

Development of Peace Studies and the Asian Context

Sung Chull Kim

This introductory article illustrates the development of peace studies and then reviews the Asian context in it. Peace studies has developed through three approaches—state-centered, human-centered, and structure-critical—the origins of which can be traced back to Kantian federalism and republicanism, Tolstoy’s criticism of institutionalized violence, and Marx’s critique of capitalism, respectively. In the post-Cold War era, the theories of security community, human security, and ecosocialism have developed separately. At the same time, the three approaches have competed and merged with one another in the face of increasingly complex global problems, resulting in the birth of “responsibility to protect” (R2P) and differing but simultaneous responses to climate change. Both ASEAN as a multifaceted community and development-based human security characterize the Asian context.

Keywords peace studies, state-centered approach, human-centered approach, structure-critical approach, complexity, Asian context

Introduction: The Three Approaches and Their Origins

What is peace? For a long time, people thought of peace as a tranquil order without war, as shown in such terms as Pax Romana, Pax Britannica, and Pax Sinica. However, peace as the absence of war is too narrow. If threats of any type of conflict exist or other types of violence are looming, it cannot be said to be true peace. In order to understand peace, it is necessary to look at other terms that are opposed to peace, such as conflict and violence, in addition to war. Also, it is important to look into the sources of conflict and violence and then establish norms and institutions for preventing them without incurring another conflict or new violence.

As I wrote in detail elsewhere, I argue that Emmanuel Kant, Leo Tolstoy, and Karl Marx are the original thinkers for the evolution of peace studies, although none of them declared so.¹ Both in the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods,

Table 1. Origins, Developments, and Complexity of Peace Studies

	State-centered approach	Human-centered approach	Structure-critical approach
Original ideas	Kant (1724-1804)'s federalism, republicanism	Tolstoy (1828-1910)'s critique of institutionalized violence	Marx (1818-1883)'s criticism of capitalism
Establishment in Cold War	Integration and community theory	Positive peace theory	Social transformation theory
Emergence of Complexity in post-Cold War	Security community theory	Human security theory	Ecological socialism (or ecosocialism)
	Responsibility to protect		
	Responses to climate change		

Source: Author.

the ideas of Kant, Tolstoy, and Marx have been passed down and have become the foundation of the state-centered, human-centered, and structure-critical approaches, respectively. And these approaches have greatly contributed to the development of contemporary peace studies. Although all three are in common in that they ultimately pursue human dignity, they differ from one another in conceptualizing and explaining the subject-matters.

It is worth noting that there was a fault line between peace studies of the Cold War and that of the post-Cold War era. During the Cold War, the abovementioned three approaches evolved individually, forming a division of labor in kind. After the end of the Cold War, the three approaches mostly maintained their independence from each other and at the same time overlapped and crossed boundaries with one another, which resulted in what I call the emergence of complexity. Table 1 shows the original ideas, developments, and complexity of contemporary peace studies.

The thoughts of Kant, Tolstoy, and Marx have evolved in three different directions, contributing to expansion of the scope of peace studies and to the founding of new concepts and theories. First of all, Kant's state-centered thought—the main idea of which appeared in his book, *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*—demonstrated the utility of the federation of states and the state's republican nature for preventing interstate wars. During the Cold War, Kenneth Boulding and Karl Deutsche took over Kant's idea to extend their discussion about integration and community consciousness for international peace. Today, under the umbrella of constructivism, the security community has contributed

to the formation of an important stream of the state-centered approach. Also, the theory of democratic peace, inheriting Kant's republicanism, remains an important part of this approach.

Second, Tolstoy's human-centered idea focused on nonviolence and social justice, prioritizing individuals over the state. The role of governments may be indispensable in realizing these values, but the peaceful living of individuals must precede the security of the state. In this vein, Johann Galtung presented the concepts of positive peace, structural violence, and cultural violence in the Cold War, having inspired many students of peace studies. After the end of the Cold War, the theory of human-security has added more importance to this human-centered approach. Ever since human security was presented by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) at the early stage of the post-Cold War period, it has been developed in two research directions. One is development-based human security that focuses on overcoming poverty and discrimination, the other is protection-based human security that responds to anti-humanitarian threat and violence.

Third, the structure-critical approach, which originated from Marx's criticism of capitalism, has attributed all forms of social conflict to the structure of society. A group of intellectuals, who were called the New Left or post-Marxists during the Cold War, showed that antagonism in advanced societies stemmed not only from traditional class relations but also from various social divisions on such issues as gender, ethnicity, nuclear program, and ecology. As climate change has become one of the most challenging global issues, the Marxists of today advocate for ecological socialism or ecosocialism, which they believe originally existed in Marx's early writings.

The three approaches in peace studies developed separately during the Cold War, but today they are becoming interdependent and overlapping in the face of the increasingly complex challenges. Complexity here means that various factors involved in conflict or violence are not independent or isolated. As openness and connectivity increase, the related uncertainty appears to be an important element shaping the complexity of responses. For example, climate change is not just a natural consequence but a result of industrialization, the consumption-oriented system, and divisive domestic and international politics. In response to this complex issue, different approaches come together to compete on the one hand and to merge on the other.

This article consists of three parts. First, it demonstrates the establishment of peace studies in three different directions during the Cold War, while showing an absence of conversations between them. Second, it shows not only the continued development of the three approaches in the post-Cold War era, but also the emergence of complexity in peace studies in the face of global problems. As to the complexity in peace studies, I take two examples: one is "responsibility to protect" (R2P), and the other is the responses of the three approaches to the

climate change issue. And finally, this article situates Asian peace studies within this current frame of peace studies.

Establishment of Peace Studies during the Cold War

The history of the 19th and first half of the 20th Centuries is marked by many wars. The Napoleonic Wars were followed by colonial wars among the great powers of the Great Britain, Germany, France, Russia, and Japan and then by the two world wars. The atrocities of these wars raised a fundamental question of whether mankind could survive them. Indeed, the nuclear weapons, used at the end of World War Two, showed unprecedented destructive power, and the ensuing nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union was a genuine threat to human existence. The half-century Cold War was also a fierce competition for dominance between liberal democracy and communism. The competition overshadowed the *Cold War* and led to a *hot war* that resulted in some 5.5 million deaths in the Korean War and the Vietnam War together.

Despite the race between the United States and the Soviet Union, social movements took place in various ways in advanced Western countries. In the 1950s, antinuclear activism became the mainstream of the social movements, but from the late 1960s, various topics such as human rights, gender equality, and the environment became the subjects of the movements. The so-called New Social Movement not only reflected the changes within the advanced capitalist societies but also expedited the changes. Notably, the New Social Movement served as a driving force for the detente between the East and the West in the 1970s (see Suri 2005).

For the newly independent countries, the history of the Cold War was marked by oppression and poverty as well as threats of war. These countries were also the targets of attention from the United States and Soviet Union, but many chose the path of the non-aligned movement because of their shared memories of the harsh experience of being colonized by imperial states. The countries that joined the non-aligned movement succeeded in protecting their sovereignty and independence, but many of them had to suffer from dictatorships and underdevelopment.

Paradoxically, the Cold War situation contributed to laying the foundation of the study of peace, conflict, and violence. Thanks to the efforts of the precursors, this study grew to become a scientific discipline that deserved to be called peace studies. Three approaches of peace studies emerged: integration and community theory, positive peace theory, and social transformation theory. Each of these corresponded to the state-centered approach, the human-centered approach, and the structure-critical approach, respectively. The three of them developed separately with different perspectives, thus resulting in a division of labor between

them. Furthermore, the East-West ideological competition made exchanges between the three approaches almost absent. Exceptionally, there was some dialogue between Kenneth Boulding, a pioneer of integration and community theory, and Johann Galtung, another pioneer arguing for positive peace, but there was no chance for the development of a third theory combining the two. There was also no dialogue between Galtung's positive peace theory and Marxist social transformation theory, although some viewed Galtung's idea as having something to do with Marxism.

Theory of Integration and Community

Kenneth Boulding, Karl Deutsch, and Dieter Senghaas were representative scholars of the theory of integration and community, which was based on a state-centered approach. The theory they proposed extended Kant's concept of federation by highlighting the means of integration, community building, and communication. And the theory of democratic peace, based on Kant's theory of republicanism, began to attract attention from the end of the Cold War by proving the absence of armed conflict between democracies. In this way, the pioneers had an academic calling to establish peace studies scientifically.

Early in the Cold War, national security was the main agenda for both the survival of the people and the preservation of national sovereignty, and in this context, the strategic studies to prevent armed conflicts between countries was the mainstream of international relations scholarship. The rise of strategic studies was owed to the nuclear revolution, which refers to a radical change that came from the sophistication of nuclear bombs and the nuclear strategy. In previous wars, victory or defeat was determined by the sum of defense and offense capabilities, but victory in a nuclear war was both not viable and meaningless; therefore, how to prevent a nuclear war became a key issue. Strategic studies, particularly on nuclear deterrence, made efforts to derive scientific reasoning based on rationality. However, the development of strategic studies was cancelled out by the continued development of nuclear and missile technology. For example, despite the development of a logic of mutually assured destruction (so-called MAD) to prevent a nuclear war, the arms race accelerated owing to constant technological progress.

The theory of integration and community developed while competing with the abovementioned strategic studies (Buzan and Hansen 2009, 105-6). On the one hand, strategic studies was faithful to national security or international security and was thus an uncomfortable partner to peace studies. On the other hand, strategic studies and peace studies were similar in their pursuits of the objective to prevent international conflicts and resolve nuclear rivalry. Indeed, nuclear disarmament was a subject shared by both studies.

Kenneth Boulding, originally an economist, was the forerunner of peace studies. In his book, *The Economics of Peace*, Boulding (1946) explained the

reconstruction process on the ruins of World War Two, shedding new light on the meaning of war and peace. He said that the harms of war could not be justified in any sense and went on to say that even if there was no war, other forms of conflict could be extended to a war. Therefore, he insisted on expanding the domain of “peaceful conflict,” as seen in the resolution through peaceful means of court battles and election campaigns (Boulding 1946; 1978).

Boulding considered the consciousness of “we” the most important element for community building. If different groups approach a contentious issue while sharing a “we” consciousness, a solution is visible. According to Boulding, during World War Two, the Americans on the one hand and the Japanese and Germans on the other hand did not consider each other equal human beings. That is, the lack of collective consciousness was the main reason that led the Germans, Japanese, and Americans to the tragic war, whereas differences in economic understanding were only a minor part of explaining the cause of the war.

Like Boulding, Karl Deutsch sought to find the possibility of a peaceful solution to the conflict by deliberating the concept of community. Deutsch (1957) further developed this concept by putting forward the term of “security community” in his coauthored work, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*. Deutsch’s discussion began with the smaller question of how to prevent war within the North Atlantic, rather than starting with a huge proposal for achieving eternal peace. He said that common problems must be solved through peaceful changes and that this could be done through community building. In his book, *The Nerves of Government*, Deutsch (1966) extended his discussion to the information exchange in political decision-making and postulated that any blockage of information exchange, whether under oppression or because of secrecy, would likely cause a society to become a walking corpse without consciousness. For Deutsch, and in international politics, the ability to coordinate the free exchange of information could contribute not only to restraining armed conflicts but also to forming a security community (*ibid.*, 120-4, 129).

While Deutsch explained the positive function of information and communication in domestic and international decision-making processes, Dieter Senghaas (a German student of Karl Deutsch) focused on explaining an abnormal phenomenon—that is, disconnection of information exchange and communication. Today, Senghaas (2013) is known for the Civilizational Hexagon that includes six instruments for conflict management: monopoly of violence, rule of law, democratic political participation, interdependence and excitement control, social justice, and conflict-resolution culture. During the Cold War, Senghaas made efforts to explain why information exchange and communication were disconnected and what the result of such an abnormal situation was.

Autistic hostility, as Senghaas called it, was an organized state of peacelessness in which the two superpowers—i.e., the United States and the Soviet Union—fell into an arms race. The question raised by Senghaas asked why they fell into

such a state. According to him, practical information exchanges between the two nuclear powers were extremely limited; more importantly, the introverted process prevailed in their nuclear deterrence policy. The degree of hostility that the elite understood and that appealed to the public was much higher than the degree of hostility that existed between the adversaries, and furthermore, the reproduction of this process strengthened autistic hostility. As hostility was internalized in the elite's decision-making and in the process of forming public opinion, the enemy threat would become increasingly amplified. In cybernetics and systems theory, this is a process of positive feedback in which information recycled inside amplifies to reach an uncontrollable state. Autistic hostility resulted in an aggressive stance toward the enemy and further reduced the chance of practical communications. Senghaas' (2013) conceptualization of autistic hostility contributed to uncovering the spirals of conflict and the spoilers of peace.

Meanwhile, the so-called democratic peace theory, inheriting Kant's republicanism, emerged to explain the absence of armed conflict between democratic countries. Michael W. Doyle (1983a; 1983b) was the first to make this argument at the end of the Cold War. Today, democratic peace is considered a law-like theory in international relations scholarship. However, in order to incorporate democratic peace theory into peace studies, I believe that three questions must be addressed. The first question is who represents the opinion in a democratic country (Moravcsik 2008, 234-54)? As Jack Snyder (1991) and Etel Solingen (1998) have suggested, instead of having one voice in a democracy, it is highly likely that domestic forces compete with one another and the pattern of coalition between them greatly affects the democracy's external behavior. The second question is whether it is justifiable that a democratic country, in the name of humanitarianism, intervenes in a nondemocratic country. For example, there is a ponderous question of whether or not Western intervention in the 2011 Libyan civil war was an infringement of sovereignty beyond ending the Gaddafi regime's systematic repression of citizens. The third is the question of how a nondemocratic regime can be transformed to a democratic regime; that is, what the conditions are for a democratic transition.

In sum, the pioneers who advocated the theory of integration and community tried to realize a kind of international community imagined by Kant's idea of federation. Community consciousness, information exchange, and communication were effective means for integration and community building. And the democratic peace theory that emerged within the liberal tradition was a creative theory that inherited Kant's republicanism, while leaving some research questions regarding the issue of representation in democracy and the conditions for democratic transition.

Theory of Positive Peace

While the theory of integration and community developed under the umbrella

of the state-centered approach aiming at preventing war, the theory of positive peace belongs to the human-centered approach that denied all forms of violence. The term “positive peace” was named by Johan Galtung and became the brand of his theory. Along with Boulding and Deutsch, Galtung is regarded as a pioneer in peace studies. Whereas Boulding and Deutsch used the term conflict as a concept opposite of peace, Galtung positioned violence as the opposite of peace and regarded poverty, discrimination, and oppression as forms of violence.

Born in Oslo in 1930, Galtung grew up under the influence of a medical family whose grandfather and father were doctors and whose mother was a nurse. With this background, he saw the relationship between peace and violence as a confrontation between good and evil and believed that violence should be rooted out, like how doctors deal with sources of disease. The death of Mahatma Gandhi in 1948 inspired Galtung’s interest in peace research. Galtung, who was seventeen years old at that time, could not hide his sadness as he had been deeply impressed by Gandhi’s nonviolence. No doubt, Gandhi’s nonviolence was closely linked to Tolstoy’s nonviolent resistance to institutionalized violence.

After receiving his doctorate in mathematics and sociology from the University of Oslo, Galtung established the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) in 1959 and became the director, and in 1964, he founded the *Journal of Peace Research*. While his passionate personality contributed to the establishment of peace studies, his unique leadership style sometimes sparked controversy in PRIO; for example, he insisted that Gandhi’s nonviolence to be the most important agenda. He quit as head of PRIO in 1969 but remained a professor at the University of Oslo until 1977, making Oslo a center for peace research in northern Europe. Since then, he has traveled the world working hard to spread peace studies and to realize peace. With the departure from Oslo, Galtung intended to become a cosmopolitan, and in 1993, he established an organization called TRANSCEND International (A Peace Development Environment Network) to combine research and practice (PRIO 2019).

What should be noted in Galtung’s argument is the distinction between negative peace and positive peace. While negative peace means the absence of war, positive peace refers to a state in which there is no trigger for violence—that is, social justice is realized. In this context, Galtung (1969) presented the concept of structural violence in his article. Structural violence is not a direct violence, but a structured or institutionalized inequality that occurs without being recognized by most people. What is more, Galtung explained cultural violence in line with structural violence. Cultural violence appears in a way in which symbols in religion, ideology, language, art, and science justify direct or structural violence. Cultural violence makes direct or structural violence seem right, or at least not wrong. Cultural violence has the detrimental effect of continuing and internalizing violence (Galtung 1990).

According to Galtung, violence occurs at any point of the triangle of direct

violence, structural violence, and cultural violence; more importantly, it spreads out to justify others. Once structural violence is institutionalized and cultural violence is internalized, direct violence becomes recurring and repetitive. Conversely, in order for the triangle of violence to be transformed into a triangle of peace, social justice must be realized and a culture of peace must be established.

The concepts of positive peace, structural violence, and cultural violence have provided a critical alternative to war-centered conflict research. These concepts also fascinated researchers and practitioners in subsequent years. In particular, positive peace has led to hot discussions about peace and violence and has become an abstract noun that means the state in which the sources of violence are eliminated.

Despite the above contributions, Galtung's argument left a few controversial points. Kenneth Boulding (1977), the pioneer of state-centered peace, criticized Galtung's distinction between positive and negative peace as misleading, saying that the two kinds of peace were not contradictory and there was no superiority or inferiority in terms of value. In addition, Boulding pointed out that Galtung's argument for distributive equality to eliminate structural violence could limit and sacrifice individual freedom. Boulding noted that the difference between rich and poor stemmed not only from unequal economic relations but also from different social and cultural processes and argued that poverty should be solved through expansion of production by knowledge, technology, and organization. In sum, Boulding believed that Galtung's positive peace and structural violence could have metaphorical meaning, but that they were not enough to be a model. Ten years after Boulding's criticism, Galtung (1987) published an article saying that Boulding only sought unstable peace by looking at just half of the world and ignoring the structural violence of exploitation and oppression.

The positive peace theory contributed to expanding the scope of peace, and at the same time, it had limitations in realizing a state of genuine peace in the East-West confrontational situation during the Cold War. When the Cold War thawed but poverty, ethnic conflict, nationalism, and civilizational conflict emerged to undermine the international order, Galtung's positive peace was reborn as human development and human security.

Theory of Social Transformation

During the Cold War, a new interpretation of Marxism by Western intellectuals contributed to the development of critical peace studies. Since the late 1960s, a group of Marxists, called the New Left, presented a theory of social transformation amid a vortex of social activism and student movements. Their venue for the theoretical debate was the *New Left Review*. Ralph Miliband and his associates argued that the working class should be the main body in the struggle for transforming their society. In contrast, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, who advocated "post-Marxism," criticized the class-reductionist interpretation of

Marxism and advocated for radical democracy. Laclau and Mouffe provided a theoretical basis for the social movement in the West by examining various social causes such as feminism, antinuclear activism, anti-war activism, environmental protection, racial equality, and human rights.

Between the two branches of the New Left, there appeared a crucial difference in analyzing the social transformation. Miliband, for example, argued that feminism must be a socialist movement and a class struggle. According to him, the problem of gender inequality would remain structured as long as exploitation continued in production relations. And the degree of gender inequality varied depending on class status, and inequality for the working-class women is much more serious than that for bourgeois women. Therefore, for him, abolition of such class relations is the fundamental solution to gender inequality (Miliband 1989, 100-103). In contrast, Laclau and Mouffe said that the real theoretical value of Marxism could be uncovered only when the historicity of Marxism was recognized. They believed that the structure of social conflict changed due to the development of industrial society and the complexity of social relations. The conflict structure in postwar Europe became pluralistic, and the actor and target of social transformation were also diversified. In other words, conflict in production relations became only one of many conflict relationships (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; 1987).

The New Left theorists did not view their analyses as peace studies, but they have contributed to expanding the critical aspect of peace studies. They used terms such as conflict, hostility, and struggle in different ways, but excluded the violence accompanied by the social transformation. The New Left theory of social transformation justified various issue-oriented social movements and highlighted the roles of various types of actors other than class. All in all, the New Left theory dealt with diversity and complexity of the conflicts that existed in advanced capitalism and liberal democracy.

What was the nature of change in capitalism? Ronald Inglehart's convincing explanation focused on analyzing value changes in advanced Western societies. In his book, *The Silent Revolution*, Inglehart (1977) pointed out that a qualitative difference occurred between postwar generations, and he called the difference post-materialism. The postwar generation grew up enjoying economic wealth and thus differed from the older generation. People in the new generation had a high-level of education and good information acquisition skills, and they valued the sense of belongingness and self-achievement. As politicians and governments could not respond to this qualitative change, this generation sought self-achievement through the issue-oriented new social movement (Inglehart 1977, 21-71).

The new social movement grew and eventually birthed a political force, as shown in the formation of the Green Party in West Germany in 1980. The Green Party was a composite product of environmental, antinuclear, and human

rights movements all of which were triggered and spread by the 1968 student movement. Since its establishment, the Green Party simultaneously campaigned against pollution, nuclear missile deployment, and NATO's military actions (Dalton 1984, 104-33). After having seats in the federal legislature in 1983, the Green Party posed a new challenge to the existing political order in West Germany.

In the 21st Century, the reinterpretation of Marxism has influenced the emergence of ecological socialism, which is symbolized today by the expression that "red meets green." Whereas the New Left theory and the new social movement during the Cold War understood the ecological component in the conflict structure, today's ecological socialists believe that ecological thinking already existed in Marx's writings.

Development of Complexity in Peace Studies in the Post-Cold War Era

The half-century Cold War ended with a string of revolutions across the Eastern European communist countries, a historic moment that was symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall. But the resulting joy was temporary, expectations for peace soon faded away, and globalization increased interdependence but also expanded inequality.

Since the end of the Cold War, new topics have risen in peace studies. Whereas the threat of interstate wars has decreased, the state has remained a source of threat. The threat to human survival differs from that of the Cold War. The threat not only comes from continued proliferation of nuclear weapons and rapid advancement of hypersonic missiles but is also due to the fall of previously agreed treaties, such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Cyber warfare also intensifies between states as each state comes to claim cyber sovereignty, in addition to sovereignty in the traditional sense. Also, as seen in the case of the Libyan civil war, there are cases in which the state becomes the actor that systematically violates the human rights of citizens rather than protects them. The threat caused by the state has called for a new way of ensuring international cooperation.

Ethnic hatred, extremism, and fundamentalism have become new sources of violence, particularly when national sovereignty does not function properly. Civil wars in Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, Libya, Syria, and Afghanistan have demonstrated such violence. Nationalism has also threatened peaceful coexistence, even in advanced countries, as was seen in Europe with populist politics opposing the reception of Syrian refugees. In this context, human security and humanitarianism have emerged at the forefront of peace studies.

The ripple effects of climate change and technological development have come to be recognized as a global problem endangering human survival. Natural

disasters have reached a level that threatens the survival of marginalized groups. And the development of medicine, information technology, cyberspace, and artificial intelligence has brought about unexpected consequences. Consequently, as Yuval Noah Harari (2015, 43-58) has pointed out, human beings have almost reached the level of God on the one hand but have taken the path of dehumanization on the other.

The abovementioned changes in the post-Cold War era are new challenges to humanity and call on peace studies to seek solutions. In the traditions of the state-centered approach, the human-centered approach, and the structure-critical approach, there emerged security community theory, human security theory, and ecosocialism, respectively. It is also noteworthy that peace studies have become complex as the topics of the three approaches competed with one another or, in some instances, merged. For example, topics on the responsibility to protect and peacebuilding are combinations of state-centered and human-centered approaches, and the discussion of climate change encompasses all three approaches.

One of the factors that contribute to the complexity is the expansion of the role of the United Nations (UN) as an actor. The UN is leading and coordinating peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities and humanitarian engagement. The UN also encourages consensus among participating countries and organizations and tries to control spoilers in the peace process (Kim 2020). For example, at the Climate Change Conference and the Nonproliferation Review Conference, the UN acts not simply as a leader putting forward and processing the agendas, but also as a venue for public debate among states and non-governmental organizations.

Another contributor to the complexity is that the subject of peace studies has diversified and thus cannot be explained by any one of the three existing approaches alone. Accordingly, the division of labor between them, as was seen during the Cold War, no longer exists today. Examples of interconnection between the approaches include such security and development agendas as the Climate Change Conference, the Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in Southeast Asia, the Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, Mongolia's Nuclear Weapon-Free Status, the Sustainable Development Goals, and the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus. Theoretical discussions and policy alternatives are increasingly in the process of converging between the state-centered approach, the human-centered approach, and the structure-critical approach.

This section covers the continued development of the three different approaches while maintaining their own individualities, and then it deals with the competition and merging of the three.

Theory of Security Community

With the thawing of the Cold War, the theory of security community attracted

special attention in the field of international relations and also in peace studies. While inheriting the idea of integration and community theory that flourished during the Cold War, security community theory succeeded in enhancing the level of sophistication for explaining international cooperation. The success was attributable to the help of the increasingly influential constructivism. In constructivism, the role of identity is particularly important for the creation of cooperation between states, and changes in identity can lead to structural changes in international politics. According to Alexander Wendt (1999, 313-69), a state's identity is formed by a simultaneous process that streams both from inside to outside and from outside to inside, and an identity between states is shaped by mutual processes. In addition, national identity and corresponding interests are not permanently given. Rather than focusing on acquiring a fixed interest, each state constructs its desired interest through interactions. In other words, identities and interests are learned and reinforced in response to how they are treated by important others.

From the constructivist viewpoint, Immanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (1998) have discussed the formation of a security community. The security community they refer to is not a strategic alliance but a collective entity that is based on the norm that states should not rely on military means for resolving disputes. Instead of being established by the great powers, this norm should be established by an authoritative entity that can provide weak states with expectations about security and related interests. In their theorization, Adler and Barnett focused on the process of creating a community identity, whereby they contributed to advancing Karl Deutsch's theory of community consciousness and communication.

For explaining the formation of a community identity, Adler and Barnett have explored such concepts as interaction, socialization and social learning, trust, and transnational identity. Interaction takes place through various forms of exchange in symbolic, economic, material, political, and technical domains. As the interaction improves quantitatively and qualitatively, collective experiences take place and social changes gradually occur. International organizations may contribute to social learning, which in turn, may provide opportunities to build trust between states and eventually create a shared identity.

In the Asian context, Amitav Acharya has laid out an argument for security communities with special reference to the case of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Acharya has shown that interactions and their resulting socialization provide states with a chance to avoid being entrapped into a security dilemma. Just as Adler and Barnett argued, Acharya has demonstrated that security communities can be constructed through the processes of social learning and its consequential identity formation. Of course, a *we-feeling* is the most important element for the communities (Acharya 2009, 14-42). ASEAN is not the full-fledged security community that Karl Deutsch once thought of, but it is this

aspect of ASEAN that is the central basis upon which new norms and identities have continued to emerge, particularly in the post-Cold War era. As a result, new institutions such as ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Plus Three, and the East Asia Summit were constructed.

Despite the merit of envisioning the creation of a new identity via social learning, there is a problem that security community theory has not addressed. The theory does not explain what spoilers undermine the process of forming an identity—whether the spoilers are actors, institutions, ideologies, or values. Just as Dieter Senghaas’ theory of deterrence during the Cold War showed that hostility was amplified in domestic processes, there exist spoilers in the process of building trust and forming an identity between states (for spoilers, see Kim 2020). For example, distrust or mistrust, collective memory, and differences in the value system can hinder reconciliation between states and the formation of a new identity.

As if recognizing this problem, Adler and Barnett (1998, 26-65) once stated that security community theory was based not only on socio-constructivism but also path-dependence. By socio-constructivism they meant that international politics can be newly formed by social learning and socialization. What they meant by path dependence was that international politics have historicity whereby initial phenomena influence subsequent processes. In this regard, path dependence can be likened to “sensitivity of the initial condition,” a proposition of the complex system theory that a small difference in the early stage makes a big difference later on.

Theory of Human Security

In the post-Cold War era, the concept of human security has attracted great attention. With its release of the *Human Development Report* in 1994, the UNDP first conceptualized human security. Human security, in contrast to national security, prioritizes the security of individuals. Human security is a reflection of Tolstoy’s institution-resistant and human-centered idea and Galtung’s positive peace fighting structural violence.

Human security is composed of two types: “freedom from desire” and “freedom from fear” (UNDP 1994, 24). The two types of human security are different but complementary at the same time. The former is “development-based” human security, while the latter is “protection-based” human security (MacFarland and Khong 2006). The former focuses on improving basic living through social and economic support and human development, while the latter focuses on protecting the people who are vulnerable to such violence as armed conflicts and mass killings.

Development-based human security originated from the Asian context. The prime movers were Pakistani economist Mahub Ul Haq and Indian economist Amartya Sen, who led the publication of UNDP’s *Human Development Report*

by inventing the human development index and formalizing the concept of human security. That is, their conceptualization of human security was founded on human development. Human development was meant to enhance the human ability to cope with and overcome such threats in underdeveloped countries as poverty, illiteracy, disease, discrimination, political restrictions, and violent conflicts (Acharya 2001; 2018).

In contrast to the Asian context of development-based human security, protection-based human security spawned in the Western context. Being critical of the concept of human security centered on human development, Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy highlighted the human security violations caused by violent conflicts. Since 1997, Axworthy had worked with Norwegian Foreign Minister Knut Vollebaek to underscore the narrow sense of protection-based human security. The two foreign ministers' collaborative work on this alternative human security concept not only symbolized cooperation between Western middle powers (Canada and Norway), but also reaffirmed that Western intellectuals were more inclined to focus on the issue of protecting human rights than their Asian counterparts.

The Lysøen Declaration and the Human Security Network, which Canada and Norway took lead on in 1998, contributed to the institutionalization of criminal law in the international community—for example, the establishment of the International Criminal Court under the 2003 Rome Statute, the adoption of the responsibility to protect at the 2005 World Summit and UN General Assembly, and the adoption of UN resolutions on the protection of children and women in armed conflict zones (Axworthy et al. 2014).

At any rate, there emerged contrasting views between Western human security and Asian human security. But the two types of human security are also in a complementary relationship. Underdevelopment will likely cultivate violence, and violence will more likely happen in underdeveloped societies than in developed societies. Protection from fear is needed more in underdeveloped societies than in advanced societies, and development lessens (although it cannot eliminate it entirely) the need for protection from fear. This is the point Johan Galtung noted when he proposed his concept of positive peace. In sum, human security is one body because one type of human security is a prerequisite for the other.

Human security, since its inception, has fascinated students of peace studies. Almost all the topics on development and peacebuilding are included in human security. Nonetheless, human security is more like a policy-oriented concept to solve problems than a theory (Newman 2017). To fully realize human security, the donor governments' engagements, the recipient governments' cooperation, and the international organizations' interventions are indispensable.

Ecological Socialism

The end of the Cold War was also a shock to Marxists and socialists. The popularity

of Marxist and Leninist ideologies declined, as did support for parliamentary socialist parties. Given these shifts, post-Cold War Marxists turned their attention to ecology, one of the important issues that the New Leftists had studied during the Cold War. What should be noted is that today's Marxists have not simply inherited the legacy of the New Left, but they have also proposed a different view on that issue. The present Marxists focus on the ecological element that existed in Marx's ideas but that had not yet been fully explored. They call their view ecosocialism or ecological socialism. The phrase that "red meets green" best represents their view. James O'Connor, Chris Williams, Paul Burkett, and Kohei Saito have led the discussions on ecosocialism.

Whereas James O'Connor (1998) and Chris Williams (2010) simply attributed ecological destruction to the problem of commercialization in capitalism, Paul Burkett (2009; 2014) and Kohei Saito (2017) argued that an ecology-friendly idea was originally an integral part of Marxism. Burkett emphasized that ecological practice has already been discussed under the materialistic basis of Marxism and that Marx's genuine contribution was his proposal of socialism as an alternative to ecologically destructive capitalism. Burkett maintained that capitalism, which saw nature as capital, would eventually fall into chaos by the law of entropy. He argued that sustainable development in the capitalist way could not prevent ecological destruction, and that socialism and communism were solutions for sustaining ecology and human development.

In his book *Karl Marx's Ecosocialism*, Saito further delved into Marx's discussions about nature and ecology. Saito found the beginning of the environmental and ecological crisis from Marx's explanation that the original human-nature relationship collapsed because of the fundamental change in the relations of production. For example, Marx's somewhat early work, *Paris Notebooks*, provided an explanation for why capitalism pursued complete commercialization of land property, which had a decisive impact on the alienation of labor. In feudal societies, the feudal lords privatized land by monopolizing the labor of serfs, while serfs maintained a friendly relationship with the land through their loyalty to the lords. Serfs were legally dependent on the lords, but they were guaranteed freedom in the production process on the land. However, this mutually beneficial aspect disappeared when Western Europe moved into the capitalist age because the land became a commodity and the relationship between workers and land was changed into a means of accumulating the wealth for capitalists. Consequently, the relationship between humans and land broke down. Saito argued that the reconciliation of humans' relationship with land would only be possible with socialism. In socialism, cooperative farms could solve the problem of alienation of labor, restoring the friendly relationship between humans and land.

Ecosocialism or ecological socialism has come to stand on firm Marxist ground. According to ecosocialism, the capitalist economy is bound to be ecologically destructive. In discussing the climate change issue, ecosocialism

has challenged both the market-oriented and risk-taking development and the resource-destructive and consumption-oriented lifestyle. This critical theory is worth noting to cope with the global crisis.

Complexity 1: Theory of Responsibility to Protect

The concept of responsibility to protect (R2P) is a mixed product of the human-centered approach and the state-centered approach. R2P has brought about an important change in the concept of sovereignty. Since the establishment of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, each country has been able to control its territory and domestic affairs in the name of sovereignty. The concept of R2P, however, has created room in which the international community may intervene in internal affairs of countries that fail to protect its citizens. The 2009 report, *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect*, presented by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, summarizes the components of the responsibility to protect: first, every country has a basic responsibility to protect its citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity; second, the international community helps each country develop its ability to protect its citizens from the abovementioned crimes; and third, when a country clearly fails to protect its citizens, the international community has a responsibility to act in a timely and decisive manner to prevent and stop the crimes (United Nations General Assembly 2009).

The concept of R2P stemmed from the reflection that the international community did not properly respond to genocide in Rwanda, Srebrenica, and Kosovo in the mid-to-late 1990s. When Kofi Annan was appointed UN Secretary-General in 1997, he pointed out that the then concept of sovereignty had limitations in terms of human rights and humanitarian protection. Lloyd Axworthy of Canada, who advocated “protection-based” human security, joined Annan’s idea. Axworthy held an International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2000, which led to the publication of an ICISS report called *The Responsibility to Protect* in the following year (ICISS 2001). This report provided further justification for international intervention. However, controversy arose over whether the intervention would be an infringement on sovereignty or natural as a responsibility of the international community.

Finally, the World Summit that the United Nations organized in 2005 was a watershed moment for discussions on R2P. The Summit released a report on the responsibility to protect, which stated that all countries are responsible for protecting their citizens from four types of violence: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. In other words, unlike the ICISS report, this report limited four crimes as the object of R2P and excluded other human rights violations. The report did not mention the international community’s criteria for intervention, but in paragraphs 138 and 139, it revealed that the UN Security Council would be the entity to sanction humanitarian intervention. The

report's article 139 stated,

The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful means in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (UNGA 2005).

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who took office in 2007, took the initiative to implement R2P as a UN policy under the slogan “narrow and deep.” The 2009 report, written under Ban’s leadership, clearly defined three parts of R2P, and the 2012 report stated that all three parts are equally important and argued that R2P would strengthen rather than undermine sovereignty (Bellamy 2013, 488-97). Since then, the UN Secretary-General continued to publish reports on such R2P-related topics as the need for early warning (2010), organic cooperation with the UN and local communities (2011), timely and decisive response (2012), state responsibility and prevention (2013), the international community’s collective responsibility (2014, 2016), continuous application (2015), duty for prevention (2017), early warning and early action (2018), lessons for prevention (2019), protection of women (2020), and atrocity prevention (2021) (UN Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect 2023).

R2P is a significant international norm intended to prevent organized and systematic crimes, but it has been challenged in the process of implementation. First, controversy continues over the relationship between the international community’s collective action and the intervention of state sovereignty. In R2P, military intervention is the last resort and where the controversy remains most fiercely. The case of Libya in 2011 is a prime example. When Muammar Gaddafi inflicted extensively systematic violence on his people, the UN Security Council cited R2P to adopt the UN Security Council Resolution 1970 and imposed sanctions on him, and it also decided to refer the case to the International Criminal Court. The subsequent UN Security Council resolution 1973 (which was adopted in the absence of China and Russia) included the establishment of a no-fly zone for Libya, the allowance of necessary measures excluding the presence of ground troops, and the banning of weapons. However, the NATO’s air raid brought about a dispute on the matter of the responsibility to protect. Alleged civilian casualties by the air strike were raised by China and Russia, who also criticized NATO’s military actions for violating sovereignty by turning their original objective of saving lives into changing the regime. Since then, China and Russia refused

military actions in the name of protecting sovereignty. In connection with the Syrian civil war in 2011, when the UN Security Council discussed adopting a resolution on the grounds of R2P, China and Russia exercised their veto power instead of merely being absent for the vote. Eventually, Syria's civil war intensified without R2P being realized, resulting in 380,000 civilian deaths and 12 million refugees, both domestic and international, over the past decade.

The intense debate on whether R2P violates sovereignty has been centered around military action, and this dispute has been raised among the permanent members of the UN Security Council. This means two things. One is that the UN Security Council has been the primary mover of establishing and implementing the concept of R2P, and the other is that the conflict between R2P and sovereignty is not just a legal issue but one that represents the conflicting interests of the great powers.

R2P also reveals limitations in its implementation. A state's inhumane decision to block international humanitarian aid during calamitous disasters is excluded from R2P on the grounds that it does not belong to any one of the four aforementioned crimes. Even if a state neglects its responsibility to protect its citizens, the international community becomes helpless in the name of respecting sovereignty. The international community has no international legal basis or norms for engagement if a dictatorship refuses humanitarian aid to victims of natural, social, medical, or technological disasters. Despite the death of around one hundred thousand people in Myanmar due to Cyclone Nargis in 2009, the Myanmar government denied international humanitarian organizations entry to the country, and thus the international community had no other way but to wait for approval.

Complexity 2: Responses to Climate Change

All three approaches—state-centered, human-centered, and structure-critical—join global efforts to cope with climate change, which is one of the most enduring, challenging global issues. While each of the approaches competes with one another in providing solutions, there seems to be a possibility for a theoretical convergence.

It was shortly after the end of the Cold War that climate change began to draw attention as a global problem, and the UN was the venue for discussions on how to induce cooperation between developed and developing countries. The first international agreement on climate change was the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), adopted in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992, and aimed at preventing global warming by controlling greenhouse gases. In 1997, the Kyoto Conference on the Prevention of Global Warming adopted the Kyoto Protocol to UNFCCC to implement the above agreement. After many twists and turns, the Protocol went into effect in 2005, making it mandatory for participating countries to limit greenhouse gas emissions. However, it was difficult for the

Kyoto Protocol to be implemented due to the differing interests of countries. The United States withdrew from the Climate Change Convention before the Kyoto Protocol took effect, China and India were not included because of their developing country status, and Canada, Japan, and Russia withdrew after the Kyoto Protocol took effect. On the other hand, the Paris Agreement adopted in 2015 has great policy significance. Some 196 countries or organizations participated in the Paris Agreement, and they agreed on a substantial reduction of global greenhouse gas emissions to limit the global temperature increase in this century to two degrees Celsius (UN 2015). The Paris Agreement was ratified by major parties, including the United States, China, Brazil, India, and the European Union, and thus in November 2016, it became the first comprehensive binding climate change agreement. Notably, the United States withdrew in 2017 but rejoined in 2021.

As for the Paris Agreement, the state-centered, human-centered, and structure-critical approaches have all discussed the causes of and solutions to climate change in varying ways. From the perspective of the state-centered approach, international cooperation is urgently needed to establish governance to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and the domestic political conditions should be friendly to solving this problem. According to the human-centered approach, the climate change agreement must conform to human security, and discussions on social justice and norms are urgently needed for this. The structure-critical approach regards the increase in greenhouse gas emissions as being the result of industrialization and at the same time coming from capitalism which promotes consumption.

For responding to the climate change issue, the approaches need to further expand discussions between themselves and merge with one another; however, for merging, each of them should first address the following problems. First, in the state-centered approach, the politics of climate change—specifically, how much democracy can contribute to this issue—remains an important question. The relationship between democracy and the absence of war has been supported by democratic peace theory and has been proven empirically, but the impact of democracy on international relations regarding the climate change issue has been underexplored. In particular, the question of whether and how much democracy can contribute to reducing carbon dioxide emissions remains unanswered. One study (Lee 2019) reveals that a participatory democracy, or a deliberative democracy, does not indefinitely guarantee the efficiency of the policy responding to climate change, and it shows a nonlinear relationship between the two variables. Second, in the human-centered approach, the response to climate change has been considered an important test of social justice, and in this context, climate change justice has emerged as a new concept. Nonetheless, it is simple-minded logic to think that climate change can be solved through climate change justice alone. Climate change is a complex consequence of natural changes, human and

social mishandlings, and lack of international cooperation, so an effective solution to the climate change issue will depend on the level of comprehensiveness of the related policies, as well as all participants' concerted efforts to implement them (Kim et al. 2019). Third, from the perspective of the structure-critical approach, ecological socialism has postulated that capitalism itself, and consumerism, is regarded as the only cause of climate change. But such structural reductionism will never solve the problem. Advanced capitalist countries and developing countries are increasingly linked together, owing to supply chains. Instead of simply criticizing the structure of capitalism, ecological socialism should propose an alternative system for developing and sharing eco-friendly technologies that benefit both advanced and developing countries.

In sum, it is a desirable situation that the three approaches competitively discuss climate change and actively provide solutions. However, inasmuch as climate change is a complex problem, the approaches should take mutually accommodating attitudes toward one another and make efforts to establish creative, comprehensive alternatives for addressing climate change.

The Asian Context

The Asian context of peace studies is not unique but in line with contemporary peace studies in general. Above all, as domestic socio-political landscapes and the international environment have changed, peace studies in Asia has also undergone alterations, elevating the importance of the human-centered approach. Democratic transition, the most remarkable change in developing countries, has not only empowered citizens and civil society, but has also opened new opportunities for activists and scholars to investigate old and new topics of peace and conflict. Inasmuch as democratic transition is closely associated with awareness of human rights, the analyses related to that subject have taken place through the prism of the human-centered approach. South Korea and the Philippines entered the transition in the mid-1980s, and Indonesia did so in the late 1990s. Myanmar followed suit in 2010, although the coup turned it upside down in 2021. Old issues related to the past—which victims and their supporters could not address for long—have become significant topics of investigation. For example, transitional justice, which deals with state-led violence, has been a hot topic in South Korea, Indonesia, Cambodia, and the Philippines in varying ways (Kim and Ganesan 2013).

The surge of the human-centered approach was also attributable to the thawing of the Cold War. This dramatic change at the global level substantially lowered tensions in the Indochina peninsula and the Korean peninsula, which in turn changed the mindset of observers of peace and conflict in those regions and in Asia more broadly. National security lost its dominance, and positive

peace became a significant menu item for the study of peace and conflict. Development, rights, justice, and diversity increasingly attracted academic attention. Human security, along with human development, was proposed via the UNDP by Asian scholars, such as Mahbub Ul Haq and Amartya Sen, and then it became central in peace studies in Asia. Since human security originated from comprehensive security—an idea that the Japanese originally proposed—it is not an overstatement to say that human security has Asian origins and was an Asian invention. Furthermore, Asia became the region where human security, particularly development-based human security, was extensively employed and tested.

International development assistance for post-conflict or underdeveloped societies—for example, new Cambodia after the Paris Peace Agreement, Vietnam after its troop withdrawal from Cambodia, and Myanmar in democratic transition—has eyes on development-based human security and has provided observers with a chance to test the theory. Gender equality, empowerment of the civil society and women, enhancement of the quality of education, and institution-building have been significant topics of analysis.

The absence of democratic transition and retarded democratic transition prohibit genuine peace and the development of peace studies. The cases of China and Thailand, analyzed in Yousun Chung's and Pavin Chachavalpongpun's articles in this issue, illustrate this point. The present regime is considered the state per se, and given this, national security precedes or even disregards human security and human-centered studies. In the Thai case, a sharp political division and recurrent military interventions have interrupted democratic transition. Chachavalpongpun argues that the continued violence in the southernmost provinces, called the Deep South, is not simply a result of the Buddhist-Muslim confrontation but a composite of the current regime's nondemocratic and national security-oriented practices there. In the China case, Chung shows that stability and order are dominant values in the authoritarian regime, and despite this, the middle class's rights movement commands special attention from observers of peace studies.

It is noteworthy that democratic transition, despite opening the opportunity for the enhancement of human rights, does not bring about equal consequences to all cases (see Peou 2014). And the achievement of procedural democracy alone cannot assure peace if there is no social justice, as Galtung argued long ago. Underdevelopment and marginalization may remain the source of instability and can bring about the recurrence of direct violence.

Miriam Coronel-Ferrer's article on the Philippines demonstrates this point counterintuitively. The post-Marcos democratic space contributed to the explosion of internal confrontations, rather than harmony, in the southernmost Philippines, as shown by both Bangsamoro's armed struggle for liberation and the communist-led insurgency in Mindanao. She attributes this instability to continued injustice and grievances, and at the same time points out the need of overcoming

parochialism and changing the mindset of all people who are involved in the case.

Violence in Indonesia is another example of the opening of windows of opportunity—such as democratic transition and the post-Cold War tension reduction—but which was not followed by peace. As Douglas Kammen demonstrates in his article, right after the collapse of the authoritarian Suharto regime, old conflicts continued, as observed in Aceh, East Timor, and Papua, and new forms of violence arose, including communal violence and Islamic terrorism. The sources of violence must have originated from a long-felt sense of marginalization, although diversity in the forms of violence needs further analysis. Furthermore, contrary to expectations, the military's repressive capacity without clear top-down instructions helped escalate violence. It is notable that this socio-political condition contributed, in part, to limiting the growth of peace studies and, in turn, the poor scholarship hampered in-depth analysis of the violence. The study of violence was mostly carried out in the domain of political science and strategic studies, and there was little chance for the bottom-up human-centered approach to further probe the genuine deep-rooted problem and prescribe an effective solution to it.

In some different ways, Myanmar was a partial success story for the human-centered approach. The political transition that began in 2010 contributed to improving the conditions for international development assistance and human security. In his article, Andrew Ong aptly notes the changes in peace studies scholarship. The pre-transition period was marked by institution-level analysis, which concentrated on the sovereignty issue concerning, in particular, the conflicts between ethnic armed organizations and the military. Political transition in 2010 raised a variety of topics, ranging from cease-fires and peace processes to human security and peacebuilding. But the 2021 coup entirely overturned this development of scholarship.

Compared to the forementioned cases, South Korea is a model case in which both domestic and international changes were followed by the development of peace studies in general and the study of rights and justice in particular. As Hun Joon Kim demonstrates in his article, democratic transition, which immediately preceded the end of the Cold War, broadened the scope of peace and conflict studies. Inasmuch as Korean democracy was achieved by the citizens' victory over authoritarian rule, the 1987 political pact expanded the domain of civil society and civil activism. Nongovernmental organizations mushroomed and dealt with the environment, labor, justice, and human rights. Accordingly, entering in the 2000s, the topics of analysis within the range of the human-centered approach diversified, so included here are the relationship between sovereignty and human rights, North Korean human rights, development aid, state violence, transitional justice, multiculturalism, cultural relativism, etc. This current diversification markedly differs from the pre-democratic period during which security studies prevailed and where security meant only national security.

Japan has been a leading country in peace studies in Asia. From the inception, Japanese universities hosted the two founding fathers, Kenneth Boulding and Johan Galtung, as visitors to boost that scholarship; therefore, as in the early period of the Cold War, Japanese peace studies strengthened the basics of both the state-centered approach and the human-centered approach. On the one hand, pacifism, based on the state-centered approach, was facilitated by the international factor, that is, Japan's defeat in World War Two. Pacifism, both as a movement and as an agenda for research, has aimed at denouncing war and armament, as stipulated in Article 9 of the Japanese constitution. On the other hand, the human-centered approach evolved through continued interactions with international scholarship of peace studies, for which the International Peace Research Association was instrumental. It is noteworthy that the government's development aid to underdeveloped and post-conflict societies has always been accompanied by academic involvement in the human security context. However, as Makiko Takemoto points out in her article, Japanese peace studies has faced challenges in the post-Cold War era. The turning point was the dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) for peacekeeping operations in Cambodia in 1992. Since then, controversy has continued, both on the policy side and in the scholarship, over the SDF's nature in the constitution as well as over its overseas military operations. Today, the Ukraine War divides the Japanese between pacifists and militarists.

The Asian context is also visible in the state-centered approach. ASEAN is a prime example of the community that the pioneers of the state-centered approach, such as Boulding and Deutsch, postulated in the Cold War. ASEAN launched as a loosely formed security community during the Cold War, but today it is a community of multiple purposes including common security, free trade, and nontraditional security. ASEAN has acted as a nodal point that not only binds together the ten member countries but links them to extra-regional powers called dialogue partners. Despite limitations in terms of solidarity and unity, ASEAN's affiliated institutions—for example, ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Plus Three, and ASEAN Plus Six—have functioned to disseminate its mission to other Asia Pacific countries and to create new norms of regionalism beyond Southeast Asia. As constructivists claim, ASEAN is neither an alliance nor a bloc that antagonizes outsiders but is a community with a collective identity among the member countries. The principles of peaceful resolution of disputes, consensus, and noninterference bind the member states together.

One of the most distinctive missions that ASEAN has tried to realize is nontraditional security. This type of nonmilitary security deals with such situations as pandemics, natural disasters, refugees, human and drug trafficking, climate change, etc. Nontraditional security requires governmental, nongovernmental, and international organizations to work together. And thus, nontraditional security becomes the domain where the community identity meets human security. As for peace studies, it is the domain where the state-centered approach

and the human-centered approach merge. Mely Caballero-Anthony aptly notes this point in her article with the term of “comprehensive peace.”

In Asia, there is no other genuinely community-oriented organization other than ASEAN. ASEAN acted as a node for the establishment of the East Asia Summit, but the latter’s development of community building remains a difficult task. Likewise, China-Korea-Japan cooperation has come to create the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat, but as the China-US rivalry escalates, the secretariat’s role remains routinized without active cooperation projects.

In sum, the Asian context has shown distinctive points. First, the development of peace studies, particularly from the human-centered approach, has seen variations, depending on each country’s extent of democratization and peculiar national situations. Despite the variations, the general trend is that national security, which once dominated during the Cold War, is no longer a single key element for peace, and human security has become an increasingly important topic for both policymakers and analysts. Second, as for peace studies scholarship, Asia is truly a vibrant place where the human-centered approach meets the state-centered approach that focuses on community building; ASEAN is a model community that has envisioned such a merge. Third, in Asia, human security, and the study of it, is focused on development-based human security, while little attention is being paid to protection-based human security. Development-based human security was an Asian invention and has blossomed in the Asian context. This is not necessarily good. There consequently seems to be little chance for the responsibility to protect to become a hot topic of debate anytime soon (see Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect 2022).

Conclusion

This article has analyzed the evolution of the three approaches of peace studies and then examined their tendency to compete and interconnect for coping with global problems. In this conclusion, after a brief evaluation, I would like to mention the challenges that lie ahead for the Asian context, in particular.

To be sure, the state-centered, human-centered, and structure-critical approaches have each contributed to enhancing expertise in varying ways while maintaining their own individual qualities. In terms of expertise, each approach has raised the level of analytical quality and explanatory power. Kantian discussions of federalism and republicanism developed into security community theory and democratic peace theory; Tolstoy’s idea of nonviolence, as opposed to institutionalized violence, was reborn as positive peace by Galtung and then human security and human development today; and Marx’s criticism of the structure of capitalism was inherited by critical peace studies, particularly today’s ecological socialism.

The differing paths of development also revealed limitations. In particular, during the Cold War when scholars and observers working within the traditional disciplines—such as political science, sociology, anthropology, history, and area studies—joined this relatively new business of explaining conflict and violence, they normally adopted one of the three approaches, depending on their expertise. The result was that each analysis remained segmented and fragmented. Little communication took place between the three approaches, and the division of labor was a kind of norm.

In the post-Cold War period, peace studies have undergone unprecedented changes. Above all, there was a need to understand complexity of the conflict and violence issues. Departing from the division of labor seen in the Cold War era, the three approaches entered a new era—in responding to the complexity, engaging in debates and competitiveness produced new concepts and theories that crossed the borders of the approaches. Debates on R2P and the UN-led implementation of it, responses to climate change, and discussions about post-conflict peacebuilding are examples of this crossing borders across the different approaches.

In Asian countries, democratic transition and/or the changes in the international environment have in varying ways contributed to the growth of peace studies since the early 1990s. The importance of national security as a topic of analysis has relatively decreased; development-based human security with special reference to underdeveloped and war-torn societies has been one of the most burgeoning topics; community identity regarding ASEAN has remained a vibrant subject for both optimists and pessimists; and North Korea's nuclear armament has brought about renewed interest in the nuclear weapon-free zones in Southeast Asia and Central Asia.

Despite the unprecedented progress, the Asian context in peace studies must address several challenges. First, authoritarian rule and stagnated democratic transition still interfere with both development-based human security and relevant research. Returning to military politics in Myanmar, for example, not only severely deteriorated the human rights situation—for example, indiscriminate killings and forced migration—but it also hampered the entrance of humanitarian workers and concerned scholars. Also, what seems like a religious minority issue in Thailand's southernmost area, as Chachavalpongpun notes, is a problem that stems from the absence of genuine democracy. Without democracy, the value of national security and unity precedes protection of individuals from violence. Procedural democracy is not enough, but democratic consolidation is essential to the growth of peace culture, inclusion, and justice, as opposed to discrimination, marginalization, and parochialism.

Second, the distinctive characteristics of sovereignty in Asian countries (sovereignty is considered sacred) and the power politics in the region has left protection-based human security untouched. For example, R2P is a concept that

the UN stipulated the definition of and that it applied to Libya. But the violence that has taken place in Asian countries has not been a subject of R2P discussions. The principle of noninterference in ASEAN, along with power politics, shields violent leaders and regimes from public discussions about R2P, not to mention the application of it. The current situation of prioritizing sovereignty over protection of human rights must become a subject of critical scrutiny among researchers and practitioners.

Third, peace studies in Asia has not become a genuine interdisciplinary science. Convergence of peace studies and strategic studies is a legacy of the Cold War when the nuclear revolution and arms race threatened the survival of humanity. Today, the convergence is no longer meaningful because the threat to humanity is so diversified and complex. And the point of analysis in strategic studies is mostly irrelevant to the concerns of contemporary peace studies. For instance, strategic studies has investigated terrorism in Indonesia by focusing on international networks of jihad, relevance to Islam, and challenges to sovereignty, rather than on the sources of terrorism and human rights violations. A notable point is that the poorer a democracy is, the more likely it is to rely on strategic studies in dealing with conflict and violence. For peace studies to become an interdisciplinary science, such traditional disciplines as anthropology, philosophy, religion, law, and sociology should be integrated into it.

Fourth, peace studies in Asia should make efforts to combine specificity and universality of peace. Each conflict or violence has its own specific sources, and prescriptions for its resolution thus differs case by case. However, emphasis on specificity may lead to parochialism. Bangsamoro's separatist movement cannot be attributed to a specific religious characteristic alone, but it grew out of a deep-rooted problem of social injustice. The current Islam-dominated religious approach has not been an effective way of resolving the violence. Likewise, the violence surrounding the ethnic Malay Muslims in Thailand's Deep South cannot be explained solely by the confrontations of specific ethnic or religious groups, but the lack of democracy should also be accounted for. This is why the authors of the Filipino and Thai cases in this special issue emphasize the need for local-global interactions and universal perspectives. In this vein, the expression of peace in Chinese characteristics is no more than a word game and attributing North Korea's nuclear defiance to the regime's distinctive characteristics alone is not enough to account for the reality.

Acknowledgements

The main part of this article—especially on the development of peace studies—has been adopted from a previously published article in Korean (see Kim 2021).

Notes

1. My view on Immanuel Kant, Leo Tolstoy, and Karl Marx as original thinkers was inspired by W. B. Gallie's (1978) book, *Philosophers of Peace and War: Kant, Clausewitz, Marx-Engels and Tolstoy*, which was a publication of Gallie's 1976 lecture at the Wiles Lectures, Queen's University in Belfast. Unlike Gallie's analysis, however, I take only three thinkers, excluding the military strategist Clausewitz. Opposing how Gallie saw Marx as a thinker of revolution and war, I regard Marx as a social scientist who criticized the structure of capitalism. Also, unlike how Gallie took Tolstoy's novel, *War and Peace*, as a text for analysis, I focus on Tolstoy's later works on state, religion, patriotism, and tax system, as well as his letter exchanges with Gandhi.

References

- Acharya, Amitav. 2001. "Human Security: East versus West." *International Journal* 56 (3): 442-60.
- Acharya, Amitav. 2009. *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*. London: Routledge.
- Acharya, Amitav. 2018. *Constructing Global Order: Agency and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Adler, Immanuel, and Micheal Barnett, eds. 1998. *Security Communities*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. 2022. "Implementing the Responsibility to Protect in Asia Pacific: An Assessment of Progress and Challenges." The University of Queensland. https://r2pasiapacific.org/files/9031/Implementing_R2P_in_the_Asia_Pacific_may2022.pdf (accessed April 12, 2023).
- Axworthy, Lloyd, Knut Vollebaek, Stein Kuhnle, and Sorpong Peou. 2014. "Introduction: Human Security at 20—LysØen Revisited." *Asian Journal of Peacebuilding* 2 (2): 143-49.
- Bellamy, Alex J. 2013. "The Responsibility to Protect." In *Security Studies: An Introduction*, ed. Paul D. Williams, 488-97. New York: Routledge.
- Boulding, Kenneth E. 1946. *The Economics of Peace*. London: Michael Joseph Ltd.
- Boulding, Kenneth E. 1977. "Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung." *Journal of Peace Research* 14 (1): 75-86.
- Boulding, Kenneth E. 1978. *Stable Peace*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Burkett, Paul. 2009. *Marxism and Ecological Economics: Toward a Red and Green Political Economy*. Chicago: Haymarket Books.
- Burkett, Paul. 2014 (originally 1999). *Marx and Nature: A Red and Green Perspective*. Chicago: Haymarket Books.
- Buzan, Barry, and Lene Hansen 2009. *The Evolution of International Security Studies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dalton, Russell J. 1984. "The West German Party System between Two Ages." In *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment?* eds. Russell J. Dalton, Scott C. Flanagan, and Paul Allen Beck, 104-33. Princeton: Princeton

- University Press.
- Deutsch, Karl, et al. 1957. *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Perspective*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Deutsch, Karl. 1966. *The Nerves of Government: Models of Communication and Control*. New York: Free Press.
- Doyle, Michael W. 1983a. "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 1." *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 12 (3): 205-35.
- Doyle, Michael W. 1983b. "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2." *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 12 (3): 323-53.
- Gallie, W. B. 1978. *Philosophers of Peace and War: Kant, Clausewitz, Marx Engels and Tolstoy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Galtung, Johan. 1969. "Violence, Peace and Peace Research." *Journal of Peace Research* 6 (3): 167-91.
- Galtung, Johan. 1987. "Only One Quarrel with Kenneth Boulding." *Journal of Peace Research* 24 (2): 199-203.
- Galtung, Johan. 1990. "Cultural Violence." *Journal of Peace Research* 27 (3): 291-305.
- Harari, Yuval Noah. 2015. *Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow*. London: Harvill Secker.
- Inglehart, Ronald. 1977. *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). 2001. *The Responsibility to Protect*. <https://www.idrc.ca/en/book/responsibility-protect-report-international-commission-intervention-and-state-sovereignty> (accessed January 23, 2023).
- Kim, Hyunseop, Jiewuh Song, Biung Ghi Ju, and Eunnyeong Heo. 2019. "Paris gihubyeon-hwahyeobjeong haeseo Hangug-ui gongjeonghago hyoyuljeogin gihubyeonhwa daeungbangane daehan siron" [A Study on Korea's Fair and Efficient Climate Policies under the Paris Agreement]. *Innovation Studies* 14 (3): 301-31.
- Kim, Sung Chull. 2021. "Pyeonghwahagui Gyebo: Yeonwon, Gyebo, Bokapwa" [The Evolution of Peace Studies: Origins, Approaches, and Complexity]. *Journal of Peace & Unification Studies* 13 (2): 5-78.
- Kim, Sung Chull, and N. Ganesan. 2013. "Introduction: Conceiving State Violence, Justice, and Transition in East Asia." In *State Violence in East Asia*, eds. N. Ganesan and Sung Chull Kim, 1-18. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
- Kim, Taekyoon. 2020. "Bunjaeng ihu pyeonghwaguchukeui seonggongyoine gwanhan jeonryakjeok pyeonghwaron: pyeonghwajogongwa yangjaseungineui ijungju" [Strategic Peace and Success Factors for Peacebuilding in the Post-Conflict Period: A Positive Pair of Peace Conditionality and Bilateral Warranty]. *Culture and Politics* 7 (2): 213-54.
- Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe. 1985. *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Toward a Radical Democratic Politics*. London: Verso.
- Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe. 1987. "Post-Marxism without Apologies." *New Left Review* I/166. <https://newleftreview.org/issues/i166/articles/ernesto-laclau-chantal-mouffe-post-marxism-without-apologies> (accessed January 23, 2023).
- Lee, Jae Hyun. 2019. "Jigujeog gihubyeonhwawa minjujuuiui biseonghyeongseong:

- 170gaegug panel data reul jungsimeuro” [The Nonlinearity between Global Climate Change and Democracy: Evidence from Panel Data for 170 Countries]. *Korean Journal of International Studies* 59 (3): 199-228.
- Lim, Jinhee, and Taekyoon Kim. 2021. “Bringing Drugs into Light: Embedded Governance and Opium Production in Myanmar’s Shan State.” *Oxford Development Studies* 49 (2): 105-18.
- MacFarland, Neil S., and Yuen Foong Khong. 2006. *Human Security and the UN: A Critical History*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Miliband, Ralf. 1989. *Divided Societies: Class Struggle in Contemporary Capitalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Moravcsik, Andrew. 2008. “The New Liberalism.” In *Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, eds. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, 234-54. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Newman, Edward. 2017. “Human Security.” *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*. doi: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.215.
- O’Connor, James. 1998. *Natural Causes: Essays in Ecological Marxism*. New York: Guilford Press.
- Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). 2019. “Inspiration from a Father: Johan Gatung Interviewed by Henrik Urdal.” <https://blogs.prio.org/2019/05/inspiration-from-a-father-johan-galtung-interviewed-by-henrik-urdal/> (accessed January 23, 2023).
- Peou, Sorpong. 2014. “The Limits of Potential of Liberal Peacebuilding for Human Security.” *Asian Journal of Peacebuilding* 2 (1): 37-60.
- Saito, Kohei. 2017. *Karl Marx’s Ecosocialism: Capitalism, Nature, and the Unfinished Critique of Political Economy*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Senghaas, Dieter. 2013. *Dieter Senghaas: Pioneer of Peace and Development Research*. Heidelberg: Springer. Kindle edition.
- Snyder, Jack. 1991. *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Solingen, Etel. 1998. *Regional Orders at Century’s Dawn: Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Suri, Jeremi. 2005. *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- United Nations. 2015. “Paris Agreement.” https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023).
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 1994. *Human Development Report 1994*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- United Nations General Assembly. 2005. “2005 World Summit Outcome.” Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 16 September. A/RES/60/1. https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_60_1.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023).
- United Nations General Assembly. 2009. *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect. Report of the Secretary-General*. A/63/677.
- United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect. 2023. “Responsibility to Protect.” <https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/key-documents.shtml> (accessed January 23, 2023).
- United Nations Security Council. 2011. “Resolution 1973.” S/RES/1973. <https://www.un.org/peace/operations/1973/>

undocs.org/S/RES/1973%20(2011) (accessed January 23, 2023).

Wendt, Alexander. 1999. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Williams, Chris. 2010. *Ecology and Socialism: Solutions to Capitalist Ecological Crisis*. Chicago: Haymarket Books.

Sung Chull Kim is Visiting Research Fellow at Seoul National University Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, where he was also Humanities Korea Professor until retiring in 2021. Kim is a Nonresident Senior Visiting Fellow at Korea Center, National University of Singapore East Asian Institute and is author of *China and Its Small Neighbors: The Political Economy of Asymmetry, Vulnerability, and Hedging* (State University of New York Press, 2023), *Partnership within Hierarchy: The Evolving East Asian Security Triangle* (State University of New York Press, 2017), and *North Korea and Nuclear Weapons: Entering the New Era of Deterrence* (Georgetown University Press, 2017). Kim serves as editor of *Asian Journal of Peacebuilding*. Email: kim239@snu.ac.kr

Submitted: May 05, 2023; Accepted: May 10, 2023

