

The Korean Peace Process and International Cooperation

June 4, 2019, Tue.

10:00 am - 6:00 pm

—

Magnolia Hall, Hoam Faculty House
Seoul National University

Organized by

Institute for Peace and Unification Studies,
Seoul National University

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PROGRAM

10:00 am – 10:10 am Welcoming Speech: **Kyung Hoon Leem** (Director, IPUS, SNU)

10:10 am – 11:50 am **Session 1: Denuclearization and Sustaining Peace**
Chair: **Sung Chull Kim** (Humanities Korea Professor, IPUS, SNU)

“U.S.-North Korea Relations in the Korean Peace Process”

by **Jean H. Lee** (Director, Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy at Wilson Center, U.S.)

“Revisit of the Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone: Implications for the Korean Peace Process”

by **Fumihiko Yoshida** (Director, Research Center for Nuclear Abolition at Nagasaki University, Japan)

Discussants: **Dong-Joon Jo** (Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, SNU), **Sung-Woo Lee** (Senior Researcher, IPUS, SNU)

12:00 pm – 1:00 pm Organized Lunch

1:00 pm – 3:45 pm **Session 2: Agenda Items for International Cooperation**
Chair: **Bumsoo Kim** (Professor, College of Liberal Studies, SNU)

“What Role should China Play in the Peace Process of Korean Peninsula?”

by **Liang Zhi** (Professor, Institute for Studies of China's Neighboring Countries and Regions at East China Normal University, China)

“Japan's Role in the Korean Peace Process”

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Discussants: **Jaewoo Choo** (Professor, Department of Chinese Studies, KHU), **Kijeong Nam** (Professor, Institute of Japanese Studies, SNU), **HakJae Kim** (Humanities Korea Professor, IPUS, SNU)

3:45 pm – 4:00 pm Coffee Break

4:00 pm – 6:00 pm **Session 3: Roundtable Discussion**
Chair: **Kyung Hoon Leem** (Director, IPUS, SNU)
All participants

6:00 pm - 8:00 pm Organized Dinner

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Session 1: Denuclearization and Sustaining Peace

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Session1

U.S.-North Korea Relations in the Korean Peace Process

Jean H. Lee

(Director, Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean
History and Public Policy at Wilson Center, U.S.)

01



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Aug. 8, 2017, 12:31 p.m.

WHITE HOUSE




By NOAH BIERMAN

Trump warns North Korea of 'fire and fury'

President Trump, facing a growing nuclear threat from North Korea, warned the country on Tuesday against any new provocations and issued his own threat of "fire and fury like the world has never seen."

"North Korea best not make any more threats to the United States," Trump told reporters from the clubhouse of his golf course in Bedminster, N.J., where he was being briefed separately of the opioid epidemic. "They will be met with fire and the fury like the world has never seen."

Trump added that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un "has been very threatening beyond a normal state, and as I said, they will be met with fire and frankly power, the likes of whi

(Photo: AP)

President Donald Trump said he and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un "fell in love" because of Kim's "beautiful letters," but another top Pyongyang official warned that denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula won't happen unless the U.S. backs up its warm words with action.

Trump, speaking at a rally in West Virginia on Saturday night, said both leaders took tough positions at their June summit.

"I was really tough and so was he, and we went back and forth," Trump told an adoring crowd of thousands at Wesbanco Arena in Wheeling. "And then we fell in love, OK? No, really, he wrote me beautiful letters, and they're great letters. We fell in love."

Photo: Jean H. Lee

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Trump leaves Hanoi summit with Kim Jong-un early and empty-handed

'Sometimes you have to walk,' says US president as talks with North Korea collapse

Thu, Feb 28, 2019, 19:36

Suzanne Lynch Washington Correspondent







Photo: Jean H. Lee

US president Donald Trump speaks as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo looks on during a news conference after a summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in Hanoi on Thursday. Photograph: Evan Vucci/AP

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AGREED FRAMEWORK BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA GENEVA, OCTOBER 21, 1994

Delegations of the Governments of the United States of America (U.S.) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) held talks in Geneva from September 23 to October 21, 1994, to negotiate an overall resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula.

Both sides reaffirmed the importance of attaining the objectives contained in the August 12, 1994 agreed statement between the U.S. and the DPRK and upholding the principles of the June 11, 1993 joint statement of the U.S. and the DPRK to achieve peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. The U.S. and DPRK decided to take the following actions for the resolution of the nuclear issue:

I. Both sides will cooperate to replace the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with light-water reactor (LWR) power plants.

1) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the U.S. President, the U.S. will undertake to make arrangements for the provision to the DPRK of a LWR project with a total generating capacity of approximately 2,000 MW(E) by a target date of 2003.

-- The U.S. will organize under its leadership an international consortium to finance and supply the LWR project to be provided to the DPRK. The U.S., representing the international consortium, will serve as the principal point of contact with the DPRK for the LWR project.

-- The U.S., representing the consortium, will make best efforts to secure the conclusion of a supply contract with the DPRK within six months of the date of this document for the provision of the LWR project. Contract talks will begin as soon as possible after the date of this document.

-- As necessary, the U.S. and the DPRK will conclude a bilateral agreement for cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Photo: Jean H. Lee

"All the News That's Fit to Print" **The New York Times** Late Edition

VOLCXXLI... No. 48,899 NEW YORK, MONDAY, DECEMBER 8, 1991 50 CENTS

DECLARING DEATH OF SOVIET UNION, RUSSIA AND 2 REPUBLICS FORM NEW COMMONWEALTH

Frantic Moves Came to Light In Days Before Maxwell Died

As the Empire Was Crumbling

By STEVEN PROKESCH

LONDON, Dec. 8 — At the time of his mysterious death on Nov. 5, Robert Maxwell almost certainly knew he was about to be caught.

He had drained hundreds of millions of dollars from his two flagship public companies and from employee pension funds in a frantic attempt to keep his heavily indebted publishing empire afloat.

The authors of the Maxwell empire, Coopers & Lybrand, Definitive, were to conduct their next regular audit of the pension funds in a couple of months. And Coopers would have quickly discovered the transactions, said a person very familiar with the details of a special financial examination of the empire conducted for the banks after Mr. Maxwell's death. He agreed to discuss the report only if his identity was not disclosed.

"Basically grabbing cash,"

The Coopers team also found evidence that some of the diverted money went to the Daily News in New York to cover its losses. That raises more doubts about the future of the newspaper, which Mr. Maxwell acquired in March.

The maneuvering by Mr. Maxwell to prop up the private companies that controlled his empire "was doomed to failure," the person familiar with the "Coopers' report" said.

"It was" a sophisticated fraud like BCCI," he said, referring to the scandal surrounding the Bank of Credit and Commerce International. "The guy was basically grabbing cash, and Coopers found it out within days of going in." The Coopers team was led by Richard Stone, the partner in charge of the accounting firm's corporate finance division.

This discovery led the man holding

West Europeans Gather to Seek A Tighter Union

By ALAN RIDING

MAASTRICHT, The Netherlands

The Union Is Buried: What's Being Born?

By CELESTINE BOHLEN

Gorbachev's Vain Pleas Make His Eclipse Clear

no keeps warning about has already happened. This is a fact they can cope with their daily lives, as they do in the three outposts of the new

TAKE OVER A-ARMS

Newborn Bureaucracy Is Inheriting Functions of Old Authority

By BERG SCHEMANN

MOSCOW, Dec. 8 — The leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Byelorussia declared today that the Soviet Union had ceased to exist and proclaimed a new Commonwealth of Independent States open to all members of the former union.

In a series of statements issued after a two-day meeting in a Byelorussian government retreat, the leaders of the three Slavic republics declared their efforts to create a new union on the ruins of the old one. But they called for the creation of new "sovereign bodies" for defense, foreign affairs and the economy that would have their seat in Minsk, the capital of Byelorussia, and decided to maintain the ruble as the common currency.

They declared that the "interests and aspirations of the former union ceased as of the moment of signing, and that the new commonwealth assumed all international obligations of the Soviet Union, as well as control over its nuclear arsenal.

Gorbachev's Move

The U.S.S.R., as a subject of international law and geopolitical reality, is ceasing its existence," the leaders declared (Times page A5).

The action essentially stripped President Mikhail S. Gorbachev of his office and authority and the immediate question was whether the tough and implacable Soviet leader would resist — and if he did, whether the military or other forces of power would support him.

The three outposts of the new

The New and the Old

POPULATION (January 1990)

Byelorussia	10.3 million
Ukraine	21.8 million
Russia	148 million
Others	70.8 million

CONSUMER GOODS (Share of production 1988)

Byelorussia	1.5%
Ukraine	16.4%
Russia	47.0%
Others	28.2%

AGRICULTURE (Share of total output, 1988)

Byelorussia	5.4%
Ukraine	22.1%
Russia	26.7%
Others	21.4%

Source: The Statesman's Yearbook, 1991-92; U.S.S.R. Press and Figure Annual, 1991

"We, the republic of Byelorussia, the Russian Federation and Ukraine... state that the U.S.S.R., as a subject of international law and geopolitical reality, is ceasing its existence."

— Brest declaration, Dec. 8, 1991

Fear and Famine in North Korea

AUG. 8, 1997

Two months of drought and scorching heat has turned North Korea into a veritable oven enclosing 24 million people. The normally green fields squeezed onto and around the mountains of this reclusive country are now a sickly brown. Visitors report that undernourished people walk listlessly on the streets of Pyongyang, and relief agencies fear that a looming famine, following two years of floods and economic dislocation, will scythe down the very young and old. It is not the doctrines of Marx but of Malthus that now shape this isolated and fanatical Communist fortress.

ARDUOUS MARCH 1994-1998

Hyundai Motor-Korea
Foundation Center for
Korean History and
Public Policy



Photo: Jean H. Lee

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Photo: Jean H. Lee

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Photo: Jean H. Lee

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North Korea's Leader Is Seriously Ill, U.S. Intelligence Officials Say

By MARK MAZZETTI and CHOE SANG-HUN SEPT. 9, 2008



Kim Jong-il, North Korea's leader, missed a national parade in Pyongyang on Tuesday and may have suffered a stroke. Kyodo News, via Associated Press

RELATED COVERAGE

TIMES TOPIC

Kim Jong-il

TIMES TOPIC

North Korea

WASHINGTON — Kim Jong-il, North Korea's leader, is seriously ill and is likely to have suffered a stroke weeks ago, American officials said Tuesday, raising the prospect of a chaotic power struggle in nuclear-armed North Korea.

Intelligence officials in Washington said that the exact status of Mr. Kim's health was unclear, but that on Tuesday he failed to attend a celebration of the 60th anniversary of the founding of North Korea and that American intelligence agencies believed that he was now under the care of doctors in Pyongyang, North Korea's capital.

Photo: Jean H. Lee






Photo: Jean H. Lee

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Photo: Jean H. Lee

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US aid a step toward Korea nuclear talks

North Korea would suspend its controversial uranium enrichment program under deal



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By JEAN H. LEE

Associated Press

updated 12/18/2011 10:01:40 AM ET

Print | Font: A A + -

The United States is poised to announce a significant donation of food aid to North Korea this week, the first concrete accomplishment after months of behind-the-scenes diplomatic contacts between the two wartime enemies. An agreement by North Korea to suspend its controversial uranium enrichment program will likely follow within days.

A broad outline of the emerging agreement has been made known to The Associated Press by people close to the negotiations.

Discussions have been taking place since summer in New York, Geneva and Beijing. They have already yielded agreements by North Korea to suspend nuclear and ballistic missile testing, readmit international nuclear inspectors expelled in 2009, and resume a dialogue between North



David Guttenfelder / AP

North Korean farmers pass fields at a collective farm near the town of Sariwon, North Korea, on Oct. 25. In a landmark shift after three years of tensions, the United States is poised to announce in the coming days its first significant donation of food aid to North Korea -- a small but symbolic offer that is expected to pave the way for long-stalled discussions on dismantling Pyongyang's nuclear program.

NORTH KOREAN LEADER KIM JONG IL, 69, HAS DIED



In this Aug. 24, 2011 file photo, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il listens to Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, unseem, during a meeting at a military garrison outside Ulan-Ude. Dmitry Astakhov / AP

By Jean H. Lee, The Associated Press • December 18, 2011 10:34 pm
Updated: September 27, 2017 7:49 am

PYONGYANG, North Korea — Even as the world changed around him, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il remained firmly in control, ruling absolutely at home and keeping the rest of the world on edge through a nuclear weapons program.

Inheriting power from his father, he led his nation through a devastating famine while frustrating the U.S. and other global powers with an on-again, off-again approach to talks on giving up nuclear arms in return for food and other assistance. Kim was one of the last remnants of a Cold War-era that ended years earlier in most other countries.



Photo: Jean H. Lee

RISE OF A THIRD KIM: KIM JONG UN



Photo: Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy

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Photo: Jean H. Lee

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PHASE I: BUILDING LOYALTY AMONG THE PEOPLE

- MOVING FROM MILITARY-FIRST TO PARTY-FIRST
- IMPROVING STANDARD OF LIVING


Wilson Center

Photo: Jean H. Lee
Wilson Center for Korean History and Public Policy

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WOONG THE YOUNGER GENERATION

- **WITH SPORTS AND LEISURE**
- **WITH SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY**



Photo: Jean H. Lee
Korea Foundation Center for
Korean History and
Public Policy

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Photo: Jean H. Lee



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Photo: Jean H. Lee

video: Jean H. Lee



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Photo: Jean H. Lee

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Photo: Jean H. Lee

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PHASE II: BUILDING LEGITIMACY AS MILITARY STRATEGIST

- WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS
- BY HEIGHTENING TENSIONS



Photo: Jean H. Lee
Hyundai Motor-Korea
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Public Policy

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



Photo: Jean H. Lee

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
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
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PHASE III: KIM JONG UN AS INTERNATIONAL STATESMAN



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 **OCHA** United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

HOME / ASIA AND THE PACIFIC (ROAP) / DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

 Save

DPR KOREA
COUNTRY PROFILE

 **OCHA**

Key Figures¹

24.9 million population (2017) 

53%	47%
Female	Male

41% of people are undernourished (GHI 2014)

18M (70%) of people are vulnerable to food insecurity (2017)

\$114M funding requested to respond to the most urgent needs (US\$ millions)



Map Source: UNCS, ESM. The boundary and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Map created in Sep 2017.

Photo: Jean H. Lee


Wilson Center

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Photo: Jean H. Lee

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Photo: Jean H. Lee

photo: Jean H. Lee

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Photo: Jean H. Lee
photo: Jean H. Lee

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photos: Jean H. Lee

Photo: Jean H. Lee

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Session1

Revisit of the Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone: Implications for the Korean Peace Process

Fumihiko Yoshida

(Director, Research Center for Nuclear Abolition at
Nagasaki University, Japan)

02

Revisit of the Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone: Implications for the Korean Peace Process

Fumihiko Yoshida

(Director, Research Center for Nuclear Abolition
at Nagasaki University, Japan)

Revisit of the Northeast Asian Nuclear
Weapon Free Zone
~ Implications for the Korean Peace Process ~

Fumihiko Yoshida

Research Center for
Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University
(RECNA)

June 4, 2019



<http://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/>


About RECNA

Our missions

1. to disseminate information and make proposals towards abolishing nuclear weapons, through academic research and analysis
2. to contribute to disarmament and non-proliferation education for youth
3. to serve as a “think tank for the local community”

<http://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/recna/en-top>


Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones in the World



Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ)

- NWFZs are an international legal arrangement whereby a geographical area is created in which no nuclear weapons exist.
- Common Characteristics of NWFZs
 - Nonexistence of nuclear weapon
 - In the zones, the acquisition, possession, deployment, testing and use of nuclear weapons are prohibited.
 - Provision of Negative Security Assurance
 - Using or threatening to use of nuclear weapons by nuclear weapon states against countries within the zone is prohibited.

Concept of “Three plus Three” Northeast Asia NWFZ



Panel on Peace and Security of Northeast Asia (PSNA)

- Established in November, 2016.
- Consists of prominent experts from Japan, ROK, China, United States, Russia, Mongolia, Australia, Germany and the United Kingdom.
- Mission: “to facilitate political processes, through timely policy recommendations and public engagement, to create a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in Northeast Asia as part of establishing peace and security in the region.”
- Collaborates with Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, Asia-Pacific Leadership Network (APLN) and other partners.

Roadmap for Nuclear Diplomacy in North Korea (2/3)

The second phase

- a resumption of Six Party talks without preconditions, confidence building measures, verification of dismantlement of relevant test sites, and negotiations commencing on a new peace and regional security arrangement.

Roadmap for Nuclear Diplomacy in North Korea (1/3)

The first phase of this Roadmap

Initial commitments by North Korea to suspend all nuclear and missile tests, and fissile material production (including enrichment) in return for the US and ROK scaling back joint exercises (especially those using nuclear capable systems); and to provide energy and humanitarian assistance to DPRK.

<https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/general-roadmap-and-work-plan-for-nuclear-diplomacy-with-north-korea/>

Roadmap for Nuclear Diplomacy in North Korea (3/3)

The final phase

- The declaration and implementation of a legally binding and internationally verified nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty (as in the case of five other regions in the world together with the single state Mongolian NWFZ)
- Negative security guarantees provided by the recognized nuclear-armed states to all parties to a regional NWFZ.
- A final peace treaty agreed for the ending of the Korean War

Food for Thoughts

REGIONAL SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN NORTHEAST ASIA

By Peter Hayes

- Paper to Session 4: Regional security framework in North East Asia—As a parallel endeavor, what regional security framework should be envisaged and constructed?”
- Joint ROK–Japan Workshop
- June 1&2, 2019

Regional Security Framework in North East Asia (Peter Hayes, 2/5)

- Thus, even when it is denuclearized, the Korean Peninsula will not be peninsula of peace in the midst of these great power dynamics in East Asia.
- Unless something additional is done, it will be surrounded by an ocean and neighboring continent of preparations to fight a nuclear war.

Regional Security Framework in North East Asia (Peter Hayes, 1/5)

- The Asian pentapolar great power security system that consists of China, Russia, the United States, Japan, and India, instability today does not arise from bilateral shifts in relative throw-weight or missile accuracy or numbers.
- But it will arise from imbalances of power in new nuclear coalitions employing mobile missiles, missile defenses, anti-satellite systems, and new, disruptive technologies already introduced into the modernization of legacy NC3 systems
- This pentapolar system is far more complex than the bipolar Cold War threat system. It is far more complex than the Cold War tripolar standoff.

Regional Security Framework in North East Asia (Peter Hayes, 3/5)

- To survive, both Koreas must use agile diplomacy and locational leverage to align and act in ways that ameliorate the risks of great power nuclear war.
- They need to create time and space in those places where the great powers might collide and activate nuclear threat and bring weapons into play, to avoid nuclear threat mongering and risk-taking.
- They need to strive to create a regional, not just a bilateral framework that builds on the inter-Korean peace and denuclearization processes to curb the use of nuclear threat by the great powers.

Regional Security Framework in North East Asia
(Peter Hayes, 4/5)

- A nuclear weapons free zone in the region (Northeast Asia), buttressed by other comprehensive security measures at a regional level, is an important option to explore.
- It may be better framed as a comprehensive regional security zone that incorporates the key elements of a nuclear weapons-free zone, rather than a standard multilateral nuclear weapons-free zone.

Regional Security Framework in North East Asia
(Peter Hayes, 5/5)

The denuclearization of the Peninsula will require that the nuclear great powers commit to a binding framework of negative security assurances and limiting of the use of nuclear threat against the region, thereby reducing the role played by nuclear weapons in great power relations.

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Session 2: Agenda items for International Cooperation

What Role should China Play in the Peace Process of Korean Peninsula?

by Liang Zhi (Professor, Institute for Studies of China's Neighboring Countries and Regions at East China Normal University, China)

Japan's Role in the Korean Peace Process

by Hyun Jin Son (Professor, Hiroshima Peace Institute-Hiroshima City University, Japan)

Russia's Game on the Korean Peninsula

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Challenges and Opportunities in Vietnam's Reform and Opening: Implications for North Korea

by Ho Viet Hanh (Director, Institute of Social Sciences of the Central Region at Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences, Vietnam) and Bui Thi Mai Truc (Researcher)

Session2

What Role should China Play in the Peace Process of Korean Peninsula?

Liang Zhi


(Professor, Institute for Studies of China's Neighboring Countries and
Regions at East China Normal University, China)

03

What Role should China Play in the Peace Process of Korean Peninsula?

Liang Zhi

(Professor, Institute for Studies of China's Neighboring Countries and
Regions at East China Normal University, China)



Preface: Why I choose to discuss this topic?

- * Is China's influence on the peninsula becoming marginalized?
- ** Is China a key actor in the North Korean nuclear issue?
- *** What role should China play in the peace process of Korean Peninsula?



- * China-North Korean relations as a de facto alliance(1950-1961);
- ** Pyongyang swaying between Beijing and Moscow(1961-1969);
- *** China-North Korean alliance: “A thing of the past” (1969-1992) ;
- **** China's policy toward North Korea driven primarily by security and economic interests during the post-cold war era.



I. North Korea in the China's Foreign Strategy.



II. China's Role in the Process of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.



* Should China seek to cooperate with U.S.?

China-North Korea-Soviet Union triangle relations during the Korean War;

The Korean Peninsula during the Sino-U.S. rapprochement in the 1970s;

China's support for United Nations sanctions on North Korea since 2017.



III. China's Role in the Peace Process of the Korean Peninsula.



** Should the Six-party Talks be resumed?

The Six-party Talks failed to achieve any of the objectives it sought to meet;

Putin suggested Russia might welcome a revival of multilateral talks on North Korea, known as the Six-party Talks;

The resumption of the Six-party Talks does not seem possible in the near future.



* The Korean Armistice Agreement should be replaced by a peace treaty of ending the Korean War. China is one of the signatories of the armistice and should participate in formulating and signing the peace treaty;

** China wishes to encourage North Korea to switch his focus from nuclear and missile developments to economic development. China could continue to provide necessary economic assistance and investments for North Korea together with U.S. and South Korea and even corporate North Korea into Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to help sustain the peace on the peninsula.



Session2

Japan's Role in the Korean Peace Process

Hyun Jin Son


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04

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
1. Change in the situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula

- Japan, meanwhile, is intent on intervening in the Korean Peninsula following the bilateral negotiations between North and South Korea, and to influence Japan's influence.
- Abe emphasized the strength of the US–Japan alliance and ordered Trump to not misjudge the timing of sanctions against North Korea, and is trying to talk to North Korea conduct under-the-table negotiations.
- In order to play a role in the peace process on the Korean Peninsula in the future, Japan will promote normalization of diplomatic relations with North Korea through bilateral negotiations centered on the US–Japan alliance.




1. Change in the situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula

- Change in the security situation since PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Games.
- 「Panmunjom Declaration on Peace, Prosperity and Reunification of the Korean Peninsula」 (April 27, 2018)
- 「2018 North Korea–United States Singapore Summit」 (June 12, 2018)
- 「2019 North Korea–United States Hanoi Summit」 (February 27–28, 2019)



2. Japan's Position on the Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula

- Japan's greatest challenge in the peace process on the Korean Peninsula is the normalization of relations with North Korea.
- Until now, Japan is the only country that has not engaged in dialogue with North Korea. (North Korea had 4 meetings with China, 2 meetings with South Korea and 1 summit meeting with Russia)
- At present, Japan emphasizes the importance of the US–Japan alliance and adheres to its stance that it should not put pressure on North Korea nor delay sanctions against North Korea.



2. Japan's Position on the Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula



- On the other hand, the view of the peace process on the Korean Peninsula in Japan is negative. The key reason for that is the uneasiness caused by North Korea's kidnapping of the Japanese, nuclear tests and missile launches.
- According to a poll by the Yomiuri Shimbun, only 18% of Japanese people think of the unification of the two Koreas as being a positive, while 80% have a negative opinion.



2. Japan's Position on the Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula



- In the process of the denuclearization negotiations for the Korean peninsula, Japan will need not only dialogue to normalize relations with North Korea, but also cooperation with neighboring countries such as South Korea and China.



3. Japanese Internal Issues



(1) Japanese abduction issue

- Japan maintains that if the North Korean government takes full measures to ensure complete denuclearization, but does not fully resolve the Japanese abduction issue, it will continue to impose sanctions and will not provide economic assistance.
- North Korea has not claimed that the abduction issue has already been solved, while Japan has maintained its position to not engage in dialogue with North Korea without the complete resolution of the abduction issue.




3. Japanese Internal Issues



- The Japanese government recognizes that the abduction issue is a key issue for North Korean relations, and that this issue is very important for the survival of the Abe administration in Japan.

The abduction of Japanese citizens is a critical issue concerning the sovereignty of Japan and the lives and safety of Japanese citizens. Without the resolution of this issue, there can be no normalization of relations between Japan and North Korea. The Government of Japan is fully committed to making its utmost efforts to realize the return of all abductees to Japan as quickly as possible. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan)



3. Japanese Internal Issues



(2) Constitutional Amendment Issue (Peace Constitutional)

- In Article 9 of the Constitution, Japan has a so-called peace Clause that prohibits war or armed threat or the exercise of force.

[Renunciation of war Article 9]

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.



3. Japanese Internal Issues



- Japan does not possess any kind of power such as not having an army, and does not acknowledge the right of belligerency.
- Prime Minister Abe has emphasized the necessity of amending the Constitution after his second term.
 - it intends to expand the mission and action of the self-Defense Forces
 - a substantial military force capable of projecting force.
 - exercise collective self-defense power for international relations.



3. Japanese Internal Issues



(3) Normalization of Diplomatic Relations between DPRK and Japan

- 「Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration」 (September 17, 2002)
 - Unfortunate pasts liquidation
 - Establishing political, economic and cultural relations
 - Contributing to region peace and security

The Japanese side regards, in a spirit of humility, the facts of history that Japan caused tremendous damages and suffering to the people of Korea through its colonial rule in the past, and express deep remorse and heartfelt apology. (Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration, Article 2)



3. Japanese Internal Issues



Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration

- With respect to the outstanding issues of concern related to the lives and security of Japanese nationals, the DPRK side confirmed that it would take appropriate measures so that these regrettable incidents, that took place under the abnormal bilateral relationship, would never happen in the future. (Article 3)
- Both sides confirmed that, for an overall resolution of the nuclear issues on the Korean Peninsula, they would comply with all related international agreements. Both side also confirmed the necessity of resolving security problems including nuclear and missile issues by promoting dialogues among countries concerned. (Article 4)



4. Japan's Role in the Process of peace on the Korean Peninsula



- Armistice Agreement → Peace Agreement
 - USFK(United States Force Korea), USFJ(United State Force Japan)
role change
- Japan will have to play an important role, not only in the peace settlement on the Korean Peninsula, but also in Northeast Asia more broadly.
 - Region balancer role
 - Recovering of trust with neighboring countries
 - Efforts to resolve the North Korea nuclear issue



4. Japan's Role in the Process of peace on the Korean Peninsula



- 「Japan-Passing」
 - Abe is worried about being sidelined at a proposed meeting between US-DPRK.
 - Japanese media did not attend the closing of the North Korean Nuclear test facility.
 - Deterioration of public opinion in Japan.
- Restoring confidence by solving historical issues.
 - Comfort women's issue, Force labor
- Improving Korea-Japan relations



4. Japan's Role in the Process of peace on the Korean Peninsula



- Japan's strategy towards DPRK has changed as a result of recent the second summit between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un.
 - Abe calls for Japan-DPRK summit without preconditions to resolve abductions.

"I would like to meet with North Korean Workers' Party Chairman Kim Jong Un without preconditions and hold frank discussions at the earliest possible date.(The Sankei Shimbun at the Prime Minister's residence on May 1)



Session2

Russia's Game on the Korean Peninsula

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Russia's Game on the Korean Peninsula

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Abstract

Russia's behavior toward the Korean Peninsula is determined by a complex mix of motives and interests that include a commitment to nonproliferation, desire to avert war on the Russian Far Eastern border, pursuit of economic benefits, and consideration of great-power prestige. Moscow's quasi-alliance with Beijing is another—and increasingly salient—factor in Russian policies toward Korea. The Kremlin is aware that North Korea is vital for China's security and recognizes that Beijing's stakes in the Korean Peninsula are significantly higher than Moscow's. In return for its cooperation, Moscow expects Beijing's acknowledgment of Russian interests in areas of paramount concern for the Kremlin, such as the Middle East and Europe. The last year saw the emergence, and even institutionalization of sorts, of a Beijing-Moscow-Pyongyang alignment. This recalls the 1950s when the three were Communist allies against the U.S.—only this time it is Beijing, rather than Moscow, who is the leader in the trio. Russia's willingness to play second fiddle to China on the Korean Peninsula should be placed in the wider East Asian context. This disinclination to balance China's rising influence in East Asia is primarily due to the fact that most of the region lies outside the area of Russia's vital national interests. Chinese expansionism in East Asia and the Pacific actually benefits Russia because it diverts U.S. attention and resources from confrontation with Moscow in Europe.

Since the late nineteenth century, Russia has been a major stakeholder in Korean affairs, at times even exercising critical influence on them. Although the United States and China are at present the preeminent external influences on the peninsula, Russia remains a consequential actor. One important source of Russian leverage is its close ties to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).¹⁾ Moscow has long-standing political, humanitarian, and commercial links with its neighbor across the Tumangan River (known as the Tumannaya River in Russia and the Tumen River in China). The Russian ambassador to Pyongyang recently remarked that bilateral relations are “very frank,” “friendly,” and possibly “even better than they used to be under the Soviet Union.”²⁾ Moscow's interests on the peninsula are backed by its military assets in Northeast Asia. In case of a North Korea contingency, Russia has the capacity to intervene militarily, aiding or derailing moves by other players.

Russia's behavior toward the Korean Peninsula has been determined by a complex mix of motives and interests that include its commitment to nonproliferation, desire to avert war on the border with the Russian Far East, pursuit of economic benefits, and ambition for great-power prestige. The country's quasi-alliance with China is another factor, and an increasingly salient one, in Russian policies toward Korean affairs. In pursuing its diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula, Moscow has collaborated closely with its main strategic partner, Beijing. Even though Russia's interests regarding North Korea are not fully aligned with China's, there is enough overlap to establish effective cooperation.

The paper explores the dynamics of Russian-Chinese interactions with respect to North Korea. It pays special attention to the emergence of a Beijing-Moscow-Pyongyang alignment, which is in a sense a return to the 1950s when the same three capitals were Communist allies against the United States. I then place Russian policies on the Korean Peninsula within the

1) For a detailed analysis of Russia-DPRK ties, see Artyom Lukin et al., “Nuclear Weapons and Russian–North Korean Weapons,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, November 29, 2017, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/11/nuclear-weapons-russian-north-korean-relations>.

2) “Posol RF v Phenyane: KNDR ne poluchila ‘ni kopeiki’ za priznanie Kryma chastyu Rossii” [Interview with Russian Ambassador to the DPRK Alexander Matsegora], TASS, February 7, 2018, <http://tass.ru/politika/4936217>.

wider geopolitical context of East Asia and argue that Moscow has made a strategic choice to tolerate China's drive for preeminence in the region.

The Russia-China Axis and North Korea

After the end of the Cold War, Russia more or less delegated the task of looking after North Korea to China. During discussions in the United Nations or other international forums on North Korean misbehavior, Moscow usually let Beijing do the job of advocating for Pyongyang. However, the situation changed in late 2013 when relations between North Korea and China began to deteriorate in the wake of the execution of Jang Song-thaek, who was considered China's closest ally in the North Korean leadership. The North started to display a desire to move away from China and closer to Russia. In 2017, the North Korean press launched a direct rhetorical assault on China, accompanied by Pyongyang's de facto boycott of high-level political contacts with Beijing. For its part, China backed the U.S.-initiated sanctions resolutions against the DPRK at the UN Security Council and began to enforce them in earnest, applying significant pressure to the North Korean economy. During the same period, North Korea was one of the few states who supported Russia following the 2014 crisis around Ukraine and Crimea and diplomatic exchanges between Moscow and Pyongyang remained active. Whenever anti-DPRK sanctions were discussed at the UN Security Council, it was Russia, rather than China, that tended to be the most ardent defender of Pyongyang, working to soften the proposed penalties as much as possible.

As acrimony between China and North Korea lasted from late 2013 to early 2018, Moscow showed few signs of exploiting the split or expanding its own influence over the DPRK at China's expense. There were some weak attempts to increase business links with the North, but they failed. A consortium of private Russian companies, backed by Russia's then minister for development of the Russian Far East Alexander Galushka, tried to pursue commercial opportunities in North Korea in the wake of Pyongyang's break with Beijing. In 2014, the project “Pobeda” (Victory) was announced, which envisioned Russian

firms gaining access to North Korean minerals in exchange for investments in the North's dilapidated railway network.³⁾ However, the project, which carried an estimated cost of \$25 billion, never got off the ground because the Russian side apparently lacked financial resources. Galushka also stated Russia's intention to trade directly with the North, rather than exporting Russian products to the DPRK through Chinese intermediaries.⁴⁾ However, the crisis over North Korea's nuclear and missile tests in 2016–17 made those plans moot, and Galushka himself left the government in May 2018.

In the diplomatic realm, Russia stepped up coordination with China. In April 2015 the two countries launched a regular vice-ministerial dialogue on security in Northeast Asia centered on the Korean issues, with meetings normally conducted twice a year.⁵⁾ The delegates to the dialogue include not only diplomats but also representatives from defense ministries.⁶⁾ In July 2017, Moscow and Beijing announced their unified position on the North Korea crisis. During the summit between Putin and Xi Jinping in Moscow on July 4, 2017, a joint statement was adopted by the foreign ministers of the two countries. The statement put forward a joint initiative that combined the previous Chinese proposals for a “double suspension” (the halt of nuclear and missile programs by the North in exchange for a suspension of massive U.S.-ROK military drills) and “parallel advancement” (simultaneous talks on the denuclearization and the creation of peace mechanisms on the peninsula) with the Russian-proposed stage-by-stage Korean settlement plan.⁷⁾ It was the first time that China

3) Yonho Kim, “Russia, North Korea Strike Deal: Improved Railway for Mineral Resources,” *Voice of America*, November 8, 2014, <https://www.voanews.com/a/russia-to-overhaul-north-koreas-railway-in-return-for-mineral-resources/2513493.html>.

4) “Alexander Galushka: Rossiya i KNDR rasschityvayut na vzaimovыgodnoye sotrudnichestvo bez posrednikov” [Alexander Galushka: Russia and the DPRK Aim for Mutually Beneficial Cooperation without Intermediaries], Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East, October 14, 2015, http://minvostokrazvitia.ru/press-center/news_minvostok/?ELEMENT_ID=3713.

5) “O pervom raunde rossiysko-kitayskogo dialoga po bezopasnosti v Severo-Vostochnoy Azii” [On the First Meeting of Russia-China Dialogue on Security in Northeast Asia], Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Russia), April 25, 2015, http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/1207275.

6) Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Russia), Press Release, October 10, 2017, http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2895093.

7) “Joint Statement by the Russian and Chinese Foreign Ministries on the Korean Peninsula's Problems,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Russia), July 4, 2017, http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2807662.

and Russia so clearly articulated their common position with respect to North Korea.

In issuing the joint statement, Moscow and Beijing explicitly linked the resolution of the North Korea problem to the United States' willingness to make major strategic concessions in Northeast Asia. Russia and China insisted that “allied relations between separate states should not inflict damage on the interests of third parties” and expressed opposition to “any military presence of extra-regional forces in Northeast Asia” as well as to “the deployment of THAAD antimissile systems.” The July 4 statement ends with Russia and China vowing “to protect the two countries' security interests and to ensure a strategic balance in the region.” In other words, China and Russia want the United States to weaken its strategic grip on Northeast Asia, at least with respect to the Korean Peninsula and the U.S.-ROK alliance.

Sino-Russian diplomatic coordination was again on display in September and December 2017 when the UN Security Council passed new sanctions punishing North Korea for nuclear and missile testing. To the surprise of many, Russia supported tough penalties on the North, even though it had previously insisted that “pressure through sanctions has run its course and doesn't work.”⁸⁾ Russia did not even object to the introduction of a phased-out ban on the use of North Korean labor, despite the fact that the country is the biggest importer of contracted workers from the DPRK and depends considerably on such labor for construction projects in the Russian Far East. Chinese lobbying was the most important reason for Moscow's decision to go along with the UN Security Council vote penalizing North Korea.

The summit between Vladimir Putin and North Korea's Kim Jong Un in April 2019 in Vladivostok symbolically reaffirmed Russia's role as a player in the Korea game, but it showed that Moscow's stakes on the Peninsula are probably not as high as those of China, the US and South Korea. Putin spent only a few hours with Kim and then departed for a three-day visit to Beijing to attend a Belt and Road forum, leaving his guest to enjoy Vladivostok.⁹⁾

The Russia-China collaboration in Northeast Asia is just one element of their

8) “Nebenzia: sanktsii v otnoshenii KNDR ne rabotayut, nuzhno iskat' mirny put' uregulirovaniya” [Nebenzia: Sanctions against the DPRK Don't Work, Peaceful Ways of Settlement Should Be Looked For], TASS, September, 2, 2017, <http://tass.ru/politika/4526372>.

9) <https://www.38north.org/2019/05/alukin050219/>

“comprehensive strategic partnership,” which under Trump has only grown tighter. North Korea has been the primary test of the U.S.-China-Russia strategic triangle in Asia, and Russia has sided with China.¹⁰⁾ Moscow is unlikely to do anything on the peninsula that would run against the basic interests of its main strategic partner. Top Russian officials, including Putin himself, have repeatedly praised China as the country that has contributed the most to the current diplomatic progress on the peninsula.¹¹⁾ Russian diplomats emphasize that they have been “very closely collaborating” with their Chinese counterparts, with bilateral consultations taking place in Beijing and Moscow “almost on a monthly basis.”¹²⁾

The Kremlin is well aware that North Korea is vital for China’s security and recognizes that Beijing’s stakes in the Korean Peninsula are significantly higher than Moscow’s. What it expects in return is Beijing’s acknowledgment of Russia’s interests in the areas of paramount concern to Moscow, such as Ukraine and the Middle East. There might even be a tacit agreement between the two partners that Moscow defers to Beijing on Northeast Asian issues while, in return, China recognizes Russia’s leading role in the Middle East.¹³⁾

If there are any differences between Russia and China on the Korean Peninsula, they are manageable and have been effectively handled. All the major moves Moscow undertakes with regard to North Korea are coordinated with Beijing.

10) Gilbert Rozman, “Giving a New Jolt to Strategic Triangle Analysis,” *Asan Forum*, August 30, 2017, <http://www.theasanforum.org/giving-a-new-jolt-to-strategic-triangle-analysis>.

11) See, for example, Vladimir Putin (remarks at the Valdai Club meeting, Sochi, October 18, 2018), http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58848?fbclid=IwAR1fE28r0ejQ0M_8_8vC3ZEnOHexUv6a0Nuu8gg65K6gWxDAYsInIHnUbg.

12) “Zamglavy MID RF: SShA priglasili nas k sebe dlya dialoga po KNDR” [Interview with Deputy FM Igor Morgulov], TASS, October 20, 2018, <https://tass.ru/interviews/5699045>.

13) Andrey Kortunov, “Pyongyang Is Starts and Wins. What Can the Losers Do?” Russian International Affairs Council, November 13, 2017, <http://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/pyongyang-is-starts-and-wins-what-can-the-losers-do/>.

The China-Russia-DPRK Bloc Reborn?

With China-DPRK rapprochement moving apace and Russia-DPRK relations already quite warm, 2018 saw the emergence, and even institutionalization of sorts, of a Beijing-Moscow-Pyongyang bloc. In October, Russia, China, and North Korea, represented by deputy foreign ministers, held their first ever official trilateral meeting in Moscow. They issued a joint statement calling for the easing of the UN Security Council sanctions against North Korea to reward Pyongyang for its “important denuclearization steps.” The statement also called for establishing “mutual trust.” The process of trust-building should be “phased and synchronous in nature and accompanied by reciprocal steps by the states involved.”¹⁴⁾ In effect, this formula reiterates Pyongyang’s long-held mantra and contradicts the U.S. stance that any significant rewards to the DPRK, such as the removal of sanctions and the signing of a peace treaty, can only happen after North Korea’s full denuclearization. In another jab at the United States, the three sides denounced “unilateral sanctions.” The present Russia-China-DPRK coalition is in a sense a throwback to the 1950s, when the same three countries were Communist allies against the United States—only this time it is Beijing, rather than Moscow, who is the leader in this trio.

The tripartite diplomatic alignment of Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang currently stands in clear opposition to U.S. strategic goals in Northeast Asia. However, it is not at all clear how viable and durable this coalition will be. Beijing, and to a lesser degree Moscow, would certainly like to use the trilateral alignment to diminish U.S. strategic dominance in Northeast Asia and drive the United States out of the Korean Peninsula. The question is whether North Korea is willing to join China and Russia in their anti-U.S. drive.

Pyongyang is definitely seeking rapprochement with Washington and might even be interested in the continued presence of U.S. forces in Northeast Asia as a hedge against China. Kim Jong-un apparently hopes to achieve a grand bargain with Washington that

14) “Sovmestnoye informatsyonnoye commyunike o tryokhstoronnih konsul’tatsiyah zamestiteley ministrov inostrannyh del Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Kitayskoy Narodnoy Respubliki i Koreyskoy Narodno-Demokraticeskoy Respubliki” [Joint communiqué on the trilateral consultations of the deputy foreign ministers of Russia, China and the DPRK] Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Russia, October 10, 2018, http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3370331)

would normalize relations with the United States while leaving the DPRK as a de facto nuclear power. It is quite possible that Washington, under Trump or under the next president, eventually agrees to a deal that would see North Korea relinquish its intercontinental ballistic missile capability and the most visible elements of its nuclear program while retaining the core nuclear potential. With China rapidly becoming the overriding geopolitical concern for the United States, a nuclear North Korea might even be considered at some point as an important asset in balancing Beijing in Northeast Asia, somewhat similar to how Washington saw a nuclear-armed Communist China as a counterforce to the Soviet Union. Strategically, North Korea could well be the Vietnam of Northeast Asia: a country that used to be a bitter enemy of the United States but becomes a close partner and friend thanks to a changed geopolitical context. Like Vietnam, North Korea is extremely good at playing games between contending major powers. From the 1960s until the 1980s, Pyongyang was engaged in an artful game with Moscow and Beijing, playing both ends against the middle. There is good reason to predict that Kim will try to pull off the same trick by exploiting the intensifying rivalry between Washington and Beijing. Ironically, in the Moscow-Beijing-Pyongyang triad, North Korea may turn out to be the most pro-American, with intriguing implications for Northeast Asia's geopolitics.

Leaving East Asia to China?

Russia's relative passivity on the Korean Peninsula is partly explained by its limited economic resources. Competing with Beijing for the status of Pyongyang's chief patron would require hefty financial commitments that Russia can hardly afford. According to well-informed Russian sources, China spends at least one billion dollars a year subsidizing North Korea.

Furthermore, North Korea lacks appeal to Russia's most powerful vested interests, such as the oil and gas industry and the military-industrial complex. Unlike the Middle Eastern countries or Venezuela, North Korea has no oil and gas reserves. Admittedly, there is a long-standing idea for a trans-Korean natural gas pipeline that would bring Russian gas to South

Korea via the North. However, Russia's Gazprom does not currently view this project as a priority in its Asian strategy due to the many risks involved and the uncertainty about the sources of funding its construction. For Russia's defense companies, North Korea is of little interest because it does not have much cash, not to mention the fact that international sanctions prohibit the export of military hardware to the DPRK. For Russia's most powerful economic actors, and apparently for the Kremlin itself, the bottom line is that you cannot make money on North Korea.

State-owned Russian Railways is Russia's only major company with a tangible stake in North Korea, owning the Khasan-Rajin rail and port venture in which it invested \$300 million. Although Russian Railways is interested in realizing the idea of connecting the Trans-Korean railway network with the Trans-Siberian line, the company is not counted among Russia's most powerful lobbyists and does not have connections to the Kremlin on par with Rosneft, Gazprom, or Rostec. Moreover, even though the Khasan-Rajin venture is exempt from UN Security Council sanctions, the project has been mostly idle since 2017 due to the toxic environment around any commerce involving North Korea.

Russian deference to China on issues related to the Korean Peninsula, albeit somewhat hurting Moscow's great-power pride, does make geopolitical sense. As discussed above, the East Asian and Pacific theater south of the Russian Far East is not the top economic or political priority for Moscow. Although its geopolitical vision for a "greater Eurasia" nominally encompasses East Asia, the Kremlin treats Pacific affairs as an area of lower concern than Europe, the Middle East, or Central Asia.¹⁵⁾ The only time the Pacific dominated Russian grand strategy was a brief period in the late nineteenth to early twentieth century when Czar Nicholas II and his entourage entertained the ambition to make the Russian empire the master of Northeast Asia, including the Korean peninsula. Those grand designs abruptly ended with Russia's humiliating defeat to Japan in 1905. After the Russo-Japanese War, Russia has never again attempted to play a leading role in East Asia, saving strategic resources for other regions it deemed of higher importance, such as Europe and the Middle

15) Vladimir Putin (speech at the Belt and Road International Forum, Beijing, May 14, 2017), <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54491>.

East. In order to be a first-tier power in the Asia-Pacific, Russia would need to have a significant economic presence in the region and strong naval capabilities to project power in a mainly maritime theater. Moscow understands that it lacks both of these prerequisites and is under no illusion that it may develop them in the foreseeable future.

The Kremlin appears to have chosen to refrain from balancing China in East Asia, and there is mounting evidence that it may even be aiding Chinese hegemonic pursuits in the region. For instance, although its official stance on the South China Sea disputes is strict neutrality, Russia has recently tilted in favor of Beijing. For example, following the July 2016 Hague tribunal ruling that rejected China's claims to sovereignty over the South China Sea, Putin publicly expressed solidarity with Beijing, calling the international court's decision "counterproductive."¹⁶⁾ This statement was backed by the first-ever joint drills conducted by Chinese and Russian warships in the South China Sea.¹⁷⁾

Conclusion

At present, the Kremlin's main geopolitical game is in the Middle East rather than East Asia. In the wake of Russia's bold intervention in Syria, the Middle East is consuming most of Moscow's foreign policy attention and diplomatic resources, raising the question of how much is left to spare elsewhere. This is not to say that Moscow has ignored the Peninsula, but it certainly treats the Korean affairs as more or less a secondary priority on the list of Russian foreign policy concerns.

This disinclination to balance China's rising influence in East Asia, be it on the Korean Peninsula or in the East and South China Seas, is primarily due to the fact that most of the region lies outside the area of Russia's vital national interests. Instead, the country's overriding priority in East Asia is defensive: maintaining sovereignty over the geopolitically

16) Jack Stubbs and Katya Golubkova, "Putin: Outside Interference in South China Sea Dispute Will Do Only to Harm," Reuters, September 5, 2016, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-g20-russia-china/putin-outside-interference-in-south-china-sea-dispute-will-do-only-to-harm-idUSKCN11B1QC>.

17) Ben Blanchard, "China, Russia Naval Drill in South China Sea to Begin Monday," Reuters, September 11, 2016, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-china-russia-idUSKCN11H051>.

vulnerable Russian Far East. As long as Russia remains a formidable military and nuclear power, its Far Eastern territories are safe against aggression from any potential predator, be it China or anyone else.

In return for not opposing China's ambitions to re-emerge as the suzerain of East Asia, the Kremlin expects Chinese backing, or at least benevolent neutrality, in areas of prime significance to Russia like the Middle East or Eastern Europe. In addition, Chinese expansionism in East Asia and the Pacific benefits Russia because it diverts U.S. attention and resources from confrontation with Moscow in Europe.¹⁸⁾ Moscow is enjoying the spectacle of China and the United States battling it out in the Asia-Pacific in the hope of reaping benefits from their epic competition.

18) "Retired U.S. General Says War with China Likely in 15 Years," *NBC News*, Oct. 25, 2018, <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/retired-u-s-general-says-war-china-likely-15-years-n924031>

Session2

Challenges and Opportunities in Vietnam's Reform and Opening: Implications for North Korea

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
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(Researcher)



OUTLINE




SUMMARY OF FACTORS LEADING TO “DOI MOI”

- “Doi Moi” started being discussed in the mid-term of the Communist Party of Vietnam Congress IV. The period from Congress V to Congress VI was a fierce and complicated struggle between the first elements of the reform and the thoughts of maintaining the old management mechanism.
- “Doi Moi” was considered as the official path in Vietnam in the Communist Party of Vietnam Congress VI
- “Doi Moi” was the result of a process of exploration and experimentation. It was a step-by-step process from low to high, from part reform to fundamental reform.




SUMMARY OF FACTORS LEADING TO “DOI MOI”



SUMMARY OF FACTORS LEADING TO “DOI MOI”

- The renewal actions came first, because it came from the requirement of practice.
- As the reality was summarized, it became a guiding thought that can really consider it as “innovative thinking”.
- The theory comes from practice but then is used to direct practice.



SUMMARY OF FACTORS LEADING TO “DOI MOI”



“Doi Moi” was for the benefit of the people, relied on the people, promoted the active and creative role of the people, was relevant to reality, was always sensitive to the new.

BREAKTHROUGHS IN VIETNAM DURING OVER 30-YEAR PERIOD OF “DOI MOI”

POLITICS

ECONOMICS

INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONSHIPS

SOCIETY

SUMMARY OF FACTORS LEADING TO “DOI MOI”

- The document of the Party's Congress VIII raised the lesson: "Incorporate economic reform with political reform, regard economic reform as a center, and gradually implement reform in politics".
- Vietnam firstly focused on the successful implementation of economic reform, overcoming the socio-economic crisis, creating necessary physical and spiritual foundation to maintain political stability, construct and strengthen people's beliefs, facilitate reform in other aspects.

**Economics
& Politics**

BREAKTHROUGHS IN POLITICS



Vietnam has gradually built and completed the socialist rule of law with the spirit of "The state is of the people, by the people and for the people".

BREAKTHROUGHS IN ECONOMICS

- Vietnam has built a multi-sector economy, encouraged workers to work, enabled people to own, manage land, produce and consume goods and products.
- Vietnam has taken advantages of a latecomer country in the process of globalization and geo-economic position to create a national synergy, strive which helps shorten the process of industrialization towards modernization.



BREAKTHROUGHS IN ECONOMICS



- The economic structure has shifted towards reducing the agricultural sector, increasing the service and industrial sectors. Vietnam has gradually formed fully and synchronously market factors and market types which operate smoothly.
- The market of goods and services has developed and perfected in terms of scale, structure of goods - domestic and foreign markets, commercial infrastructure, services, management mechanisms, and competition levels.
- Economic growth has basically been in harmony with cultural development, human development, social progress and justice, protection of natural resources and the environment.

BREAKTHROUGHS IN ECONOMICS

Economic growth

- The average economic growth rate was 7% from 1991 to 2016.
- During this period, the rate was over 7% in 3 years, over 8% in 7 years, over 9% in 2 years.

Exports and imports

- Total of import and export value was \$5,156.4 million in 1991 and up to \$333.06 billion in 2016.
- Has become a large exporter of coffee, rubber, cashew nuts, pepper, seafood.

GDP

- Vietnam joined the low middle-income group in 2011.
- In 2016, GDP per capita reached \$2,215 which was 11.78 times higher than in 1991.

Inflation

- Inflation rate reduced from 774.7% in 1986 to 12% in 1995 and has been only one figure since then.

BREAKTHROUGHS IN SOCIETY



- The international-standard poverty rate in Vietnam dropped sharply and continuously, from 58.1% in 1993 to 28.9% in 2002, 14.2% in 2010 and 6.9% by the end of 2017.


- Developed the social insurance system, social assistance, health insurance policies to create conditions for people to enjoy culture, health and education.



BREAKTHROUGHS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

- In the Party Congress VI (1986), the Communist Party of Vietnam advocated: Expanding international cooperation, enhancing attraction of foreign investment. In the Party Congress VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, Communist Party of Vietnam continued to advocate expanding, multilateralizing and diversifying foreign relations.
- Started from "want to be friend" to "being willing to be friends" and now "being a friend, a reliable partner and responsible member" of the international community. From "breaking the siege, embargo" comes to "integrate into the regional and world economy" and is followed by "proactive and active international integration" in a comprehensive way.
- Vietnam has established relationships with 185 countries out of the UN's 193 countries; promoted economic, trade and investment relationships with 224 markets in all continents; participated in 70 international organizations
- At forums such as ASEM, APEC, the United Nations, Vietnam has a voice, and suggests initiatives respected by countries. Vietnam has been elected to many important positions such as the non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (term 2008-2010); member of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) (term of 1998-2000, 2016-2018).

CHALLENGES VIETNAM FACED IN "DOI MOI"



BREAKTHROUGHS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

- 1991: Normalized relationship with China
- 1995:
 - ✓ Normalized relationship with the United States
 - ✓ Became a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
- 1998: Joined the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC)
- 2006: Became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
- 2015: Signed the Declaration of Ending negotiations on Vietnam-EU Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA)

CHALLENGES VIETNAM FACED IN "DOI MOI"



CHALLENGES VIETNAM FACED IN “DOI MOI”

- The economic growth rates are quite good, but the economic development is still not relevant to the potential and requirements, and not sustainable.
- The socialist-oriented market economy institution has been slow to be completed, the system of market formation and development has not been synchronous.
- In fact, Vietnam has not really created conditions for all economic sectors in the country to develop evenly. There is still the psychological discrimination between economic sectors, especially between the public and the private enterprises.



CHALLENGES VIETNAM FACED IN “DOI MOI”

- Political reform is still slow, not synchronized with economic reform, especially in terms of organization, institutions, mechanisms and policies.
- The political system is still cumbersome, not very efficient.
- The construction and improvement of the socialist rule-of-law state has made many progresses but there are many limitations.



CHALLENGES VIETNAM FACED IN “DOI MOI”

- In terms of cultural development, there are many limitations in solving social problems and environmental protection which affects the sustainable development.
- Many pressing issues arose, especially social issues and social development management. Resources are exploited indiscriminately, ecological environment is polluted, global climate change is more and more affecting Vietnam, causing serious consequences.
- In terms of education and training, after the reunification of the country, Vietnam encountered difficulties in reorganizing the education system.
- It can be said that Vietnam does not have a clear educational philosophy, thus, education is not really the country's top national policy.



CHALLENGES VIETNAM FACED IN “DOI MOI”

- There have not effective solutions to prevent the recession in political ideology, morality and lifestyle of officials and party members yet.
- The situation of corruption, waste, bureaucracy, and social negativity is serious. The Party's leadership for the State, and the mass organizations has reformed slowly.



IMPLICATIONS FOR NORTH KOREA FROM “DOI MOI” IN VIETNAM

- 1 • The experience of Vietnam shows that if reform is not implemented, it will not be able to develop the country. Reform needs to be based on the interests of the citizens.
- 2 • Determining areas, scales and steps of the reform should be based on specific domestic and international conditions, and ensure to maintain the principles to avoid collapse
- 3 • As reform implement, North Korea needs a new mindset of socialism at the general level of reasoning, and build a proper model which is based on the specific conditions of the country.

IMPLICATIONS FOR NORTH KOREA FROM “DOI MOI” IN VIETNAM

- 4 • In the process of reform, technical difficulties will always arise, therefore, solutions to these certain problems are necessary.
• There must be a serious summary of the theory to handle problems voluntarily and not far from the principle issues such as ensuring the interests of the country, people's interests, socialist orientation
- 5 • In the process of reform, North Korea needs to expand democracy in parallel with effective controlling power to minimize bad habits which do not exist in the current social management but develop strongly in the transition process

IMPLICATIONS FOR NORTH KOREA FROM “DOI MOI” IN VIETNAM

- 6 • For international relations, it is necessary to eliminate hostile thinking to have honest cooperation with partners on the basis of the interests of the parties.
- 7 • In the process of reform, the unification of the country as a common interest and desire of the North Korean people. Thus, this will be a big issue to concern and take appropriate steps based on the specific context of both North Korea and international communities.



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