

International Academic Conference of
Korean Unification

Korean Unification and International Cooperation

Date & Time July 8, 2013
9:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M.

Location Seoul National University,
Hoam Faculty House,
Convention Center,
Mugunghwa Hall, 2nd fl.



Co-host



IPUS

Institute for Peace and Unification Studies
Seoul National University



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Program

- 9:00-9:30 Registration and Open Conversation
- 9:30-9:50 Opening Address and Congratulatory Address
- 10:00-12:30 Session I **Neighboring Countries' Policies toward the Korean Peninsula**
- Moderator Dal-Joong Chang (Seoul National University, South Korea)
- Presenter 1 *U.S. Perspective*
Celeste Arrington (George Washington University, U.S.A)
- Presenter 2 *Chinese Perspective*
Yunpeng Ma (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, China)
- Presenter 3 *Japanese Perspective*
Kan Kimura (Kobe University, Japan)
- Presenter 4 *Russian Perspective*
Dmitry Labin (Moscow State Institute for International Relations, Russia)
- Discussant 1 James Person (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, U.S.A)
- Discussant 2 *Annika Bolten*
Drutschmann (Federal Foreign Office, Germany)
- Discussant 3 Sandip Kumar Mishra (University of Delhi, India)
- Discussant 4 Sung Chull Kim (Seoul National University, South Korea)
- Panel Discussion: *Conference Participants*
- 12:30-13:00 Lunch

14:00-16:30 Session II **International Community's Support for Korean Unification**

Moderator Edward Reed (Kyung Hee University, South Korea)

Presenter 1 *The Role of a Unified Korea in Peaceful Cooperation within Northeast Asia*

Young-Ho Park (Korea Institute for National Unification, South Korea)

Presenter 2 *The Role of the International Society in Facilitating Korean Unification*

Fei Long (Shanghai International Studies University, China)

Presenter 3 *The Role of Neighboring Countries in Facilitating Korean Unification*

Sheena Greitens (Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies, U.S.A)

Presenter 4 *The Role of E.U. in Facilitating Korean Unification*

Eric Ballbach (Free University of Berlin, Germany)

Discussant 1 Zachary Hosford (Center for a New American Security, U.S.A)

Discussant 2 Natalia Toganova (Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russia)

Discussant 3 Xiao-ke Wang (Jilin University, China)

Discussant 4 Hiroyasu Akutsu (National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan)

Discussant 5 Achakorn Wongpreedee (The National Institute of Development Administration, Thailand)

Panel Discussion: *Conference Participants*

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Session I

Neighboring Countries' Policies toward the Korean Peninsula

Presentation

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U.S. Perspectives on Korean Unification

Celeste Arrington (*George Washington University, U.S.A*)*

The United States supports Korean unification but maintains that the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) should determine the timing and nature of unification. This stance resonates with one of the main principles articulated in the 1972 North-South Joint Communiqué, the 1991 Basic Agreement between the ROK and the DPRK, the 2000 North-South Joint Declaration, and the final statement of the 2007 North-South summit. In all these instances, Seoul and Pyongyang emphasized that unification should take place by Koreans’ “own initiative.” Despite such agreement, it is unclear when or how unification might take place. And few countries in the region are keen to see unification to occur soon due to the large costs and challenges expected to accompany unification.

As a result, there are numerous different U.S. perspectives on Korean unification, and Washington DC has few overt policies to promote or even plan for unification.

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Most of its policies revolve around joint contingency planning with South Korea (but, crucially, not China) for a potential North Korean invasion, regime collapse, revolution, or some other form of instability in or around North Korea. Nevertheless, since U.S. forces fought on the South's side in the Korean War (1950-1953) and have helped defend the ROK since then under the auspices of a mutual defense treaty, the United States will be involved in eventual unification processes on the Korean peninsula. Ever strengthening bilateral trade and people-to-people ties between the United States and South Korea further ensure that the United States will somehow be implicated in unification.

Not only will unification draw on U.S. government assistance, it will undoubtedly also involve American non-governmental organizations (NGOs), religious groups, academics, and technical experts because of the complex array of social, economic, legal, political, medical, infrastructural, and other issues that will arise during unification.

Precisely when and how the regime in Pyongyang collapses or relinquishes power will affect the U.S. role in unification processes. Since the 1990s, an international consensus has emerged that unification would ideally entail the peaceful and gradual absorption of North Korea under South Korean democratic rule and capitalism. Yet, as was evident in Germany in 1989, it may ultimately be impossible to predict or even control exactly how unification will occur. Scholars with more expertise in unification than myself have suggested a range of different scenarios for how unification might begin. These range from the gradual to the swift, and from the unlikely scenario of Kim Jong-eun and his posse voluntarily relinquishing power or agreeing to some form of managed transition to the more likely scenario of a coup or more widespread rebellion and civil war.¹⁾ Seoul, Washington, and other governments hesitate to speculate openly

1) For example, see Marcus Noland, "Why North Korea Will Muddle Through," *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 4 (1997): 105; Fareed Zakaria, "When North Korea Falls," *Washington Post*, October 18, 2010; Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind, "Pyongyang's Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North Korea," *International Security* 35, no. 1 (Summer 2010): 44 - 74; Patrick McEachern, *Inside the Red Box: North Korea's Post-totalitarian Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 231-232.

about the likelihood of any of these potential scenarios for fear that they might come true or inflame already tense relations with North Korea.²⁾ The unpredictability and the daunting challenges entailed in responding to any of the soft or hard landing versions of such scenarios leave few eager for unification and limit incentives for U.S. policymakers to actively plan for unification.³⁾

Despite the fact that considering Korean unification is a much higher priority in Seoul than in Washington, we can still infer what some of the top concerns might be from the U.S. perspective should unification begin to occur. These include – in order of importance for the United States – securing North Korea’s nuclear weapons, missiles, and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs; coordinating policy with China and communicating non-hostile intent to Beijing; mitigating disputes over history between Japan and a unified Korea; providing for the basic needs (food, water, shelter, etc.) of North Koreans; containing and addressing any public health concerns; and initiating transitional justice processes. This is, of course, not an exhaustive list and the precise details of each issue will depend on when and how unification actually occurs.⁴⁾ Still, I will briefly discuss each concern in turn, emphasizing again that I do not think there is or should be a single U.S. perspective on these issues or on Korean unification more broadly.

- **Securing North Korea’s nuclear weapons, missiles, and other WMD programs**
 - The U.S. government is currently focused on the threat of a nuclear ICBM from North Korea. But the potential proliferation of weapons, related technology, and technicians from North Korea in the event of regime collapse constitutes

2) Bruce W. Bennett and Jennifer Lind, “The Collapse of North Korea: Military Missions and Requirements,” *International Security* 36, no. 2 (Fall 2011): 85-86.

3) Ralph Hassig and Kongdan Oh, “The United States and Korean Unification,” in *Korean Unification and the Position and Roles of the Four Neighboring Powers*, ed. Jung-Ho Bae (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2011), 49-72.

4) For more, see “The USC-CSIS Joint Study: The Korea Project – Planning for the Long Term,” with principal investigators Victor Cha and David Kang, <http://csis.org/program/korean-unification>.

an arguably greater threat to American interests. Already, DPRK equipment or know-how has been linked to Iran, Syria, Pakistan, and Myanmar. Preventing such proliferation will be the top U.S. priority in any unification scenario. This supersedes questions of whether a unified Korea will retain nuclear weapons capability, possibly setting off an arms race with China and Japan. Hopes of persuading the DPRK to denuclearize before unification diminished this spring, when Kim Jong-eun revised the constitution to equate further nuclear weapons development with economic reinvigoration as the state's main goals. Thus, the United States should plan multilateral measures to account for, secure, and monitor all components of the North's WMD program.

- **Coordinating unification policies with Beijing** — Korean unification will alter the balance of power in Northeast Asia, and the potential presence of U.S. troops in the northern part of the peninsula may unsettle China. As a result, Seoul and Washington should strive to coordinate closely with Beijing during the process of unification. North Korean provocations in the first half of 2013 appear to have undermined Beijing's willingness to tolerate North Korean behavior, as evidenced by China's assent to UN sanctions, statements from the Obama-Xi summit in June, and Beijing's diplomatic actions toward Pyongyang. While the current chill in China-DPRK relations — as well as Park Geun-hye's diplomatic initiatives toward China and the recent U.S.-China-ROK track 1.5 discussions — may facilitate coordinated planning for Korean unification, China's fundamental interest in maintaining stability on the Korean peninsula and its principle of non-interference in other states' affairs may contradict ROK and U.S. objectives. As a result, Seoul and Washington should create an institutionalized forum through which they can coordinate with Beijing in the event of Korean unification.

- **Managing the "Japan factor"** — Since the United States' closest allies in the region are the ROK and Japan, Washington will have to coordinate its policies during unification with both countries. But Washington will also have to help manage

issues related to historical memory between Japan and its former colony, Korea. The present Abe government in Japan has ruffled feathers in Northeast Asia by suggesting the need for reinterpretation of its imperial expansion and policies in the first half of the nineteenth century, while also considering constitutional revision. Chinese and South Korean public and official perceptions of Japan have reached new lows since Abe took office in late 2012. During unification and the concomitant shift in the regional balance of power, Korean officials may rely on the United States to restrain its other Northeast Asian ally – Japan – from pursuing security policies that might threaten its neighbors. Moreover, as North Koreans shake off the fetters of tyrannical rule during the process of unification, the history issue will become a serious stumbling block to regional cooperation. Pyongyang has long sought reparations from Tokyo to match the economic aid South Korea received from Japan in 1965 under the Basic Treaty. During unification, Washington should discourage Japanese political elites from inflaming historical memories and foster governmental and non-governmental efforts between Korea and Japan to address historic wrongs committed on the Korean peninsula.

- **Providing for the basic needs of former DPRK citizens** – Beyond emergency humanitarian assistance, providing sustained food, water, and shelter for ordinary North Koreans will be a concern for the United States. It is unlikely to receive the same priority as securing North Korean weapons and managing the DPRK's military and security forces, though. Less and less patience remains in the United States for humanitarian aid or sunshine policy-style gradual economic engagement of North Korea. Some members of the U.S. Congress expressed concern, for example, during deliberation of the KORUS FTA about whether goods produced in the Kaesong Industrial Complex fell under the FTA, and thus whether the United States might indirectly support the DPRK regime. At the same time, mounting outrage in the United States over North Korea's human rights record

has strengthened support for sanctions and international shaming of the regime in Pyongyang. This outrage – fuelled by growing testimony from defectors – could lead to support for humanitarian and development assistance programs once the regime in Pyongyang collapses. Mobilizing small NGOs, some of whom already have experience in North Korea, to help design and implement such programs would be most effective.

- **Containing and addressing any public health concerns** – Regardless of the nature of unification, North Koreans’ health will require multilateral governmental and medical attention. Compared with other autarkies, North Korea has relatively high levels of public health. But sanctions and economic deprivation, as well as malnutrition, have compromised North Korean citizens’ health. NGOs working in the North recently warned, for example, of the spread of multidrug resistant tuberculosis.⁵⁾ Especially since SARS and other diseases emanated from Asia, U.S. policymakers have become more attuned to the dangers of the cross-border spread of diseases. Training North Korean doctors to help manage such public health concerns would also provide jobs to skilled professionals who would not otherwise be able to compete with ROK medical professionals’ modern training.
- **Holding at least some former DPRK officials accountable for past human rights violations** – Finally, mounting public concern in the United States over the DPRK’s human rights record will translate into demands for justice for at least some former North Korean officials. The UN Human Rights Council’s March 2013 establishment of a Commission of Inquiry (CoI) for the DPRK represents a first step in determining whether DPRK officials committed crimes against

5) “Humanitarian Aid for NK Should Continue,” *KBS News*, May 8, 2013, http://english.kbs.co.kr/news/news_view.html?No=95797&id=Po; Sharon Perry et al., *Engaging North Korea on Mutual Interests in Tuberculosis Control*, Academic Paper Series (Washington DC: Korea Economic Institute, February 2011).

humanity that could be subject to an international tribunal. Transitional justice should proceed gradually after other more immediate unification issues have been addressed, but the United States should work with Korean officials to use domestic Korean institutions to pursue fact-finding, selective amnesties, and punishment in certain instances as a part of Korean reconstruction and reconciliation. With one of the largest militaries in the world, North Korea's highly militarized society could pose significant risks to U.S. interests in the event of Korean unification.⁶⁾ Former security agents should be re-educated or held accountable, therefore, while the large number of former members of the KPA or reservists should be disarmed, re-trained, and given jobs.

In conclusion, the challenges entailed in Korean unification are daunting, and most American officials and observers expect Koreans to lead the process of addressing these challenges. Yet U.S. policymakers and scholars can do more to prepare to support Koreans in this process. Perhaps especially after the Kim Jong-eun regime's provocative actions and efforts to solidify his country's status as a nuclear weapons state during the first half of 2013, gradual and peaceful unification seems increasingly unlikely. Swift unification, precipitated by a crisis in the North, will arguably involve even more challenges than a phased transition. As a result, international coordination between the ROK and the United States, as well as with China, will be essential. Such coordination should extend beyond government-to-government planning to include the academic, business, NGO, and diaspora communities in the ROK and the United States and their neighbors.

6) Bennett and Lind, "The Collapse of North Korea," 85 ff.

A Chinese Perspective of Studying on the Korean Peninsula Reunification

Yunpeng Ma (*Chinese Academy of Social Sciences*)*

Abstract

The paper puts out a new premise judgment on the Korean peninsula reunification: there is an asymmetric security structure on the Korean peninsula. And the paper employs the “nuclear deterrence under the non-balance-of- power” theory to analyze the Korean Peninsula Reunification issue. The key driving forces to promote the Reunification of Korean peninsula lie in the economic sustainable development of the North Korea (ROK) and the political democratization of the South Korea (DPRK). China should take an accurate self-position and play a greater and more active role in the Korean peninsula Reunification.

Keywords: Korean peninsula Reunification, the Security Structure, the ROK, the DPRK, the Nuclear Deterrence under the Non-balance-of-power

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CHAPTER I : The Premise Judgment and Analyzing Perspectives on the Korean peninsula Reunification

Premise Judgment: There is an asymmetric security structure on the Korean peninsula.

Except of the premise judgment that the DPRK is a rational nation actor, this paper also puts forward that there is an asymmetric security structure on the Korean peninsula in which two antithetical governments from one nation but are totally different in state nature both struggle around the issue of the Korean peninsula Reunification dominance which serves as the main driving force and logical start of the inter- Korean relations.

There is a relatively clear security structure which the interests of the Korean peninsula and the surrounding big powers are intertwined in:

The first level: the U.S-ROK alliance vs. the DPRK; the second level: the U.S-ROK-Japan vs. the DPRK; the third level: the U.S-ROK-Japan vs. Sino-Russia- -DPRK. The later relationship is much looser than the former one, in some specific matters, there are even some great conflicts between the different actors in the same party. Among the three relationships, the asymmetrical relation of the US-ROK alliance vs. the DPRK acts as the core relationship in the Korean peninsula security structure, and it greatly affects the security situation on the Korean peninsula.

Researcher Piao Jianyi from the Asia-Pacific and the Global Institute for Strategic Studies in Chinese Academy of Social Sciences holds that, the relation and contradiction of the inter-Korean is the principal contradiction of the Korean peninsula Reunification¹⁾. Moreover, the core contradiction between the inter-Korean is competing for the Korean peninsula Reunification dominance which requires substantive change of the asymmetrical relation of the US-ROK alliance vs. the DPRK.

1) Researcher Piao repeatedly emphasizes this viewpoint at the Asia-Pacific PhD programs of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, while the experts from the North Korean Academy of Social Sciences regard contradiction between the DPRK and the United States as the core contradictions of the Korean peninsula issues.

Perspective I : Class Analysis

Not so much class analysis is still employed in the modern international relation study. But, the class analysis is necessary and indispensable to deep into the nature of the relationship between the congener's heterogeneity regimes.

Marx pointed out that, in the political analysis, it's necessary to "take the political conflicts as the interests struggling between the existing social classes and the class groups who were determined by the economic development.²⁾" The class divisions have a profound impact on the political life which makes people unequal in the political status, results the countries non-uniform in the form and substance and leads to the inevitability of conflicts between the antagonistic classes. "All the confrontations and conflicts between different classes are based on the conflicts of economic interests, and always revolved around the economic interests.³⁾"

But when the class analysis is used in the Korean peninsula Reunification studying, as the opposing sides are two non-uniformed and independent regimes, the interest of national Reunification will serve as the top interest instead of the economic interests for a quite long time.

Since August of 1945 when ended the Japan' rule in the Korean peninsula and North-South divided and conquered, the class antagonism has become a normal state. Take the event of Korean peninsula independent for an instance, the DPRK called it as "liberation" (解放) while the ROK called it as "retrocession" (光復). The north side had thoroughly cleared the foundation of Japan ruled, then established the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), while the South side retained almost all the old order foundation⁴⁾ and established the Republic of Korea (ROK). The oppositions between the DPRK and ROK are not only the regime opposition, but also the opposition

2) *Collected Works of Marx and Engels (Volume 22)*, People's Press, 1965, p.592.

3) Chen Zhen-ming and Chen Bing-hui, eds. *Political science: Concepts, Theories and Methods*, Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2004, pp.174-176.

4) The Republic of Korea retained a considerable part of the old bureaucratic system in the Japan ruled era, for example, there was no land and redrawing of state property.

on the class.

Perspective II: Nation Analysis

The particularity of the inter-Korean relations also lies in that, the North-South confrontation is the confrontation between two heterogeneous regimes from one nation whose legalities have never received official approvals from each others, but treat each other as one part of the non-unified country. So, the Korean peninsula Reunification should be treated, first of all, as the national internal issues, followed by the relations between different countries. Therefore, the nation analysis methods should be taken precedence on the Korean peninsula Reunification studying, followed by the international relation analysis methods.

On the Korean peninsula Reunification studying, the national interests are not equal to the state interests, compared with the state-to-state relations, the national relations are more complex and should be always considered on the Korean peninsula Reunification studying.

CHAPTER II: The Analysis of Korean Peninsula Reunification Based on the “Non-Equilibrium Nuclear Deterrence”

The core theme of the Korean peninsula Issues should be the peaceful Reunification, and all of the Korean peninsula reunification, including the North Korean nuclear issue, to some extent, are just the extension of the Reunification issue.

In the North Korean nuclear issue, these stakeholders have their own interests' considerations. Take the interests of the DPRK, the ROK and the U.S. who acts as the core in the first layer of the Northeast Asia' security structure as an instance, there are fundamental conflicts in core national interests. And the contradictions are not only

in the structural level, but also in the specific policies implementation. In order to illustrate the question easier, in this paper, we analyze the asymmetric security structure on the Korean peninsula by the concept and logical method of “nuclear deterrence”.

The “*asymmetric nuclear deterrence*” (不對称核威懾) emphasizes the gap of strategic nuclear forces between two sides while the “*nuclear deterrence under the non-balance-of-power*” (非均勢核威懾) emphasizes the overall military strength gap. As long as the opposing sides are in a non-equilibrium structure in the overall military strength, the nuclear deterrence between them is right the “nuclear deterrence under the non-balance-of-power”⁵⁾. In the security structure on the Korean peninsula, the ROK-U.S. alliance opposes against the DPRK with not only overwhelming overall military strength, but also with asymmetric presence of strategic nuclear forces. Before the DPRK possessing of nuclear weapons, the Korean peninsula was in the one-way “nuclear deterrence” structure of the ROK-U.S. alliance against North Korea, while since the DPRK possessed of nuclear weapons in 2005, it would be more exactly to describe the asymmetric security structure of the Korean peninsula with the “nuclear deterrence under the non-balance-of-power”. Fundamentally, the generation of the North Korean nuclear issue related to the asymmetric security structure on the Korean peninsula, rather than the general thought that the North Korea takes the nuclear weapons as a means to blackmail the international aids.

For the ROK, as one of the core national interest, to achieve the Korean peninsula’ Reunification is not only the starting point of making policy toward the DPRK, even has been included in the current constitution. The fundamental contradiction in the inter-Korean relations is competing for the reunified dominance, In more specific terms, that’s who leads the Reunification, how to achieve the Reunification and what Reunification to achieve? Dr. Kissinger believes that “the tension on the Korean peninsula reflects all the intricate issues, especially, it is question that two countries should

5) Yan Xuetong and Yan Liang, eds., *International Relations Analysis*, Beijing: Peking University Press, 2008, p.180.

take what responsibilities respectively in the Reunification (if the Korean peninsula really comes to be unified in the future)”⁶⁾. “The ROK uses the ROK-U.S. alliance as a means to safeguard its independence and promote the Reunification.”⁷⁾

In the security structure of the “one-way” nuclear deterrence, the ROK-U.S. alliance has the absolute advantage against the DPRK and the ROK holds the reunified dominance of the Korean peninsula. In the reality of the context, the South Korean government has the freedom to choose the policy toward the DPRK. As long as the Korean peninsula is still in the security structure of the “one-way” nuclear deterrence, the ROK can ensure the diplomatic advantage toward the DPRK cost-effectively and master the Reunification dominance. The real reason of the ROK strongly opposing the DPRK to develop nuclear weapons is unwilling to alienate the Reunification dominance instead of worrying about the North Korea’s nuclear weapons would explode in the South Korea one day. What the ROK really worry is, if the DPRK and the ROK-US alliance constitutes the structure of the “nuclear deterrence under the non-balance-of-power”, then the South Korea’ absolute diplomatic advantage toward the DPRK will be offset what will reduce the validity (有効性) in pursuing the interest of national Reunification. “The DPRK’ possessing of nuclear weapons actually increases the uncertainty of the ROK’ safety and the costs to be spent on the Reunification issue.”⁸⁾

In the security structure of the “one-way” nuclear deterrence, as the disadvantaged side, the DPRK takes safeguarding the “system security” as the bottom line of policy. The secondary goal is to fight with the United States for lifting the economic blockade and sanctions against the DPRK, what’s more, in this process, to compete with the ROK for Reunification dominance, at least for the peer dominance. “During 10 years of the South Korea’ democratic reform faction in power, the critical point of the North-

6) Henry Kissinger, *The Global Strategy of the United States*, trans. Hu Li-ping and Ling Jian-ping, Hai Nan Press, 2009, pp. 117-118.

7) Henry Kissinger, *The Global Strategy of the United States*, trans. Hu Li-ping and Ling Jian-ping, Hai Nan Press, 2009, p. 106.

8) MA Yunpeng, *The changes and impacts of the policies of Lee Myung-bak government toward the DPRK*, LLM. Dissertation, Shanghai Jiao tong University, 2011, p. 27.

South Korea had been able to improve largely the relationship is that the two sides had held the bottom line of never to engage in system confrontation and never to threaten the survival of another system⁹⁾.”

The fundamental way for the DPRK to achieve the security strategy objectives is to change the absolute superiority of the ROK-U.S. alliance against the DPRK through possessing of nuclear weapons. “Even if the DPRK has nuclear weapons¹⁰⁾”, and even has formed strategic nuclear deterrence to the ROK-US alliance, the North Korea is still only to concern about the survival safety due to lack of strength to compete with the ROK-US alliance for the peer security or absolute security. But, the structure equilibrium of the “nuclear deterrence under the non-balance-of-power” maintained by the nuclear weapons cost-effectively is more stable than the balance of “one-way” nuclear deterrence ensured by the conventional forces and the South Korea’s “peaceful Reunification policy” for the North Korea’ system safety. Therefore, there are two completely contrary policy directions for the North-South Korea at the beginning. The ROK has a strong desire to maintain the advantages toward the DPRK in the asymmetric structure of one-way nuclear deterrence, while the DPRK is committed to change the passive situation of being in the subordinate position on the issue of Reunification caused by the asymmetric security structure.

The security demands of the United States on the Korean peninsula are much more than just to prevent the North Korea from developing nuclear weapons and the attendant terror threats and nuclear proliferation. The United States of America seems to be more concerned about the “Asian balance of power”¹¹⁾, as well as the construction of the missile defense system in Asia. Dr. Kissinger states that, “The United States must maintain its presence in Asia. Its geopolitical objectives must continue to be preventing

9) Wang Sheng, “the analysis and forecast on the inter-Korean relation since Lee Myung-bak in administration”, *Contemporary World*, October, 2009.

10) In April, 2012, the North Korea amended the Constitution and cleared in preface to the self-proclaimed “nuclear possessors”.

11) Henry Kissinger, *The Global Strategy of the United States*, trans. Hu Li-ping and Ling Jian-ping, Hai Nan Press, 2009.

Asia to forge an unfriendly Group (the situation said above is most likely to occur when the Vulnerable Asia is influenced by one of the big countries in Asia).¹²⁾ “When the balance of power in Asia or the national interests of the United States face a real threat, the United States will never compromise.¹³⁾”

The American government seems to think that, the missile defense system in Asia is the only way to maintain the “Asian balance of power” and safeguard the interests of the United States. In the view of the US-Japan had cooperated to build into the missile defense system very early, the cooperation with the ROK to build the last part of the Northeast Asian missile defense system in the Korean peninsula will be the thing the United States yearns for. But the reality is that, since “the U.S. withdrawn the equipped tactical nuclear weapons from the South Korea in September of 1991¹⁴⁾”, the South Korean government has been resisting the requirements from the United States to deploy a missile defense system in South Korea. Dr. Kissinger said, “Seoul should understand Washington’s global responsibilities, should not criticize the U.S’ military plans, such as the missile defense system.¹⁵⁾” To build a missile defense system can enhance the national security coefficient through increasing the cost of attack from other countries. “If the U.S. was not equipped with the missile defense system, the country trying to blackmail it just needs to consider how reliable the weapon performance. The situation will be more complicated with the missile defense system plan. Though some atomic warheads could be possible to reach the United States, but it’s difficult to know exactly how many the number is. Either or it had to launch a nearly full-scale war.¹⁶⁾” On the surface, there is no common interests and proposition between

12) Henry Kissinger, *The Global Strategy of the United States*, trans. Hu Li-ping and Ling Jian-ping, Hai Nan Press, 2009, p. 101.

13) Henry Kissinger, *The Global Strategy of the United States*, trans. Hu Li-ping and Ling Jian-ping, Hai Nan Press, 2009, p. 108.

14) Chen Fengjun and Wang Chuanjian, *The big powers of Asia-Pacific and the Korean peninsula*, Beijing: Peking University Press, 2002, p. 105.

15) Henry Kissinger, *The Global Strategy of the United States*, trans. Hu Li-ping and Ling Jian-ping, Hai Nan Press, 2009, p. 121.

the ROK and the U.S. in the issue of deploying tactical nuclear missiles in the South Korea to build the Asian missile defense system. But, if some special conditions are equipped, this proposition to build TMD without common interests may true to be the common demand with common interests of both sides wish for.

The special conditions as follows: the first one, the North Korea possesses of nuclear weapons and develops delivery tools (including long-range bombers and range rocket¹⁷⁾); the second on, the deterioration of inter-Korean relations leads to the brink-of-war policy. In 2005, the North Korea had successfully produced the nuclear weapons what was widely used to criticize the reconciliation and cooperation policy toward the DPRK as a failure. However, the “non-nuclear·open·3000” policy toward the DPRK of Lee Myung-bak government carried out since 2008 makes the first condition more mature and makes the second one “successfully” turn to be reality. I believe that, when the ROK is completely powerless in controlling the North Korea nuclear issue, the South Korea would be possible to join in the U.S.-led missile defense system, then, to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea to build the missile defense system would become the ROK-US’ common interest, even though with the different actual pursuit: for the ROK, it is nominally to prevent the attack from the DPRK’s nuclear weapons; however, it will be a key step for the United States to finish the Asian missile defense system and hedge the strategic nuclear forces of Sino-Russia. The United States expects to keep the balance of power in Asia to guard against any attack from Asia (including “unexpected attack”) in this way. Dr. Kissinger admitted that, the missile defense system “is not only against a certain ‘rogue state’, but also to guard against other nuclear powers who are not ‘rogue states’. As even one nuclear missile could also cause catastrophic consequences, the United States must try to protect

16) Henry Kissinger, *The Global Strategy of the United States*, trans. Hu Li-ping and Ling Jian-ping, Hai Nan Press, 2009, p.56.

17) On the December 12th, 2012, the DPRK succeed to launch the “light star 3th” application satellite into space, experts said that the technology of DPRK to launch long-range rocket is relatively mature.

itself from accidental launch accident, unauthorized attacks, or for any purpose to launch a limited attack threat. In other words, the United States needs to maximize the cost of nuclear attack.¹⁸⁾”

As the next step of the chain reaction in the Northeast Asian security structure level, the completion of the U.S.-led missile defense system in the South Korea means the Sino-Russian strategic nuclear forces fail in deterring the United States in Northeast Asia, then, China and Russian would act as the role of the DPRK in the “ROK-U.S. vs. DPRK” structure due to the relatively stable balance of the “nuclear deterrence under the non-balance-of-power” turn into the unstable balance of the “one-way” nuclear deterrence. China and Russia may develop more powerful and penetrating strategic nuclear weapons to hedge the U.S. missile defense system in Asia. As early as 2005, Professor Xuetong Yan (閻學通) pointed out, “before 2007, China needs to effectively enhance the nuclear deterrent forces to ensure that the penetrating ability of the strategic nuclear weapons is more powerful than the intercept ability of the anti-missile system to consolidate the balance of the nuclear deterrence in East Asia.¹⁹⁾” The end should be worth the most worry in the chain reaction of Northeast Asian security structure level is just this outcome, in other words, it may lead a new round of nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia. I believe that, the real reason of China opposes the North Korea to possess of nuclear weapons is largely based on this disastrous consequences of the situation on the Korean peninsula rather than directly against the nuclear itself.

18) Henry Kissinger, *The Global Strategy of the United States*, trans. Hu Li-ping and Ling Jian-ping, Hai Nan Press, 2009, p.57.

19) Yan Xuetong, “The basis of the peace in East Asia”, Xinhua Monthly Report, October 26th, 2011, <http://www.xhyb.net.cn/detail.asp?id=33780>]

CHAPTER III: The Objectives of Studying on the Korean peninsula Reunification

It's no doubt that the Reunification in Korean peninsula would come true one day. The way of the reunification in the Korean peninsula is one of the objectives of studying on the Korean peninsula Reunification. For Chinese scholars, the studying on the Korean peninsula Reunification should also answer these questions that how to play a greater and more active role in the Korean peninsula unified process for China, as well as how to safeguard national interests and so on.

Section I : The Driving Forces of the Korean Peninsula Reunification

The most important concerns of studying on the Korean peninsula Reunification should be the issues of economic development in the DPRK and the political democratization in the ROK. On the road to Reunification, the North and South Korea should make different efforts: for the DPRK, it's to maintain sustained economic development and gradually return to the international community while the democratization process in the ROK would have far-reaching impact on the Korean peninsula Reunification.

The Economic Development in the DPRK

On the basis of long-term research in the DPRK' economic development, we draw a conclusion that, the DPRK' economy is orderly recovering and steady developing which could serve as an evidence for the first premise judgment that “the North Korea is a rational state actor” in the Korean peninsula Reunification studying.

A large gap between the DPRK and ROK in economic development serves as one of the major practical difficulties in the Korean peninsula Reunification. Even though the “absorption Reunification” (吸收統一) what the ROK wants was able to come true, the ROK's current economic strength is not sufficient to support the

stability and sustainable development of reunified Korean peninsula. The sustained and stable development of DPRK's economy is one of the main driving forces to narrow the gap between the two sides and to promote the common interests for the DPRK and ROK on the issue of the Korean peninsula Reunification.

The Political Democratization in the ROK

According to the view of class analysis, the contradiction on the Korean peninsula reunification of “who leads the Reunification, how to achieve the Reunification and what Reunification to achieve?” is mainly the class antagonism, in other words, it's the incompatibility between the proletariat in the DPRK and the big bourgeoisie in the ROK. Historical facts have proved largely that if the democratic reform faction is in power²⁰⁾, the ROK government tends to promote the reconciliation and cooperation policy toward the DPRK. While the ROK is in the ruling of conservatives²¹⁾, the government would draw hard-line policy toward the DPRK. It's believed that there is a strong positive correlation between the Korean peninsula reunification and political democratization in the ROK which could reduce the class differences and antagonisms between the South-North Korea objectively and essentially. In other words, it's not only in the facts, but also on theoretical reasoning, the political democratization in the ROK is the fundamental and most important driving force of promoting the inter-Korean's political harmony and Reunification.

The Delimitation Problem

There are many disputes on the demarcation between the North-South Korea, including the dispute caused by large area of overlap of the South Korea's “NLL” with the territorial waters the North Korea claimed which leads to many frictions, and even armed conflicts. At the current stage, the demarcation problem may serve as an

20) As the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun governments.

21) Such as the Lee Myung-bak government, the 18th presidential candidate Park Geun-hye is a member of the conservative faction, too.

important incentive of the North-South conflicts, but in the long run, the contradiction on the delimitation problem is more likely to promote the reconciliation and cooperation between the DPRK and the ROK, which requires some preconditions as follows: the benign development and deep interaction among the sustainable economic development in the DPRK and continued political democratization in the ROK. At this stage, the policy of “擱置爭議、共同開發” (putting aside the disputes and seeking common development) would become the joint optimal choice, and ultimately would solve the demarcation problem by promoting the Reunification process.

Section II: The Choices for China on the Korean peninsula Reunification

For China, there are three questions on the Korean peninsula Reunification need to be identified:

First, how to look upon the Korean peninsula Reunification more accurately, including these problems related to the Korean peninsula Reunification discussed a lot in the former part of the paper;

Second, how to accurately define the role of China should play on the Korean peninsula Reunification. When talking about the North Korea nuclear problem, many scholars who subconsciously think that China's assistance to the DPRK should lead to the DPRK's subservience to China are indignant, because the North Korea usually ignores China's opinions. Researcher Zhu Liao-ye from Jilin Academy of Social Sciences holds that, “China is unable to control over the DPRK completely”, “China has an important influence on the North Korea, but this influence is limited and insufficient to control over the DPRK. China and the DPRK are two equal sovereign states with different core national interests.”²²⁾

22) Zhu Liaoye, “The trend of China-DPRK relations in the post North Korean nuclear period”, *Eastern Liaoning University (Social Sciences)*, Vol. 12, No.3, 2010, p.126.

The author thinks that China cannot and should not control over the DPRK. It's not only based on the international code of conduct, but also based on the consideration of the national strategic interests: China is still unequipped with the ability to provide the security protection of the nuclear umbrella for the DPRK in structural level. As it means that China head-on confronts with the U.S-ROK alliance. If China can't provide the security protection for the controlled country, what whereby does China control over the DPRK?

What really should do is, if the "independent and peaceful Reunification" of the Korean peninsula is in line with China's national interests as China government claimed, China should take some effective efforts to promote the DPRK's economic development and the ROK's political democratization. Until now, China has taken some substantial steps in promoting the economic development in DPRK²³). However, there is still no effective ways and substantial progress in positively impacting on the ROK's political democratization. The possible way is to promote indirectly the political democratization in ROK through supporting the reconciliation and cooperation between the North-South Korea.

Third, one of the important negative factors to restrict China to play a greater role in the Korean peninsula affairs is, there is a serious differentiation in understanding and realizing the DPRK between the Chinese official and the public. In the post Cold War, the South Korea's media has mastered the discourse power on the Korean peninsula Reunification. The South Korea's media is filled with a variety of inaccurate reports about the North Korea. The network propagation with interpretation and Chinese media' simple quote have seriously negative impact on the Chinese public in understanding the Korean peninsula situation correctly. Compared with the ordinary people, the Chinese official grasps relatively true information about the North Korea, while the majority of ordinary people become the "slaves" of the ROK's media which

23) China and the DPRK are promoting the program of "co-development, co-management" in Changchun-Jilin-Tureen regions.

leads to serious division between the Chinese official and popular understanding about the DPRK. Therefore, the foundation of public opinion to play a greater role in the Korean peninsula has been seriously weakened. Researcher Piao advocated on this issue, “Chinese government needs to further improve the environment of domestic media and public opinion. In order to create more favorable conditions for the domestic media reports the Korean peninsula problems objectively and impartially, it’s necessary for the Chinese government to consider taking some practical measures.”²⁴⁾

24) Piao Jian-yi, “The causes and prospects of the current security crisis on the Korean peninsula”, in Zhang Jie and Yang Dan-zhi eds., *The assessment of Chinese perimeter security situation* (2011), Hong Kong, CO: Hong Kong Press for Social Sciences LTD, 2011, p. 46.

How Can Isolated Japan Go Back to the Region?

Kan Kimura (*Kobe University, Japan*)*

Main Points of Presentation

- 1) Basic situation of Japan-South Korean relations
- 2) Different understanding on US-China relations
- 3) Japanese policy to North Korea as an obstacle?
- 4) How isolated Japan can come back to mutual relations in this region.

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Japan-ROK relations

- Deep Discouragement in 2012
- Two Betrayed expectations
- 1) Increasing of mutual exchanges will ease international tensions.
- 2) Disputes are just made by a few nationalistic politicians
- → Situations in 2012 gave deep impacts to Japanese society
- Failure of mutual trust between new governments
- 1) High expectations of Japanese society to ROK new government
- 2) Low priority of Japan on South Korean diplomacy
- 3) Collapse of Abe's "value-oriented diplomacy"
- 4) Yasukuni visit, "Invasion" statement
- 5) Park's strong criticism against Japanese government.

Different understanding on US-China Relation

- South Korean changing view on Northeast Asian Relations
- → Big gap of understanding
- 1) Japan regards the basic situation as rivalry between US and China.
- → So they believe that the "value-oriented diplomacy" can work.
- 2) ROK regards that both of China and US indispensable and the relations are compatible.
- → So they also regard Japanese hard-policy against China as a big hindrance on Northeast Asian situation.

	GDP	China	South Korea	Japan	Year
China	5,878,629	—	3.52	5.07	2010
South Korea	1,116,247	19.76	—	9.68	2011
Japan	5,867,154	4.69	1.44	—	2011

New situation regarding on North Korea


- Decline of interests on abduction issue in Japan.
- Failure of economic sanctions against North Korea and Japanese loss of economic influence on North Korean economy.
- Increasing pressure from China to North Korea.
- Japanese government found this situation as a big chance to negotiate with North Korea.
- → Very negative reaction from South Korea about Japanese “intervention” to Korean situation, because it was regarded as a big obstacle for China-ROK cooperative pressure against North Korea.
- → it hurts more Japan-ROK relation.

Case Study: Trilateral Summit Meeting

- No sincere talks about how to solve most serious problems in the region, territorial/historical issue.
- Hidden Hypotheses
 - 1) The disputes were made by “evil” political leaders so the situation could be changed if leaders could have mutual trust.
 - → So they believed face-to-face meetings themselves were important.
 - 2) The situation could be calmed down if amounts of mutual exchanges increased.
 - → So they just prepared a lot of events to accelerate mutual exchanges.

Going beyond the myth of mutual exchange

- However, increasing of amounts of mutual exchanges never directly means increasing of mutual importance.
- Because of
 - 1) decreasing of economic importance of neighbors.
 - 2) decreasing of strategic importance of neighbors.
 - → Both prepare the structure to make publics easily understand relations with neighbors countries not so important anymore.
- However, political leaders just have believed the situation is calmed down by the mutual exchanges and neglected the situation.



Share of major partners in South Korean trade (1965-2011)





Table Two: Ratios to the number of articles including Japan on Chosun Ilbo

	일본+교과서 Japan + Textbook	위안부 Comfort woman	정신대 Volunteer labor corps	야스쿠니/야스쿠니 Yasukuni	신사+참배 Shinto Shrine + Worship	일본+독도 Japan Dokdo/Takeshima	일본+독립운동 Japan independence movement	친일파 Japanese collaborator	일본+배상 Japan Compensation
	日本+教科 書	慰安婦	挺身隊	靖園	神社+參拜	独島	獨立運動	親日派	日本+賠償
1945-49	0	0	0.001618123	0	0	0	0	0.025080906	0.03802589
1950-54	0	0	0	0	0	0.0272277	0	0.001237624	0.01608911
1955-59	0.0006427	0	0	0	0	0.002892	0	0	0.00771208
1960-64	0	0	0	0	0	0.0070439	0	0.000454442	0.00499886
1965-69	0.0005992	0	0	0	0	0.0077891	0.0005992	0.000299581	0.0014979
1970-74	0.0003898	0	0	0.0011694	0.0001949	0.0009745	0	0	0.00116936
1975-79	0.0004597	0.0002298	0	0.0002298	0.0004597	0.0098828	0	0.000229832	0.00114916
1980-84	0.0276865	0	0.001173158	0.0002346	0.0023463	0.0030502	0.0004693	0	0.00093853
1985-89	0.0127208	0	0.000942285	0.0004711	0.0025913	0.0025913	0.0007067	0.000471143	0.00094229
1990-94	0.0068027	0.0986395	0.176870748	0.0034014	0.0181406	0.0022676	0	0.005668934	0.00793651
1995-99	0.0066994	0.1201429	0.016971862	0.0049129	0.0138455	0.0107191	0.0017865	0.004912908	0.00267977
2000-04	0.0114464	0.066077	0.010405827	0.0244537	0.0468262	0.0083247	0.0005203	0.005723205	0.00156087
2005-09	0.011236	0.0594569	0.005149813	0.0440075	0.0205993	0.042603	0.0014045	0.013576779	0.00327715

DB Chosun, <http://db.chosun.com/DBmain.html> (last visited on February 4, 2011).



How can Japan be back to cooperation?

- Destruction of mutual trust between Japan and South Korea, not only of ruling elites but also of public opinions
- → Ruling elites have less incentives to reconstruct the relations.
- Both need to find the incentives of mutual cooperation between two countries.
- Questions for Japanese
 - 1) What actual interests Japan get from smoother relations in the region.
 - 2) What Japan can do for the region
- → Of course, it is nonsense to believe Japan can not get anything from the smoother relations, and Japan, the third biggest economy in the world, can not do anything there.

*So, we welcome
your any suggestions!*

Thank you for your attention.

International Legal Framework for Economic Co-Operation of Russia in the Northern Asia-Pacific Region

Dmitry Labin (*Moscow State Institute for International Relations, Russia*)*

The provision of an international legal framework for economic co-operation in the Asia-Pacific region has recently become very topical. Especially since the Russia's accession to the WTO in 2012 and preparation to join the OECD.

Thus, the implementation of the project to land a gas pipeline from Russia to South Korea through the territory of the DPRK could give a new momentum to the sub-regional economic integration in the Korean peninsula.

According to the new Eastern Gas Program¹⁾, adopted by the Government of the Russian Federation, Russia has set the task to develop the new long-term export lines to supply its natural gas in the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, in order

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1) On 3 September 2007 the Ministry of Industry and Energy of the Russian Federation approved the "Programme of creation an integrated gas production, transportation and supply system in Eastern Siberia and the Far East, with the view of gas exports to China and other countries in the Asia-Pacific region." <http://www.gazprom.ru/production/projects/east-program>.

to ensure the safe energy security, the Republic of Korea seeks to diversify its energy imports lines so as not to depend solely on the Middle East region. This trend of events prompted the co-operation between Russia and the Republic of Korea aimed to implement the project of gas supply from Russia to the Republic of Korea.

It should be noted that there has been established a sound legal basis for a full-scale bilateral economic cooperation between Russia and South Korea. The following agreements have been concluded: on trade; on investments; on illegal, unreported and unregulated harvesting of living marine resources; on elimination of double taxation; on cooperation in military-technical sphere; on cooperation in the peaceful use of the nuclear energy; on cultural exchange, and many others.

South Korean investments as well as their range have been constantly expanding in many regions of Russia. Besides, Russia and South Korea are satisfied with the common business environment and are interested in the development of the business connections with North Korea, including the free economic areas in East Asia. In 2012 South Korea has become a third major investor from Asian region to Russian economy (immediately after Kazakhstan and China).

As regards the statistics, the mutual total trade in last year already reached \$ 25 billion, while the volume of the Korean investments accumulated in the Russian economy since 1989 as of the current year amounts to 3 billion U.S.\$.

Nowadays the conditions favorable for the investments exchange in both countries have allowed the South Korean business to expand beyond the Far East region of Russia. According to the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry the two-thirds of the regions of the Russian Federation are developing business connections with South Korea, as compared to only one third in the early 2000s. Moreover, South Korea offers to its Russian partners more favorable investment conditions than many Chinese or Japanese counterparts.

All this resulted from the liberalization of the foreign economic policy of Seoul, which is based today primarily on the expansion of free trade areas involving South Korea. The creation of such an area has been negotiated between China, Japan and

South Korea; and a similar project is being implemented with the United States. Having in view the development of the mutual economic relations, I think it is quite possible that something similar may be created between South Korea and Russia.

However, we must not forget that the foreign investors are primarily interested in the issues of security of their investments and property as well as the rule of law. Russia has yet to do a lot in this sphere despite the things that have been done already. Investors appreciate the real actions, not promises.

Today Russia takes for granted the need to maintain the traditionally friendly relations with the DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) on the basis of generally accepted international standards. Russia is strongly against its political and economic isolation. The new Treaty of Friendship, Good-neighborliness and cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was signed on 9 February 2000 (substituted the Treaty of 1961).

This agreement laid down the international legal basis for the future implementation of joint projects, including those in the energy cooperation field.

It is important to note that in 2006 the intergovernmental Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments of 1996 was ratified. This agreement provides for the necessary conditions for the protection of investments made in the framework of the bilateral economic cooperation between Russia and the DPRK.

Despite the complicated relationship between the ROK and the DPRK, it is unlikely that there would be any international law difficulties connected with the conclusion of a tripartite intergovernmental agreement should all necessary conditions for commercially beneficial projects, such as the transit of natural gas, be agreed. As the UN members, our countries are the equal international law actors, that is they have a right to enter into such agreements. In our opinion, the determining factor in this respect should be the mutual economic benefit of the parties. However, it should be noted that there is a non-ordinary international law problem in the relations between the two Koreas. Therefore the reunification of Korea, should it happen of course, would meet the national interests of Russia on the following grounds:

1. The Reunification Headed by South Korea Will Urge The Development of the Russian Far East And Siberia.

The key projects for the development of energetic and travel corridors in the Russian Far East and Siberia suggest transit through the territory of the DPRK. Such projects can not be implemented with the current isolation regime of North Korea, the regime which is hard to rely on.

2. The Expansion of Economic Co-Operation with the Unified Korea Would Increase the Economic Benefits for Russia.

After the reunification of Korea, Russia will get access for the participation in the large-scale projects connected with the transport, energy and industry on the favorable conditions. In addition, there would be a growth in demand for the goods traditionally exported from Russia (timber, metals, fuel and raw materials), as well as for the energy infrastructure and helicopters.

3. The Reunification of Korea Will Provide the Excellent Opportunities for Russia to Strengthen Its Position and Influence in the Asia-Pacific Region.

First, in order to reduce dependence on China and increase the influence in the region a system of multilateral cooperation is required. And the most reliable and influential partner in this process is the unified Korea.

Second, if Russia will contribute to the cause of reunification of Korea (for example,

by settling the North Korean nuclear problem and establishing a multilateral system of security in the region), it will therefore play a leading role in:

- (1) the development of the Russian-Korean and Chinese border areas,
- (2) the creation of a sub-regional energy community of the North-Eastern part of Asia, and
- (3) the creation of the East Sea countries economic community.

Thus Russia will be able to strengthen its position in the region. This policy was reiterated once more by the Russian President Vladimir Putin at the recent APEC summit in Vladivostok, who noted that regional integration should enhance the dynamics of the world economy development and play a key role in upholding the open market and freedom trade rules.

According to the President Putin, it is important to stimulate the global negotiating process and encourage it on the lower levels as well as form the expanded integration areas and create the mechanisms for dialogue between the regional and sub-regional groupings.

On balance, this means that Russia finally appears on the verge of leadership in the Far East, which she failed to achieve one hundred years ago.

Discussion

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Discussion

Annika Bolten-Drutschmann (*Federal Foreign Office, Germany*)*

* **Annika Bolten-Drutschmann**, Policy Planning Staff (Asia), Federal Foreign Office, Germany

Discussion

Sandip Kumar Mishra (*University of Delhi, India*)*

* Sandip Kumar Mishra, Professor, University of Delhi, India

Discussion

Sung Chull Kim (*Seoul National University, South Korea*)*

* **Sung Chull Kim**, Humanities Korea Professor of IPUS, Seoul National University, South Korea

Session II

International Community's Support for Korean Unification

Presentation

The Role of a Unified Korea in Peaceful Cooperation within Northeast Asia
Young-Ho Park (Korea Institute for National Unification, South Korea)

How Can China Acquiesce in Korean Unification?
Fei Long (Shanghai International Studies University, China)

Planning for Korean Unification: International Cooperation & Comparative Understanding
Sheena Greitens (Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies, U.S.A)

Multilateralism and the Role of the European Union in Facilitating Korean Unification
Eric Ballbach (Free University of Berlin, Germany)

Discussion

Zachary Hosford (Center for a New American Security, U.S.A)
Natalia Toganova (Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russia)
Xiao-ke Wang (Jilin University, China)
Hiroyasu Akutsu (National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan)
Achakorn Wongpreedee (The National Institute of Development Administration, Thailand)

The Role of a Unified Korea in Peaceful Cooperation within Northeast Asia¹⁾

Young-Ho Park (*Korea Institute for National Unification, South Korea*)*

Introduction

Year 2013 is the 60th anniversary of the conclusion of the Armistice Agreement of the Korean War. But, the Korean peninsula is still divided. Although South and North Korea have had more than 600 dialogues and contacts since the early 1970s, the basic characteristics of tension and conflict between them remains. During the last six decades, the two Koreas have trodden different paths to the national development. The results are starkly different. South Korea has become a member of the DAC of the OECD. It has achieved both economic development and democratization. But, North Korea remains as one of the poorest countries in the world and is also regarded as one of the worst human rights situation.

While the majority of its people continue to live in a dire economic condition,

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1) This is a draft for presentation, not for quotation.

North Korea has developed nuclear weapons program. It now claims a 'nuclear weapons state.' It poses significant challenges to international order in Northeast Asia as well as to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. This is why all concerned countries exert every effort to achieve the denuclearization of North Korea.

Although Korean unification may be many years off, it can happen at the certain historical crossroads. The Korean peninsula should not remain in the state of conflict and confrontation in the global age. Korean unification will be a key turning point for Korea to leap forward. It will also bring about a great opportunity for the durable peace and common prosperity of Northeast Asia.

Theoretical Types of Unification²⁾

<Table 1> shows a result of opinions presented at an experts workshop organized by the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) in October 2002 and the categorization of unification types according to a CSIS report published in August 2002.³⁾

Opinion 1 suggested three unification types: unification by agreement, unification by absorption, and unification by war. Unification by agreement is a peaceful unification resulting from the conclusion of an agreement between South and North Korea. There are two sub-types in terms of government system: unitary system and federal/confederal system. Unification by absorption sees the possibility that South Korea's liberal democracy and market economy reaches out to whole North Korea. Unification by war sees the possibility of complete destruction of the military demarcation line by armed conflict.

2) Young-Ho Park, "Scenarios for Korean Unification and North Korea Contingencies" *Korea and World Affairs*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Spring 2010), pp. 9-11.

3) CSIS Working Group Report, *A Blue Print for U.S. Policy toward a Unified Korea* (Washington, DC: CSIS, August 2002), pp. 3-9.

Opinion 2 proposed to choose the modality of unification (intentional or accidental) and method of unification (absorption or co-existence) as two standard variables. On the modality of unification, ‘intentional’ means the two Koreas achieve unification according to planned intention and program; ‘accidental’ means achieving unification by the impact of drastic changes from internal and external environments. There are four types of unification. The first one is intentional absorption type, including unification by arms. The second type of intentional co-existence applies to the first phase of unification in Yemen. The third type is accidental unification by absorption, like the German-style unification. The fourth type is accidental co-existence and there has been no such case.

Opinion 3 presented three unification types: agreement type, absorption type, and war type. But, it pointed out that actual unification can happen in composition.

The CSIS report also indicated that there can be various unification types of the Korean peninsula, but ultimately they can be categorized into the three types: unification by peaceful integration, unification by absorption due to the failure of the North Korean system, and unification by war.

<Table 1> Unification Types

Opinion 1	Opinion 2	Opinion 3	CSIS
Agreement type (Unitary, Federal or Con-federal)	Intentional absorption (War type)	Agreement type	Peaceful integration type (soft landing)
Absorption type	Intentional Co-existence (Agreement type) Accidental absorption (Absorption type)	Absorption type	Collapse of system/absorption type (hard landing)
War type	Accidental Co-existence (Absorption type)	War type	War type

Feasibility of Unification by Types⁴⁾

<Table 2> shows the feasibility of unification by types. In actual situation, however, it will be dependent on the conditions of timing and circumstances. It is true that no one expected German unification back in 1989. In the early 1990s, many experts predicted that North Korea would face sudden collapse in a short time period. But North Korea remains as it is.

On the feasibility of unification by types, the following is a summary of the experts' discussion: first, the majority believed that the agreement type unification would be difficult to implement without the process of co-existence and integration between South and North Korea. It is an ideal type of unification, but it needs fundamental changes in North Korea. The feasibility is not high if the premise is that North Korea should undergo a peaceful and gradual transition toward a liberal democracy and capitalist market system.

Absorption type unification as a result of a drastic change in North Korea is highly unstable and difficult to cope with, but is evaluated to be relatively highly likely than other types. The feasibility may change depending on stable development and future-oriented inter-Korean relations and changes in North Korea. The possibility of North Korea's collapse is a key factor in evaluating the feasibility of the absorption type unification.

No one wants unification by war. The feasibility of the war type unification was evaluated to be minimal. It is believed to be an issue of preparation for war rather than a unification scenario. The CSIS report also viewed it as the worst scenario, but it emphasized the need for the United States' military role in regards to the unification process in the type of military collision.

4) Young-Ho Park, "Scenarios for Korean Unification and North Korea Contingencies." pp. 12-13.

<Table 2> Feasibility by Unification Types

Opinion 1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agreement type– High possibility in long-term • Absorption type – Highest possibility in mid- to long-term • War type – Small possibility in short-term, but minimal
Opinion 2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intentional absorption type – Low • Intentional co-existence type – Low • Accidental absorption type – High • Accidental co-existence type – High
Opinion 3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agreement type – Low • Absorption type – High • War type – Not for consideration
CSIS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Peaceful integration type – Not feasible without a very long period of co-existence and integration • Collapse of system (Absorption type) – Highly likely, although unable to make accurate forecast • War type – Unlikely, but the United States is preparing most for an accidental military accident

Possible Timing of Unification

<Table 3> shows the changing trend of the public opinion of the Korean people on the possible timing of Korean unification. Although the portion of predicting ‘impossibility’ has been increasing, an interesting point is that regardless of the time of survey, the Korean people generally predicted 10 to 20 years until unification is possible. It can be said that they chose the safest timing barring something unusual happening. But, unification could come at any time as history unfolds. According to a German survey conducted in 1987, only 3 percent of respondents said ‘yes’ to the possibility of German unification.⁵⁾

5) Seike Jansen, Zwei Deutsche Staaten-zwei deutsche Nationen? In: Deutschland-Archiv, October 1989, p. 1139.

<Table 3> Possible Timing of Unification

Year	Within 5 years	Within 10 years	Within 20 years	Within 30 years	Over 30 years	Impossible
1999	3.0%	27.0%	28.3%	7.4%	11.3%	22.9% ^①
2002 ^②	0.0%	13.0%	44.9% ^③	40.6% ^④	–	1.4%
2007	3.7%	23.5%	30.8%	14.7%	13.8%	13.3%
2008	2.3%	13.0%	22.1%	15.5%	24.9%	22.3% ^③
2009	2.80%	16.9%	27.6%	16.2%	16.5%–	19.8%
2010	3.4%	17.8%	24.1%	13.4%	20.8%	20.6%
2011 ^⑤		10.7%	16.4%	12.3%	11.3%	49.4%
2011 ^⑥		11.0%	21.3%	12.0%	18.1%	37.5%

Source: KINU (1999-2002, 2011), IPUS (2007-2010)

① Those who said “don’t know” ② 2002 results are from experts’ survey ③ 10-15 years (21.7%), 15-20 years (23.2%) ④ The choice was “after 20 years” ⑤ April 2011 ⑥ July 2011

Strategic Interests of the Four Surrounding Countries of the Korean Peninsula

USA’s Strategic Interests

- A unified Korea based on liberal democracy and open-market economy is a vital interest for the US
- Regional stability may become even more critical in the tenuous period of uncertainty and turmoil likely to characterize Korea’s transition
- Disposal of North Korea’s WMD arsenal, materials and production facilities
- Sustained regional economic growth through the promotion of market economies and open sea-lanes
- Preserve US treaty alliances as cornerstone of peace and stability in East Asia
- Keep regional balance of power by ongoing commitment to regional security and mitigate potential military rivalries

China's Strategic Interests

- A unified Korea allied to the US would create fear for the Chinese
- Stability in the region to sustain and create economic prosperity
- Positive proof of the disposal of North Korea's WMD arsenal and production facilities
- Regional balance of power not to impinge on Japan's interests
- Opportunities for expanding markets and conducting an economic exploitation

Japan's Strategic Interests

- A unified Korea with its military capability and economic potential would undoubtedly create fear for the Japanese, due to past grievances and a belief of retribution on Korea's part.
- Stability in the region to sustain and create economic prosperity
- Positive proof of the disposal of North Korea's WMD arsenal and production facilities
- Regional balance of power not to impinge on Japan's interests
- Opportunities for expanding markets and conducting an economic exploitation

Russia's Strategic Interests

- A unified Korea will have a positive effect on its position in the Asia-Pacific region
- A stable Northeast Asia would strengthen its diplomatic power in the Far East
- It gains a reliable partner on the Korean peninsula
- Create opportunities for Russian businesses and the government to participate in massive transport, energy and industrial projects
- Create new demand for Russian energy, timber, metal and petrochemical products, and machinery

Unified Korea's Policy Options

US-Korea Alliance

- Preference for a reconfigured status quo(stability)
- US commitment to post-Unification security
- Restructuring of the existing US-ROK alliance

Sino-Korea Entente

- Encourage DPRK economic reforms following the China model
- Increase Chinese influence in both North and South Korea
- Shape outcome of eventual Korean unification in favorable directions
- Advance Chinese economic development through trade and investment in both South Korea and North Korea.

Strategic Independence

- Stability more important than denuclearization (due to potential domestic impact of a DPRK collapse)
- Impact on relations with United States important consideration
- Opportunity to showcase Chinese influence, diplomatic weight


Neutrality

- Stability more important than denuclearization (due to potential domestic impact of a DPRK collapse)

The Role of the Four Surrounding Countries in Korean Unification

<Table 4> shows that how Korean experts' on unification and North Korea see the role of the four surrounding countries in Korean unification. In a KINU project of predicting Korean unification,⁶⁾ a question was asked to a panel of 51 experts. The question was "Do you think that U.S. (China, Russia, Japan) interests agree or disagree with the idea of Korean unification?"

<Table 4> The Role of the Four Surrounding Countries in Korean Unification



6) Young-Ho Park and Hyeong Ki Kim, 2010 Unification Clock: *When Will We See a Unified Korea?* (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2010), pp. 34-35.

About 70.6 percent answered ‘positive’ on the role of the United States in unification. The panel member’s view on China’s role in Korean unification was negative. On the role of Russia, panel member’s views appeared to be neutral. They were slightly more negative toward Japan’s role in Korean unification than of Russia’s. The panel viewed that international community would be somewhat friendly to the unification of the Korean peninsula.

The Role of a Unified Korea in Peaceful Cooperation⁷⁾

The four surrounding countries of the Korean peninsula have keen interests in the Korean unification. Korean unification means a fundamental change to the state of the Korean peninsula. It will have major effects on the interests of the four surrounding countries and on dynamics and international order in Northeast Asia. Korean unification will bring about many positive effects or benefits for each of those countries. And it will greatly contribute to the peace and common prosperity of Northeast Asia.

The United States

- A unified Korea will contribute to prevailing the United States’ national interest and its traditional values to Asian regions and the world. South Korea is a model of simultaneously achieving economic development and democratization. A unified Korea can become a model of contribution to international peace and common prosperity.
- A unified Korea could contribute to international peace by actively participating in preventing new security threats along with the United States. Korea’s active participation in the making of a peaceful world order will bring about positive effects to

7) Young-Ho Park, “Korea’s Diplomatic Strategy for Unifying the Korean Peninsula” Jung-Ho Bae (ed.), *Korean Unification and the Positions and Roles of the Four Neighboring Powers* (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2011), pp. 147-151.

- maintaining the United States' leadership.
- The unified Korea will be a worldwide model of nonproliferation and active realization of peace as a denuclearized peaceful country.
 - The unified Korea will play a peace mediator role for conflicts that could arise in the dynamics among the powers in the Northeast Asian region. Amid continued Korea-U.S. strategic alliance, the unified Korea will share the role with the United States.
 - The unified Korea will be able to prevent China from becoming a hegemonic country and thereby prevent the emergence of a “vertical Sino-centric” international order, and contribute to the emergence of a horizontal peace order that is mutually beneficial and equal.
 - A unified Korea will be a bridge country linking the continent and ocean and Korea-U.S. alliance will continue to play the role of the pillar of peace and stability in the Northeast Asia region even after unification, just like the continuation of the NATO alliance.
 - Korea-U.S. alliance will be operated amid cooperation with a Northeast Asian multi-lateral security cooperation system that is expected to be formed in the process of unification. Unified Korea's continued alliance with the United States will be a fortress of strategic cooperation through the United States' continued bilateral alliance with other Asia-Pacific countries such as Japan and Australia.
 - A unified Korea will be the catalyst of economic prosperity that leads the economic prosperity of the Northeast Asian region through the Korea-U.S. FTA, the Korea-China-Japan FTA, and developed Korea-Russia economic partnership.

China

- Pursuing the unification of Korea should be carried out along with developing trust relationships between Korea and China in political and security terms, and this will be the foundation of strategic friendly relations with China.
- The emergence of a unified Korea will contribute to peace and economic prosperity of Northeast Asia and positively contribute to China's national interest. The Unified

Korea will peacefully cooperate and coexist with China and contribute to expanding peace and security of Northeast Asia.

- The emergence of a unified Korea will positively contribute to China's economic interest, such as consummating China's long term strategy on modernization. That is, the emergence of a unified Korea will contribute to creating a stable and peaceful environment intended by China, present an opportunity to accelerate the economic development in Northeastern China, and provide a positive turning point in China's construction of the Northeast Asian community.
- The unified Korea will respect the existing borders with North Korean regions as well as China's minority policy based on the principle of non-intervention.
- Korea-U.S. alliance after unification will be adjusted in accordance with the post-unification era. Korea-U.S. relations will be developed to more balanced relations, and Korea-China military cooperation will be possible, and military trust and cooperation between Korea and China will increase.
- A unified Korea eliminates the source of security crisis on the Korean peninsula and thus will be an important opportunity for parallel development of Korea-U.S. alliance and Korea-China strategic cooperative relationship.

Japan

- Unified Korea will be the foundation for further advancement of Korea-Japan relationship based on the "strategic cooperative" relations that are expected to follow as relationships between the two countries develop further.
- A unified Korea will play the role of neutralizing China's "vertical Northeast Asian order" by cooperating with Japan.
- The process of realizing unified Korea will propel continuous development of the Northeast Asian community centered on Korea, Japan, and China. The emergence of a unified Korea is the path to realizing the Northeast Asian community also favored by Japan.
- Unified Korea will play the role of partner for denuclearization and creating peace

in the Northeast Asian region. The unified Korea will be the friendliest neighboring country to Japan in the aspect of foreign relations and security.

- Cooperation with Japan is inevitable in the process of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula, and this will be a stage to unfold Japan's initiative to make Northeast Asia a nuclear-free zone.
- Comprehensive security cooperation between the unified Korea and Japan will play the role of neutralizing China's "vertical Northeast Asian order."
- If the unified Korea presents an opportunity for co-existence and co-prosperity throughout Northeast Asia, the unified Korea would be a genuine helper to Japan's "Northeast Revitalization New Deal policy" in the economic aspect.
- Unified Korea and Japan will be positioned as equal leaders and competitors in good faith in the advanced technology industries of the Northeast Asian region.
- The unified Korea will present an opportunity to propel the realization of the Northeast Asian community planned by Japan.
- With regard to history issues, the emergence of a unified Korea will be an opportunity to resolve conflict elements with Japan and make a new start.
- The unified Korea will present a clue to fundamentally resolving the issue of North Korea's abduction of Japanese, which is one of the issues of the Japanese people's acute concern.
- In social and cultural aspects, the unification of Korea will be an opportunity to develop the existing pop culture represented by the Korean wave to a new pop culture combining the traditional culture of North and South Korea. As countries of strong traditional and pop culture, social and cultural exchanges between the unified Korea and Japan in various forms could generate the effect of actively sending the message of Northeast Asian culture to the entire world.

Russia

- The unification of Korea will bring about considerable benefits to Russia, such as maintaining the stability of the Korean peninsula, removal of North Korea's weapons

of mass destruction, central country of the Eurasian connections, entry of the Russian Far East into the Asia-Pacific economic bloc, and full-steam development of the East Siberian areas and the Russian Far East.

- The process and emergence of a unified Korea will play the role of stepping stone for new development in the areas that traditionally border between Russia and the Korean peninsula, while respecting Russia's interest in these areas.
- The emergence of a unified Korea will be an opportunity for the Russian Far East's economic leaping forward. Full-scale development of Siberian oil fields and underground resources, as well as transportation networks including the Eurasian railways and gas pipe lines will contribute to Russia's national development.
- Creating a friendly external environment is essential to Russia's successful achievement of its national goal of modernization and other goals and the stability of the Korean peninsula, which has a 17-km border with the Russian Far East, is also very important.
- The unification of the Korean peninsula will enable the Russian government to more focus on achieving its national goals because it will transform a potential conflict region in the Russian border areas to a stable region.
- With the unification of the Korean peninsula, the TSR-TKR connection will naturally be realized and Russia will be able to emerge as the central country that connects major Eurasian cities -- Busan, Seoul, Wonsan, Khabarovsk, Siberia, Moscow, Prague, Frankfurt, and Paris. Through this connection, human and material movements between Europe and Northeast Asia are expected to increase on a large scale.
- The Russian government has long felt the need to develop East Siberia and the Far East areas, but has not been able to develop full-scale because of lack of capital, technology, manpower, and investment. Thus the unification of the Korean peninsula will open the possibility of developing this region on a full scale.

How Can China Acquiesce in Korean Unification?

Fei Long (*Shanghai International Studies University, China*)*

Introduction

Not so long ago, there was an article wildly quoted by China's major websites titled *In North Korea's Dangerous Game, It's China's Move*. This article which was published on an America based magazine — the *World Politics Review* reflected some very interesting views of the western world on China's attitude and possible role on Korean Peninsula issues.

In this article, Steven Metz, the author expressed an opinion about China's ideal role in the possible "Second Korean War", saying that he hope China can be "matured enough as a great power to allow the world to remove its dangerous allies this time". Despite its misjudgment on China's rationality in the 1950s' Korean War, this signal sentence reflected at least two very important aspects of westerner's view on China's role in Korean peninsula. Firstly, China is so powerful and so important in issues related

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to the DPRK, and it still has the ability to veto any action that the international society intends to take towards the DPRK. Secondly, the best thing they expect China to do in the coming change in Korean peninsula is to take a position of acquiescence.

The first idea is no need to explain more, while the second need further explanation.

In this speech, I plan, at the first part, to make an analysis on what China's ideal role in Korean unification process will be, showing why I agree with Metz's opinion of "acquiescence". The second part will focus on explaining under what circumstance China will acquiesce in the unification of Korean peninsula.

An announcement I want to make here is that my analysis is just the best guess I can make based on the international relations theory and my own understanding about China's foreign policy.

China's Grand Strategy and the DPRK's Role

China's grand strategy is widely discussed by scholars around the world. The core of China strategic design has never been changed since *economic growth* gained its central status in the late 1970s. The concept Peaceful Rise or Peaceful Development did show China's ambition to be a great power. However, in the foreseeable future, economic development is still the main focus of China's leaders and her citizens. In this sense, China's so called grand strategy is still a domestic-centrism plan focusing on inner development. The sentence "economic development needs a peaceful environment" has already become a doctrine for China's leaders. Maintaining peace and avoiding conflict, especially around our neighbors was and will be one of the main targets of China's foreign policy. We can also see this belief from the Strategic Opportunity Theory that the length of the strategic opportunity relies on how long will the peaceful environmental around China be kept. Therefore, we can say that if any activities want to get China's support, it must be proved to be beneficial to the stability of this area.

Rethinking the DPRK's role in China's strategy before we move on to the discussion will be helpful for us to get a better understanding about China's possible position in the coming Korean unification process. It turned out that if we re-judge the elements that make the DPRK important to China in the old days, situation really has changed a lot:

Firstly, the DPRK can no longer serve as an effective Strategic Buffer for China, for the concept Strategic Buffer itself is already outdated. This opinion is very reasonable as war today is dominated by high-tech weapon that allows a military operation in a much longer distance.

Secondly, the DPRK is not a reliable ally for China. China's feeling of being used by the DPRK rose from the Korean Nuclear Crisis. As we can learn from the DPRK-USA interaction history, the DPRK's main concern was the attitude and reaction of the USA, not China. This American-centrism in the DPRK's foreign policy shows that it is more a speculator, rather than a good comrade.

Thirdly, the DPRK, under the leadership of the young Kim Jong-un, may not be a very rational country. Its nuclear weapon will be as dangerous to China as to other countries. If we draw a map of the DPRK's nuclear instruments, we can see that most of them are settled near China's northeast border. So we can see that the DPRK is using China as a shield for its nuclear instruments, for China's northeast area will greatly suffer from any kinds of nuclear bombings.

Therefore, the DPRK in China's grand peace-and-stable-maintaining strategy is not as important as many traditional ideas believed.

With this uncomfortable situation, we cannot say that China will make the first movement to change the relation structure in Korean peninsula. This opinion comes from nation or human's nature: path-dependence and fear of uncertainty. We can see that during the world history, countries always tend to avoid change unless the situation was of great necessity and urgency. Even though the DPRK is not a very reasonable player, China cannot easily abandon the proved relatively successful experience built in the last 50 years, to seek for a future full of uncertainty and risks.

Prudence and fine-tune (rather than reform) are very useful keywords to better understand China's foreign policy. Therefore, a change in the Korean peninsula such as a unification process or warfare against the DPRK operated by China first is unthinkable.

However, it will be a totally different story if the incident was lead by some other actors in this area. As we can see from Sudan issue, even though China preferred a stable situation, it showed some mature ability to adjust its policy and action to face the unavoidable governmental change there. In this sense, it is fair to say that there is possibility for China to turn its policy on Korean Unification from resisting any changes to acquiescing in changes, of course, under the circumstance that it is reassured and its wills are satisfied.

Korean Unification as a Risk to China

Specifically speaking, the main reason why China is not showing a positive attitude toward Korean Unification is that she has not enough confidence on the future of a united Korea. In other words, China is afraid of the USA's dominance in Korean unification process.

As far as China is concerned, if the model of the military relationship and power structure between the USA and the ROK remains the same, which means the USA keeps the Wartime Operational Control and U.S. troops remains stationed in Korean peninsula, the USA will without a doubt dominate the Korean unification process. As a result, the U.S. dominated Korean unification will bring a pro-American country and highly rely on the military support from the Americans, which is not what China wants to see. Under this context, for China, it will make a lot of sense to see the new Korea as American's new strategic asset to give pressure on China, rather than a new friend to make.

The U.S troops near Yalu River will be a strategic nightmare for China. Even

though in this global and nuclear age, any type of warfare between two major powers like China and the U.S is unthinkable, China will suffer the pressure from the U.S at least mentally. This is a lesson China learned from the history of its interaction with the former Soviet Union. In the days of military confrontation, China's economic development was highly influenced by Soviet's military force in the north border, though people know that the price of war is too high for both of them to afford.

All in all, if China has not enough confidence in the new unified Korean, then North Korea's existence will be a "last bad" option.

Elements that Make China's Acquiescence Possible

From China's perspective, the acceptable power that dominates the Korean unification process will be the South Korea alone. At the same time, the international society including the USA might offer some assistance while take no further involvement.

China's attitude on the Korean unification issue will mostly rely on South Korea's capacity and straightening out her relations with the USA. The official statement that "China will always support an independent reunification in Korean peninsula" shows that China would like to see an independent unification process without the USA. China is not likely to seek for an unarmed and neutral Korea, for she usually respects countries' basic needs. However, China will be very likely to ask the U.S arm forces to leave the Korean peninsula and give Korea fully independence and autonomy.

The South Korean dominated Korean unification process matches up with China's national interests.

On the one hand, Korean people reaching the goal of unification relatively independently will make the new Korea a more independent country. Without taking military responsibility in American Asian alliance system, the Korea will have more strategic space in Northeast Asia, and opportunities with her will also be relatively

wider. In other words, China will be able to try to make a new friend with this new neighbor, rather than treat as a new threat.

On the other hand, the new Korea would focus mostly on its own development and seek to be a peaceful actor for a long time. Rebuilding the underdeveloped north will need wide international cooperation, which will not only benefit China's own economy, but also create new way to promote construction of North Asian community.

If all my above analysis stands, we can come to a conclusion that China's attitude on the Korean unification issue will mainly depends on the South Korea's efforts. Whether the ROK is powerful and skillful enough to normalize the relationship with the USA will be in the key position of China's concern.

Planning for Korean Unification: International Cooperation & Comparative Understanding

Sheena Greitens (*Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies, U.S.A*)*

Introduction: Thinking About Unification

The division of the Korean peninsula has now persisted for six decades. As the U.S.-ROK alliance completes its sixtieth year, the regime in Pyongyang appears to have outlasted many of its authoritarian counterparts and successfully executed its second leadership transition - a notoriously difficult task for authoritarian political systems.¹⁾ There is little evidence that either collapse or systemically threatening instability are imminent in North Korea today. Nevertheless, the events of 1989 in Eastern Europe, and of the Arab Spring have shown that relatively small events can disrupt long-standing equilibria, and that change almost always comes unexpectedly.²⁾ The same may well be true on

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1) Succession is notoriously difficult for authoritarian regimes to accomplish. See Jason Brownlee, "Hereditary Succession in Modern Autocracies," *World Politics* (July 2007), pp. 596-628.

2) Victor D. Cha and Nicholas D. Anderson, "A North Korean Spring?" *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Winter 2012), pp. 7-24; Timur Kuran, "Now out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the Eastern European Revolution of 1989," *World Politics*, Vol. 44, No. 1 (1991), pp. 7-48.

the Korean peninsula.

Preparing for unification is a central task of the government and people of the Republic of Korea. Unification planning is constitutionally mandated, and Trustpolitik has already become a hallmark of President Park's tenure. Inter-Korean communiqués have consistently emphasized that unification should be a Korean-led process, a stance fully supported by the United States. At the same time, unification planning has important implications for neighboring countries and for the international community. Unification of the Korean peninsula is likely to impose significant costs not just on the Korean people, but on regional actors and the international community, and to mark a strategic sea change in the East Asian security environment. A number of factors, however, have thus far limited international discussion about unification, as well as long-term contingency planning. These include more urgent, competing demands on the time and attention of the governments involved; political constraints that make some actors reluctant to discuss contingencies that they view as undesirable; and the simple hypothetical nature of any potential unification scenario.

There is significant division among scholars and policymakers who work on Korea as to the state of the North Korean regime, its current and future stability, and the most likely scenarios under which unification could become a possibility.³⁾ Accordingly, one recent report by Victor Cha and David Kang highlights the difference between a “big bang” versus a “gradualist” unification process,⁴⁾ while a previous report by Jonathan Pollack and Lee Chung-Min identified four possible scenarios: integration and peaceful unification; collapse and absorption; unification through conflict; disequilibrium and external intervention.⁵⁾ In reality, we should be prepared for the possibility that unifi-

3) For example, Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind, “Pyongyang’s Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North Korea,” *International Security*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Summer 2010), pp. 44-74; Sheena Chestnut Greitens, “Succession and Stability in North Korea,” *CSIS Korea Platform* (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2011).

4) Victor Cha and David Kang, *Challenges for Korean Unification Planning* (USC-CSIS Joint Report, December 2011), p. 49. Victor Cha and David Kang, *Challenges for Korean Unification Planning* (USC-CSIS Joint Report, December 2011), p. 49.

cation may incorporate elements of all of these scenarios.

The circumstances of unification may not be clear in advance, but they will decisively affect which challenges will be central to the unification process, how those challenges can be confronted, in what order, and what policy initiatives to address those challenges might look like. They will also affect how American foreign policy-makers address unification-related questions. Decision-makers in Seoul, Beijing, and Washington may prioritize different indicators for collapse or transition, and may therefore have different thresholds for intervention and the initiation of any “unification” process. Once someone acts, however, the “first mover” question will, in turn, have path-dependent effects on everything that follows, and will constrain other actors’ choices.⁶⁾ As a result, the circumstances of unification will have a decisive influence on American perspectives and on the United States’ desired role.

In the United States, research and planning for unification scenarios has primarily been conducted by the U.S. military and researchers affiliated with it; these studies have focused on contingency planning for a collapse, and on potential U.S.-ROK military requirements for a post-collapse Korean peninsula.⁷⁾ Planning in terms of civilian requirements and state-building processes, however, has been slower to develop, for several reasons. These reasons include the fact that the U.S. military (rather than civilian agencies) has funded much of the extant work; the lack of clarity around the circumstances of unification; and the recognition by observers that the unknown initial circumstances will exert such a decisive influence on the terms, costs, and tasks of any unification process. As a result, there has been, as yet, relatively little discussion

5) Jonathan D. Pollack and Lee Chung-Min, *Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999).

6) Cha and Kang, p. 7.

7) A seminal work in this regard is Robert Collins, “Patterns of Collapse in North Korea,” n.d., manuscript shared with the author. See also Pollack and Lee; David S. Maxwell, “Catastrophic Collapse of North Korea: Implications for the United States Military,” monograph prepared for the School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army (1996); Bruce Bennett, forthcoming manuscript (RAND, 2013); Bruce Bennett and Jennifer Lind, “The Collapse of North Korea: Military Missions and Requirements,” *International Security*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Fall 2011), pp. 84-119.

in English language literature on the long-term tasks of unification: formal integration and societal reconciliation.⁸⁾

This paper seeks to offer a first step in addressing that gap. It does so with a great deal of humility, recognizing how much is currently unknown about the type of transition that might lead to unification, and how vast the scope of the issues attendant on any unification scenario will be. Policymakers will have to plan for immediate humanitarian assistance and long-term investment in a range of issues - water, power, health care, food, education, public security, information provision - and will have to navigate strong political pressures in deciding when to shift from the former type of assistance to the latter. They will have to balance consistency and clarity with respect to their strategic vision/endgame with tactical flexibility and the capacity to correct course where necessary as developments unfold. They will have to find the right mix of short-term expediency and long-term restructuring, and of efforts that ensure stability and control on the one hand and political legitimacy on the other.⁹⁾ Even political legitimacy itself will be a balancing act between local forces, national politics, and international audiences. And finally, it is not just the policies themselves but their sequencing and their communication to different audiences that will affect support for any unification effort, and therefore its likelihood of success.

Given the complexity of the calculations that will undoubtedly face policymakers involved in the unification process, I have chosen not to offer a set of prescriptions that may be too specific (or too generic) to be of much use. Instead, I believe that the best contribution an international scholar can make at this juncture is to offer a set of questions to consider, and a comparative perspective on these issues. In the pages that

8) For a major exception, see Victor Cha and David Kang, *Challenges for Korean Unification Planning* (USC-CSIS Joint Report, December 2011). Otherwise, the analysis that exists has been generated by think tanks and research institutes in Seoul. See, for example, Korea Institute for National Unification, *Basic Readings on Unification* (Seoul: KINU, December 2012); Kyuryoon Kim and Jae-Jeok Park, *Korean Peninsula Division/Reunification: From The International Perspective* (Seoul: KINU, December 2012).

9) See discussion in Cha and Kang, p. 8.

follow, therefore, I use that framework to examine two key issues:

security sector reform, and Korean national identity in the wake of unification.

Security Sector Reform and Transitional Justice

Security sector reform is likely to constitute one of the most acute challenges confronted during the unification process. A comparative perspective on security sector reform and transitional justice helps identify some of the key choices and tradeoffs that are likely to arise.

The North Korean military is among the world's largest: over 1 million men-in-arms by most estimates. Military service is (generally) mandatory, and the terms of service are among the world's longest. Moreover, the DPRK military, especially under Kim Jong Il's "military-first politics," is one of the strongest and most functional institutions in North Korea today. Some estimates suggest that because of preferential resource allocation, the military may consume as much as 25% of North Korea's rather limited gross domestic product.¹⁰⁾ In addition to the military, North Korea also has a large and well-developed internal security apparatus involved in maintaining domestic order and conducting political police work, consisting of the Ministry of State Security (*bowibu*), the Ministry of People's Security (*inmin boanbu*) and other actors.¹¹⁾

It is unlikely that the North Korean military and security apparatus will be disbanded during the unification process, for several reasons. Maintaining public order in North Korea may well require these institutions' involvement - or at least will likely preclude authorities from cutting loose the million-plus armed individuals currently in their

10) Pollack and Lee, p. xiv; see also Republic of Korea, *Defense White Paper 1997-98* (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 1998), pp. 55-56.

11) For the most comprehensive description in English of this apparatus, see Ken Gause, *Coercion, Control, Surveillance, and Punishment: an examination of the North Korean police state* (Washington: Committee on Human Rights in North Korea, 2012).

service.¹²⁾ The American and international community's experience in Iraq has suggested the dangers of too rapidly disbanding the military in post-conflict situations, as well as of disbanding in ways that are perceived to be socially or ethnically non-neutral. The coming demographic shortfall in the ROK military makes it theoretically possible to absorb some of these forces into a unified Korean army, but this will depend on how policymakers assess the size requirements for a post-unification Korean military, something nearly impossible to determine at this point.¹³⁾

At the same time, however, retention of some or all of these forces poses a significant long-term challenge from the perspective of transitional justice. In recent years, there has been mounting attention in the United States and internationally to the human rights abuses committed inside North Korea - including the January 2013 establishment of a United Nations Commission of Inquiry. This is likely to create pressure for swift transitional justice mechanisms and investigation and punishment of human rights abusers - and indeed, South Korea's own experience with the post-1945 retention of Japanese-trained police forces (about 40%) has demonstrated the legitimacy problems that arise when previously abusive security forces are allowed to remain in office under a new regime.

On the other hand, North Korean military and security forces are more likely to resist unification if they are told that all that awaits them is punishment. Political and regime transitions that have occurred elsewhere in the world have typically requires negotiation and compromise with the outgoing actors, including security forces. As a result, amnesty of some kind, for some section of the security forces, is likely, and complete lustration and accountability are probably impossible. When it comes to

12) Past assessments of unification scenarios have assumed mass migration up to 10% of the North Korean population (approximately 2 million people), and discussed the requirement for a large security force to maintain order amid these population flows. Disbanding security forces is assumed to add to migration and lower the personnel available to oversee order. Cha and Kang argue, however, based on past cases, policymakers have a tendency to dramatically overestimate the magnitude of probable migration. See Cha and Kang, p. 17.

13) Bruce Bennett, "ROK Army Requirements in 2020," RAND, p. 2, <http://1.usa.gov/peu3yf>.

unification planning, the point is this: transitional justice may be a long-term process, but plans for transitional justice, and how those plans are publicized and communicated beforehand, will likely affect how unification occurs, who opposes it, and how difficult the process might be.

It is also important to consider that North Korea's coercive apparatus works - to a degree much greater than most other authoritarian regimes - by involving the population in surveillance and social control.¹⁴⁾ At least 5% of the population is in the military at any given time; most men have participated in between five and ten years of military service (or longer); every North Korean belongs to one of five organizations under the system of "organizational life" that regulates society; and an estimated one in twenty North Korean citizens acts as an informant for the political police. On the one hand, this is good; broad social inclusivity in authoritarian security services has, in other contexts, rendered those forces less willing to use force against the population on the regime's behalf. (Here, those planning for unification should anticipate significant diversity across units; the KPA and Ministry of Public Security, which are more broadly representative of North Korean society, are likely to react differently than the Ministry of State Security and the elite units that protect the regime, including, probably, the military's political commissars.) Another implication of this broadly inclusive structure, however, is that it is probably neither possible nor advisable to punish so many North Korean citizens; no post-authoritarian society has attempted to do so. In addition to a tribunal for a limited number of offenders, therefore, North Korea is likely to require something like a truth commission process to document its people's history and to focus on historical truth and reconciliation in place of retribution.

Thus, planning for unification suggests the need to conduct more detailed studies on some of the following questions, in order to lay the groundwork for security sector reform.

14) Perhaps the most comparable systems are East Germany and Taiwan under the KMT. For comparative analysis, see Sheena Chestnut Greitens, *Coercive Institutions and State Violence Under Authoritarianism* (PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 2013).

- 1) Which of the military and security forces within the DPRK are representative of North Korean society, and which are more exclusive? Along what lines are inclusivity and exclusivity understood (regional, class, family, etc)?
- 2) Does the military have an identity and vision of itself independent of the regime and the Kim family? What is the intra-military variation in this identity by unit?
- 3) What is the relationship between various units of the military to other coercive institutions such as the GPWD, MSS, and MPS? What are the implications for inclusivity and legitimacy of disbanding some units but not others?
- 4) Will the North Korean military and coercive apparatus be disbanded or retained? Which parts of the military-coercive apparatus will be disbanded entirely, which will be folded into South Korean institutions, and which will be preserved relatively intact? Will officers as well as enlisted personnel be decommissioned? Over what time frame will changes to the security apparatus be made?
- 5) What will transitional justice look like? Who will be punished, and who will receive amnesty? Will this depend on the part of the coercive apparatus that someone worked for (eg, will it matter if someone is a guard at the North Korean prison camp system versus a political commissar in the military), on their level of seniority, or on both?
- 6) Will transitional justice focus on fact-finding, punitive measures, reconciliation, or a combination of the three? Will the system of transitional justice be domestic, international, or some hybrid of the two?
- 7) In the long term, how will the courts, legal codes, and judicial institutions be integrated?
- 8) What are the most relevant comparisons for each of the above questions? Along what dimensions should comparisons be made? In what ways can international collaboration be leveraged to analyze these comparisons?

Korean National Identity in the Wake of Unification

Inherent in the Republic of Korea's vision of unification is the idea that unification will require the formation of a new national community.¹⁵⁾ As with security sector reform, wholesale rejection of North Korean identity is likely to make unification harder, costlier, and more contentious. South Korea, therefore, faces the difficult task of finding a way to affirm the North Korean people, and aspects of the North Korean identity, without affirming the North Korean system of government. As with security sector reform, it must decide what elements of the old North Korean order to keep, reform, or discard; how to integrate some elements into South Korea; and how to communicate what is being done to domestic, national, and international audiences who have an interest in supporting the process.

South Korea's current experience with defectors coming from North Korea (*talbukin*, or *talbukcha*) suggests that this has already been challenging. Discussion on policy toward *talbukin* tends to treat them as a community of victims, damaged by their past experience and now in need of services and assistance. Certainly that is a reasonable policy emphasis given the medical, educational, employment, and criminal statistics involving the defector population.¹⁶⁾ It does, however, pose challenges for South Korea today, and for a unified Korea tomorrow, if the residents of North Korea are convinced that they have nothing to offer modern Korean society. In recent conversations, defectors have noted that one of the most frightening aspects of their transition to life in the South was wondering what their value could possibly be; years after arriving, one still wondered what he and his friends could contribute.¹⁷⁾

15) KINU, Basic Readings on Unification, p. 4.

16) For some statistics, see Marcus Noland and Stephan Haggard, *Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea* (Washington: Petersen Institute for International Economics, January 2011); International Crisis Group, *Strangers at Home: North Koreans in the South* (Seoul, Asia Report No. 208, 2011).

17) Author's interviews with North Korean defectors, Seoul, South Korea, March 2011 and June 2013.

Beyond service delivery and public policy, therefore, there is work to be done both to create a positive vision of what the *talbukin* can contribute to a thriving, modern, global South Korean society today, as well as to create a positive vision for what former citizens of the DPRK will have to offer a unified Korean society in the future. North Korean refugees and their transitions to South Korea are often treated as *sui generis*, and certainly there will be distinctively Korean aspects of this process and of the national identity that emerges in a unified Korea. However, intriguing parallels

between South Korea's experience with North Korean defectors and America's recent experiences with returning military veterans - whose transitions are marked by similar statistics and challenges, whose major questions also center on what they have to contribute, and whose integration into civilian life has been smoothest when they find ways to contribute to local communities - suggests that comparison and contrast with other populations undergoing transition and integration may be helpful points of reference.¹⁸⁾ The key questions to consider for Korean unification, then, are what comparisons are most relevant and useful, and then what those comparisons can teach us about the formation of a new Korean national identity.

Conclusion: What Can Be Done?

In accordance with U.S. policy and the statements of the Republic of Korea (as well as of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea), planning for and implementation of unification should take place under the initiative of the two Koreas. In preparing for that day, however, there are several areas in which international community may be able to play a constructive role.

The first is in the simple accumulation of knowledge and analysis on North Korea.

18) Joe Klein, "Can Service Save Us?" Time Magazine, 20 June 2013.

As many of us know, reliable data on fundamental aspects of the DPRK (for example, demographic statistics, trade figures, and detailed maps) is extraordinarily difficult to obtain. The Ministry of Unification and its research institutes do an excellent job of assembling the best information available. Additional comparative perspective, however, could help maximize researchers' analytical leverage and develop creative policy initiatives; having options and frameworks readily available may help policymakers anticipate choices, make informed decisions, and mitigate potential tradeoffs. Collaboration between Korean scholars and the international community to generate that comparative perspective, therefore, is one way to develop a more robust toolkit for eventual use.

Additionally, the international community could work with South Korea to engage with the North Korean people as broadly as possible. Facilitating training and educational exchanges is one step toward beginning to develop the underutilized human capital of North Korea. International actors may also be best placed to help with capacity building in the DPRK, strengthening infrastructure and systems in areas like agriculture, transportation, and medical care. While neither of these contributions are likely to transform the regime and hasten unification itself, they may help to make the process easier once it arrives. Increased interactions are also likely to be the first step in building a positive, shared identity for all Koreans in a post-unified Korea.

Multilateralism and the Role of the European Union in Facilitating Korean Unification

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Abstract

This paper addresses the external dimension of Korean unification and focusses in particular on the role of (regional) multilateralism. Building on a brief theoretical discussion and acknowledging a highly instrumental perspective on multilateralism in Northeast Asia the paper argues for the necessity and functionality of embedding Korean unification within a stable regional order, and aims to shed light on the question whether the European experiences with embedding Germany's unification multilaterally provides any valuable insights for Korea and Northeast Asia. Moreover, the paper discusses the limits and potentials of the European Union's (EU) role in facilitating the complex process of Korean unification and argues for the role of a 'proactive broker of multilateralism.'

"For every complex problem, there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong"

(H. L. Mencklen)

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Introduction

The similar experiences of Germany and Korea as divided nations have quite naturally attracted mutual attention, and the case of German unification has long been used as a (sometimes fitting and sometimes not so fitting) ‘model’ for understanding and analyzing the complex problems and implications of a possible Korean unification. While virtually every domestic aspect of German unification has been scrutinized in detail, the external dimension and particularly the role of multilateralism in facilitating Korean unification has been a far lesser acknowledged component of this analogy. This is all the more surprising given that there seems to be a general agreement that the complex process of Korean reunification will most likely be subject to close monitoring by the regional powers. While bilateral processes will most likely continue to be the most crucial ordering principle in Northeast Asia, there is reason to believe that multilateralism will be a vital additional component in facilitating Korean unification. Are thus Hanns Maull and Sebastian Harnisch (2002: 36) right when they argue, that “multilateral cooperation best suits the complex situation on the peninsula, and therefore gets taken up even by those - like the US and China - who are skeptical about its utility and reach”? To be able to realistically debate this question it is necessary to first take a closer look on the concept of multilateralism itself. Thus, in order to explore the prospects and promises of multilateralism in the context of the Korean question, this paper will first offer a brief theoretical discussion of the concept of multilateralism, a term that is often used yet only seldom defined. Yet, “multilateral cooperation” can refer to various types and forms of intergovernmental interaction as well as to specific foreign policy strategies. As the theoretical discussion reveals, European and Northeast Asian multilateralisms are characterized by very different degrees of institutionalization, resulting primarily from the degree to which the respective multilateral process is characterized by strategic and instrumentalist and/or a norm-driven considerations. While multilateral structures in Northeast Asia are primarily instrumentalist, this does not *per se* diminish the value and importance of

multilateralism in Northeast Asia and especially in facilitating the process of Korean unification. In fact, in the case of Korea multilateralism has already, and in the future may well increasingly, constitute an additional layer to the bilateral ordering structures in the region. Similar to the German case multilateral cooperation is thus expected to play an important role in (managing) the external aspects of Korean unification - although most likely not in form of a highly institutionalized type of multilateralism, as such a type of cooperation necessitates a high degree of mutual trust, transparency and commonly agreed norms and procedures among the actors involved.

1. Scholarly Perspectives on Multilateralism¹⁾

While the first documented use of the term ‘multilateral’ dates back to the year 1858, the noun form of the word only came into use in the aftermath of World War I (see Powell 2003: 5). As James Caporaso (1992: 600-601) points out, the noun ‘comes in the form of an “ism”, suggesting a belief or ideology rather than a straightforward state of affairs’. An understanding of multilateralism as it was debated in the United States (US) after 1945 seems to reinforce this rather normative perception of multilateralism, depicting it simply as the ‘international governance of the “many”’, while its central principle was said to be the ‘opposition [of] bilateral and discriminatory arrangements that were believed to enhance the leverage of the powerful over the weak and to increase international conflict’ (see Kahler 1992: 681). Despite such early efforts to approach the term, the disciplinary debate on multilateralism in the fields of International Relations (IR) and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) is still comparatively young. For too long, to refer to a popular critique from Tom Keating (1993: 12), political science limited its research to the notions of ‘institutions’ and/or ‘cooperation’ without explicitly paying

1) This chapter draws heavily on Ballbach, Eric (2013): *Between Autonomy and Influence? Multilateralism and North Korean Foreign Policy in the Six-Party Talks*, in: Frank, Rüdiger, James E. Hoare, Patrick Köllner and Susan Pares (eds.): *Korea Yearbook 2013: Politics, Economy and Society*, Vol. 7, Leiden und Boston: Brill (forthcoming in September 2013)

attention to the phenomenon of multilateralism. Although the term multilateralism is frequently used in various contexts - including the debate on the chances and limits of regionalization in NEA and in the context of the Korean question - the concept still lacks analytical clarity and is only 'seldom defined or even operationalized' (Dosch 2006: 2; see also Seol 2008).²⁾

To very briefly summarize the theoretical debate on multilateralism one may distinguish two different perspectives, both of which refer to interrelating actors and therefore conceptualize multilateralism as a phenomenon of international politics rather than a foreign policy phenomenon. A first scholarly definition and a typical example of what was later labeled a quantitative (e.g. Baumann 2007: 443), formal (e.g. Diebold 1988: 1), or nominal (e.g. Ruggie 1993: 6) perspective was provided by Robert O. Keohane (1990: 731), who defined multilateralism as 'the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions'. While acknowledging its accuracy in principle, a number of scholars subsequently criticized this definition or, more precisely, its 'incomplete character'.³⁾ Arguably the most prominent critic was offered by John G. Ruggie (1993: 6, 11), who notes that Keohane's nominal definition misses the qualitative dimension of the phenomenon, thus overlooking those properties that differentiate it from other 'generic institutional forms' - namely bilateralism and imperialism. Ruggie (1993: 11) subsequently defines multilateralism as:

“an institutional form that coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct-that is, principles which specify


2) For recent examples of scholarly works without a definition and/or operationalization of the concept, see: Kang 2006 and Kwak 2006.

3) For example, Jörn Dosch (2002: 25) states that multilateralism defined in a nominal way refers to nearly every form and type of cooperation which encompasses at least three actors. Similarly, Weiss and Rihackova (2010: 8, italics in original) note that 'according to this view, every interaction with more than two participants is multilateral, regardless of whether the coordination occurs only once or regularly, whether it is institutionalized or ad hoc.

appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard to particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence.”

However, this qualitative definition not only conceptualizes multilateralism solely as a phenomenon of international politics but furthermore brings with it a very narrow analytical focus that by and large excludes the vital strategic dimension of the concept. Ruggie (1993: 10, 12) himself characterizes multilateralism as a ‘highly demanding institutional form’ and explicitly excludes particularistic interests or strategic exigencies from his definition. Baumann also emphasizes the qualitative character of multilateralism when he maintains that to be characterized as ‘multilateral’, the relations between states should to a large degree be shaped by the principles of non-discrimination and indivisibility (Baumann 2007: 445-46). However, in NEA multilateralism is arguably best understood ‘as an extension and intersection of national power and purpose rather than as an objective force in itself’ (Green and Gill 2009: 3). Incorporating an instrumentalist perspective seems particularly relevant when discussing the question of Korean unification, an issue which is inherently linked to the strategic calculations of the involved parties. Against this background, a broader definition of multilateralism seems appropriate, one that allows for analytically capturing the strategic dimension and the instrumental value of multilateralism as a distinct foreign policy tool. Multilateralism is thus defined here as a specific type of foreign policy (behaviour) which is characterized by the willingness of a single country to coordinate its foreign policy on a specific issue and/or in a specific area with at least two other states within varyingly dense institutionalized structures to achieve its foreign policy objectives at hand-notwithstanding what this willingness is based upon.

Figure 1: Different (Ideal–Typical) Analytical Perspectives on and Characteristics of Multilateralism



Source: Eric J. Ballbach

Using such a broad definition opens the possibility for distinguishing between various manifestations of multilateralism in the realm of foreign policy, ranging from reflective to highly instrumental (e.g. Anderson and Goodman 1993). Moreover, these different (ideal-type) manifestations can be analyzed via different theoretical and methodological approaches: while the reflectivist position has been taken up primarily by social constructivists, the instrumentalist arguments can be associated with rationalist approaches to the study of multilateralism (see also Kratochwil 1993; Baumann 2006; Caporaso 1992; Fey 2000; Martin 1993). Ultimately, all approaches make assumptions about the basic motivations of state behavior and can thus be drawn on to analytically address the motives of a specific country in referring to or rejecting multilateralism as a means of its foreign policy. In the following section, a neorealist approach is applied to help make sense of North Korea's seemingly inconsistent foreign policy vis-à-vis the SPT, characterized by both cooperation and non-cooperation.

2. Multilateralism and the Question of Korean Unification - A View from Europe

2.1. Is There a Role for Multilateralism in Solving the Korean Question?

The brief theoretical discussion made clear that multilateralism is a multi-dimensional phenomenon. While the European experiences demonstrate that multilateralism may well encompass both strategic considerations and normative commitments, in NEA, multilateralism is arguably best understood in instrumental terms. Against this background, many observers have critically noted the low degree of institutionalization of NEAs multilateral structures - with Paul Evens (2007) even describing Northeast Asia as an anti-region with regard to multilateral security cooperation. Yet, such assessments result from a mere qualitative understanding of the multifaceted concept that is multilateralism. In the context of Northeast Asia and particularly in the case of Korean unification, an understanding of multilateralism that by and large excludes the concept's crucial strategic dimension and its instrumental value as a distinct foreign policy tool is highly problematic. Moreover, to acknowledge a primarily instrumentalist perspective on multilateralism in Northeast Asia does not per se mean that the phenomenon would be superfluous in the region and particular with regard to the Korean question. As the developments in the post-Cold War era have shown, multilateralism has made considerable progress in the post-Cold War era and has already begun to play an increasing role in addressing major challenges with regional implications - despite (or because of) the fact that the parties primarily participate in multilateral initiatives out of strategic calculation and are not driven by certain shared norms or values. While the regional powers may have had diverging or sometimes not so diverging interests, they all have shown some level of support for multilateral initiatives to enhance regional stability, as is exemplified by such multilateralisms as the Trilateral Cooperation and Oversight Group (TCOG), the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), the Four-Party Talks, and the Six-Party Talks on the Track-I level as well as the Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) and the Northeast

Asian Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) on the track-II level. As these examples already illustrate, acknowledging an increasing role of multilateralism as an ordering principle in Northeast Asia is not to deny the continued primacy of bilateralism. None of these structures could have been established without sound bilateral relations on which they were built and have much less did they replace any bilateral processes. Rather, such multilateralisms provide an (increasingly important) additional layer to Northeast Asia's primarily bilateral ordering structure: it operates in addition to not as a replacement for the bilateral superstructure.

Given this 'multilateral change' in Northeast Asia and considering the important role multilateralism played in the context of embedding Germany's unification it is safe to assume that even a highly instrumental perspective on multilateralism in Northeast Asia does not discount the importance of multilateralism in the context of the Korean question. In fact, despite (or because of) the highly strategic calculus of the (Northeast Asian) states' multilateral involvement, there is reason to believe that multilateralism will be crucial before, during and after Korean unification:

To begin with, given that the division of Korea was itself a process in which external powers played a crucial role, the sensitive question of Korean unification would naturally provide strong incentives for regional powers to make their strategic interests heard during all stages of Korean unification. As was the case with Germany in Europe, Korea's pivotal geopolitical position in Northeast Asia makes the specifics of the country's unification quite naturally a matter of regional relevance with important ramifications for the whole Northeast Asian order. Hence, neither the German nor the Korean unification could have been/can be achieved without some kind of formal international agreement (e.g. a formal peace treaty). Given that the Korean unification will lead to a noticeable shift in power in Northeast Asia, the process requires a robust and sustainable framework of regional order in order to prevent regional destabilization.

Moreover, solving the Korean question will raise a number of issues that are arguably best solved multilaterally - not because of any inherent normative considerations but because important dimensions of the challenges in the context of Korean

unification could and most likely must be to some degree addressed comprehensively through multilateral cooperation. Many of the specific issues that in the case of Germany could be resolved only multilaterally will - in the Korean case - similarly need some form of regional cooperation. Thus, to argue for the relevancy of multilateralism in contributing to the political ordering of Korean unification is to acknowledge that a number of related issues - such as the nuclear question, the question of conventional military forces, the economic framework of and for unification, and the question of (non-) alignment - are of immediate regional and international concern and naturally touch upon the very core interests of all regional players. Multilateralism could therefore facilitate the necessary mutual accommodation of interests and objectives and contribute to diminishing the risks of polarization as well as broaden the opportunities for trade-offs, hence for package deals (Maull 2001: 4). Therefore, it is safe to assume that similar to the German case multilateral cooperation will be of considerable importance in addressing the external (and sometimes internal) aspects of unification.

2.2. The Differences and Limits of the European Model

To argue for the importance of multilateralism both in Northeast Asia in general and in the context of Korean unification in specific may lead to the temptation to look at the European experiences as a model. However, a closer look reveals some important differences with regard to the general role multilateral structures played in Europe and Northeast Asia. To begin with, both West and East Germany had been closely integrated in dense webs of multilateral cooperation structures (and in the case of West Germany even integration) in Europe. While this artificial integration could not be sustained in East Germany due to a lack of roots in and support by the East German society, in West Germany, the deep integration into European structures both reflected and in turn solidified profound changes in German society and the country's political culture. Multilateralism was therefore very important in bringing about German unification in the first place; it constituted a vital condition facilitating unification:

“Multilateralism made German unification possible: it provided essential reassurance for Germany’s neighbours, constrained Germany’s freedom and provided anchors to German foreign policy behaviour. Unification in the case of Germany also acted as a catalyst for multilateral co-operation and integration in Europe and across the Atlantic” (Mauß & Harnisch 2001: 6).

As Mauß (ibid.) continues, in the case of Germany there thus developed a virtuous circle, in which the progress of multilateralism produced further impulses towards both the deepening and widening of multilateral cooperation in Europe.

Figure 2: Multilateralism in Germany’s and Korea’s Unification



Source: Eric J. Ballbach

While multilateralism has also come to play an increasingly important (although by comparison much different) role in Northeast Asia and on the Korean peninsula, it is hard to imagine that multilateralism could similarly work as an immediate enabling factor and catalyst of Korean unification in the near future. This is because the politically dominant external relationships and the primary ordering structure of the Korean peninsula affairs are still the bilateral security ties of South Korea with the United States and - at least traditionally - those of North Korea with China and thus the multilateral structures in the region are not deeply rooted in the political order. Unlike in the case of Germany, therefore, the process of Korean unification will most likely not be backed by similar multilateral structures that have evolved over several

decades and that have themselves stabilized the bilateral relations among its members. The fact that European multilateralism has evolved over decades - often in bitter dispute - is an important point that is often lost in the 'romanticized view' of European multilateralism:

“Europe’s overall effective means for a cooperative, comprehensive and pro-active approach to security affairs are the results of a long process which is still far from being completed. Despite a large set of shared norms and values and mostly compatible foreign policy interests it took the Western European states almost four decades from the foundation of the European Economic Community in 1957 to the first steps towards the institutionalization of a European security policy. The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) came only into existence as the result of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 while the more elaborated European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was born in 1999 at the European Council meetings in Cologne and Helsinki” (Dosch 2003: 13).

In closing this chapter it may be said that while the European experiences with embedding Germany’s unification multilaterally are of analytical and political value for addressing the complex unification of Korea, there are clearly limits to simply transferring the European experiences. At the same time, if we reject the rigid and one-sided conceptual framework of ‘transfer’ and if we define security not simply in military terms, than Europe’s and Germany’s experiences may still be useful for Northeast Asia and Korea - and they may well define Europe’s future role on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia.

3. Is There a Role for Europe in Facilitating Korean Unification?

Any potential future European contribution to peace and stability in Northeast Asia requires a realistic consideration of both Europe’s stakes and the potential and limits of engagement in the region. As will be shown in this chapter, this brings to light a different level of economic and security engagement by the EU in Northeast Asia

which points to a discrepancy between Europe's own aspiration (as a player) and its actual engagement (as a mere payer). While Europe has in the past only modestly contributed to peace, stability and prosperity in Northeast Asia, it could and should do more. Despite or because of the fact the EU's strategic influence in the region is limited Brussels should consider to take the role of a 'proactive broker'.

3.1. Europe's Stakes and the EU's (Modest) Involvement

Europe's influence in Northeast Asia clearly is not vital, but its strategic interests are important. On the one hand, as is not least reflected by the recently signed Free Trade Agreement (FTA), South Korea is an important economic partner for the EU (and vice versa). As such, Europe has an immediate stake in peace, stability and prosperity on the Korean peninsula, although this seems to be far less debated in Europe itself. Political turmoil in Korea (e.g. through a collapse of North Korea) would most certainly have global political *and* economic repercussions - e.g. through the interconnectedness of the international financial markets and activities as well as the likelihood of Europe's contribution to any crisis management. Thus, Europe's interests are not and should not be seen as being exclusively economic. North Korea's WMD and missile exports to the Middle East have already begun to directly threaten European security interests. As such, patterns of regional cooperation and conflict in Northeast Asia are likely to have implications for Europe's own external relations. As a matter of fact, since the mid-1990s the EU did get engaged on the Korean peninsula beyond the mere economic realm and although Europe's involvement in the region has been primarily driven by economic interests, before the outbreak of the 'second nuclear crisis' the EU did (although modestly) contribute in a number of ways to the stabilization of the security situation on the Korean peninsula:

- European countries have provided a substantial contribution to the IMF financial support for South Korea during the Asian crisis, both in the IMF program and the so-called "second line of defense" credits;

- Europe participated in a number of regional multilateral initiatives such as the ASEAN-Europe-Meeting (ASEM) and the now defunct KEDO process. Both the European Union collectively and several European countries individually have participated in the multilateral KEDO process, in which the EU obtained one of the three directorships;
- Explicitly designated as a contribution to regional stability, the European Commission has provided substantial food and humanitarian aid to North Korea (the DPRK received roughly 370 million Euros from the EU between 1995 and 2005)
- Several European countries as well as the European Commission have opened diplomatic relations with the DPRK since the early 2000s. Today almost all member countries have diplomatic ties with the DPRK. The visit by an EU troika to Pyongyang in May 2001 was interpreted by many as signaling Europe's determination to play a more active diplomatic role on the Korean peninsula;
- Europe is a significant supplier of arms to South Korea, and recently has developed its involvement in bilateral and regional security dialogues with East Asia;

While these examples show that the EU did indeed take some steps towards a more active approach vis-à-vis the Korean peninsula since the mid-1990s up until the early 2000s, the EU's influence on 'hard security issues' in the region is still limited at best and its immediate contribution to regional peace and stability has consequently been rather modest. Nothing illustrates this point better than the limited role of the EU following the outbreak of the second nuclear crisis, in which the EU's role was limited to supplying verbal assurances and support for its regional partners. European countries seem to have defined their interests in Korea in commercial, rather than in political and strategic terms, and - as the passive stance during the second nuclear crisis has shown - they have at times been more disposed to quarrel

among themselves than pull their weight jointly. In the longer term, such a limited role of the EU in the Northeast Asian security structure is not only problematic considering the high stakes of Europe in the region, but it also contradicts Europe's own ambition and stated goal of being a player, and not only a payer.

3.2. Europe's Potential: The EU as an Active Broker of Multilateralism?

When discussing the European Union's (potential) role with regard to facilitating Korean unification one has to consider the limits of Europe's influence in the Northeast Asian region in general and the Korean peninsula in specific. In this regard one has to acknowledge a discrepancy between Brussels economic and security involvement. Certainly, awareness of the strategic interconnectedness of the two regions clearly is growing on both sides - witness the ASEM process and the FTA or the contribution of European countries such as Germany in transferring knowledge with regard to its own experiences with unification and the role of multilateralism. In fact, Europe already does contribute, modestly but significantly, to peace, stability and prosperity in East Asia, but it could and should do more still. This is not to suggest that Europe could play a strategic role in East Asia, comparable to that of the US. Even if Europe would live up to its own expectations of being a vital political player in the region, the EU will in no way be a militarily relevant player. Yet, given that Europe's stakes are more substantial than is presently recognized in Europe itself, the EU has not yet fully exploited its potential. It is argued here that the EU would be well advised to take up the role of an 'active broker of multilateralism'. European influence could be useful in providing additional resources to any material efforts, and in its ability to moderate, precisely because of its position as an outsider without much strategic power or specific strategic interests, tendencies among the key players in the region to pursue biased and risky policies. Europe cannot and should not define the rules for East Asia's regional order. But it could contribute both to the establishment of the relevant and necessary multi-lateral structures and to upholding them once they are in place. Such a role of an active broker wouldn't be (primarily) based on a direct influence power position within the

institutions themselves – the European Union could have a subsidiary role in any “2+2+N” approach towards regional peace and stability. Rather, the EU should actively promote and even be of help to establish and maintain vital multilateral processes in Northeast Asia – specifically with regard to the Korean question. This role as an active broker of multilateralism could contain a variety of tasks:

- As much as Germany shares its experiences with unification with the ROK, Europe could similarly share its own experiences with multilateralism in Europe more forcefully. However, to be reliable as an active broker of multilateralism and in order to share Europe’s experiences with multilateralism in a substantial way would also require an open discussion of the EU’s failures, not only its successes. The fact that the OSCE has recently been more active in sharing its experience with South Korea and Japan is an encouraging signal in this context.
- In line with the first point, the EU could actively engage in persuading the involved powers in the region of the merits of stable multilateral channels to address regional issues in Northeast Asia – with the Korean question certainly being a decisive one. While Europe may be predestined to take a more proactive role in the context of the Korean question, to gain influence beyond the Korean peninsula (i.e. in Washington and Beijing) on regional issues in Northeast Asia would require a much greater political investment in its relations with the region – which would in turn make necessary a greater willingness to better coordinate the EU’s foreign policy towards the region.
- The EU could make a more proactive use of its historically grown special role on the Korean peninsula. Not only do some EU member states such as Germany have diplomatic relations with both North and South Korea, but the European states have never acted as colonial powers on the Korean peninsula.

Conclusions

Building on a short theoretical debate on the multifaceted phenomenon that is multilateralism, the paper discussed the lessons and limits of European experiences with multilateralism for facilitating the complex process of Korean unification. It was furthermore discussed if and what role the European Union may play in facilitating Korean unification. The main argument of the paper is that despite the highly instrumental (as opposed to normative) nature of the Northeast Asian states' perspective on multilateralism, there is reason to believe that multilateralism will nonetheless be crucial before, during and after Korean unification. Not only is any solution of the Korean question naturally linked to the interests and influences of the regional powers, but a number of related issues - such as the nuclear question, the question of (reduction of) conventional military forces, the economic framework of and for unification, and the question of (non-) alignment - are of immediate regional and international concern and are best addressed multilaterally. Yet, to argue for the relevancy of multilateralism in the context of Korean unification is not to dispute the ongoing influence of bilateralism as the primary ordering principle in Northeast Asia and most likely in the process of Korean unification. Rather, it is assumed that multilateralism will be a crucial additional ordering principle for the complex unification process. Any long-lasting multilateral structure in which the Korean question may be embedded in requires a sound bilateral substructure among the states involved. To put the same thing differently: any qualitative Northeast Asian multilateralism in the sense of Ruggie requires a normalization of bilateral relations first. Without bilateral normalization, multilateralism will remain highly strategic and instrumental and therefore reaffirm the primacy of bilateralism as the most important ordering principle in Northeast Asia. Against this background it comes as no surprise that the role of the European Union on the Korean peninsula has thus far been rather limited. Europe, it was argued, has thus far neither lived up to its potential nor its own aspiration of being a player, not only a payer. Yet, with the stakes being high for Europe as well, it was proposed that

the EU may well play the role of an 'active broker' of multilateralism on the Korean peninsula.

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Thailand's position toward both Korea

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North Korea

- **reactions to the 2006 North Korean nuclear test were nearly unanimous in their condemnation and denunciation of the test.**
- In a press release issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Royal Thai Government "deplores" the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK government and "deeply regrets" that North Korea "chose to ignore" the international community's warnings. Thailand calls upon North Korea to abide by the principles of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. The statement also urged all sides to exercise restraint and to resume negotiations.(1)
- (1)

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- **Trade watch over Korean crisis**
 - Published: 2 Apr 2013 at 20.22
 - Online news: Bangkok Post
 - Trade officials are closely monitoring rising tensions on the Korean peninsula, amid concern the crisis could affect Thai trade with Seoul and Pyongyang.
 - Srirat Rastapana, director-general of the International Trade Promotion Department, said Tuesday the department expected no short-term effect because of the tense situation. But she said a close watch would be maintained by trade offices in South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, China and Hong Kong. There is no official Thai presence in North Korea.
 - She was concerned about the weakening Korean won, which would make imported products to South Korea higher.

- **Cabinet approves N.Korea sanctions**
- Published: 30 Apr 2013 at 16.11
- The cabinet on Tuesday passed a resolution providing for Thailand to impose sanctions against North Korea, as proposed by the Foreign Ministry.
- Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra said the move follows a request for cooperation by the United Nations.
- The UN approved a fresh load of sanctions on March 7 against North Korea for its underground nuclear test in February.
- Ms Yingluck said it is Thailand's intention to see regional problems solved through peaceful means.
- There are currently no details as to which sanctions Thailand will apply.

Koreans in Thailand

- Koreans in Thailand Total population 17,500 (2011)^[1]
- Regions with significant populations [Bangkok](#) · [Phuket](#) · [Chonburi](#) · [Chiang Mai](#)
- **Koreans in Thailand** consists of [North Korean](#) refugees as well as immigrants and expatriates from [South Korea](#). According to South Korea's [Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade](#), in 2011 there were about 17,500 Koreans living in Thailand.
- **North Korean refugees**
- Thailand's [Chiang Rai province](#) is a popular entry point for [North Korean defectors](#) into the country.^[2] Most of these defectors have escaped economic hardship in North Korea and traveled to Thailand for temporary refuge in the hope of being able to resettle in third countries, usually South Korea. Thailand is the easiest route to access and the most accommodating, compared to [Mongolia](#) and [Vietnam](#), where border security is tighter and in some cases, those fleeing have been sent back to North Korea to face harsh punishment.^[3]
- **South Korean expatriates**
- A variety of factors have drawn [South Korean](#) expatriates to Thailand including the country's [golf courses](#), as well as the [cuisine](#), the weather, and business opportunities.^[4] There were an estimated 17,500 South Korean nationals or former nationals in Thailand as of 2011. Among them, 53 had obtained Thai nationality, 114 were permanent residents, 500 were [international students](#), and the remaining 16,800-odd South Korean residents had other kinds of visas. Their population fell by about 13% from 20,200 since 2009. 14,000 live in [Bangkok](#), 1,500 in [Phuket](#), and 1,000 each in [Chonburi](#) and [Chiang Mai](#). Their community exhibits a significantly lopsided [sex ratio](#), with 10,750 men as compared to just 6,760 women, a ratio of about 1.6:1.^[5]

South Korea- Thailand relations

- Both countries established diplomatic relations on October 1, 1958. The year 2008 is the 100th year of bilateral relations with two nations.
- During the [Korean War](#), Thailand was the second nation sending troops for supporting South Korea just after United States. In October 2003, South Korean president [Roh Moo-hyun](#) visited Thailand while Prime minister [Thaksin Shinawatra](#) to Seoul in November 2005.^[1]
- South Korean is 10th largest trade partner, which is about to reach the scale of 10 billion dollars.^[2]
- **(1) (English)**[Official webpage of Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Thailand.](#)
- **(2) (Korean)**[재외공관 인사말](#)

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- Bangkok has a Koreatown located in the Sukhumvit Plaza area near Sukhumvit Soi 12.^[4] Phuket also has a Koreatown and numerous Korean restaurants.^[5] There has been controversy over illegal immigrants from South Korea working as tour guides; the Tourism Authority of Thailand, the Korean Association in Phuket, and the South Korean consulate in Phuket signed an agreement in 2007 to promote the hiring of Thai tour guides instead.^[6] Korean culture is popular throughout the country thanks to the Korean Wave.^[4]

- **Education and language**

- There are about 56 schools in Phuket that teach the Korean language. There is also a Korean school in Bangkok known as the Korean International School of Bangkok.
- South Korean children born in Thailand to South Korean expatriates show little language shift towards Thai.^[7]

- **Religion**

- There were two Korean Buddhist temples and thirteen Korean Christian churches in Bangkok as of 2008. The Korean Union Church at Ratchadapisek Road is the most popular. The average Korean church in Bangkok has an attendance of about a hundred or two hundred worshippers.^[4]

- **In popular culture**

- Thai martial arts film *The Kick* follows a Korean family of Taekwondo experts who move to Thailand.



- **Thailand, South Korea agree to expand trade to US\$30 bln within 5 years**
- Monday, 12 November 2012 By [MCOT](#)
- [Be the first to comment!](#)
- BANGKOK, Nov 10 -- Thailand and South Korea agreed on Saturday to work closely together to expand bilateral trade volume to US\$30 billion by 2016 as their leaders pledged to upgrade relations between the two countries to a "strategic partnership."
- Thai Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra and visiting South Korean President Lee Myung-bak reached the agreement during bilateral talks in Bangkok.
- Mr Lee, who arrived in Bangkok on Friday, is the first South Korean president to make an official bilateral visit to Thailand in 31 years.
- According to the joint statement after the talks, the leaders also agreed to "serious efforts" to conclude a trade and economic cooperation "action plan" for 2013-2017 at an early date to further energise trade and minimise trade barriers. They asked the joint trade committee of both sides to start negotiations as soon as possible.
- Trade between South Korea and Thailand reached an all-time high of \$13.9 billion last year.
- Bangkok and Seoul have agreed to seek preliminary discussions and a joint study about forging a comprehensive economic partnership agreement in order to strengthen economic links between the two countries, said the joint statement.

-
- Ms Yingluck and Mr Lee have welcomed cooperation in various Thai infrastructure projects, especially its water management system, high-speed train line, power plant development projects and the Dawei deep sea port project.
 - During her visit to South Korea in March, Ms Yingluck expressed keen interest in South Korea's project to revive its four major rivers in a way that prevents floods, preserves water resources and promotes tourism along the waterways.
 - South Korea has expressed interest in importing rice from Thailand in response to higher demand while many Thai fruits including mango, longan and pomelo are also favourite choices for South Koreans.
 - Both leaders also called for launching aviation talks at an early date to facilitate people-to-people exchanges and transfers of goods and services at a time when the number of people visiting each other's nation topped 1.3 million last year.
 - After the meeting at Government House, Mr Lee toured the Chao Praya River and the Lad Pho canal, a move seen as underlining South Korea's willingness to share its water management experience and know-how. Thailand is working on a massive \$11.3 billion project to build a large-scale water management system.
 - Mr Lee is scheduled to return home on Sunday.



Issues after Korea unification

- **Political-Security Cooperation**
- **Finance and Economic Cooperation**
- **Socio-Cultural Cooperation**



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Institute for Peace and Unification Studies
Insitute for Unification Studies
Korea Foundation



Seoul National University Institute for Peace and Unification Studies

“Peace through inter-Korean reconciliation, peace through the promotion of cultural and human rights, and peace through ecological civilization”

The Institute for Unification Studies was established as a multidisciplinary research organization at Seoul National University in 2006. The Institute and its mission have since steadily expanded as reflected in the change of its name to the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies (IPUS) in 2008. As the new name indicates, the Institute conducts research projects not only focusing on inter-Korean relations and reunification issues but also on peace studies in general and their relevance to the complex peaceless situation on the Korean Peninsula. Accordingly, the IPUS consists of two research units: the Center for Unification Studies (CUS) and the Peace and Humanities Research Group (PHRG). Taking advantage of the knowledge convergence between local issues and universal values, the CUS and the PHRG work together to create a new paradigm on peace studies. In other words, the two research units seek to generate synergy effects leading to multidisciplinary and convergent knowledge on peace and peacelessness. The subjects with which the IPUS deals range from the North Korean diasporas, the North Korean nuclear program, and separated families in the two Koreas, to broader topics such as economic development and ecological destruction, historical and territorial disputes, religion and peace, violence and transitional justice, peace movements, and humanitarian assistance and protection.

Envisioning a twenty-first century discourse on peace, the long-term aim of the IPUS programs is to accomplish three dimensions of peace: peace through inter-Korean reconciliation, peace through the promotion of cultural and human rights, and peace through ecological civilization. Specifically for this purpose, in 2010, the PHRG launched the “Peace and Humanities Research Initiative,” an overarching project in which many scholars with diverse backgrounds in social sciences and the humanities work both collectively and individually. Themes addressed by this project encompass not only traditional peace research topics but also new forms of threat, violence, destruction, and disasters that transcend national boundaries.

In addition, the IPUS endeavors to link research programs to public service programs addressing both conflict and peacebuilding issues. Although the IPUS has no degree program, it offers a non-credit course called the Unification Academy as well as an extra-curricular series called Peace Camp. The Unification Academy covers various topics on divided Korea, whereas the Peace Camp focuses on peace studies, from the humanities and social sciences perspectives. Both training courses are open to university students as well as the general public. Also, the IPUS works to engage and expand international networks for enhancing cooperation in peace research and for continuous enhancement of the peace education program at Seoul National University.

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Unification Studies

The peaceful reunification of North and South Korea remains one of the most important challenges that the Korean people must deal with in the twenty-first century. For the past sixty years, the Korean Peninsula has remained heavily militarized and has been marked by mutual distrust and confrontation across the divide. Transforming such hostile inter-Korean relations into peaceful coexistence, and eventually into reunification, is a vital task for the Korean people today. Recognizing the significance of the reunification issue, the Center for Unification Studies not only accumulates knowledge on causes of division, war, and confrontation, but also facilitates studies on these issues in the context of multidisciplinary peace research in general. Furthermore, the IPUS aims to build the capacity to cope with those challenges that may arise during the process of reunification – such as refugee flows, identity problems, transitional justice, and new institution building.

The Center oversees and anchors various research organizations conducting Korean unification studies at Seoul National University. Building on this integrating role, the Center aims to create a comprehensive, interconnected, and networked research environment for unification studies within Korea and abroad. Envisioning sustainable peace on the Korean Peninsula, the Center seeks to create an epistemic community in which discussions about building a peace regime on the Peninsula are predicated upon resolution of the Cold War legacies. In tackling these problems, researchers in the Center adopt multidisciplinary and convergent perspectives in peace studies.

Research Projects and Activities

Unification Attitude Survey: The Center conducts an annual national survey on public awareness of unification issues. With this survey, it aims to analyze public attitudes and awareness on the topics of inter-Korean relations, perceptions of North Korea, South Korea's North Korea policy, and international relations surrounding the Peninsula. The survey analysis provides observers and policymakers with reliable data on related issues and their policy implications.

Inter-Korean Integration Index: The Center has compiled this annual index since August 2008. The indices encompass not only political, economic, and cultural aspects but also patterns of daily life such as consumption, food, and housing. Through quantitative analysis and evaluation of the degree of integration between North and South Korea, it aims to identify short-term changes and long-term trends related to inter-Korean integration. Also, it intends to enhance socio-cultural understanding of the unification issue particularly among South Korean youth.

Unification Policy Forum: The Forum is a platform for domestic scholars, international experts, and governmental officials to explore policy issues related to inter-Korean relations and North Korea. The Forum proceeds with various formats including invited speakers' talks and a series of small workshops.

Unification Academy: This is an eight-week non-credit course offered to undergraduate and graduate students at Seoul National University; it is also open to the general public and students of other universities. Popular topics include North Korean arts and architecture, human rights in the North, life of former East Germans after unification, and educational systems in South and North Korea. Students may participate in a summer field trip to enrich and deepen their understanding of the issues of inter-Korean relations and of North Korea.

Conferences: The Center holds a series of conferences inviting domestic and international scholars to discuss prominent issues on peace and unification studies. The conferences cover topics such as inter-Korean relations, regional and international security, North Korean politics, human rights in the North, building a sustainable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, and the conceptual development of peace studies.

Peace and Humanities Research

With a generous Humanities Korea Grant-In-Aid from the National Research Foundation, the IPUS created the Peace and Humanities Research Group (PHRG) in 2010 and launched a new research project, “Peace and Humanities toward a Green Korea.” Under this overarching project, also called HK Peace and Humanities Research, researchers conduct peace studies at the interface of the humanities and social sciences. It aims to combine analytic methods in the social sciences with the humanities imagination. The project envisions both realizing sustainable peace on the Korean Peninsula and imparting its spirit and experiences to other parts of the world.

Housed in the IPUS, the PHRG consists of nine full-time faculty members with diverse disciplinary backgrounds: history, sociology, gender and culture studies, religion, literature, and political science. The members undertake long-term research projects on various topics such as multiculturalism and identity problems, dual-use nuclear technology, human rights of refugees, historical peace studies, state violence, German unification, cultural ecology, among others. As part of its mission, the PHRG expands collaboration with international scholars and organizations to develop a new paradigm of peace studies.

Agenda of “Peace and Humanities toward a Green Korea”

“Peace and Humanities toward a Green Korea” is a multidisciplinary and convergent research project to develop new visions of peace and peace studies and to relate them to the context of the Korean Peninsula. Peace studies in the twentieth century focused on security of nation-states, especially war prevention and conflict resolution. In the twenty-first century, the imaginary boundary between nation-states appears to be partially dissolving or undergoing fundamental transformation through expanded exchanges of information, knowledge, labor, and culture. Such drastic spatial, temporal, and cognitive changes thus require a transition in the

scope and domain of peace studies. “Peace and Humanities toward a Green Korea” aims to create a new paradigm by either expanding or further developing the existing peace studies approaches. In particular, it aims to produce an exemplary model of peace studies on the Korean Peninsula in consideration of the context of national division.

In the ten-year long program, the main ideas and topics will be developed three steps: basic analysis, systemization, and expansion of peace and humanities. The key concepts – unification and peace, green peace, and solidary peace – aim to combine the universal values of peace with the regional context of Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula.





Asian Journal of PEACEBUILDING

Asian Journal of Peacebuilding (AJP) is a semiannual peer-reviewed journal newly launched by the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies (IPUS) at Seoul National University. It publishes original research on the topics of violence, conflict, and peacebuilding around the world. The aim of AJP is twofold: first, to promote innovative research on issues related to peacebuilding in Asia, a region where national divisions, transitions, and developments are intertwined with new forms of threat, violence, and destruction. Second, it aims to disseminate peace studies conducted both in the traditional disciplines of social sciences and humanities, as well as in interdisciplinary fields at the interface of religion,

culture, ecology, and gender studies.

AJP welcomes papers written by scholars around the world, both within and outside the Asian region. Exemplary topics that AJP focuses on include but are not limited to: reconciliation in divided societies (or nations); migrants and refugees; weapons of mass destruction (WMD developments; development and ecological destruction; historical and territorial disputes; peacemaking or mediation in intrastate conflicts; violence and transitional justice; anti-nuclear weapons (or anti-nuclear power) movements; women affected by war; democratic transition and human rights; post-conflict institutionalization; and humanitarian assistance and protection.

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- Japanese and Korean/Chinese Reconciliation through Experience-based Cultural Interaction
- The South-China Sea Maritime Dispute: Legality, Power, and Conflict Prevention
- Thai-Cambodian Conflict: The Failure of ASEAN's Dispute Settlement Mechanism
- Critical Juncture and Nuclear-Power Dependence in Japan: A Historical Institutional Analysis
- Tracing an Uneven History: Notes on Sources and Trajectories of Thai State Violence
- Democracy and Development in Asia
- Government and Civil Society Cooperation to Protect Refugee Rights and Development

Submissions and Inquiries

All papers are subject to anonymous peer review. The reviewers are selected based on their expertise in the area of the submitted paper, and they will evaluate submitted papers on the basis of creativity, quality of scholarship, and contribution to the field of research. Please follow the manuscript submission guidelines.

To send submissions or for more information:

E-mail: peacejournal@snu.ac.kr | Website: <http://tongil.snu.ac.kr/xe/ajp>

Publications



Unification Attitude Survey

Unification Attitude Survey, 2007-2011 (annual)

Unification Research Series

(published at Seoul National University Press)

Jeong-Sook Hahn, Chan-Sook Hong, and Jae-Won Lee, *Women and German Reunification* (2013)

Keun-Sik Jung, Eun-mee Jeong, and Dong-Wan Kang, *The Structure and Dynamics of Inter-Korean Exchanges and Cooperation Governance* (2012)

Jeong Nam Choi, et al., *Towards Successful Inter-Korean Cooperation for Agricultural Development of North Korea: An Evaluation and Approach* (2012)

Byung-Yeon Kim and Moon-Soo Yang, *Markets and the State in North Korea* (2012)

Hyowon Lee, *Judicial Precedents Related to the Relationship between South and North Korea* (2012)

Jae-il Kwon, *On North Korea's Collective Writings on Korean Linguistics* (2012)

Soon-Hyung Yi, Chang-Dae Kim, and Meejung Chin, *Social Interactions and Communications of North Korean Refugees in Public and Private Spheres* (2012)

Hong Bae Lim, Tae-Soo Song, and Byungkee Jung, *Twenty Years after the Reunification of Germany: Basic Data* (2012)

Seg-Min Youn, et al., *Unification Broadcasting for Multimedia & Multichannel Era* (2012)

On-Juk Yi and In-Jeong Yi, *Kim Il sung Youth League and Democratic Women League in North Korea* (2011)

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Dal-Joong Chang, Jung-Chul Lee, and Sooho Lim, *US-DPRK Confrontation: Cold War Confrontation within the Post-Cold War Era* (2011)

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Byung-Yeon Kim, et al., *Inter-Korean Integration Index, 1989-2007* (2009)

Jung-Wook Kim, et al., *A Comparative Study on Environmental Policy in South and North Korea, Volume 2* (2009)

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Soon-Hyung Yi, et al., *The Social and Psychological Acculturation of North Korean Defector Families* (2008)

Sam Ock Park, et al., *Strategies for the Industrial Development of North Korea: A Geographical Approach* (2008)

Se-Kyun Kim, et al., *The Making of the North Korean System and International Relations surrounding the Korean Peninsula* (2007)

Peace and Humanities Research

PHRG, *What is Peace and Humanities Research?* (Seoul: Akanet, 2013)

PHRG, *What is Greening Peace?* (Seoul: Akanet, 2013)

N. Ganesan and Sung Chull Kim, eds., *State Violence in East Asia* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2013)

IPUS People

Name	Title	ResearchField
Myoung-Kyu Park	Director of IPUS	Historical Sociology, Inter-Korean Relations, Sociology of Nationalism, Peace studies, Sociology of Religion, Culture and Identity
Byung-Yeon Kim	Deputy Director of IPUS	Transitions to the Market, North Korean Economic System, Economic Institutions and Growth
Hong Bae Lim	Deputy Head of PHRG	German Literature, Reunification of Germany
Jiwoon Baik	Humanities Korea Research Professor	Modern Chinese Literature and Thought, East Asian Cultural Studies
Yong Seok Chang	Senior Researcher	Comparative Politics, Political Economy of North Korea, Inter-Korean Affairs
Eun-mee Jeong	Humanities Korea Research Professor	North Korean Economy, Inter-Korean Relation and Integration, Everyday Life and Social Changes of North Korea
Philo Kim	Humanities Korea Professor	North Korean Society, Inter-Korean Relations, Development and Democracy, Integration and Reconciliation
Sung Chull Kim	Humanities Korea Professor	International Security, Dual-use of Nuclear Technology, State Violence
Taewoo Kim	Humanities Korea Research Professor	Historical Peace Studies, Modern Korean History, the History of the Korean War
Dong-Ki Lee	Humanities Korea Research Professor	Cold War History, Peace History, Peace Theory
Moonyoung Lee	Humanities Korea Professor	Cultural Studies, Globalization
Young Hoon Song	Senior Researcher	International Conflict, International Humanitarianism, Refugee and Forced Migration
Bo-hyuk Suh	Humanities Korea Research Professor	International Relations, Inter-Korean Relations, Human Rights
Chan Su Yi	Humanities Korea Research Professor	Religious Philosophy, Religious Culture, Japanese Religion
Jeongok Lee	Researcher	International Politics
Sujin Lim	Humanities Korea Researcher	Global Social Policy, International Organisation, Chinese Social Policy



❧ A Pleasant Walk with
the Institute for Unification Education
toward Unification

Unification, beyond our imagination!

Since its foundation in 1972, the Institute for Unification Education has been taking a range of initiatives to raise awareness of the various issues pertaining to Korean affairs and to help South Korean people obtain a better understanding of the visions for unification. The primary purpose of unification education is to help all South Koreans build a correct view on unification based on the principles of liberal democracy, a strong sense of national community and an appropriate understanding of national security. The Institute for Unification Education strives to bring South and North Korea closer by fostering these educational programs.



Those who prepare for Unification will lead Unification!

●●○ Goals



● Learning about unification is not all in our heads, but we must feel it in our hearts, too.

The Institute for Unification Education provides various educational programs to promote a South Korean society in which all citizens have a healthy perspective on national security and a strong sense of national community based on the values and principles of liberal democracy.



⊗ Future-oriented view on Unification

We teach the public the importance and various benefits of unification and helps people envision "a greater Korea."



⊗ Balanced view on North Korea

We raise public awareness on unification by helping people develop an objective and accurate view of North Korea.

⊗ Healthy view on National Security

We aim to strengthen a healthy view of national security based on an accurate perception on the divided situation and security reality of the Korean peninsula.



● As you learn about unification, the aspirations of both South and North Koreans will cheer you on.

The Institute for Unification Education provides extensive information on unification policy, Inter-Korean relations, North Korea and international affairs. Such efforts will nurture people's ability to solve the potential problems that may arise during the process of unification.



⊗ Unification Policy

Unification policy and framework, unification vision and tasks, unification process of divided countries, etc.



⊗ Understanding North Korea

Understanding North Korean politics, military, economy, society, North Korean foreign policy, current situation in North Korea, etc.

⊗ Inter-Korean Relations

Pending issues and disputes in inter-Korean relations, social and economic cooperation, inter-Korean dialogues, etc.

⊗ International Affairs

Neighboring countries' political affairs, North Korean nuclear issue, the policies of China, Russia, Japan and the U.S. toward the Korean peninsula, etc.





●●○ History

The Institute for Unification Education has been preparing for unification for the past 40 years.

Since its establishment in 1972, the Institute for Unification Education has been undergoing a series of changes in accordance with the ever-changing conditions of the Korean affairs. Over the past 40 years, the Institute has played a leading role in raising awareness of unification issues among South Koreans and helping people realize the importance of unification.

- May 1, 1972 Founded as the "Center for Unification Training" in Jangchung-dong.
- December 26, 1986 Renamed as "Institute For Unification Training"
- March 2, 1991 Relocated to current location in Insu-dong
- May 3, 1994 Established Course for visitors to North Korea
- December 17, 1996 Renamed as "Institute For Unification Education"
- February 5, 1999 Enacted Unification Education Support Act
- October 13, 2000 Opened Cyber Homepage (www.uniedu.go.kr)
- April 6, 2004 Established Online Unification Education Course
- January 5, 2006 Established Education Course for Future Leaders
- June 21, 2010 Established Education Course for Special Lecturers
- June 8, 2011 Appointed Dr. Myung-Chul Cho as the 21st Executive Director





- **General Education Division (02) 901-7173**
 - Establishes basic plans and guidelines for unification education.
 - Manages cyber lectures.
- **Education Management Division (02) 901-7052**
 - Manages education curriculum.
 - Supports professors' activities.

- **Support & Management Division (02) 901-7111**
 - Supports the Institute's administration.
 - Manages budget and facilities.
- **Education Cooperation Division (02) 901-7026**
 - Manages and Supports schools' and communities' Unification Education
- **Research & Development Division (02) 901-7166**
 - Develops and distributes books, publications and multi-media materials




The Institute for Unification Education is a specialized organization that has an aim to spread unification education and help South Korean citizens have a better understanding of unification.

A Creative Conduit to the World


The Korea Foundation is
making Korea a true friend of the world




Support for Media



Support for Korean
Studies Overseas



Public Diplomacy



Culture & Arts Exchange

KOREA **KF**
FOUNDATION
한국국제교류재단


KOREA FOUNDATION Boosts the Brand Value of 'Global Korea'

The Korea Foundation was established in 1991 to promote awareness and understanding of Korea, and to enhance the goodwill and friendship of the international community toward Korea and its people. As a representative organization of Korea's public diplomacy efforts, the Foundation implements a variety of activities and programs including support for Korean Studies worldwide as well as the promotion of cultural and people exchanges.



Korea Foundation Signature Programs

Promote Korea Worldwide and Make Friends with All Peoples and Countries



- **KF Assembly** Provide professors of Korean Studies in KF-supported positions, directors of Korean Studies centers, and other relevant scholars and specialists with the opportunity to get together to discuss matters of mutual concern and to strengthen their network relations.
- **KF Global e-School** With the participation of distinguished scholars and prestigious universities, within and outside of Korea, the program offers online video courses in real time to advance the globalization of Korean Studies.
- **KF Global Seminar** A Korea-led initiative to place Korea-related and global issues on the international agenda and to make known Korea's specific positions on global issues, based on Korea's systemic efforts to contribute to multilateral issues and to publicize its policy initiatives.
- **KF Forum** Arrange for prominent Korean and foreign figures to deliver lecture presentations to Korea's opinion leaders, specialists of various fields, and the general public to enhance understanding of international matters and globalization trends.
- **KF Global Internship** Support the development of Korea's future global leaders by dispatching graduate students and young professionals to world-leading museums, think-tanks, and international organizations for firsthand work experience.

◎ **Korea Foundation Online Resources**

Homepage	www.kf.or.kr
Newsletter	http://newsletter.kf.or.kr
Koreana	www.koreana.or.kr
Korea Focus	www.koreafocus.or.kr
Support for books on Korea	www.booksorkorea.org

The collage features several circular and rectangular images. At the top left, a group of people are seated around a table in a meeting. To the right, a man in a suit is speaking at a podium. Further right, a group of men are seated at a table with microphones, likely at a conference or seminar. At the bottom left, a man in a white traditional Korean garment is playing a zithar-like instrument. At the bottom right, a group of young people are performing music, with some playing violins and others on a piano.

Support for Korean Studies Overseas

Enable Korean Studies to Flourish Worldwide

The Foundation implements a variety of support programs to promote Korean Studies by encouraging more Korea-related education and research throughout the international community and fostering the development of specialists in Korean Studies. The assistance programs enable universities abroad to offer courses on Korean Studies and language, and to organize Korea-related academic events. The Foundation also cultivates next-generation Korean specialists through the provision of scholarship and fellowship support.

- Support for Korean Studies and language courses at universities worldwide
- Support for Korean Studies-related academic activities
- Fellowship support for Korea-related research
- Korean Studies workshops for foreign educators

Public Diplomacy

Building a Global Knowledge Network through Open Communication

The Foundation pursues a better understanding of Korea, as well as its people, in the global community through intellectual exchange programs targeted at prominent figures, professionals and experts in a variety of fields, and next-generation leaders and students across the globe. In addition, the Foundation organizes forums and seminars as a venue for Koreans and foreigners from various fields to discuss and share their views on key bilateral, regional and global issues of common concern and interest.

- Invitation of distinguished individuals and next-generation leaders
- Youth exchanges
- Bilateral forums and global seminars
- Policy-oriented research grants



Culture & Arts Exchange

Bring Together the Cultures of Korea and the World

To introduce Korean culture worldwide, the Foundation sponsors a variety of cultural and art exchange activities, along with providing support for the establishment of Korean exhibition galleries at world-renowned museums, so that more foreigners can view and appreciate Korea's arts and culture. In addition, the Korea Foundation Cultural Center serves a venue to facilitate two-way cultural exchanges by hosting various events, in which Koreans and foreign residents in Korea can acquire an understanding of global cultures.

- Promotion of Korean culture and arts abroad
- Support for Korean programs at overseas museums
- Promotion of world culture and arts in Korea

Support for Media

Disseminate Information about Korean Culture to Worldwide Audiences

The Foundation publishes and distributes various publications and films to introduce the true character of Korea and its culture to global audiences. In addition, the Foundation distributes Korea-related publications and video content to universities, libraries, and research institutions abroad to enhance foreigners' understanding of Korea and to promote Korea-related research activities.

- Publish periodicals and materials on Korea and its culture
- Produce video contents on Korea
- Support the broadcast of Korean TV dramas worldwide
- Distribute reference materials for Korean Studies



Donation Program

Public-Private Efforts to Enhance the Korea Brand

In the 21st century, the cultural and academic standing of a country or people creates a kind of brand value, which can be compared to the competitiveness of a commercial product. Therefore, the efforts to make global citizens properly understand Korea are a vital means to upgrade its national brand value as well as to strengthen its international competitiveness. The Foundation operates a donation program so that private businesses and individuals can support Korea-related initiatives at world-leading universities and museums, in order to bolster Korea's national image among the global community.

● **General Donation**

Donations made without a specific designation for usage of the donated funds are allocated to various exchange projects, in accordance with the Foundation's program priorities.

● **Designated Donation**

If a donor designates a donation for the support of a specific project or program, the Foundation will provide the administrative services necessary to implement the donor's request, including follow-up measures. In such case, the donor, the Foundation, and the recipient need to conclude a three-party agreement that outlines the obligations of each party, including a proper acknowledgement of the donation.

● **Noteworthy Projects of the Donation Program**

- Establishment of Yoon Se Young Professor of Korean History at Harvard University

- Establishment of Chung Ju Young Distinguished Professor of International Economics and Business at Johns Hopkins University
- KF-Samsung Scholarship for College Students
- KF-AMORE PACIFIC endowment fund for the Los Angeles Museum of Art's acquisition of contemporary Korean artworks

● **Participation in KF Donation Program**

Institutions and individuals that seek to donate funds to the Foundation's donation program are requested to call, e-mail, or visit the Foundation office. Upon our receipt of your intention to make a donation, a Foundation official will contact you to discuss the related details. For additional information about the application procedures, please contact the following department.

- ※ **Management & Innovation Department**
Tel (82-2) 2046-8518 E-mail plan@kf.or.kr



● **Korea Foundation Office in Seocho-dong**

Diplomatic Center, 10th Floor 2558 Nambusunwghanno, Seocho-gu, Seoul 137-863, Korea
Phone (82-2) 2046-8500 Fax (82-2) 3463-6075
E-mail webmaster@kf.or.kr Homepage www.kf.or.kr

● **Korea Foundation Office in Suha-dong**

West Tower 19th Floor (KF-CC Gallery 2nd Floor), Mirae Asset Center 1 Building, 67 Suha-dong, Jung-gu, Seoul 100-210, Korea
Phone (82-2) 2151-6520 Fax (82-2) 2151-6590