and a central impetus for its launching the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

Nuclear transfers is a very real concern, especially given North Korea's history of using its military resources & other illicit activities as revenue streams. But North Korea does not have commitments to external groups or a history of supporting independent terrorist activities. To the extent that the country lacks an ideological motivation to proliferate, the regime will probably take credible warnings seriously. Moreover, proliferation is a poor instrument for coercive diplomacy (discussed below), providing neither visible nor immediate impact.

**Regional Security** In the Northeast Asia region, a steadily (if slowly) growing arsenal of nuclear weapons in North Korea will aggravate tensions and uncertainties. Most gravely, North Korea's actions could trigger a nuclear acquisition "domino effect." Some worry particularly that North Korea might spur Japan to obtain nuclear weapons of its own.

But Japan may be less prone to soon pursue nuclear weapons than it appears, and is unlikely to make such a decision so long as US security guarantees are credible.<sup>4</sup> The same goes for South Korea & Taiwan, albeit for different reasons. So the North Korean nuclear test is not necessarily going to topple other East Asian proliferation dominos.

More broadly, though, this fear increases regional security tensions and uncertainties. So the implications are high. But, perversely, North Korea's actions bolster support for regional security postures which often have wider purposes. Missile defense cooperation between the United States and Japan is one example. This is why expressions of concern from some corners for this dimension of consequences have been at times ambivalent.

**The Nonproliferation Regime** North Korea is the first state ever to withdraw from the NPT. North Korea has also released itself from the 1992 agreement with South Korea to keep the Korean peninsula nuclear free.

If North Korea remains outside the NPT and suffers no serious consequences, the precedent will erode current NPT compliance norms. But making a "special deal" to gain North Korea's re-accession to the NPT would also set a precedent inducing other NPT parties to bend the rules in hopes of additional benefits. Hence, there are no good options to mitigate the impact of North Korea's NPT withdrawal.

The Bush Administration rarely expressed worries over potential impacts of North Korea's NPT withdrawal on the viability of the treaty or the health of the nonproliferation regime more broadly. Instead, it supported a growing body of critics charging that developments in North Korea and Iran signify the failure of the NPT regime itself.

In fact, the NPT regime remains highly effective in most of the world. Moreover, the erosion of the regime is itself a medium through which Korean Peninsula developments drive other nuclear acquisition dangers – such as Iran's ambitions. The NPT did not prevent North Korea (and several other countries) from developing nuclear weapons, but it remains one of our strongest tools to contain these ambitions and to mitigate their wider impact. Dismissing this vital ongoing role will only make matters worse.

North Korea's 2006 nuclear test did not create all these implications. It did aggravate them somewhat, in the short-run. But, ironically, the test also alleviated them to some degree: it provided outside analysts with important forensic data about North Korea's program, and probably demonstrated that the program is not as advanced as many fear.

More broadly, the nuclear test, and North Korea's nuclear program to date more generally, have not had as deleterious an impact as there might have been in any of the above three areas of consequence – at least not yet. There are several reasons for this, including skepticism North Korea has been able to fashion a usable nuclear warhead, its recommitment to a non-nuclear future in the context of current negotiations, the apparent credibility of deterrent threats in all but the most extreme contingencies, and the exceptionalism from the outset of North Korea's relationship with the global nonproliferation regime. Most of these variables, however, may yet shift; and even if North Korea's nuclear programs progress no further than the current status quo, these capabilities will continue to threaten and corrode in all three areas.

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<sup>4</sup> In 1995 the Japanese Defense Agency compiled a 31-page secret report reaffirming previous government studies' conclusions that developing nuclear weapons would damage Japan's national and regional security interests. The existence of the report was disclosed by the *Asahi Shimbun* on 20 February 2003 <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/japan/nuke.htm>>. Cf. Mataka Kamiya, "Nuclear Japan: Oxymoron or Coming Soon?" *Washington Quarterly* 26, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 63-75.



## DPRK Motivations

To react wisely to these developments, we must understand North Korean motivations as best we can. What are the sources of North Korea's nuclear ambitions? There are no pat answers.

Virtually all analysts conclude that at some foundational level the Pyongyang regime is motivated by "regime survival." But there's ambiguity in what this means exactly. And this impulse is not alone fully determinative of the regime's postures.

Some analysts suggest that repeated North Korean provocations are merely an effort to "get attention" from the United States and other principals. Such explanations imply an understanding of Kim Jong-il as a spoiled adolescent in need of a good spanking – an image reinforced by media attention to the Dear Leader's reportedly salacious lifestyle.

This simplistic assessment is almost certainly wrong. Rather, North Korea's provocative actions probably flow from a calculated strategy of coercive diplomacy. This strategy anticipates positive effects beyond the short-term rise in tensions and animosity such actions elicit. This strategy has met with success in the past. The renewed positive negotiating environment with the United States following its 1998 missile test, leading to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's visit to Pyongyang two years later, is one example. More recently, the 2006 missile and nuclear tests led rather directly to renewed negotiations and the February 2007 agreement.

But to understand North Korea's provocative actions as an effort in coercive diplomacy still leaves the question: to what end? Here lays the most basic question regarding Pyongyang's motivations: is the regime prepared to reach an agreement entailing surrender of its nuclear capability, or not? Engagement advocates tend to answer "yes;" North Korean belligerence is mainly maneuvering for bargaining position. Confrontation advocates usually answer "no;" North Korean accommodation is merely a tactic to assuage neighbors and buy time.

Much debate over North Korea policy is defined by these two opposing prescriptions – engagement vs. confrontation – and so also by the two opposing assumptions about North Korea's motivations underlying the prescriptions. The problem is that both approaches may be wrong:

- Most fundamentally, the choice is too simple. In fact, it may be the case that North Korea's leadership pursues its nuclear program for multiple and evolving reasons, and has not made up its mind whether it will ultimately surrender it. A lot may depend on not only the terms of any ultimate deal, but the contextual situation at the time.
- Moreover, the Pyongyang regime, although highly centralized and monolithic, has its internal factions and divided interests which will bear on Kim Jong-il's decision-making. If rumors of Kim's ill health and diminishing leadership are accurate, these divisions are likely to increase in importance and volatility.
- Finally, there is the problem of uncertainty: given the opacity of the regime, no single assumption about North Korean motivations can be shown to be definitively right.

Given these problems, it makes little sense to base policy solely on one set of assumptions. A sturdier approach is to first consider how North Korea actually acts, and then consider the range of factors, domestic and international, that might be influencing these actions. Policy responses should take into account the potential influence of as many of these factors as possible. The goal is to develop effective responses regardless of which sets of assumptions about motivations may actually be correct.

To illustrate this approach, following are three simple profiles illustrating differing imagined combinations and weights of the many factors that may influence North Korean decision-making.

The three profiles roughly follow Scott Sagan's three models of nuclear proliferation motivations: external security circumstances, domestic politics and institutions, and the influence of ideas and norms.<sup>5</sup> Each of these generic categories can be tailored to incorporate DPRK-specific national factors,<sup>6</sup> producing three archetypical DPRK profiles:

- **National Unity:** emphasizes leadership and ideational drivers, like ideology and nationalism. The regime exhibits very strong solidarity with visionary behavioral traits.
- **Regime Power** Emphasizes power capabilities, external circumstances and regime survival. The regime exhibits strong or moderate solidarity and behaves as a classic rational actor.
- **Domestic Factions** Emphasizes internal characteristics, including economic and political. The regime exhibits weak or moderate solidarity and behaves with bounded rationality.

No single profile is "right." The point is not to choose among them. There are elements of the actual regime in each profile; reality combines elements of all of them. Rather, the profiles are abstractions, intentionally flexible and adaptable. Their purpose is to provide insight and stimulate new viewpoints; their utility is measured by their plausibility, not their accuracy. Utilizing the profiles entails envisioning how decision-making and behavior are generated in each of them, and ideally to find points of convergence among their implications. The profiles can then be applied to developing policy responses.

## Policy Response Patterns

Despite the escalation of the nuclear crisis, most debate about North Korea policy remains defined by the same dichotomy mentioned earlier: *engagement* versus *confrontation*.

However, since the early 1990s, North Korea has shown that it neither dependably reciprocates accommodation, as engagement advocates hope, nor routinely cowers to intimidation, as confrontation advocates expect. Rather, North Korea's most consistent behavior has been to exercise coercive diplomacy to disrupt unsatisfactory circumstances and provoke action by interlocutors. Policy success has been most forthcoming when the US and other principals simply have been attentive to its full implementation; i.e., when prioritizing *interaction* over *neglect*.

The distinction between engagement and interaction in this context is important. Engagement means adopting certain assumptions about Pyongyang's willingness to reach deals and work to solve its internal crises through reform. Interaction means that Korean peninsula issues stay at the forefront of attention and lines of communication remain open even during periods of heightened tension.

Interaction versus neglect was a driving dynamic in the ebb and flow of post-1994 US-North Korean relations. Under the Clinton administration, waning interaction often undermined overarching engagement intentions. North Korean provocations often rekindled direct attention as well as new action – sometimes engaged, sometimes confrontational, but typically settling down the situation.

In its first two years, the Bush Administration's lack of interaction as much as its confrontational posture contributed to escalating tensions. Following the collapse of the Agreed Framework, the Bush Administration became marginally both more interactive and engaged, as policy was bedeviled by internal divisions and overshadowed by the war in Iraq. Personnel changes at the

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<sup>5</sup> Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb," *International Security* 21/3 (Winter 1996/97).

<sup>6</sup> A non-exhaustive list of DPRK-specific factors includes: International imperatives; Regime survival; Juche philosophy/ideology; History and nationalism; Economy; Leadership; Military role in society.

beginning of President Bush's second term elicited more genuine engagement, leading to the September 2005 Statement of Principles. But acrimony over vying interpretations of its provisions helped the administration's hard-line factions reassert control of North Korea policy, contributing to a downward spiral culminating in North Korea's 2006 nuclear test.<sup>7</sup>

In the waning years of the administration, a commitment to the negotiating process was sustained over time. But indications that by this time the embattled administration's main motivation was to gain a foreign policy "win" suggest that its engagement was more tactical than fulsome, and drive the impression that it was willing to sacrifice prospects for eventual DPRK nuclear disarmament to staunch immediate proliferation activities. The administration may have abandoned the hope of "regime change" but not its reticence to abide Pyongyang as a sovereign interlocutor, defaulting to an apparent strategy to contain and tolerate the DPRK while allowing a nuclear resolution to await more naturally induced regime transformation. In terms of the two dimensions noted above, the Bush administration became significantly more *interactive* with North Korea over time, accounting for a dampening in the volatility of the situation; but its *engagement* remained grudging, contributing to the painstakingly incremental pace of progress.

The Obama administration thus enters the scene at a time both degraded and opportune. North Korea, predictably, is acting restlessly, particularly in the wake of South Korea's cessation of unconditional aid. Key allies Japan and South Korea, while uncomfortable with much of the Bush administration's direct dealings with North Korea, warily await indications of what form the Obama administration's ethos of engagement will take in Northeast Asia. The painstaking and less than satisfying progress of the Six-Party Talks in the past two years could easily unravel, but could also be built upon. In terms of the two dimensions noted above, the new administration is very likely to be more *engaged* – and more committed to the principle of engagement – than its predecessor. But how *interactive* its diplomacy will be in the context of so many other competing absolute priorities – i.e., how much energy and attention the administration will actually be able to devote to the Korean nuclear conundrums – remains to be seen.

Framing policy responses in terms of both these dimensions, rather than the simple dichotomy of engagement and confrontation, illuminates consideration of future policy options. This framework may be further enhanced by casting them across the DPRK profiles presented above (rather than static assumptions of DPRK motivations).

- In the **National Unity** profile, interaction is highly commended, and would best include a mix of engagement and confrontation. This is the profile under which US hostility most serves to positively reinforce the regime. Thus, a relative emphasis on engagement is both less costly and more effective from the US point of view. The US role is prominent, but negatively; there are fewer ways for the US to satisfy DPRK needs. Hence, deals are feasible but difficult; the prospect of the DPRK fulfilling its obligations is qualified, impinging confidence in agreements. An overt "breakout" from obligations might be planned, especially as an end move to a crisis precipitated for that purpose.
- In the **Regime Power** profile, interaction is highly commended, and again would best include a mix of engagement and confrontation. But a balance tilting more toward confrontation is probably advisable: this is the profile under which the regime is playing hardball diplomacy, and is probably most sensitive to credible threats. Deals are possible and the prospect of the country fulfilling its obligations is more likely, because the regime has deal-making power


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<sup>7</sup> See Wade L. Huntley, "U.S. Policy toward North Korea in Strategic Context: Tempting Goliath's Fate," *Asian Survey* 47:3 (May/June 2007); and "Ostrich Engagement: The Bush Administration and the North Korea Nuclear Crisis," *The Nonproliferation Review* 11:2 (Summer 2004).

and confidence, and because the regime is sensitive to international context, providing more ways for the US to satisfy its needs.

- In the **Domestic Factions** profile, engaged interaction is commended, but not strongly. This is the profile in which the US influence is smallest, because North Korea is least responsive to outside forces. Too heavy a hand could create problems of its own – almost any action is likely to provoke one or another faction. Internal constituencies and internal controls are important, lending a certain momentum to the status quo. Here, deals would be elusive, but the regime’s breach of obligations in place is not strongly motivated; defection would be reactive to proximate causes. These conditions hold unless internal turmoil reaches a degree of disintegration fundamentally disrupting policy control.

The policy implications of these profiles can be tabulated in terms of the two main axes of *engagement v. confrontation* and *interaction v. neglect*, and mapped onto these policy axes to show the areas of most likely policy success.



Several overarching policy implications emerge:

- First, we notice the space where all three policy profiles overlap. This is probably the orientation which, over the long-run, will be most successful.
- Second, the widely recommended approach of combining engagement and confrontation – “carrots and sticks” – is inadequate unless girded by sustained interaction.
- Because factors fluctuate in influence on Pyongyang’s decision-making, policy must embody flexibility in this consistency. At any given time, the most effective policy could be anywhere in these three spaces.
- Finally, factors influencing Pyongyang’s decision-making are opaque. The country does not always respond similarly in similar circumstances. Hence, rather than acting or responding in a “tit-for-tat” manner, policy should be oriented consistently toward shaping environment to which Pyongyang’s decision-making responds, so far as is possible.

Looking at the profiles individually, a few other observations emerge.

First, prospects for “good” outcomes not correlated with regime solidarity. The Regime Power profile offers the best prospects, but here the regime is only moderately stable, at the midpoint between the other two profiles. This complicates setting policy goals sensitive to regime stability.

Second, prospects for engagement not necessarily correlated to DPRK disruptive behavior. In some circumstances, the regime’s motivations for engagement & for confrontation are both

simultaneously heightened or lowered. These observations highlight the utility of conceiving “interaction” to be an orthogonal axis and the need for policy-making perceptiveness.

Thirdly, and ironically, the profile under which “good” outcomes are most imaginable – Regime Power – is also the profile under which a tilt toward confrontation is advised. The implication here is quite provocative: that the US should be more accommodating when North Korea appears to be least responsive to it, but firmer when North Korea seems more ready to reach an accord. This is a counterintuitive observation – almost the opposite of “tit-for-tat.” But there is an underlying logic: one should be cautious in the face of volatility, but once at the negotiating table one bargains hard. This in fact somewhat reflects the North Korean diplomatic approach of the past decade, albeit in the context of its penchant for coercive diplomacy & brinkmanship.

Finally, assessment through the profiles underscores the already evident conclusion that successful policy must be built on a strategic consensus among the United States, China, and the other principal interested powers (South Korea, Japan and Russia) as to long-term goals. The need for carefully crafted policy, incorporating elements of both engagement and confrontation and sensitive to disparate results that might emerge from small policy differences, can hardly be satisfied without such a coordinated consensus.

### **The Regional Security Imperative**

As observed earlier, the collapse of the Agreed Framework at the end of 2002 marked the critical threshold past which North Korea was decidedly on the road to becoming nuclear armed. The regime’s subsequent declaration that it requires nuclear weapons for its security and its subsequent nuclear test all evince how far it has now moved down that road.

Achieving a non-nuclear Korean peninsula now requires rolling back an existing capacity. Although North Korea still has very far to go before it is a full-fledged nuclear power, no country has ever given up a publicly demonstrated nuclear weapons capability. There are only two known cases of rollback in which operational nuclear arsenals existed: South Africa and the former Soviet republics. Both these cases involved governments that had not embraced nuclear weapons in their security policies. And, both rollbacks were involved dramatic regime change.

Presently, North Korea’s government has recommitted itself to eventually eliminating all its nuclear arms. That rollback goal should never be surrendered. But, given the heightened challenge, strategies to curtail North Korea’s nuclear weapons development focusing only on that issue in isolation may no longer be up to task.

Two implications follow. First, the international community should also be taking measures to mitigate all categories of consequence of North Korea’s nuclear activities so long as the situation remains unresolved. This objective requires building better cooperation among key interested parties. Such efforts should be aimed not merely at eliciting unity in responding to Korean actions but also at building an environment of cooperative security throughout the Northeast Asian region as insulation against the ongoing corrosiveness of North Korea’s posture.

The second implication, therefore, is that the promise at the backdrop of the Six Party Talks – to negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula formally ending the over half-century old state of war and mapping the road to eventual Korean reunification – should move to the forefront. The Six Party Talks have long been considered a potential precursor to a wider East Asian cooperative security regime. Now, however, progress in building broader cooperative mechanisms is also increasingly important to peaceful achievement of a non-nuclear Korean peninsula.

Anticipation of a broader political settlement was a key component of the 2005 Statement of Principles. Both the United States and North Korea agreed “to respect each other's sovereignty,

exist peacefully together and take steps to normalize their relations subject to their respective bilateral policies.” This provision echoes similar intentions in the 1994 Agreed Framework – lack of progress on which may have been more disappointing in Pyongyang than delays on the material side of the deal. The September 2005 agreement also promises that “the directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum,” resolving the suspended state of war defined by the terms of the armistice that ended the Korean War in 1953. The agreement thus directly linked resolution of the nuclear crisis to the creation of an overarching regional security accommodation.

The potential for the Six-Party Talks process to contribute to reducing nuclear threats and enhancing security cooperation in the region more broadly may be realized in two distinct manners.

First, the Six-Party Talks process, whose specific aim is to denuclearize the Korean peninsula, can contribute to reducing nuclear weapons capabilities and nuclear threat reliance in the region more widely. Most directly, a peacefully denuclearized Korean peninsula would reduce proliferation pressures on Japan and other neighboring countries, and could help relax regional dependence on nuclear deterrence by the United States and China. More ambitiously, a denuclearized Korean peninsula could be a catalyst to the long sought development of an East Asian Nuclear Weapons Freeze Zone.

The second avenue for a wider contribution from the Six-Party Talks process is in facilitating the development of security cooperation mechanisms. To the extent that “Regime Power” dynamics drive DPRK motivations, US pledges to normalize relations and provide negative security assurances should carry great weight. Much would need to be worked out over the nature and limits of US negative security guarantees, but the costs of early and significant US moves toward normalizing relations are relatively cheap compared to the potential benefits that could accrue in smoothing negotiations over more contentious tangible matters.

Moreover, those provisions would necessarily entail remodeling related security arrangements. Through this mechanism, generating a permanent peace settlement for the Korean peninsula would contribute powerfully to the building a regional security cooperation framework among the principle powers of East Asia. Many models for such a framework already exist. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) already provides an incipient basis for dialogue, albeit with a limited mandate. The Conference for Security Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) offers an example of institutionalized regional security cooperation some have thought might be adapted to fit particular East Asian needs.

These two paths are related. Just as resolving nuclear tensions on the Korean peninsula can facilitate a broader Korean peace settlement, so might reducing nuclear threat reliance in the region more widely contribute to the development of mechanisms for security cooperation among the region’s major powers. Thus, the disposition of North Korea’s nuclear weapons ambitions is linked directly to prospects of region-wide security cooperation through two routes.

Additionally, realizing this wider potential of the processes set up to deal with North Korea’s nuclear ambitions is increasingly instrumental to that nearer-term imperative as well. While it has long been anticipated and hoped that progress toward resolving Korea-specific issues could contribute positively to progress at the wider regional level, relatively less attention has been paid to the potential for improved regional security cooperation to facilitate solutions in Korea. But, as the years have passed, this second potential has become at least as important as the original.

The reason for the increasing importance of this return effect is that the Korean nuclear situation has degraded. Compared to the situation a decade ago, North Korea’s nuclear weapons capabilities have advanced considerably. As noted earlier, the Pyongyang government likely now

controls some four times as much reprocessed plutonium, enough for a half dozen or more nuclear explosive devices, it has conducted a nuclear test, and it has effected its withdrawal from the NPT with relatively little consequence. Recent progress in negotiations, while much welcomed, has yet to begin reversing that situation. This is why the potential contribution of progress in reducing nuclear threats and building cooperative security mechanisms at the regional level has become much more important to resolving the Korea-specific nuclear conflicts.

It is to be welcomed that North Korea's nuclear advancement has not precipitated new nuclear weapons initiatives among its neighbors, dramatically unsettled regional security stability, opened proliferation floodgates or fatally undermined the nonproliferation regime. But the price of "learning to live with" a nuclear North Korea, beyond the lingering possibility of highly disruptive future actions, is to embed nuclear threat reliance even deeper into regional security relations. This is why the potential contribution of progress in reducing nuclear threats and building cooperative security mechanisms at the regional level has become much more important to resolving the Korea-specific nuclear conflicts. Indeed, a peaceful and complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula may now depend upon such wider progress.

### **7<sup>th</sup>-Party Contributions**

What can parties outside the Six-Party Talks process do to facilitate progress both in this wider context and within the process specifically? The question can pertain both to other interested governments and to non-governmental civil society organizations. The following discussion develops a typology of potential contributions using illustrative Canadian possibilities.

Canada's relationship with the DPRK in this decade has tracked the ebb and flow of diplomatic engagement by the United States and other principal actors. Canada established diplomatic relations with the DPRK in February 2001, in hopes of promoting improved governance and human rights in the country. This occurred at a high point in engagement of North Korea; US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had visited Pyongyang the previous year, and a visit by President Clinton had nearly come to pass. With the deterioration of the US-DPRK relationship under the Bush administration, culminating in the collapse of the Agreed Framework at the end of 2002, Canada placed bilateral relations on a "not business as usual" footing, precluding formalized senior-level meetings or other intensification of the relationship.

Following the breakthrough joint Statement of Principles in 2005, Canada adjusted its policy to allow for "small-scale, grassroots-level capacity-building and training initiatives." This adjustment was suspended following the 2006 missile and nuclear tests, but turned again with renewed progress following the February 2007 agreement. At this stage, Canada readjusted policy to allow greater engagement which would "promote full denuclearization and advance long-term goals such as political reform, improved human rights and regional security." Nevertheless, the scope of this engagement remains explicitly "contingent on the continuing progress in resolving the nuclear crisis" through the Six-Party Talks process.<sup>8</sup>

Importantly, Canadian policy toward the DPRK evinces a focus on the conditions of the North Korean people, expressed through both human security and human rights outlooks. Canada has provided both food and non-food humanitarian assistance since 1997, and has maintained this minimum support even when all other forms of engagement are suspended. In October 2008, Canada responded to a World Food Program appeal with \$2 million in food supplies to individual North Koreans.<sup>9</sup> With its policy focus on general conditions of livelihood, Canada would in the

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<sup>8</sup> "Bilateral Relations: Canada - Democratic People's Republic of Korea," Government of Canada (ND) <http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/geo/dprc-bb-en.aspx>

<sup>9</sup> "Canada Provides Emergency Food Aid to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," Canadian International Development Agency (October 2008) <http://www.acdi->

future prioritize development assistance; however, such increased engagement is by stipulation contingent on progress toward resolving nuclear contestations.

Canadian policy strongly supports the Six-Party Talks process as a non-participant; it does not seek or see value in a more direct role, recognizing that few if any purposes would be served by a expanding the participation in the Six-Party talks process itself. However, Canada has in the past shown its readiness to contribute directly to Korean de-nuclearization efforts, joining KEDO in 1995, shortly after its inception. Canada would likely be prepared to take an active role in any new KEDO-like organization and/or cooperative activities under other auspices. For example, Canada has been a primary participant in the G8 Global Partnership, which at its 2008 summit agreed to undertake activities outside Russia on a case-by-case basis and when consistent with serving its founding purposes.<sup>10</sup> An active Global Partnership role to support dismantlement of North Korean nuclear facilities would be fully consistent with its mandate and offer a distinct organizational identity potentially smoothing the path to DPRK concurrence.

Beyond these specific prospects, Canada could also contribute productively in a facilitative role. Such a role would take into account its unique relationship to the United States, characterized by both intimate civil and military cooperation and defiance on certain key security policy questions. This history leaves Canada at once familiar and independent, providing both a capacity and a measure of credibility. In such a facilitative role, Canada could productively operate in two modes: as a *convening force* and an *innovation source*.

To operate as a convening force means to provide the venue and forum within which the principal agents may better advance their engagement. It does not mean to be a “mediator” (which would be a direct rather than facilitative role). It may mean a literal venue and forum, as in providing a nurturing environment for low-key meetings or other expert exchanges at either official or track-II levels. But operating as a convening force can be less direct as well; for example, in pursuing independent engagement with North Korea, Canada might prioritize initiatives that would also enable a US role (perhaps more remotely, perhaps not immediately) or at least have Canada-US counterpart initiatives. Such a focus would be especially useful in areas in which direct US-DPRK engagement outside the Six-Party Talks process remains most problematic.

A less direct means to operate as a convening force would be to focus on the challenges of nuclear threat reliance and cooperative security construction at the regional level. With a broader scope than the effort to forge a permanent Korean peace called for in the current Six-Party Talks agreements, such regional-level efforts can be undertaken independently of the Korean nuclear diplomacy. Yet, given the increased importance of the regional level environment to the Korean negotiations (described in the preceding section), such independent efforts could prove to provide powerful contributions.

Canada can be an innovation source with respect to facilitating North Korean engagement in a number of ways. One is to take a lead role in initiatives outside the core nuclear program

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[cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/FRA-1010145244-Q5Z](http://cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/FRA-1010145244-Q5Z). Nevertheless, in March 2009 the WFP is providing only 15 percent of the food assistance desired, reaching only two million of the 6.2 million people targeted, having received only US\$22.7 million of the US\$504 million budget (4.5%) for the emergency operation plan adopted in 2008. “The country is soon to enter the critical ‘lean season’ when food stocks from last year’s harvest run low. In certain parts of North Korea, particularly in the Northeast, high levels of malnutrition are anticipated.” “WFP Does What Little It Can For North Koreans,” World Food Program (March 5, 2009) <http://www.wfp.org/stories/forced-scale-back-wfp-focuses-most-vulnerable-north-koreans>

<sup>10</sup> “Report on the G8 Global Partnership,” Government of Canada (2008) [http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/g8/summit-sommet/2008/g8\\_global\\_partnership-partenariat\\_mondial\\_g8.aspx?lang=eng](http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/g8/summit-sommet/2008/g8_global_partnership-partenariat_mondial_g8.aspx?lang=eng)



contentions but vital to its ultimate resolution. Such initiatives can focus on development and capacity-building efforts; for example, activities to familiarize technical elites in North Korea with economic, commercial and social standards and approaches in the international community.<sup>11</sup> While the timing and modalities of direct government-sponsored involvements must be coordinated with principal parties, Canada can also proactively facilitate a host of non-governmental support activities more distant from the nuclear diplomacy.

Another means of innovative contribution is through synthesizing the perspectives these encounters garner into a dynamic assessment of the ongoing state of engagement prospects in general. Developing a process to draw on civil and commercial as well as diplomatic contacts, this analysis could generate perspectives invisible to the United States and other Six-Party Talks participants. This analysis would seek to build insights into North Korea's current dispositions – i.e. reduce the uncertainty driving the utility of the three regime profiles introduced above – and develop specific proposals for enhancing future engagement.

Canada's success in serving a facilitative role, in either of these modes, would depend in part on all the main parties positively reinforcing that role. But such a role could be fulfilled through the accumulated activities of a host of agents – such as companies, universities and NGOs – operating in independent capacities. Positive reinforcement could come more in the aggregate of these activities than from a singular Canadian government posture. Many forums and innovations could also have independent impact, while sensitivity to the feedback from the efforts would be further data to building lines of communication and understanding.

The Six-Party Talks process is a dialogue among the governments, necessarily expressing the security priorities of those governments. Most serious discussions of potential wider regional security frameworks taking place between governments or at non-governmental “Track Two” forums similarly premise that the principal parties are the region's governments themselves. This approach to the issue manifests security outlooks defined in terms of the relationships of sovereign nation states; i.e. national security.

The agenda of such an approach by definition diverges from the weight Canadian policy places on human security and human rights concerns, which have played a formative role in Canadian foreign policy outlooks and continue to drive the emphasis on collaboration and development support in most current Canadian international roles. The preceding section described why efforts to build a Korean peace settlement and regional cooperative security are more vital than ever to resolving the nuclear challenge. By extension, progress on the national security and human security agendas are equally co-dependent, especially with respect to addressing the “human conditions crisis” in North Korea. This interdependence is recognized in the agreement between Canadian and South Korean interlocutors on the importance (if not the precise means) of promoting humane governance conditions both with respect to North Korea and on a wider regional and global basis.<sup>12</sup>

Progress toward peaceful conflict resolution and cooperative security dialog will serve human security needs. But the specific objectives of the Six-Party talks and the broader regional cooperative and human security agendas are not identical. Other interested parties can contribute most effectively to supporting the narrower process by clearly identifying where those agendas overlap while remaining attentive to where they do not. In defining those parameters with precision, these parties can better delineate their own roles from that of merely cheer-leading the principal governments. The important point is that, where those roles prioritize the desire to

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<sup>11</sup> “Defining a Forward-Looking Partnership Between Korea and Canada,” Conference Report of the 6th Meeting of the Canada-Korea Forum, Millennium Seoul Hilton Hotel, Seoul, South Korea, 7-9 September, 2008 <<http://www.asiapacific.ca/en/conference/the-6th-meeting-canada-korea-forum>>

<sup>12</sup> “Defining a Forward-Looking Partnership Between Korea and Canada.”

address directly North Korea's human conditions crisis, such efforts will largely reinforce rather than impede solutions to the nuclear confrontation.

This perspective should also inform outside parties' disposition toward the evolving state of the Six-Party process, especially with respect to the relationship between that process and the broader objectives of building North Korean civil viability and regional cooperative security mechanisms. Pursuit of these broader objectives by countries outside the Six-Party Talks should not be tied too closely to the vagaries of progress in the Six-Party Talks themselves. Other governments, and especially non-governmental actors, often take significant progress in this process as a light at the end of the tunnel and source of motivation, while reacting to setbacks in that process with their own retrenchment. Too frequently, these tendencies are overreactions.

Taking a broader view, it is easy to see that the vacillating pattern of progress and regress in the negotiation process is part of the process itself. Opportunities and obstacles in the pursuit of broader developmental and regional objectives are at least partly independent of whatever the current disposition of the core negotiations happens to be. Indeed, because progress on these broader objectives may now be a necessary catalyst rather than merely a hoped for consequence of Korean peninsula denuclearization, setbacks within the core negotiating process may now actually present stronger opportunities—and stronger needs—for pursuing objectives at the broader levels. Having delineated the differences in the agendas, it also becomes possible to realize and measure success independent of the outcomes of the inter-governmental processes.

## Conclusion

For too long debate over how to deal with North Korea has been little more than an argument over “carrots” versus “sticks.” A few analysts have long called for a “bold initiative” for dealing with North Korea that would combine engagement and confrontation, a direction captured by the emphasis in the preceding analysis on the need for sustained *interaction*. The preceding analytical frameworks for coping with uncertainty over DPRK motivations offer further basis for transcending that initial dichotomy.

But with North Korea still as close as it has ever been to possessing a full-fledged (if fledgling) nuclear arsenal, anticipating broader regional security cooperation as an outgrowth of the Six-Party Talks process is no longer sufficient. Peaceful and permanent de-nuclearization of the DPRK requires a “bold initiative” reaching beyond Korea itself, setting as a forefront goal creation of a sturdy East Asian security community. This effort also requires appreciating the integral role that alleviating North Korea's human conditions crisis must also play.

Satellite images of Northeast Asia at night show swaths of lights separated by the darkness of the seas. One readily recognizes the contours of Japan to the east. To the west, a mass of lights reveals the populated eastern coast of China. In between is another island of lights. But this is not an island – it is South Korea. Then one notices what's missing: North Korea is dark. The image graphically depicts North Korea's energy crisis. But the image even more powerfully conveys how North Korea, quite literally, is missing from the world.

Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions are a dire international security threat. But the desperate conditions of North Korea's political culture, economy and society constitute as grave a human crisis as we face anywhere in the world. In the globalizing world of the early twenty-first century, these are challenges for all of us.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld once embraced the principle, articulated earlier by US President Dwight D. Eisenhower, that “if a problem cannot be solved, enlarge it.” James Goodby has applied this adage to the Korean confrontation:

The nuclear issue can only be resolved within a framework that is as large as the strategic issue of which it is a part. ... In parallel with [the six-party] talks, or independently if the talks are not resumed, [the parties] should work out a mandate for a permanent mechanism to promote security and cooperation in Northeast Asia. ... The mandate for a security community should be as broad as that of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.<sup>13</sup>

A minimalist beginning in this direction, oriented around a realistic problem-solving approach, is feasible, and the initial parameters of such security cooperation are straightforward. Regarding Korea conundrums, the United States and China could find common ground on both the impracticality of “regime change” and the importance of an active role for the UN Security Council, forging the Sino-American concord needed for a lasting solution. But reaching that convergence would require the United States and China to build a more collaborative strategic relationship regarding Northeast Asia more broadly and to involve the region’s other principal parties – constituting a “small m” multilateralism along the lines of the early nineteenth century European “Concert of Powers.”<sup>14</sup>

Unlike with the hard details of the nuclear confrontation, other governments and non-governmental civil society initiatives can contribute vitally by nurturing the innovative ideas and supportive climate necessary to such broader political progress. Economic and social engagements can produce tangible results and also promote broader momentum. There are also areas more directly related to security where these other actors can make a difference. Ongoing advocacy of Northeast Asian nuclear weapons free zone proposals, for example, can (and should) help contribute to the broader goal of political engagement as well as to refining and implementing the concept itself.

There is a clear linkage between North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and the nature of Pyongyang’s regime. But this linkage is not unique to North Korea – it merely evokes the pernicious bond between reliance on nuclear threat-making and inadequate governance conditions that finds expression in Northeast Asia generally – and at the global level as well. A peaceful and permanent nonproliferation solution in Korea cannot be isolated from the necessity of restoring sufficient and sustainable economic, social and political governance conditions within the country. But a level of regional security stability is a precondition of all these non-nuclear objectives. And neither a peaceful non-nuclear solution on the Korean peninsula nor the full embrace of North Korea within the global community of nations are achievable through confrontation. Peace and human security within states is rarely achieved through means that widen the divides between states. These goals require simultaneously engaging the Pyongyang regime while also grappling with the complex tensions involved in Northeast Asia’s own encounter with today’s globalization and the systemic dynamics of nuclear proliferation of the post-Cold War world.

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<sup>13</sup> James Goodby, “Enlarge the North Korean problem,” *International Herald Tribune*, Tuesday, June 21, 2005. C.f. Huntley, “Ostrich Engagement.”

<sup>14</sup> Paul Evans, “Constructing Multilateralism in an Anti-Region: From Six Party Talks to a Regional Security Framework in Northeast Asia?,” conference on Cross Currents: Regionalism and Nationalism in Northeast Asia, Shorenstein Asia Pacific Research Centre, Stanford University, May 11-12, 2006; revised July 8, 2006; see also David Capie and Paul Evans, *The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), pp. 77-81.



# Assisting North Korea to Denuclearize and Reform: the Role of WCPs

Prepared for  
the International Conference  
on the Future of North Korea and Global Cooperation

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Bong-Geun Jun, Ph.D.  
jun2030@gmail.com  
IFANS, Seoul

\*The views expressed are solely those of the speaker and do not reflect the views of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade(MOFAT).

## Contents

Purpose

KEDO Case: Global Cooperation and Engagement with North Korea

Who WCPs\* Are and Why They Care

North Korea's Perception of WCPs

WCP's Bilateral Relations with North Korea

How to Assist North Korea

## KEDO Case: Global Cooperation and Engagement with North Korea

### Background

- 1993            1<sup>st</sup> NK Nuclear Crisis: withdrawal from the NPT
- 1994.10        US-DPRK Agreed Framework: LWR, HFO Projects
- 2002.10        2<sup>nd</sup> NK Nuclear Crisis: AF and Projects terminated

### Organization

- Executive Board Members(4): ROK, Japan, US, EU
- Members(8): New Zealand, Australia, Indonesia, Chile, Argentina, Poland, Czech Republic, Uzbekistan

### Financing: Executive Board Members

- ROK            1,454,649,042(USD)
- U.S.            405,106,000(USD)
- Japan          498,485,755(USD)
- EU/EAEC      122,377,723(USD)

## KEDO Case: Global Cooperation and Engagement with North Korea

### Other Contributors(1995-2005, USD)

WCPs		Others	
Australia	14,444,400	Argentina	200,000
Canada	4,683,664	Brunei	423,690
Finland	645,593	Chile	20,000
France	503,778	Czech Republic	127,816
Germany	1,011,485	Greece	25,000
Italy	1,821,429	Hungary	10,000
Netherlands	790,192	Indonesia	974,907
New Zealand	2,539,460	Malaysia	300,000
Norway	749,844	Mexico	99,985
U.K.	1,000,000	Oman	100,000
		Peru	100,000
		Philippines	150,000
		Poland	10,000
		Qatar	100,000
		Singapore	1,600,000
		Switzerland	118,148
		Thailand	356,510

## **KEDO Case: Global Cooperation and Engagement with North Korea**

### **Lessons from the KEDO Projects: Key Success Factors**

- North Korea's political will to implement denuclearization promises
- North Korea's respect for and implementation of protocols and contracts
- North Korea's capacity and preparedness to fulfill its obligations and to receive foreign provisions
- Continued political and financial support from contributors:  
Broader and moderate political support base to smoothen crisis

## **Who WCPs are and Why They Care**

Who WCPs Are

Why WCPs Care

Who North Korea Is: WCPs Perception of North Korea

North Korea's Perception of WCPs

What WCPs Can Do

## Who WCPs Are and Why They Care

### Who WCPs Are

	Relations with North Korea	Economic Assistance Level	NK's Perception/Attitude
<b>South Korea</b>	Good-Bad	High-Low	Brotherhood/Hostile
<b>U.S.</b>	Bad-indifferent	Medium-low	Necessary/Hostile
<b>Japan</b>	Bad	Very Low	Hostile
<b>China</b>	Good	High-Medium	Partnership/Suspicious
<b>WCPs</b>	Good/Moderate	Medium	Unharmful/Suspicious
<b>Others</b>	Good-Bad	Low	Moderate

## Who WCPs Are and Why They Care

### Why WCPs Care

- International political and moral obligations:
  - To help North Korean people who are suffering from human rights abuse and shortage of basic humanitarian necessities
  - To defuse crises and make the world safe from North Korean WMDs and other military threats
- The North Korean case imposes most unique and extraordinary diplomatic and political challenges.
- North Korea is one of the world's greatest trouble spots, of the greatest nonproliferation threats, and of the remotest, most isolated, and enigmatic countries.



## Who WCPs Are and Why They Care

### Who North Korea Is : WCPs Perception of North Korea

- A failed state with one-man, totalitarian regime and supreme-leader-ism, military-first ideology
- A isolationist, self-reliant *Juche* - economy, suffering from chronic economic, energy and food crises
- A country with nuclear weapons and missile capability, posing serious regional and global proliferation threats, and thus threatening regional and global peace
- Therefore, it is necessary to denuclearize, open, democratize and reform North Korea, not by confrontation and containment, but by dialogue and engagement

## North Korea's Perception of WCPs

- Without harmful "subversive" intentions and capabilities
- A channel to the Western and English-speaking world and to foods assistance, modern economy and technology
- Possible donors and economic partners
- A buffer against the U.S. hostile policy against North Korea
- Demanding human rights and political reforms issues, but less imposing and intimidating

## WCP's Bilateral Relations with NK

Australia

Canada

Italy

United Kingdom

## WCP's Bilateral Relations with NK

### Australian Relations with NK

- Established diplomatic relations in 1974 and soon after opened Embassies in both Pyongyang and Canberra, but closed them in late 1975
- Joined KEDO in 1995 and resumed its diplomatic relations with NK in May 2000 after 25 years of suspension; NK re-opened an Embassy in Canberra in 2002, but closed it for financial reasons in 2008
- Imposed both the UNSC 1695 and 1719 and unilateral sanctions against NK after the 2006 missile and nuclear tests
- Provided about A72 mil. humanitarian assistance since 1995 through the IOs, but suspended bilateral development assistance since the 2006 nuclear test
  - biggest contributor to KEDO projects except 4 EB members

## WCP's Bilateral Relations with NK

### Canadian Relations with NK

- “The DPRK has long been a destabilizing element in the Asia Pacific region. Nonetheless, Canada considers that, over the long term, engagement offers the best prospects for integrating North Korea into the international community of nations.”
- Established diplomatic relations with NK in February 2001, accrediting its Ambassador in Seoul to NK. Adjusts its level of engagement with the North subject to the progress of the nuclear issue
- Provided food and other humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations since 1997, mostly through WFP. Plans to expand development assistance as the nuclear talks progress
- After the September 19 Six-party Joint Statement, allowed small-scale capacity-building and training initiatives, but put on hold again since the 2006 nuclear explosion

## WCP's Bilateral Relations with NK

### Italian Relations with NK

- Established diplomatic relations with NK in January 2000 after the successful September 1999 US-NK missile test moratorium talks
- Became the first G-7 country to normalize relations with NK, leading a flurry of countries to follow its path soon after

## WCP's Bilateral Relations with NK

### U.K. Relations with NK

- Established diplomatic relations with NK in December 2000 after the June 2000 inter-Korean Summit
- Opened its Embassy in Pyongyang in July 2001; NK opened an Embassy in London in November 2002. Since then, both sides exchanged high-level delegations frequently
- Provided English language and human rights training for North Korean officials in the UK and funded three British Council ELT teachers at universities in Pyongyang. Maintains bilaterally funded humanitarian projects in DPRK

## How to Assist North Korea

### What WCPs Can Do

Areas	Assistance/Pressure
<b>Political</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To continue political and human rights dialogue</li> <li>• To support inter-Korean dialogue</li> <li>• To provide inducements for expanded contacts</li> <li>• To coordinate closely with ROK and the U.S.</li> </ul>
<b>Nonproliferation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To support Six-party Talks politically and financially</li> <li>• To impose UNSC Res. 1540, 1695, 1718 against NK</li> <li>- To apply export/technology control and to contain NK's illegal trade and financial transactions</li> <li>• To help NK prepare and submit the 1540 National Implementation Report( 137 have submitted so far)</li> </ul>
<b>Social-Economic-Humanitarian</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To expand humanitarian assistance to vulnerable sectors</li> <li>• To provide agricultural, public health, education modernization programs</li> <li>• To expand invitation and personnel exchange programs</li> </ul>

(A Non-proliferation Assistance Example)  
UNSCR 1540 Committee 'REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE' TEMPLATE

**Purpose of the Template**

This template is intended to serve as a useful tool for States seeking assistance to implement their obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (April 2004).

**How to request assistance**

Requests for assistance may be submitted to the 1540 Committee by using this template or by sending a written request through your country's UN Mission to forward to the Committee.

**Categories of assistance that Governments may consider**

Drafting of national reports, legislation or regulations.  
Implementation of regulations, administrative, or technical measures  
Training, e.g., for administrators, regulatory and enforcement officials  
Equipment, e.g., detection equipment, licensing software.

**Funding source**

Please indicate if you have a preferred funding source

## How to Assist North Korea

- To utilize WCP's unique and favorable position in its relations with North Korea
  - To continue political and human rights dialogue, but don't expect a quick result
  - To start nonproliferation dialogue, provide assistance to build nuclear control/safety, export control systems and prepare the 1540 national report
  - To expand contacts with NK and become NK's windows and gate to the modern world as well as the world's gate to NK
- To lead global efforts to change North Korea's foreign behavior and modernize its systems
  - The NK nuclear issue may not resolved unless NK changes first.
  - To expand from nuclear/nonproliferation centered policy to broader NK policy
- To expand humanitarian assistance, including foods and know-how
- To play a role of balance wheel against fast-changing and extreme up-and-downs of political environment surrounding the Korean peninsula



SESSION 2

## 북한의 경제개발과 국제적 지원

Global Assistance in North Korea's Economic Development  
L'assistance mondiale dans le cadre du développement  
économique en Corée du Nord









*AA paradigm shift on economic assistance  
in North Korea.*

*What could EU do to end an endless game?*

**Dr. Rosella Idéo**

(Professor, University of Trieste)

What European Union can do is based on one obvious consideration and on a subsequent obvious question:

- 1) The US is the main player in North Korea's game. A game which has been going on for many years, repeating itself endlessly. Without a comprehensive engagement plan by the US, the North Korea conundrum cannot be resolved. That is the essential prerequisite to make things work. The situation requires a bold change of perspective and a clear strategy beyond the 6PT, and not to be trapped in the same contradictions.

Such is the intersection of different national interests on the process.

This hypothesis includes the full integration of NK into the international community. To be more specific, it requires a new comprehensive engagement plan establishing long term peace and security in North East Asia. Openly and unambiguously. The pivot of this global North Korean strategy should be the formal end of the Korean war, viewed in this case not as a string attached to the denuclearisation issue but as a priority target. Security needs, economic integration of the DPRK in the international order and sustainable development policies in North Korea should be put in motion immediately and simultaneously. The 20 years of isolation and solitude of North Korea sound anachronistic after the end of the cold war.

- 2) The question is the following: Would the US expand instead of narrowing the number of players? And in such a scenario would US be willing to include European Union participation?
- At the moment, judging from many signs, including the recent visit to Asia by Secretary of State Clinton, the US seems to rely mainly on China, which had performed and will undoubtedly perform an unquestionably crucial role in the North Korean issue. Or will the administration turn to their Anglo-Saxon allies in the Pacific?
  - Moscow is also pressing Washington to have a say or as it call it a ‘coordinated policy’ with the Americans because of economic and strategic interests in East Asia. I’ve recently read a presentation of Russian views by ambassador Georgy Toloraya who was focusing just on that direction.
  - In the last year there has been a straining in Inter-Korean relations, since the election of president Lee Myung-bak, which causes worries among many observers. Will this be a stumbling block toward an eventual international agreement on the NK issue? And will Japan as well? A Japan that is not eager to pay any bills (in terms of aid supply to DPRK) until the issue of the abductees is satisfactorily (for them and their public opinion) resolved.
  - Given the present tense situation in and around the Korean peninsula, I am convinced that Europe, for more than one reason, can help support a paradigm shift in this complex intersection of national interests, represented mainly in the sextet.
  - A) A general remark is the following: Europe has been able to “invent” and practice among its member states peace, democracy, human rights, a sustainable development that was able to spread out welfare, in a measure unknown in the past, within its boundaries. This may be a rhetorical remark coming from a European but it is history.
  - B) Moreover, Europe is the world’s largest donor of international aid and cooperation, as well as the most engaged in alleviating suffering in poor countries.

- C) Europe, the continent that once created imperialism and colonialism, has acquired a deep consciousness of the need to understand cultural differences and now pays a lot of attention in developing its policies using the knowledge of historical and political realities of others countries. This is true in the Korean peninsula context too.
- D) Another remark is that the US and North Korea share just one thing: a deep mistrust that has been lasting for the past 60 years.

Europe with its success story of economic integration and confidence-building practices could help bridge the differences and help US and North Korea to forge a new relationship cleared of suspicion and prejudices. East Germany's Ostpolitik and the idea of «Change through Rapprochement» represents a successful strategy and a motor of change. It was the bottom up reforms that produced changes, not coercive diplomacy with the subtext of a “regime change”. The pact that recognized clear and permanent boundaries in Europe was an indispensable framework for the fall of the Berlin Wall and the construction of Security in the European Union. The former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, the most ‘realist’ US politician and official in decades, had stressed this point since the beginning of the crisis.

- E) Many signs are pointing to the possibility that North Korea would welcome the “old Europe” approach and mediation intervention. It should not be overlooked that Pyongyang views with suspicion and some resentment China's involvement with North Korea both politically and economically. North Korea's reliance on China trade and investments deepens even further.
- F) Moreover, the US cannot deliver the economic assistance needed to build that confidence with North Korea. Here again Europe can help.
- G) Last but not least, European intervention was the most helpful western intervention on NK's behalf until the administration of George W. Bush derailed the process of détente envisioned by former president Kim Dae Jung to make Pyongyang a member of the international community.

Briefly. In the '90's until the beginning of president Bush's first term, Europe had followed a line of "critical engagement" with Pyongyang. It supported the framework agreement (1994), the related KEDO project and the sunshine policy of president Kim Dae-jung. After the summit of June 2000 Italy took the lead in establishing full diplomatic relations with Pyongyang. EU recognition followed in May with other European states establishing relations, except for France (that so far is the only one of the 27 European countries that has no relations at all with Pyongyang). The Nobel Prize to Kim Dae-jung sealed the international community's support for the policy of détente and reconciliation between the two Koreas.

- The grand total of the EU's economic cooperation (KEDO project included) of 346 million \$ was spent mainly in this phase of dialogue and détente.
- In March 2002 the European Commission adopted a document called Country Strategic Paper that can still be used as a possible guideline of action.

The Country Strategic Paper action plan (initiated with a provisional 15 million euros for 3 years) was envisioned by the European Commission on the wave of the optimism that followed the first ever inter-Korean summit between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il<sup>1)</sup>

- The plan set out the strategic framework and objectives for technical assistance in North Korea.

It was a multi-dimensional integrated process covering broad based sustainable growth, capacity and institution building, private sector development, social services, environmental concerns, good governance and human rights. In short was a comprehensive approach to address all the shortcomings of NK.

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1) [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/korea\\_north/docs/01\\_04\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/korea_north/docs/01_04_en.pdf)

- The crux of the plan was to enable Pyongyang to help itself and was based on the assessment that NK would need a structural reform plan based on a new industrialisation effort. In truth, food security for the NK population can be only assured by rebuilding robust industrial and service sectors. NK agriculture cannot provide the solution of a self sufficient country given the well known geographical constraints.
- The Country Strategy Paper 2001-2004 therefore had three focal points of action :
  - 1) Institutional support for capacity building, with training programs to enable key institutions to adopt international economic practices and build relations with the outside world.
  - 2) management and use of natural resources, including access to sustainable energy services. Lack of energy has always been the real Achilles' heel of North Korea
  - 3) creation of a reliable transport sector, a key sector to be modernized.
- In the meantime Europe through ECHO (European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office) provided humanitarian assistance to NK<sup>2)</sup>

BUT this broad plan of action was never implemented because the “Axis of Evil” equation lead to the nuclear crisis in October of the same year. It was the first casualty of the Axis of Evil paradigm.

- But it could be taken as a useful guideline either by the US or by the South Korean administration to address in a rational way the problems of cooperation with North Korea in the future.
- After the 2002 crisis erupted, Europe retreated and has since then been ‘staying on the bench’. But it continued through ECHO and other international organisation to help the helpless North Korean people.

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2) <http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/evaluation/2008/dprk.pdf>

- Italy has followed the diplomatic line of action of Europe:  
Its line of action was: No development assistance but only humanitarian emergency aid. The assistance to DPRK will be increased only in response to progress by DPRK in addressing concerns such as human rights, non-proliferation, security issues, economic structural reforms, progress in inter-Korean reconciliation.
- Since 1998 when president Kim Dae-jung promoted his sunshine policy Italy has supplied emergency humanitarian aid to Pyongyang.
- With about 3 millions euros each year, Italy is among the principal European donors in North Korea.  
It was the first of the G7 countries to establish diplomatic relations with the DPRK - an icebreaker to move things forward. Italy has tried since to promote and strengthen the European role in supporting the 6PT and the inter-Korean dialogue with the purpose of avoiding a dangerous derailment. At the same time it has put pressure on Pyongyang to accept and respect the international norms of behaviour and the agreements signed.
- With its long experience in Cooperation in the health and sanitation fields Italy opened in 1998 a Cooperation Office in Pyongyang where the expert-resident is aitalian medical doctor.
- Now Italy has adopted a bi-multilateral model for its cooperation with contributions to International Organisations (as FAO, WFP, World Health Organisation, UNICEF) that are carrying out distribution of aid to NK while the Cooperation Office in Pyongyang is carrying out in-the-field monitoring.

The Italian cooperation also provides important opportunities for training of North Koreans in Italy.

There are specialized training courses for dozens of NK technicians and Managerial Personnel who manage small and medium size enterprises. A summer course in International Humanitarian Law was organized also last June. Scholarship programs for North Korean students attending Italian Universities and so

on. In Northern Italy, an annual workshop has been organised since 2002 at the Centro Volta Landau Network, in Como, to offer an open forum of dialogue to both North Koreans or to South Koreans high-level delegations. In 2008, the Como workshop, chaired by Italian Deputy Minister Stefania Craxi, saw the participation of the South Korean Chief negotiator to the Six Party Talks Ambassador Kim Sook and the Vice Minister of North Korea, Kung Sok Ung. The workshop aims “inter alia” to the setup of a possible European role to facilitate the chances of a breakthrough in the inter-Korean dialogue and in the denuclearization process.

- Italy has, since 2001, opened a door of dialogue with visits to Pyongyang by high ranking officials.

A significant improvement was made in 2007, after the Beijing February agreement, with the visit of the former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for Asia, Mr. Gianni Verneti a visit which determined a significant enlargement of the volume and area of cooperation with DPRK.

- At present the philosophy of European Union towards the Korean issue is still the one that was well resumed by Xavier Solana, the EU’ High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, after the February’s deal in Beijing. Through his spokesperson he maintained that if Europe will be asked to pay the bill of an eventual agreement with NK it will in turn be asked to be a player - as opposed to a *payer* - in any final accounting.

No doubt that it is an understandable response given the exemplary KEDO history of thrown out money, energies and positive achievements during the Bush administration first term.

The almost half million dollars Europe paid for KEDO and aid had left the political situation in the Korean peninsula even worse than it was at the end of the nineties.

As Glyn Ford, a member of European Parliament, put it: “Retrospectively, EU officials and politicians complain that the US has left Europe to pay the unpaid

bills while denying it more than a token involvement in the decision making processes”<sup>3)</sup>

That explains, in better terms, why the EU retreated, apparently “sitting on the bench” after the 2002 crisis erupted.

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3) Glyn Ford with Soyoung Kwon, *North Korea on the Brink*, London 2008, p.216.





# Building a Multilateral Mechanism for Global Assistance to North Korea

**Hyungsoo Zang**

**Dept. of Econ & Finance  
Hanyang University**



1

## Outline

- What the six-party talks would require on an economic front for a peace on the Korean peninsula
- Need to establish a multilateral mechanism and second-tier countries' active participation
- Do we have incentives to do?
- Roles of the second-tier countries in global assistance to North Korea



2

## Six-party talks in Beijing



3

## Phases I and II of the Six- party talks process

- Two Koreas, US, Japan, China, Russia
- The 9.19 Joint Declaration in 2005: N.K. will eventually abandon all its nuclear programs and weapons
- The 2.13 Agreement in 2006 (1<sup>st</sup> phase): shut-down of the 5MW nuclear reactor in Yeongbyeon
- The 10.3 Agreement (2<sup>nd</sup> phase): N.K. shall finish disablement of the 3 nuclear facilities
- In return, N.K. would be removed from the list of state-sponsored terrorism and get heavy fuels of 1 million tons equivalent



4

## **Some good scenarios assumed**

- The six-party talks somehow will draw workable roadmaps acceptable to all participating countries including NK in Phase III
- But, “commitment for commitment, action for action” basis
- The US and DPRK start negotiating to establish a normal diplomatic relation
- The international community agrees to help develop NK once 6PT resolves



5

## **CVID vs CVID**

- The U.S. wants CVID (Complete, Verifiable, Irreversible Dismantlement of NK’s nuclear weapons and programs)
- NK wants a different CVID (Complete, Verifiable, Irreversible Diplomatic relations with the U.S.)
- Both parties would not retreat unless they accomplish their own CVID
- NK’s normalization of diplomatic relation with the U.S. should imply many big changes



6

## Some interesting environments

- NK needs substantial money, but the South does not have enough public support for funding
- Interestingly, NK would not allow economic domination by a single country (e.g. China, SK)
- North Korea needs internal reforms and external opening to catch all the benefits of entering into the international community as a regular state
- If so, the int'l community would want to share the burden of as well as the benefits from participating in developing North Korea



7

## External financing options

- Private financing
  - commercial (syndicated) loans
  - \* project finance
  - FDI (Foreign Direct Investment)
  - portfolio investments (stocks, bonds)
- Official development assistance (ODA)
  - grants
  - concessional public loans



8

## **Official global assistance**

- Bilateral ODA
  - South Korea, US, EU, Japan
  - Japanese reparation payments
- Multilateral ODA
  - IMF, World Bank (IDA), ADB (ADF), UNDP
- Other official flows
  - loans from multilateral dev. Banks
  - World Bank (IBRD), ADB (Ordinary Capital resources) etc.



9

## **First ladder to the outside world**

- Direct investment by foreign private sectors will become a crucial source of funds for the rehabilitation of the North Korean economy
- For fostering foreign private investment, it is important to build international assurance that the host country will provide a stable and favorable environment for foreign investors
- Without assurance from IFIs, foreign private firms will not invest in North Korea
- NK's Admission to the IFIs is the very first step



10

## **Int'l Financial Institutions and North Korea**

- Removal of NK from the U.S. list of terrorist sponsoring states would pave a road to the admission into the IFIs (IMF, World Bank, ADB)
- Once NK joins the IFIs, it can receive financial assistance on concessional terms as well as technical assistance
- North Korea's admission to the IFIs is essential, but needs some developments in the process of Six-Party Talks as well as the improvement of the US-DPRK and Japan-DPRK relations.



11

## **Realities**

- IFIs' assistance would not exceed \$ 200~400 million maximum a year
- North Korea might not cooperate with IFIs after admission (Uzbekistan > Cambodia > Vietnam)
- "Interim period" might be quite long
- Global assistance to fragile states owing to regional security concerns might be called for
- Global assistance needs to be accompanied for North Korea's "CVID"
- Aid coordination issues



12

## **Multilateral coordination mechanism**

- Natural descendant of “successful” Six-party talks on an economic front
- Potential participants: major donors, IFIs, NGOs
- Financial as well as technical assistance to NK, either bilateral or multilateral, will be channeled and a multilateral policy dialogue with NK will be maintained
- Does not rule out bilateral assistance to or dialogue with North Korea



13

## **Benefits of a multilateral coordination mechanism**

- Multilateral assistance is less susceptible to political concerns for both donor and recipient countries than that through bilateral one
- Better suited to preventing aid duplication and to assuring transparency
- The mechanism could easily be transformed into a formal CG (Consultative Group) led by the World Bank if conditions met



14

## Consultative Group (CG)

- World Bank mobilizes bilateral and multilateral ODA for a member country
- Round Table vs. CG
- So-called IECOK (International Economic Cooperation Organization for ROK): CG for Korea operated during 1966-84
- The multilateral mechanism needs to take a form of semi-IFI by loading its own financing facility



## “Trust Fund for DPRK”?

- “Trust Fund for West Bank and Gaza”
- Also cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina, East Timor, Kosovo and others
- Financial assistance even before World Bank membership would be a possibility
- International political concerns
- post-conflict countries





## **KEDO experience**

- Korea Energy Development Organization
- Building two light-water nuclear reactors in N.K.
- North Korea wants to avoid direct contact with South Korea
- Board of directors: South Korea, Japan, U.S., EU
- Other member countries: Australia, Canada, Finland, Chile, Argentina, New Zealand, Poland, Uzbekistan, Indonesia
- Great Britain, Netherlands, Singapore, Thailand and other donors contributed
- Major donors: South Korea (70%), Japan (20%)

17

## **“Development Assistance Group for DPRK”?**

- Incentive structure (or disincentive) structure?
- North Korea
- South Korea
- China
- Japan
- Russia
- U.S.
- Non-direct parties of Six-party talks: Australia and New Zealand would replace Japan's share of 200,000 tons of heavy fuels

18

## **Potential roles of non-direct parties**

- Contribute financially to the multilateral mechanism for global assistance for North Korea
- Could “preside” the mechanism
- Non-direct parties would lead “development” aid, while the Six-parties handles “political” aid
- North Korea would prefer economic cooperation with non-direct parties
- Potential economic benefits for non-direct parties would be greater than 6 parties as North Korea wants to diversify



19



**Peter Hayes**  
***Nautilus Institute***

[peter@nautilus.org](mailto:peter@nautilus.org)

[www.nautilus.org](http://www.nautilus.org)

**Briefing To Conference on**  
***“The Future of North Korea and Global Cooperation”***

“The Six-Party Talks, Energy Assistance, and Korea’s Energy Security”

March 13 , 2009

Lotte Hotel, Seoul



## Contents

1. DPRK Energy Insecurity
2. DPRK Negotiating Preferences
3. Energy Assistance Options
4. Negotiable Energy Assistance for Phase 3  
Energy efficiency—especially buildings  
Networked energy supply or energy using networks  
LWRs or ~



2

# Part 1: DPRK Energy Insecurity

Short and sour



## DPRK ENERGY BALANCE UPDATE: OVERALL APPROACH

- **Energy Balance Elements--Rows**
  - Domestic resources extraction, imports, exports
  - Energy “transformation processes”– refining, electricity production, losses...
  - Energy demand sectors – industrial, residential, transport...
- **Energy Balance Elements– Columns**
  - Fuel/resource categories – in DPRK Energy Analysis work, general and by refined product
- **For each fuel/resource considered, demand and supply must balance**
  - Iterative analysis to balance columns



4

## DPRK ENERGY ANALYSIS: 2005 BALANCE

UNITS: PETAJOULES (PJ)	COAL & COKE	CRUDE OIL	REF. PROD.	HYDRO/ NUCL.	WOOD/ BIOMASS	CHAR-COAL	ELEC.	TOTAL
<b>ENERGY SUPPLY</b>	405	24	17	33	162	-	(0)	642
Domestic Production	480	1	-	33	150	-	-	665
Imports	5	22	17	-	12	-	0	57
Exports	80	-	0	-	0	-	0	80
Stock Changes	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>ENERGY TRANSF.</b>	(117)	(24)	17	(33)	(4)	1	37	(121)
Electricity Generation	(88)	-	(5)	(33)	-	-	60	(66)
Petroleum Refining	-	(24)	24	-	-	-	-	(0)
Coal Prod./Prep.	(23)	-	-	-	-	-	(3)	(26)
Charcoal Production	-	-	-	-	(4)	1	-	(3)
Own Use	-	-	(1)	-	-	-	(4)	(5)
Losses	(6)	-	-	-	-	-	(16)	(21)
<b>FUELS FOR FINAL CONS.</b>	289	-	35	0	158	1	37	520
<b>ENERGY DEMAND</b>	289	-	35	-	158	1	37	520
INDUSTRIAL	150	-	8	-	0	-	14	172
TRANSPORT	-	-	9	-	1	-	4	14
RESIDENTIAL	94	-	3	-	118	1	4	220
AGRICULTURAL	8	-	1	-	25	-	1	35
FISHERIES	0	-	1	-	-	-	0	2
MILITARY	22	-	12	-	4	-	9	46
PUBLIC/COMML	14	-	0	-	4	-	5	23
NON-SPECIFIED	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
NON-ENERGY	2	-	1	-	6	-	-	9
<b>Elect. Gen. (Gr. TWhe)</b>	5.23	-	0.17	11.15	-	-	-	16.55


\*Note: Gross terawatt-hours for coal-fired plants includes output for plants co-fired with coal and heavy fuel oil.

Notes: 1 PJ is  $10^{15}$  joules, ~ to energy in 24752 tonnes HFO; a 642 PJ/y economy is ~ of 15.5 million tonnes of HFO/yr  
 6-700000 tonnes HFO = ~ 4% DPRK annual energy use in 2005  
 ~22 million North Koreans currently use about 3 \* energy as 1/2 million Washington DC residents

## RECENT TRENDS AND KEY ISSUES IN ENERGY USE: DPRK

- Decline in the supply of crude oil in early 1990s (~stable since 2000, imports from China)
- Continuing degradation of electricity generation, T&D infrastructure
- Continuing degradation of industrial, district heating facilities
- International trade in magnesite, expanding trade with China in coal/ores, ROK investments
- Difficulties with transport of all goods, especially coal
- Difficulties in coal production related to lack of electricity, mine flooding
- Sporadic, highly localized economic revival, but mostly associated with foreign aid and/or in areas of the economy that are not energy intensive (markets, restaurants, small agriculture)
  - Somewhat improved electricity availability in recent years (but variable)
  - Modest additions to industrial capacity in recent years (but not across the board—some mining, little heavy industry)
- Cessation of KEDO Heavy Fuel Oil deliveries (new HFO under 6 PT)
- Construction of small power plants (often not connected to main grid)
- Significant fuelwood/biomass use in rural (and some urban) areas (ongoing deforestation)


## RECENT TRENDS AND KEY ISSUES IN ENERGY USE: DPRK



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7

## DPRK ENERGY ANALYSIS: 2007 UPDATE



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8

## DPRK ENERGY ANALYSIS: ONGOING CHANGES FOR 2007/2008 BASE YEAR

- **At least a slight reduction in availability/use of electricity for 2007, based on supply-side information**
- **Revised rural energy use based on information received (more biomass in more sectors)**
- **Update energy imports/exports, coal production situation using data from China Customs Statistics, other countries**
- **Revise DPRK resource estimates**
- **Model heat demand/supply in greater detail**
- **Investigate oil production, Sonbong refinery use rumors, change assumptions based on findings**

## DPRK INFRASTRUCTURE



## Critical DPRK Infrastructure Problems: COAL

### NOTES FROM DPRK COAL EXPERT

- *“Nobody has been able to get back down to the bottom of the mines from the days of flooding. 60% were likely flooded.*
- De-flooding a mine can take 1-2 yrs minimum subject to the proper availability of power. Once intermediary levels are dried out, work in the mines can start again (but pumping must continue).
- Importance of haulage network: Proper haulage system is critical to bring in the required materials, bring out the muck

#### -Safety Aspects:


1. Oxygen should be provided to all workers
2. The mines are gassy (methane)
3. Proper ventilation is required--main ventilation for the mine
4. Risk of fire
5. Carbon Monoxide
6. Dust Suppression
7. Don't have available timber to put in support structures below ground”

## Critical DPRK Infrastructure Problems: COAL

- **“Social impact: use of coal**
  - Coal is used by the rural sector for heating and cooking as a result of the cold climate, in collective buildings, and to meet farming requirements
  - Coal is transported and transformed into briquettes, incurring losses during the transportation phase and low efficient in use.
- **Briquetting can be improved (most is done by hand on-site, often by householders)**
- **Environmental Impact is crucial as well**
  - Use of coal should reduce pressures on deforestation
  - Briquetting should seek better burning efficiency and reducing pollution
  - *Energy share of heating and cooking in 1989 was 52% of which 77% was coal; now it is 77% of which coal is 32% and biomass is 68%*
  - This indicates that many of the rural citizens are in a survival mode.”




## DPRK ENERGY ANALYSIS: 2007 UPDATE



### Critical DPRK Infrastructure Problems: Electricity

- **Nominal capacity ~10 GWe, about 50/50 Hydro/Thermal (latter almost all coal)**
  - Actual operable capacity in recent years far lower
- **Hydro plants damaged during floods of 1995/6, but many have since been repaired**
  - Some new hydro, most small, local, limited hrs of operation
- **Thermal plants obsolete, degraded**
  - Lack of spare parts, impact of use of aggressive fuels (HFO, shredded tires) on air heaters, boiler tubes → low efficiency
  - Reports of some rehabilitation in recent years
- **2005 Estimates: 16.5 TWh total generation**
  - 2 GWe operable thermal, <4 GWe operable hydro, hydro generation 2/3 of total
- **Electricity supplies very uneven**
  - Some areas have reliable supplies, some virtually none
  - National grid isn't national—mostly collection of local grids

## Critical DPRK Infrastructure Problems: Electricity Continuing degradation of electricity generation, T&D infrastructure



## DPRK Infrastructure Problems: Feedbacks and Linkages

- **Electricity and coal infrastructure problems feed back and link to problems throughout the economy, for example:**
  - **No/sporadic electricity means that lights and pumps in coal mines don't stay on, reducing coal output**
  - **No/sporadic electricity means difficulties with coal (and other goods) transport, meaning less coal for power plants and industry**
  - **Lack of power and coal for industry limits production of spare parts for transport, generation and mining infrastructure**
  - **Lack of power makes outside investment in mining, manufacturing more difficult/less attractive**
  - **....and so on...**

## **Electric Power Update: Empirical Observations (by a contractor) of Operational and Technical Conditions of Electrical Substations in the DPRK**

- Lack of engineering and management skills on the part of DPRK counterparts
- Very old, ill-maintained, inoperable, and sometimes missing transmission and distribution infrastructure (on the order of  $\frac{3}{4}$  of transformers in some key substations missing or inoperable)
- Lack of information, lack of facilities for control of transmission and distribution equipment, poor frequency and voltage control, and a host of related problems
- A particularly cold winter day may trigger a cascade of system failures severe enough to seriously damage remaining equipment

## **Continuing degradation of DPRK Electrical Infrastructure**

- When degradation of electricity infrastructure becomes even more severe the military will effectively have to run own power stations and diesel generators are unlikely to be an adequate source of power
- As a result, ongoing degradation implies that power sector problems must be cutting deeply into the DPRK military-industrial complex economy (separate from the line-agency economy) and the military must be very concerned
- For 6PT/US Policy, reinforces the need to act on the local level, rather than trying to fix large systems that depend on other failing infrastructure. Suggests that 5 Parties/US should make a contingency plan to deal with more-rapid-than anticipated infrastructure collapse and its impacts

## Critical DPRK Infrastructure Problems: Biomass

### Forestry Sector: Data from Remote Sensing

- » About 10% deforestation 1995 - 2006;
- » FAO—10% loss since 2000
- » *Deforestation leading to flooding, landslides*
- » Growing stocks ~40-60 cu.m./ha
- » *Significant conversion, 1999 to 2004, of stocked forest to unstocked forest (plants, but no trees) and denuded forest*



## DPRK MICRO-HYDRO



## Part 3:

### 1. Energy Assistance Options In Phase 3 Long and Sweet?



### Energy Lessons from 1994-2004 for Options To Assist DPRK Energy Sector

- Select small, fast, cheap, incremental and many energy projects, delivered by NGOs and private companies on short timelines that related to dismantlement (< 6 months) and IAEA re-certification (1-3 years)
- Aim to do projects in provincial towns, most at-risk population, greatest contribution to increased political stability in DPRK (and thereby, avoided loss-of-control of fissile material and/or warheads due to DPRK collapse)
- Avoid simply transferring capital items; needs are training at enterprise-level; funds for rotating credit facilities to support consumers and proto-markets



22

## Options To Assist DPRK Energy Sector

### A Rough Initial \$100M/yr Assistance Program

1. Energy planning/capacity building: \$5 m/y
2. Rehab grid: \$25 m/y (about 3.7 PJ/yr cost eq.)
3. Rehab coal supply \$10 m/y (~ to 1.5 PJ/y)
4. Rehab generation: \$20 m/y (~ to 3.0 PJ/y)
5. Reduce end-use waste: \$20 m/y (~ 3.0 PJ/y)
6. Small-scale, rural and renewable energy: \$15m/y (~ to 2.2 PJ/y)
7. Begin transition to gas: \$5 m/y (~0.8 PJ/y)

*2 constraints: absorptive capacity of DPRK; and diminishing returns*

*Note that 1,000,000 te/y HFO ~ 40 PJ/y  
(Figures in parentheses refer to HFO cost equivalent of investments, at current 2/09 cost of ~\$270/te HFO)*



23

## Options To Assist DPRK Energy Sector

### **PRIORITY 1 Assistance for Internal Policy and Legal Reforms to Stimulate and Sustain Energy Sector Rebuilding in the DPRK**

- Reform of energy pricing practices, and the physical infrastructure to implement them
  - Careful energy planning to base aid on need and rational objectives
  - Training for energy sector actors
  - Strengthening regulatory agencies and educational/research institutions in the DPRK
  - Involving the private sector in investments and technology transfer
- **Who? APEC EWG; bilaterals; IBRD, ADB, UN, NGOs**



24

## Options To Assist DPRK Energy Sector PRIORITY 2: The Decaying Grid

- **WHAT WILL IT TAKE TO REHAB THE GRID?**
  - New conductors, substation equipment, switching equipment, modern control facilities, new towers or poles in many existing right-of-ways
  - Labor, rebar, channel iron, cement can be supplied locally, but grid-quality conductor, even nuts and bolts may be unavailable in the DPRK without significant retooling of manufacturing industries
  - Regional tie lines RFE/CH to ROK via DPRK (rent)
- Nautilus estimates: to rehabilitate ~6000 km of transmission lines, distribution system and 8000 MW of generation: \$5.5 – 7.5 B
- *Who? IBRD with Japanese reparations and ROK financing, possibly implemented by KEDO-like organization*



25

## Options To Assist DPRK Energy Sector

### PRIORITY 2: The Decaying Grid--more

- **DO NOT TRY TO REHABILITATE THE WHOLE GRID IN ONE MASSIVE PROJECT!**
- **INSTEAD, START REBUILDING THE T&D SYSTEM PIECEMEAL NOW**
  - Work with DPRK engineers to identify, prioritize list of T&D sector improvements and investments
  - Provide limited funding for pilot installations in a limited area—perhaps in the Tumen River area
  - Engage the World Bank as a leader in DPRK power sector refurbishment (with Japanese funding?)
  - Focus on projects that would help the DPRK earn foreign exchange in acceptable manner, such as grid repairs to allow key mines to operate



26

## Options To Assist DPRK Energy Sector

### **PRIORITY 3: Redevelopment Priority: Help to Rehabilitate Coal Supply and Coal Transport Systems**

- **Couple with boiler and steam line rehabilitation, especially small-medium sized boilers for winter heat**
- **Assist with evaluating and upgrading coal mines in the DPRK, including:**
  - Improvements in mining technologies, mine ventilation systems, mine safety
  - Evaluation of coal resources, mine status
  - Rehabilitation of the coal transport network: Rail infrastructure/parts, fuel supply for trains
- ***Who? Japanese Reparations, ADB/IBRD***

## Options To Assist DPRK Energy Sector

### **PRIORITY 4: DPRK Power Plant Rehab**

- **Total installed capacity <10,000 MW (10 GWe), approximately half hydroelectric, half thermal, mostly coal-fired**
- **About 10 large thermal plants, 20 large hydro plants account for over 60 percent of capacity**
- **Lack of spare parts, maintenance difficulties, fuel supply constraints, damage from natural disasters have reduced actual operable capacity to ~2 to 3 GWe at present, leaving 7-8 GWe to be refurbished**
- **THE DPRK DOES NOT NEED ADDITIONAL NEW COAL-FIRED POWER PLANTS (but old ones will require major rehab)**
- ***Who Refurbishes Generation? ROK, IPPs?***



## Options To Assist DPRK Energy Sector

### **PRIORITY 5: Reduce the Vast Waste of Supplied Energy (Energy Efficiency Impr.)**

- Domestically-produced electric and electronic devices often use 1940s, 50s, and 60s technologies
- Coal-fired boilers efficiency less than 50 percent
- Industrial plants even less efficient than Soviet counterparts on which they were based
- Steam distribution systems likely porous
- **THE FASTEST WAY TO INCREASE EFFECTIVE POWER, COAL SUPPLY IS BY REDUCING WASTE**
  - Energy efficiency improvements—lighting, motors, coal stoves/boilers, controls, building improvements...
  - Already acknowledged by DPRK
- ***Who? Technical assistance from US, China, ROK, Japan, RFE; Financing: IBRD/ADB, others?***

## Options To Assist DPRK Energy Sector

### **PRIORITY 6: Alternative Sources of Small-Scale Renewable Energy coupled with Energy-efficiency Measures**

- DPRK has a keen interest in renewable energy, and in energy-efficiency technologies
- **Focus on fast, small, cheap technologies**
  - Couple appropriate technology, humanitarian assistance; provide services in areas poorly served with energy now
- **Small hydro turbine-generator manufacturing, Wind power/water-pumping windmills**
- **Agricultural equipment efficiency measures (coupled with agricultural methods improvement) to help North Koreans to feed themselves**
- **Reforestation for fuel programs**
- ***Who? EU aid program; NGOs***

## Options To Assist DPRK Energy Sector

### PRIORITY 7: Begin Transition to Gas Use in the DPRK with LPG Networks

- **LPG = Liquid Petroleum Gas (propane/butane)**
  - More expensive than natural gas (NG), but much easier, cheaper infrastructure to import in smaller quantities
  - Clean burning, limited military diversion potential
- **Setting up LPG networks can be a first step toward use of natural gas in the DPRK**
  - Start of experience with operating gas distribution systems, developing gas use infrastructure
- **Natural gas pipelines and LNG terminals (initially, shared with ROK?) as a step toward economic development coupled with regional integration**
- ***Who? Transitional energy aid, ROK, NG consortia***

## THE ROLE OF THE DPRK IN NE ASIAN ENERGY COOPERATION

- NE Asia growth in energy use is a major global issue
- Challenges
  - Solving DPRK nuclear issue may not be strictly necessary to carry out regional energy cooperation, but would certainly be helpful, and would probably accelerate activities
  - Even once nuclear issue is (largely) in-hand, a significant effort will be needed to upgrade DPRK infrastructure, build capacity, reform legal/administrative systems to allow DPRK to participate fully
  - “Geopolitics”
- Opportunities
  - Would allow RFE pipelines, transmission lines direct route to ROK
  - Additional market for all types of technologies (and services) as DPRK is re-developed
  - Opportunity to install efficient systems, renewable energy essentially from the ground up (“laboratory” for EE/RE measures)
  - Opportunity to utilize DPRK labor, build sustainable economy
  - Potential opportunity to apply Clean Development Mechanisms

# Part 3: DPRK Preferences and Negotiating Phase 3 Energy Assistance

Longer and sour



## ANTICIPATING DPRK ENERGY NEGOTIATIONS

1. **Domestic:** has to reflect well on KJI leadership, not cross anti-US, pro-military first lines
2. **External logic:** choose items that:
  - Stand up to China, reduce dependence on China
  - Hold US at arms length but build a cooperative relationship
  - Use ROK against US, China and Japan
  - Engage Russia for marginal leverage, buffer against RO
  - Keep pressure on Japan via everyone
3. **Diplomats in lead at talks:** Interest: how achieves agreement, uses AF precedent
4. **Economic planners play minor support role at talks,** interest:
  - Financing and IFIs; Japan reparations; short-term access to ROK support
  - Capacity-building of a technocratic elite
  - Build relationship with US—training and study in US
  - Free trade zones, big cities, big industry, FX earning (Mines), supporting the military-industrial complex
5. **Energy planners and line agencies;** likely not at the talks, but might be consulted: interest:  
Coal, generation, grid, refineries, refined product import-distribution

In short, humanitarian and social-economic needs will have no DPRK voice at the talks.



34

## DPRK Likely Preferences

1. Symbolic project: LWR + Regional Grid
2. HFO
3. Rehab Coal, Coal is King
4. Mining Energy Infrastructure for FX
5. “Modern Energy” (coastal LPG, renewables)
6. Training

## DPRK Likely Preferences

1. **Symbolic project: LWR + Regional Grid:**
  - LWR is key to KJI
  - Long-term, grid rehab and RF-Korea tieline or at least ROK heavy involvement key to LWR as the SK offer is not technically attractive
  - LWR + tieline is the only way to make the LWR work anyway

## DPRK Likely Preferences

### 2. HFO (phase 2, perhaps phase 3)

- Refined product or refinery upgrade has no symbolic value for DPRK, nor utility for diplomats in striking agreement; Chinese wouldn't want DPRK to become more independent; military aren't at the table
- Which leaves only HFO: diplomats may use it to benchmark equivalent deals and to cite it as precedent or to sell it at home.
- In reality, not very useful, some coal displacement for coal mining ministry, some use in heavy industry, but hard for them to use it; could reduce HFO imports from China that they have to pay for...
- For economic ministries, HFO is a dead end because no tech transfer, no linkages, no development.
- So NK will be amenable to "equivalent HFO" services

## DPRK Likely Preferences

### 3. Rehab Coal, Coal is King

- Capacity building, basic equipment, transport, cleaning, safety, end-use equipment
- Planning ministry will have interest in waste reduction, e.g. light bulbs (reportedly already in progress), energy efficiency center of some kind, district heating pipes, end users

## DPRK Likely Preferences

### 4. Mining Energy Infrastructure for FX

- Mine-level rehab and related energy infrastructure
- DPRK interest: economic agencies;
- Yangdok mine opportunity to combine with humanitarian county-level project
- Power needs for 8 mines specified at <http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/economy/DPRKonDPRKMines.pdf>

## DPRK Likely Preferences

### 5. “Modern Energy” is Attractive but a Trap

- Will always seek capital equipment, latest high tech, seek to reverse engineer, will fail
- DPRK interest: old-style line agencies, to be avoided along with bigger hi-tech projects such as gas-fired power plants (linked to long-term huge projects such as trans-Peninsula pipedreams)
- Possible useful, negotiable projects

**Small coastal urban LPG terminal** for bottling, distribution to households, small industry

**Reunification renewables**, for example, KJI mandate exists for 0.5 GWe of windpower

## DPRK Likely Preferences

### 6. Training

Interest: Economic ministries primarily

- Enterprise-level, hands-on overseas and local short term training is best
- Europe, China, Indonesia, Vietnam, India, SQ is best
- Short-term study tours (NREL, NRECA) in US and allies such as Australia, CA, etc are best
- Technical assistance as preparation to join IBRD, ADB is attractive
- Participation in APEC EWG is attractive
- Enter into sectoral and real planning work (e.g. forestry, agricultural etc)

### Part 4: Negotiable Energy Assistance for Phase 3

Energy efficiency—especially  
buildings

Networked energy supply or energy  
using networks

LWRs or ~

Sweet and Sour

## Networked Options

- Regional power grid (RFE-DPRK-ROK)
- LPG pipeline
- LNG imports and distribution system
- Connected networks (roads, rail, telecom)

### Networked Grid: <ROK-DPRK-RF interconnection Scenario>


◆ (scenario-1)

“ROK-DPRK-RF” 3-Terminal HVDC interconnection

- Converter stations will be located in Vladivostok, some point near Seoul and Pyoung Yang

HVDC system configuration

- VSC-HVDC, DC  $\pm 500$ kV
- T/L : 1,260km (1, DC  $\pm 500$ kV 50km, 1,010km)






## <Conclusions for feasible power exchange>

- Proposal for “ROK-DPRK-RF” interconnection
  - Overview of interconnection
    - 3 Terminal PTP-HVDC system is suitable for interconnection
    - Converter stations are located at Vladivostok, Pyung Yang and Seoul
    - BTB-HVDC is not available due to weak power system of DPRK
  - System configuration
    - DC  $\pm 500\text{kV}$ , Multi-Terminal HVDC system
    - VSC type HVDC system is more appropriate for interconnection
    - Two-Bipole DC transmission
  - Feasible exchange power
    - Feasible exchange power taking account of technical and economic constraints is 3GW to 4GW
    - 3GW to 4GW is allowable from the viewpoint of energy security (About 5% of power demand in 2017)

## <Future Prospects : Interconnection Scenario>



## Up-to-date Profile of the Regional Tie-line Project

- AC transmission line 500 kV *Vladivostok – Kraskino (Russia) – Chonjing (DPRK)*
  - Electricity export from Southern part of the Russian Far East to Northeast of DPRK into *loading islands* due to various frequency of AC in Russia and DPRK (50 vs. 60 Hz)
  - Distance – 390 km, of that – 240 km on the Russian territory
  - Load – up to 500 MW (2,5-3 bln kWh annually)
  - Investments estimates – \$250 mln
  - **The major problem is the source of payment for the electricity supplies**
    - Korean party offered joint development of Sanson deposit of complex ore and payment for electricity imported from profit of Korean party
    - as preliminary assessment of Sanson project showed it can be efficient but under certain circumstances
    - to attract investors INTER RAO UES held preliminary talks with Russian metallurgical companies (RUSAL, Mechel, NLMK). For the reasons of high investment risks due to political situation in DPRK the positive decision has not been received
    - INTER RAO UES suggested to expand the list of mineral deposits and to include that of coal but DPRK delegation refused and offered as alternative option to implement modernization of CHP plant in Chonjin town
- Realization of the investment project of Interstate Transmission Line by INTER RAO UES singly, without involvement of other Russian energy and metallurgical companies is likely to be not profitable and highly risky**

## DPRK Energy Experts Working Group (EEWG) Meeting

- Day 2 Sessions: Status of DPRK Building Energy Sector
  - “Introduction of the Building Sector in DPR Korea”, DPRK Delegation
    - Examples of construction and reconstruction of dwellings in urban and rural areas, construction of public establishments
    - Plans for introduction of new construction methods, materials, and designs for interiors
    - Institutional structure of construction industry in the DPRK



### **DPRK presentations on building energy**

- Presentations show an awareness of building energy efficiency issues, and the existence of an active architecture community
- Delegation was relatively forthcoming with information on building practices, energy end-uses
- Delegation stressed needs for building energy efficiency, capacity-building in the DPRK
- For 6PT/US Policy, confirms that building energy efficiency is a major opportunity at both political—engagement at ground level on an issue of keen interest—and practical—fastest/cheapest way to improve provision of energy services to DPRK population. Again, capacity/institution building is the key place to start



- **Day 2 Sessions: International Building Energy Efficiency Initiatives, Opportunities for Assistance to DPRK Buildings Sector**

- Status of Building Energy Consumption in China
- Building Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Experience in South Korea
- Energy Efficiency & Sustainability in Buildings: Concepts and Implementation in Asia-Pacific, Australia/RMIT, green building certification




50

# DPRK Energy Experts Working Group (EEWG) Meeting

- Day 2 Sessions: International Building Energy Efficiency Initiatives, Opportunities for Assistance to DPRK Buildings Sector

- Building Energy Policies in China, Joe Huang (LBNL, Retired)

- Importance of building energy efficiency to China
    - Overview of the Ministry of Construction
    - Characteristics of China's building energy policies, standards for buildings in different climate zones, standards for windows
    - Relevance of the Chinese experience to the DPRK
    - "Agenda 21" building project in Beijing as a model for green building development



- "International Cooperation Opportunities in Building Energy Efficiency for the DPRK", Ron Jarnagin, PNNL

- Energy management as tool for international engagement
    - Benefits of establishing regional centers for excellence in energy
    - Examples of international cooperative programs in China and in Eastern Europe, importance of role of national/local government involvement



- Space heating is a primary area for energy savings, including central heating systems/district heating, distributed systems

- Combined Heat and Power Individual control of heating capacity a key in producing savings

## Major Lessons Learned/Reinforced 1 —DPRK Energy

- Physical infrastructure in critical areas close to fully depleted
- Radical change quite possible, and discontinuity is on the agenda
- Small/cheap/fast continues to be the preferred mode of assistance, both in providing visible (if modest) services quickly, providing information feedback to international community
- Barriers of entry to external groups delivering projects are going up, not down, over time
- Training and more training is needed, including at enterprise level
- Connecting regional electricity networks without proper preparation of NK grid may have devastating effects on NK T&D
- Corollary on capacity building—absorptive capacity, ability to do things, appears to be shrinking

## Major Lessons Learned/Reinforced 2 **Buildings EE**

- No country has complete answer yet for building EE
- Many opportunities for DPRK to avoid mistakes made elsewhere
- “Clean Development Mechanisms” may provide useful ways for other nations to invest in building energy efficiency in the DPRK
- Need for DPRK to adopt and adapt customized building energy efficiency standards as soon as possible
- Need and desire for training and other capacity-building, joining networks in building EE area in DPRK
- The situation in the DPRK is unique; many models used elsewhere for building EE improvement therefore will not work
- No “shortcuts” in addressing DPRK building EE needs, no room for error—must lead to improved energy/humanitarian situation

## Major Lessons Learned/Reinforced—

### General 3

- A major “**phase shift**” in DPRK in next 2-3 years becoming increasingly inevitable due to approach to physical limits of DPRK physical, social infrastructure
- **Radical uncertainty** needs to be more and more a driving factor in considering what to do
- Need to
  - **Listen** to DPRK speakers, as what they say matters
  - Maintain **compassion** for DPRK citizens in general

SESSION 3

## 국제협력, 평화, 그리고 북한 인권

Global Cooperation, Peace and Human Rights in North Korea

La coopération mondiale, la paix et les droits de l'homme  
en Corée du Nord









# *The Future of North Korea and Global Cooperation*

**Amb. John Everard**

(former British Ambassador to the DPRK)



# ***Human Rights Problems in North Korea & the Role of Non-Participating States of the Six-Party Talks***

**Kim SooAm**

(Sr. Research Fellow, Korea Institute for National Unification)

## **1. Conditions and violations of human rights in North Korea**

North Korea, as a member of the United Nations, is party to four major international human rights treaties including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

- North Korean human rights situation is evaluated as poor in accordance with the international human rights treaties
- UN resolution on North Korea human rights also confirmed that systemic, widespread, and grave violations of human rights is taking place

### ***Food Shortage(degradation of right to food)***

- Chronic food shortages and Natural disasters led to degradation of the overall food situation in North Korea

〈Factor: combination of systemic and policy factors〉

First Factor

- Inefficiency of North Korean agricultural policy
- Constraint of grain import due to the economic crisis

- Differential distribution of North Korea policy
- Restriction on freedom of movement
- Crackdown of “Jangmadang” (a Market)

#### Second Factor

- Distribution of external assistance: North Korea constrain foreign based NGO or groups to certain area of North Korea and also from approaching the local citizens  
→ Existence of children, elder and other vulnerable classes are threaten and in serious situation.

#### ***Violation of the right to life: Continuation of Public Execution***

- Public execution occurring in a case other than a case allowed by domestic penal code is violation of North Korean domestic law
- Public execution by a firing squad (nine shot) in a public space is inhumane execution method

〈Factor: legal factors〉

- Punishment of social deviation
- Current law enforcement of North Korea, based on criminal procedural law, expose and accuse social deviation publicly to persuade the crowd
- Instruction given by Kim Jung-il states that Public Execution is efficient method to persuade the crowd
- Instruction given by Kim Jung-il is higher than law
- North Korean penal code separates common criminal and political criminal(the crime of counterrevolution)

#### ***Political prisoner : Concentration camp***

- Investigation and judicial process of political criminals are taken care by National Security Agency

- Even political criminals are guarantee of judicial process based on North Korean penal code
- Based on testimony of escapees of North Korea: judicial process is being completely ignored
- Application of guilty by association is violation of human rights

〈Factor: systemic factor〉

- Maintain system of one person rule

***Forced labor, torture, and Poor detention facility***

- Not yet entered “Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment”
- Combination of severe beating, starvation, disease with poor condition of detention facility cause many death.
- Justify forced labor as education to rehabilitate political prisoner
- Forced labor of pregnant woman(violation of domestic law) and force abortion.
- Harsh and brutal treatment of political prisoners at political penal-labor colonies, prison-labor facilities and concentration camp for political prisoner continues.

〈Factor: the lack of rule of law and policy factors〉

- Law enforcement officers lacks acknowledgment of rule of law and human rights.
- Political prisoners awareness of individual rights are unfounded.

***Violation of equal rights: social discrimination***

- Social discrimination based on social stratum is violation of equal rights
- Social stratum are categorized as core class, wavering class, and hostile class
- Residents categorized as hostile class received discrimination toward their employment, housing, education, health care policy and etc. in their life

- Social changes that wasn't intended but occurred due to the economic crisis are alleviating the influence of social stratum

〈Factor〉

- Policy to maintain one person rule system in North Korea
- Maintain political power by giving preferential treatment toward supporter of current regime

### ***Operation of Control Mechanism***

- Restriction on assembly, association, and freedom of press
- common travel system, travel to special areas such as border and Pyongyang are restricted
- Restriction on travel has been alleviated due to the increase of movement of residents for survival( recently restriction of movement has been strengthen)
- Strict control over the people of North Korea's overseas travel
- External information acquisition and control all communication in order to prevent the distribution of information
- Prohibited the possession of a personal computer; the Internet is also banned

〈Factor: systemic factors〉

- Control the distribution of information between the people of North Korea
- Maintain current system and regime through strictly controlling external information

### ***Freedom of religion is not permitted in North Korea***

- Religious facilities allowed by regime (Bongsu church, Chilgol church, Jangchung Cathedral, Russian Orthodox Temple); allowed expression of religion
- Punish defectors who made a contact with religious person as political criminal

- Do not distinguish church and cathedral; lack of awareness about freedom of religion
- Use marijuana and opium to educate about religion.

〈Factor: systemic factors〉

- Freedom of religion can lead to collapse of current system
- 10 principles of monotheism requires absolute loyalty to Kim Jung-il

### ***Human rights violation against repatriated North Korean defectors***

- Strong punishment against the defectors who made a contact with either religion related person or South Korean
- North Korean defectors who defected for survival are imprisoned in labor-exercised prison then release
- There has been many testimony of violation of human rights such as forced abortion, baby-killing

〈Factor: Combination of systemic factors and economic factors〉

- By default, defectors are approached as political criminals
- Movement due to the economic crisis are punish from the perspective of crossing the border illegally

## **2. The activities of the international community to reform the human rights situation in North Korea**

〈Conditions for the reformation of human rights in North Korea〉

Due to the close-door policy of North Korea, international community has been moving actively to highlight the human rights situation in North Korea

- Highlight the human rights abuses which emerged from one person rule system

(dictatorship)

North Korean human rights investigation (fact-finding) and increase public awareness

- “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices”
- “Annual Report on International Religious Freedom” declared North Korea as countries of particular concern due to the restriction of freedom of religion and creed.
- “US Trafficking in Persons Report” gave North Korea lowest rating of tiers 3, declaring that North Korea is not even meeting the standard of TVPA.
- British Foreign Ministry human Rights Report
- Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, US Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and other international NGO’s report

North Korean human rights monitoring activities and promotion activities (advocacy)

- Financial support of the US government enables Freedom House to support international event regarding the human rights of North Korea.
- Washington’s North Korea Freedom Week events
- Japan’s North Korean human rights violation enlightenment events
- Fact-finding of human rights infringement

〈The activities of the UN to reform the human rights situation in North Korea〉  
Led by the EU, the UN adopted resolution which criticizes North Korean human rights situation and ask for reformation of its human rights situation.

- UN Commission on Human Rights: 2003, 2004, 2005
- The UN General Assembly: 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008
- Based on 2004 resolution adopted by UN Human Rights Commission, Vitit Muntarbhorn was appointed as Special Rapporteur on the situation of human



rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

- Submitted North Korean human rights report to Human Rights Council and to the general Assembly

Thematic special rapporteurs based on special procedures must inquire North Korean human rights situation via communication to North Korea

- Thematic special rapporteurs have a role of sending a communication to north Korea regarding the human rights violation that already occurred or occurring as of now
- Individually or together, or with special rapporteur on human rights in north Korea, thematic special rapporteurs can send communication to North Korea

Evaluate North Korea human rights situation based upon the country report submitted regarding to four major international human rights treaties they signed.

- consider country report submitted by North Korea by having a Q&A session with North Korean delegates
- Make recommendations through the “Concluding Observations”

〈The activities of individual countries to reform the human rights situation in North Korea〉

United States

- United States ratified “North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004”
- Appoint “Special Envoy for Human Rights in North Korea” (interim position)
- Permitted North Korean defectors to settle down in the United States
- Ratified “North Korea Human Rights Reauthorization Act of 2008” to extend the “North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004” : Special Envoy was converted from part-time position to full-time position
- Provide financial support to organizations that deals with North Korean human

rights situation through the NED and State Department budget

#### Japan

- Japan enacted many laws that deals with the violations of human rights in North Korea including abductees issue in 2006
- Appoint “North Korean Human Rights Ambassador”

#### European Union

- European Union seeks cooperation with North Korea to improve human rights situation in North Korea
- Initiated human rights dialogue with North Korea delegates in June 13, 2001
- Initiated technical cooperation on human rights related fields between some member countries and North Korea
- Human rights dialogue ended as EU led ratification of UN resolution of North Korean human rights
- United Kingdom and Germany permitted North Korean defectors to settle down in their country

Proposed to punish those responsible for human rights violation in North Korea to give catalyst effect to reformation of North Korean human rights situation

- Special rapporteur Muntarbhorn also discusses the possibility of punishment for those responsible for human rights violation in North Korea

The United States and others proposed to use Helsinki process to resolve North Korean human rights problems

- “North Korean Human rights Act”: Recommends regional human rights dialogue with North Korea using Helsinki process as a model

### 3. North Korea's response

Allegation on North Korean human rights are considered as aggression toward North Korea: response from the perspective of regime security

- North Korea believes that collapse of the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe was due to human rights strategy of the United States and West
- Resolution of UN Human Rights Committee, UN General Assembly is political conspiracy to use human rights as an issue to breakdown North Korean regime
- North Korea strongly point out that there is no universal human rights standards
- North Korea strongly points out that “our style socialism”(Leader, party, mass become one identity) is best in protecting the human rights
- North Korea strongly opposed using the principles of sovereignty and cultural relativism
- North Korea refuted by stating that human rights is under the jurisdiction of sovereignty; therefore human rights problem is domestic issue
- Loss of sovereignty is like forfeiture of human right itself; therefore human rights itself is national right
- Military first policy is best political method to ensure and protect human rights

North Korea denies all human rights resolution against North Korea

- Conspiracy theory of the United States, Japan and European Union: Hostile policy toward North Korea and would like socialist system to collapse in North Korea
- North Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson: “North Korean Human Rights resolution is false and fake promotional document”
- Ratification of resolution has been forced by conspiracy against North Korea
- Due to the western imperialism, the United Nation became threat to the North Korean regime since it based its policy on incorrect information

Denial of the existence of a special rapporteur on human rights in North Korea

- North Korea human rights resolution, Special rapporteur mandate is based on, is very politicized, selective, and based on double-standard
- North Korea denies the existence of special rapporteur, since North Korea rejects North Korean human rights resolution
- Refuses to answer communication sent out by special rapporteur to North Korea regarding the human rights violation

North Korea rejects the technical cooperation on field of human rights with UNHCHR

- UNHCHR proposed technical cooperation on field of human rights to North Korea based on North Korean human rights resolution
- Held a talk with North Korean delegates in Geneva
- Directly contact North Korean regime by sending a communication
- Technical cooperation proposed by UNHCHR is based on North Korean human rights resolution
- Technical cooperation proposed by UNHCHR cannot be accepted since it will be used as external pressure to implement the resolution
- Technical cooperation is only possible when North Korean human rights resolution has been removed from the table
- Universal Periodic Review: UPR method also been rejected due to the resolution
- North Korea refuses thematic special rapporteur and the UN special procedure
- Refuses to answer communication sent by thematic special rapporteurs regarding the human rights issue
- Its hostile policy toward North Korea and political conspiracy which uses fabricated information to breakdown the socialism system in North

Refused access of North Korea to international institutions and international NGO

- Refuse special procedure of the UN

- Allow Amnesty International to visit in 1995 (temporary)
- Allow member of Committee on the Rights of Child to visit

Refuse human rights dialogue with European Union

- Criticized human rights policy of European Union for being double standard
- Criticized European Union for being silent against occupation of Israel, invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan

Allegation by International community is being taken very sensitively by North Korea

- Penal code, criminal procedural law and other domestic law has been revised in 2004
  - \* Its hard to assume that external pressure was an only factor which made North Korea to revise its domestic law; however, we can assume that external pressure played a role.
  - \* From testimony of defectors , discover that penal code revised in 2004 is actually being implemented by north Korea
- Punishment for repatriated North Korean defector has been alleviated
  - \* However it is unsure that revision of penal code actually leads to human rights reform
  - \* Despite the revision of penal code and criminal procedural law, North Korea legal standard is still way below international standards

North Korea will cooperate submitting country report based on international human rights treaties

- Submit country report to four international human rights treaties
- Recently sent delegates to Committee on the Rights of Child to evaluate 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> country report

#### **4. The Role of Non-Participating States of the Six-Party Talks**

To establish the role of non-participating states of the Six-Party Talks: we must start with careful evaluation of effects of North Korean human rights reform activities

- Raising great interest about North Korean human rights problems in international community
- Even though North Korean regime refuses to listen, it has been communicated to North Korean regime that human rights are very important issue to deal with
- Contributed to policy change by North Korea: a revision of penal code, submit a country report and sending a delegates regarding the four international human rights treaty, alleviate punishment against defectors, and decrease number of public execution

Focus on the efficient resolution of human rights violation and future human rights activities

- Focus on reforming the human rights issues that are relatively low threat to North Korea regime
- Level of awareness and policy changes: changes in perceptions and attitudes of North Korea
- Substantial changes in North Korean system
- Enhancing the awareness of human rights to North Korean citizens

Improve human rights situation in North Korea by efficiently dividing a role between Korea, the United Nations, the United States, Japan and non-participating states of Six-Party Talks and NGOs.

- Each states attempt to induce North Korea to change its policy and change its self-awareness, oblige to protect right to live, and ease the regulation on contact with local resident to cause a mutual synergy affect.

Given North Korea's attitude, the non-participating states of Six-party Talks should focus on inducing North Korea to accept that human rights is important issue.

- North Korea recognized the United States suggestion on North Korea's human rights as the U.S. hostile policy toward North Korea
- North Korea is expected to resist while pursuing a strategy to increase pressure on nuclear talks
- However, depending on progress in nuclear negotiation, the U.S. pressure on human rights reform during the normalization talks will play major role
- North Korea protest that European Union resolution toward North Korea human rights occurred due to the U.S. hostile policy toward North Korea
- North Korea will most likely to continue protest against Western logics and its recommendation of human rights reform in North Korea, while keep justifying North Korea's position on its human rights situation
- Non-participating states of Six-party talks should play major role on inducing North Korea to accept the western recommendation to reform human rights in North Korea
- Non-participating states of Six-party talks should focus on inducing North Korea to acknowledge the importance of awareness of human rights.

As violations of human rights in North Korea occurred as regime tries to maintain its system: Short term and long-term reform plan based on systemic factors and non systemic factors should be establish

- Induce policy change to resolve human rights violations
- The human rights violations caused by systemic attribute must be approach from long-term open-door strategy
- Restriction of freedom of press, freedom of assembly and association, and freedom of religion are violated whenever issue is connected closely to Kim Jung-il centered one person rule system

- To resolve these violations long-term process of reform and open-door policy must be accompanied by overall systemic change of North Korea
- In short-mid term process, non-participating states of Six-Party Talks must support the development of North Korea while inducing North Korea to give more access to closed areas and allow local residents to participate
- Need to develop a model program for development cooperation(rights-based approach to development)
- Expand the contact with local residents while inducing local residents to build awareness of human rights

#### Creating an environment for North Korean human rights reform

- Considering the closed-door policy, Its hard to expect North Korea to reform itself without an external pressure
- Non-participating states of Six-Party Talks must enhance its role to increase the interest of international community
- Creating an environment where North Korean human rights problems can be shared publicly
- Strengthening solidarity and support with the human rights NGO

#### Short-term goal for human rights problem will be monitoring and advocacy of human rights violations

- Focus on resolving the human rights violations which is not relevant to current North Korean ruling system and strengthen cooperation between the states
- In short-term, human rights violations not relevant to North Korean ruling system should be reform immediately
- Create cooperative network revolving around non-participating states of Six-Party Talks



Expand its role to strengthening the rule of law in North Korea and change awareness of law enforcement in North Korea

- Strengthening the research of North Korean domestic law violations and violation of judicial process
- In short-term, concentrate on the problems which is not relevant to current North Korean ruling system
- In short-term, focus and promote the case study which violates North Korean domestic law and its domestic judicial procedure
- In mid- long term , strengthen the rule of law through the technical cooperation, seminar and education on human rights

Strengthen its role in UN to facilitate human rights reform in North Korea

- Improve human rights conditions in North Korea by inducing North Korean regime to change its attitude and awareness
- Combination of external pressure and negotiation
- Continuously warn North Korea of its human right violations through the United Nations
- Pressure to submit 3<sup>rd</sup> Covenant B report , while pressuring North Korea to join other human rights treaties<sup>3</sup>
- Focus on UN Concluding Observation to reform North Korean law and system
- Called for technical cooperation on human rights
- Universal cooperation and seek regular review

Strengthening cooperation between non-participating states of Six-Party Talks to reform North Korean human rights

- Human Rights Dialogue: The European Union, Australia, Canada and diversification is needed
- Technical cooperation of human rights: seminar and training of judicial workers

Contribute to the formation of multilateral human rights system

- Possibility of adopting Helsinki model (see the role of neutral and non-allied states)
- Expand its role to create an environment, which allows multilateral human rights system in Asia
- International cooperation for improving North Korean human rights should evolve around the non-participating states of Six-Party Talks, since these states are more free from nuclear and North Korean ruling system issues