경계를 넘어선 평화구축과 통일구상

Envisioning Peace and Unification beyond Borders

일시 • 2014.**4.17**(목) 09:00~18:00 / **4.18**(금) 09:30~12:15

장소 • 서울대학교 호암교수회관 무궁화홀

IPUS
Institute for Peace and
Unification Studies
Seoul National University

서울대학교 **통일평화연구원**
HK**평화인문학연구단**

4.17(목) 학술회의 프로그램

**탈경계화 ·
재경계화의
역동성과
남북관계**

· 등록　09:00~09:30

개회사　09:30~09:45

한국의 분단, 경계화, 통일의 역동성을 생각해 보며　박명규 (서울대 통일평화연구원장)

제1회의　동아시아에서의 경계 문제 : 새로운 시각　09:45~12:00

· 발표　09:45~11:00

사회 : 전재성 (서울대)

경계와 경계화에 대한 연구 : 동아시아적 함의　데이비드 뉴먼 (벤구리온대)
구성된 영토 : 동아시아 국경 분쟁의 특성　아키히로 이와시타 (홋카이도대)
탈/경계화의 역동성 : 비판적 지역주의 관점에서　이문영 (서울대)

· 휴식　11:00~11:15

· 토론　11:15~12:00

토론 : 서정민 (연세대), 김성철 (서울대), 서동주 (이화여대)

· 오찬　12:00~13:30

제2회의　한반도의 탈경계화, 재경계화 그리고 평화　13:30~16:25

· 발표　13:30~15:10

사회 : 한경구 (서울대)

한반도 탈경계화 : 햇볕정책 십년을 넘어　쿤데 괴스테르 (레이던대)
남북한 경계와 평화 구상　도진순 (창원대)
접경지역의 정치경제학 : 개성공단　송영훈 (서울대)
생태와 안보의 접점 : 남북한 접경지역의 평화공원　김재한 (한림대)

· 휴식　15:10~15:25

· 토론　15:25~16:25

토론 : 에드워드 리드 (경희대), 이석우 (인하대), 김병로 (서울대), 이수정 (덕성여대)

· 휴식　16:25~16:30

종합토론　경계연구와 한반도 평화구축　16:30~18:00

사회 : 김병연 (서울대 통일평화연구원 부원장)

Program

Dynamism of De-bordering and Re-bordering in Inter-Korean Relations

• **Registration   09:00~09:30**

Opening Speech   09:30~09:45

Conceiving the Dynamism of Korean Division, Bordering, and Reunification
Myoung-Kyu Park (Director of IPUS, Seoul National University)

Part I Borders in East Asian Contexts : New Perspectives   09:45~12:00

• **Presentations   09:45~11:00**

Moderator : Chaesung Chun (Seoul National University)

The Study of Border and Bordering: Implications in East Asia
David Newman (Ben Gurion University)
Constructed Territories: Featuring a Fantasy of East Asian Border Disputes
Akihiro Iwashita (Hokkaido University)
Dynamism of Trans-boundarization: From the Perspective of Critical Regionalism
Moonyoung Lee (Seoul National University)

• **Coffee Break   11:00~11:15**

• **Discussions   11:15~12:00**

Designated Discussants
Jungmin Seo (Yonsei University), Sung Chull Kim (Seoul National University)
Dong-Ju Seo (Ewha Womans University)

• **Organized Lunch   12:00~13:30**

Part II De-bordering and Re-bordering on the Korean Peninsula   13:30~16:25

• **Presentations   13:30~15:10**

Moderator : Kyung-Koo Han (Seoul National University)

De-Bordering Korea: Beyond the Sunshine Decade
Koen De Ceuster (Leiden University)
The Border between the South and the North, and Peace Initiative
Jin Soon Doh (Changwon National University)
Political Economy of the Borderland: The Gaesong Industrial Complex
Young Hoon Song (Seoul National University)
Interface of Ecology and Security: Peace Park on the Inter-Korean Border
Chae-Han Kim (Hallym University)

• **Coffee Break   15:10~15:25**

• **Discussions   15:25~16:25**

Designated Discussants
Edward Reed (Kyung Hee University), Seokwoo Lee (Inha University)
Philo Kim (Seoul National University), Soo-Jung Lee (Duksung Women's University)

• **Break   16:25~16:30**

Roundtable Border Studies and Peacebuilding on the Korean Peninsula   16:30~18:00

Moderator : Byung-Yeon Kim (Deputy Director of IPUS, Seoul National University)

Contents

Conceiving the Dynamism of Korean Division, Bordering, and Reunification

Park Myoug-gyu

A politically, geographically, culturally, and psychologically unique borderline exists between South Korea and North Korea, officially the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The two Koreas are divided by the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) that cuts down the middle of the Korean Peninsula. The four kilometers wide Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) on either side of the line has functioned as a barrier between the South and the North to maintain the armistice for over a half century. The MDL not only prevents military collisions but also keeps the two sides from communicating or interacting with each other politically, socio-economically, and culturally. The Line divides between the capitalist market economy and the socialist control-economy, and strictly blocks any information exchange or communication between South Korea and North Korea.

Above all, the MDL completely separates the life-world of the people in the Korean Peninsula into two domains. Two entirely different "worlds" exist in the South and the North in terms of economy and lifestyle, not to mention politics. This Line is a tragedy that made it impossible for separated families and friends to get in touch with or see each other. Such division continued over sixty years, thus creating a natural barrier in regards to emotion, perceptions, and attitudes among the people of the two Koreas. Although the South and the North share the same language, long history, and culture, it is undeniable that they have two completely different worlds split by the MDL.

I. The Borderline in the De-bordering Era

The trend of cultural exchange, de-borderization, and convergence intensifies in the globalized and informatized twenty-first century. As movement of people, goods, and information show an unprecedented level of advancement, the boundaries, organizations, and practices, which were maintained by controlling such movement, have no choice but to change or be dissolved rapidly. In this way, passport has become a must for ordinary citizens and the number of countries that we can visit without visa is increasing. Exchange and communication are rapidly expanding in every aspects of human life, including lifestyle, cultural activities, and personal relations with disappearing boundaries among goods and information.

The South Korean society is not an exception. Rather, South Korea is one of the most active players in the trend of globalization, informatization, and opening(s). South Korea has achieved the world's best informatization and a remarkable speed of mobility. Therefore, few conventional borderlines survived in this society. Most of the lines, which used to distinguish between what is domestic and what is foreign, or cities and the countryside, have disappeared or changed significantly. The border that separated "us" from "others" in the context of language or culture has clearly changed as well. Even moral boundaries between what is normal and what is abnormal continue to change rapidly in South Korea.

Taking these into consideration, it is ironic that the MDL still firmly maintains its unique function of dividing the two Koreas. South Koreans can easily visit most of the countries in the world with their passport, but their visit to North Korea is only allowed for a few exceptional circumstances. South Koreans feel a sense of intimacy and distance simultaneously toward North Korean people. The line between the South and the North is not an imaginary one that could be easily overlooked or removed. It is a unique border functioning at every level of Korean politics, economy, society, culture, history, and psychology in a comprehensive manner. Moreover, this line divides Korean people's minds that affect their behavior and perceptions.

II. Characteristics of the Borderline in Korean Peninsula

The demarcation line on the Korean Peninsula is similar to, but different from a territorial borderline between states. This line is too institutional to be considered as a temporary division line, but it cannot be regarded as permanent. Both Koreas spend a huge amount of money in order to protect the line, while officially and emotionally claiming that this line must be eliminated. Such contradictory nature makes it difficult for the young people, not to mention non-Koreans, to understand this line accurately.

1. Between "Domestic" and "Foreign"

Pyongyang, of course, is not a "domestic area" for the people of South Korea. However, it is also clear that Pyongyang is not really same as other foreign cities. North Korea is regarded as a part of Republic of Korea (South Korea) according to the South Korean Constitution. Nevertheless, Pyongyang is regarded neither a domestic area nor a foreign country when South Korean people visits there. Pyongyang seems like a foreign city that is very difficult to visit without permission, but it does not require a passport, which is a must to travel other overseas destinations. Visiting and communicating with North Korea are regulated not by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but by the Ministry of Unification. Passport issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the citizens of the Republic of Korea is of no use in visiting North Korea. Instead, a "permission to visit North Korea" issued by the Ministry of Unification is required in order to go to the North. The permission and passport are similar in function, but very different in terms of their characteristics. Of course, the permission by the North is not in the form of ordinary visa, and is based upon North Korea's own invitation lists. Many steps must be taken in order to visit the North, and the cost of travelling to North Korea is very different from the case of other countries. Further, free travel of individuals is not available in North Korea. On that account, there is an occasional feeling that North Korea is a third world, which is beyond the classification of "domestic" and "foreign."

The Inter-Korean Basic Agreement of 1992 defined that inter-Korean relations is not a relationship between states, but a special and temporary relationship established in the process of promoting national reunification. South and North Korea are recognized as two different countries that joined

the United Nations separately under international law. However, the two Koreas do not acknowledge each other as a sovereign state. Both Koreas regard reunification of the peninsula as their most important future task, while showing hostility and a sense of difference in almost all aspects. Temporality and speciality are two elements which make inter-korean relation as unique.

Two Koreas have an odd relationship where contradictory aspects are coexist in the form of zero-sum game. North Korea is regarded differently in different perspectives: brother country with same goal of reunification, hostile enemy, or de-facto neighbour country. A logical understanding of the inter-Korean relations seems difficult due to those contradictory aspects. The inter-Korean relationship can be "both domestic and foreign" or "neither domestic nor foreign" at the same time. Such relation is dialectic and complex if seen from a positive perspective. However, it can be a confusing, two-folded, and contradictory relationship from an ordinary point of view.

This special relationship will become more natural if exchange between South and North Korea expands in coming years. If a land route is opened and more people come and go between the two sides, inter-Korean visit may become similar to other domestic travelling. However, even if relations between South Korea and North Korea improves, would it be possible for a flight bound for Pyongyang to depart from the domestic terminal at South Korean airport, just like a flight to Jeju Island? This will not be easy, at least for the time being. A "special relationship" does not necessarily have to be "temporary" because it is not very unusual for a special relationship to be institutionalized and persist over a long time due to its strong binding force and inertia.

2. Between Hostile Disclosure and Cooperative Connection

The spacial distinction of two Koreas brings about a very ambivalent function to the demarcation line zone: hostile disclosure for security and cooperative connection for reconciliation. Such an ambivalent perspective is easily found in the tour programs target the region that separates the South and North. Visiting DMZ, Joint Security Area (JSA), or tours to Gaesung and Mt. Kumgang which are now closed, reflect such an ambivalent aspect well. The interesting aspect is while 'Gaesung tour' is introduced as the 'Unification tour', Panmunjom in the DMZ and the MDL region tour are introduced as the 'Security tour.' Even one who visits the identical region interprets the meaning

of the Security tour and the Unification tour differently. What is difference between security tour and unification one? Both are not an opposing opinion and the latter cannot be existed without the former, however that does not necessarily mean the two are accepted without any contradiction.

In fact, not much difference exists between Gaesung and the JSA in the way they are both tough areas to visit. Even more, similar in the way that they both are thoroughly controlled districts and also unique region that no free activities are allowed. The JSA is rather better place to visit than Gaesung or Pyongyang to understand the complicated situation of the Korean peninsula and the real status of UN and Armistice Agreement. However, most of the people perceive the meanings of Gaesung as mutual cooperation zone and Panmunjom as military confrontation zone differently. Security tour, as in its literal meaning, emphasizes perspective of the 'security' in the sense of the place, and it attaches description and explanation in that context. Visiting the underground tunnel regarded as an essential course of Security tour explains the point. Whereas, the Unification tour is not only visiting the North Korean territory, but also strongly emphasizing the perspective of the 'unification' in the sense of the place in tourism.

For the last decade, hundreds of people have visited North Korea through Mt. Kumgang and Gaesung tour. Quite a few people visited North Korea for their conference and the business besides tour. Previously mentioned, people who visited North Korea did not always feel the same. While some are supporting both Korea's cooperation and mutual interaction by looking the real state of North Korea, others are against the system of North Korea with hostility and resistance. These differences came out probably because of approaching the identical place and subject in a different perspective and concern. The place where one experiences romance may arouse resentment to another. In this point of view, actually the boundary line of South and North Korea is not only divided into geographically and spatially from the DMZ, but also epistemological and aesthetic line that pervades in our perception and consciousness that we look at object and people.

We primarily realize the pain of actuality, and the separation of space by Mt. Kumgang, Gaesung, Panmunjom, the underground tunnel, and the DMZ tours. However, it will be a key function of tourism to remind the meaning in the sense of place, history, separation of social politics and the pain of the residents. What's more, the two different issues, 'Security' and 'Unification' bonds together

as tour, in terms of market. How the growing market power, exchange of human resources and material resources created by tourism will affect in political, military dimension will ultimately be the issue of rearranging the boundaries.

3. Between Ethnic Homogeneity and Multicultural Citizenship

Rogers Brubaker, a sociologist mentioned that every community is inevitable to devide insider who has a right of membership and outsider without it. In order for building a political community, it is inevitable to distinct inner group from the outer one. Several elements including ethnicity, customs, language, and long-lasting history provide the collective index on which a clear community boundary can be constructed. Relationships between those perennial elements and political membership have been always contested.

Who is Korean people? What makes Korean community as it is? On what element can both Korea be one as a political subjectivity? It is very important and inevitable question in thinking about the Korea's reunification. In Korea, ethnic identity has been very strongly internalized. Ethnic homogeneity and political citizenship has been considered as two sides of the same coin. Korean people has believed that both South and North share the same ethnicity as the descendent of the same ancestor. Based on this assumption, it is argued that "between two Korean relation" is different from any other international relation. On this principle, North Korean defectors can easily get the citizenship of South Korea in spite of their different background in experience, knowledge, and self-identity. The ethnicity principle can go beyond the national boundary even to the extent that ethnic Koreans living in all over the world could constitute a homogeneous community with same identity and culture.

The inconsistency between ethnic identity and political membership, however, is increasing in these decades. South Korea becomes a multi-ethnic society due to the increasing inflow of the foreign workers and growing numbers of international marriage. In addition, definitions of the Korean ethnicity is not same between North and South. Differences individual's identity and sense of belonging to ethnic communities. nationality is an indicator of social position that acknowledges

a member of a person legally. In World Cup 2010, Te Se Chong, who was a Korean-Japanese player and played for North Korean team, was a big issue. The press spotlighted him not only for outstanding soccer play but also for his unique background and his tears when he heard the North Korean national anthem. Previously, Mr. Ann who had Chosunistic qualities made an active play in South Korean Team, but in this World Cup he joined North Korean's Team. By looking at Te Se Chong, and Mr. Ann, how long will strictly controlled contact of two Korea last? How will correlation of nationality and ethnic identity will change in twenty-first century for both Koreans?

Ethnicity and nationality unite or separate South and North Koreans and Korean-Japanese. Both share unique principle of unity and function of separation. Te Se Chong, a famous Korean-Japanese soccer player, is an example of visually explaining overlapping or escaping this delicate line. Because he sticked to ethnic identity, he is distinct from Japanese, and as he sticked to identify him to North Korea, he became one of their team. However, as living in Japanese society does not allow North Korean citizenship, he cannot obtain it, nor it is impossible for him to give up our citizenship unless he obtains another. For him, combining status of ethnic identity, political connectedness, and nationality is not allowed. As in the case of Te Se Chong, the borderline crossing the Korean peninsula is not only limited to the internal land but also remains in Korean-Japanese people's mentality, identity and their lives, and regulate their form of lives. Suh Kyung-sik, a Korean-Japanese professor, explained this contradictory situation as a word of 'Between Citizen and Refugee', but it seems to be insufficient. This specific situation is closely connected to the borderline of South and North Korea, and one who cannot either be an ordinary member of a nation or a refugee without a nation. This ambiguous borderline is not always negative. In reality, Jeong showed this new possibility and potential of communication. Without denying the nationality, ethnic group and culture borderline, and not restrained to these at the same time, it might be possible to widen activity space flexibly and freely.

4. Between Love and Enmity: Borderline in Mind

The borderline between North and South Korea that runs most complicatedly and painfully is right in our consciousness and mind. One who experienced wars and felt the desperate pain of the division is needless to say, and it also clearly exists in common people's lives. The generation who experienced

the boundary line with extreme pain left the place, and the new generation settled down with a line of sense and preference. Pierre Bourdieu, a French sociologist mentioned various 'distinction' such as interest, convention, and sensibility as a significant mechanism of the modern classification. Nevertheless, in Korean people's mind, the road to the North is considerably shut down.

This kind of boundary can be found through the communication with people that come across in North. South Koreans experience an emotional joy of meeting their compatriots, and biopolitics, which makes them cautious and alert, at the same time when contacting with the people of North Korea. Even though stressing the meaning of 'with our nation' or 'we are the one,' we continuously face deep cleavage between the meanings of discourse over those issues including nation, sovereignty, unification, and Koreanness. We are warned not to use or discuss the expression such as "reform and openness" and the issues like political democracy and human rights. Though international meeting where communication is only possible through a mediation of foreign language, English, is quite uncomfortable, we don't necessarily need to concern over collectiveness of nation or nationality. On the other hand, even if using the same language and eating the same food, the delicate relation that arouses our identity consistently, is a result of a divided nation's history for a half century and a real image to face directly to find a way of unification as well.

As the fact that the Demilitarized Zone is the most heavily militarized area in the world, it is a huge irony that Koreans stress the sense of kinship as the same nation, and, at the same time, continue to be alert of each other as the possible enemy. This borderline in the mind is often mobilized as emotional resource to criticize political rivals in domestic politics. It would be a great task to resolve such an emotional boundary in the process of reconciliation and reunification. This borderline of consciousness still functions as an equivocal meaning in our society. One gets along with conservative idea, and supports or maintains reality in a 'comfortable bias.' It's a universal phenomenon to feel emotionally stable by blaming the enemy and distinguishing oneself from another. On the other side, division of the Korean peninsula and hostility between South and North Korea produce the source of uncomfortableness in our lives. This reflective thoughts will be a base for preventing excessive conflicts and mutual slander, and will be an intellectual and emotional basis to achieve unification and peace. Surely, this consciousness will not spread naturally, so our effort to face the boundary of consciousness introspectively is necessary.

III. Reconstructing Borderlines for Peace and Unification

For how much longer will this line between the two Koreas sustain? How will the twenty-first century's trend of de-borderization affect the boundary between South Korea and North Korea, and change our way of setting boundaries? These are inevitable questions for the people of the Korean society in the twenty-first century. Koreans' interest in reunification of the peninsula, in the future, may convert into a critical mind on de-borderization. Against this backdrop, there is an urgent need for us to comprehensively understand and analyze the characteristics of this borderline between the South and the North.

Contemporary twenty-first century global society is characterized with the speedy debordering and rebordering in every aspect of human life. George Simmel, a sociologist maintained that contemporary human being who lives in the mobile condition of the metropolitan city has ambivalent dimension of bordering and debordering. David Frisby wrote "What makes Simmel's analysis of the metropolis so relevant to the study of modernity is its emphasis upon the sphere of circulation and exchange, not merely of money and commodities but also of social groups and individuals." Inevitably, though men live in a spatial and social boundary, men are not meant to be limited in the boundary but to surpass and rebuild it. In practice, in this twenty-first century of de-borderization and new convergence era, the various borderlines that deeply entrenched in South and North Korea has to be transformed. The questions of how we cross the line and what kind of new space we should create in the borderline zone have to be solved.

Efforts of reflecting the existing borderlines and careful reconstruction of them are very important in the Korean peninsula as well as in East Asia. The issues of setting boundary, crossing boundary and resetting boundary in creating a new level of synthesis are between: domestic vs. foreign, security vs. cooperation, market vs. politics, ethnicity vs. citizenship, and national vs. global. Those issues are closely related to the future peaceful regionalization in East Asia, where yesterday's borderlines in territory, emotion, politics, and memory are reviving despite increasing human contacts and material exchanges. The task of peace building and reunification in the Korean peninsula is situated at the center of these regional peace and global cooperation in the twenty-irst century.

Part I
Borders in East Asian Contexts : New Perspectives

The Study of Border and Bordering:
Implications in East Asia
David Newman (Ben Gurion University)

Constructed Territories:
## Featuring a Fantasy of East Asian Border Disputes
Akihiro Iwashita (Hokkaido University)

Dynamism of Trans-boundarization:
From the Perspective of Critical Regionalism
Moonyoung Lee (Seoul National University)

The Study of Border and Bordering: Implications in East Asia

David Newman (Ben Gurion University)

I. The Renaissance of Border Studies

The opening caricatures of this paper display two contrasting, polar, ways of understanding borders in the contemporary world. The first depicts a situation in which borders are an inherent part of the way in which society is ordered, the fence being constructed between two people stranded on a small desert island and each desiring to maintain their own highly demarcated territorial domain. The second depicts the ways in which any type of border, even the most concrete, can be crossed and negotiated, passing through, over or under the physical barrier, depending on the specific political situation which provides the social context for the existence of the border in the first place.

Doing justice to the first caricature, it does illustrate the fact that the two people are reaching across the border in an effort to make contact, a process which may or may not eventually lead to the opening, or even removal of the border. Perhaps it illustrates the classic notion that "good fences make good neighbours" but it does not offer any suggestion as to why the border was constructed in the first place.

The study of borders has undergone a major renaissance during the past two decades. As has been stated elsewhere, this has been evidenced by the significant growth in numbers of organizations, conferences and publications dealing with diverse aspects of the border phenomenon, itself drawing on a growing cross-disciplinary group of scholars who are creating their own cross-border frontier spaces of scientific and practitioner hybridity and sharing their diverse understandings of the significances and functions of contemporary borders and border regions. Contemporary border stuies can be summarized in a number of major themes which have emerged:

The switch of emphasis from physical borders as a geographic and static outcome of the political and social process, which was so common in the traditional study of borders, to one which emphasizes the functional and dynamics of the bordering process which constitutes an input in its own right, has been a major indication of the way border studies has changed during this period. Borders, once demarcated and imposed upon the landscape, quickly become part of the mental landscape through which we understand the ongoing dynamics of changing political landscapes. The territorial ordering of space changes much more rapidly than we normally appreciate. This is well evidenced in the Centennia computer program which shows every minor or major border change which has taken place in both Europe and the Middle East since the year 1000. Play the program fast forward and one will see the octopus-like dimensions of rapid border changes taking place throughout recent history with the time-space perspective which is vastly different to that of a single human generation. It is the latter which determines our own understanding of border fixation, focused as it is on a relatively short time span of 30-40 years.

It is impossible to understand the process of bordering without understanding the nature of the power relations which bring about their construction and their management. The demarcation and delimitation of borders be they inter state boundaries or metropolitan and municipal boundaries

– are essentially a political decision which enables peoples and spaces to be ordered, controlled and managed. As borders are created, so they become transformed into institutions which are perpetuated through a series of border management procedures which govern the nature of the border regime, the agencies of control, the characteristics of the surveillance, and the criterion which determine who can and cannot cross the border, and with which documents or visas. The removal or opening of borders is equally a function of power relations. This does not necessarily mean that the power elites have undergone change form one group to another. It may often be the same power elites in whose interest it was to maintain borders in the past, but given the changing conditions of globalization and greater democracy it is now their interest to maintain open borders as a means of retaining their power positions.

The scale dimension of borders, ranging from the inter-State borders which play a major part in international relations and Geopolitics, to the meso and micro scales of borders which impact upon people's daily life patterns, and in which many of these borders are not automatically visible in terms of hard fences or walls or security guards, has been another theme gaining prominence. Municipal and metropolitan borders determine many of life's most important issues, while many of the worlds population rarely encounter a border between States requiring them to produce a passport or other relevant document which will allow them to cross from one side to the other. Such borders may often be perceived as much as they are tangible features of the physical landscape. Borders are places where we develop an intuitive understanding of places which can or cannot be crossed, where there is something different on the other" side, be it a street, a bus route or an open field. These invisible, functional, boundaries play a major role in the shaping of human spaces, especially in the densely populated cities and metropolitan areas, the places within which the majority of the world population reside and interact.

The notion of frontiers or borderlands transfers the discussion of the border from a single cut-off point, a sharp "razor edge" to a space or a zone within which there is interaction between people from both sides of the border and/or a zone wherein the development which takes place is directly impacted by the proximity of the border. Various names have been used to define this space – ranging from borderlands, frontier zones, zones of transition, cross-border regions. While each of these terms characterizes a different type of cross-border space, they share a common feature in

their focusing on the functional dimensions and impacts of the border. Cross-border regions have been sued as a tool of the European Union in the period leading up to the enlargement of the EU and the eventual opening of the border to free movement. Much of the recent border literature has discussed the nature of the hybridity which may take place within border zones or frontier regions, as peoples come together and share their experiences and lifestyles. The opening of borders to free trans-boundary movement has brought about a renewed discussion concerning cross-border "difference" and the extent to which border openings brings about an annulment of difference (through hybridity) or actually highlights difference by those who freely cross the border as a means of encountering that same difference (better food, cheaper gas, lower taxes).

A major theme to have developed within border studies has focused on the way in which borders are represented through a wide range of forms – ranging from maps (cartography), poetry, literature, art, film, photography and, as evidenced in this paper, caricatures. The visual images of borders are important in determining how we perceive both the location and the significance of borders. The impact of borders on the life of peoples residing in a border region or attempting to cross a border are reflected in literary narratives and in film. Maps play a major role in creating our mental image of the world "picture" and while maps are considered to be a truer, more realistic, depiction of the location of the border, they too have been manipulated by the map drawers (the cartographers) as they often to seek present the political message of a particular government, especially in conditions of contested territories or imposed boundaries. Graffiti on the borders themselves have become common in many parts of the world – see for instance the remnants of the Berlin Wall, the separation barrier between Israel and the West Bank in parts of Jerusalem, the wall dividing North and South Cyprus in parts of Nicosia, or the various sections of wall which divide East and West Belfast in northern Ireland. Borders also show up clearly on satellite images of border regions, often depicting clear physical differences in situations where walls or fences do not exist but where the respective sides of the border are subject to different development policies on the part of respective governments and border managers. Internet images and computer games are another form of territorial representation which have a major influence in the way in which we are socialized into understanding the territorial images of the contemporary world.

Given the contemporary technologies of travel, the cyber dissemination of ideas and the

sophisticated production of transit visas and documents, the renewed attempts at resealing borders has met with only limited success. That does not mean to say that territorial issues are completely redundant. State borders continue to delineate the extent of sovereignty, even if this is not a s absolute as in the past. Borders continue to constitute the agents through which processes of inclusion and exclusion are practiced, through which citizenship and belonging are determined, and through which the state is able to undertake the mechanics of control within the territorial compartments over which is exercises de facto and de jure control. It is the dynamics of the bordering process rather than the location of the physical border per se that is of greater significance, at a variety of spatial levels, ranging from the local, through the State, and to the regional and the global. The border is, in its own right, part of the process through which ordering and control takes place, rather than just the physical and static outcome of the political process.

There remain a relatively small number of locations where the traditional concern with the physical demarcation and delimitation of borders continue to be part of a process of reterritorialization and conflict resolution. The focus is on borders as an essential component of power relations both within and between countries. The establishment of new states in East Timor, Kosovo and Southern Sudan has necessitated the recognition of fixed territorial borders by the international community. In some cases, this has been no more than a process through which the existing administrative borders have been transformed into state boundaries, while in some cases it has required political negotiations leading to bilateral agreements and the demarcation of new lines of territorial and physical separation. The emergence of new states has in large part been the end process of conflict resolution, one in which states define the territorial extent of the entity over which they practice control. This contrasts strongly with the theory of "borderless" and "post nation state" worlds. Globalization processes may have made many borders more porous and easier to cross on the one hand, but it has not resulted in a world in which the territorial compartments known as states are not the major building blocks of the global structure.

Thus, the contemporary discussion of borders highlights two major contrasting narratives. One of these focuses on the globalization discourse which results in the opening and even removal of borders. The second focuses on the securitization discourse and the reconstruction of heavily fortified borders. These two narratives compete with each other for hegemony as parallel narratives, both of

which are important for governments seeking to be part of the networked global economy on the one hand, but seeking to safeguard their citizens from any form of external threat on the other.

II. Borders and Security

Traditionally borders and boundaries between States have been perceived as the provider of security. The border is the line of defence against foreign armies, the infiltration of terrorists and any other form of threat to the state and its citizens. If the concept of security is extended to include other elements of human security, then the border also provides a barrier to economic "threats" in the guise of illegal immigrants, smuggled goods and other elements which may cause damage to the country's economy. As such, the border can also be constituted in such a way as to be a convenient excuse for a weak economy, especially if the border is porous or completely open to the movement of people and goods from one side to the other.

A recent supplement in the British Guardian newspaper indicates the large number new walls and fences which have been constructed between States and conflicting ethnic groups during the past decade, despite the so-called borderless world era within which we are supposed to live. Nowhere is this more evident than along thousands of kilometers on the USA – Mexico border, as too the separation barrier which has been constructed between Israel and the West Bank, the physical and functional characteristics of which display all the elements of an heavily guarded international border between two separate and independent States. Recent meetings of border scholars, who have had a tendency during the past two decades to highlight the border "opening" processes and the ways in which borders can be made easier to negotiate, have witnessed a renewed interest in the control dimensions of borders, not least the new highly technological surveillance techniques which are being used – often at great distances from the border itself – to detect any form of illegal cross-border movement. Border security has become a major factor in the renewed thinking about borders and their management in many western countries.

But the security dimensions of borders has changed considerably during the past two to three decades, contingent with the changes in warfare technology. However high the fence or the wall,

borders can be crossed in a number of ways which make the border security functions insignificant. The case of Israel /Palestine is a good case study in this respect. The "defense" borders in both the south (with the Gaza Strip) and the north (with Lebanon) do not constitute a barrier against the hundreds of missiles which are fired by the Hamas (in the south) or the Hizbollah (in the north), while long term ballistic missiles from much further afield (such as during the Iraq War in 1991) pay no attention to the borders as the fly across hundreds, even thousands, of kilometers into the heartland of the country in its major metropolitan centers such as Tel Aviv which, until recently were thought to be far removed from any form of direct military or strategic threat.

Back in the early 1970's, in the years following the Six Day War of June 1967, the eastern border between the West Bank and the State of Jordan, was seen as constituting Israel's eastern defensible border. But by the time of the new millenium, Israeli military leaders were divided about the significance of this border in providing any physical defense for the country. Removing the "defensible border" doctrine from the political discourse means that it would now be possible to withdraw from the Jordan valley under any future peace agreement, enabling the Palestinian state to have territorial contiguity and share a direct boundary with the State of Jordan, rather than being an autonomous enclave, surrounded by Israel on all sides, with no independent or autonomous strategic maneuverability of its own.

But as the following caricatures show, even the most secure and sealed borders can be crossed – be it by the sir (missiles or birds) or underground (by tunnels).

Tunnel technology has also brought the defensive functions of borders into question. Along the relatively small length of the border between Gaza and Egypt, and Gaza with Israel, numerous tunnels have been constructed, enabling the transfer of goods, people and weapons, including missiles. Prior to the Israeli unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005, there was such discussion amongst the Israeli defense establishment concerning the future control of the Philadelphi line, the border separating the Gaza Strip from Egypt. Initially, Israel desired to retain control of this border to prevent uncontrolled movement from one side to the other, but eventually agreed to withdraw and hand it over to Egyptian control. Egypt initiated a strong border regime if only because it did not want the forging of links between fundamentalist groups on both sides of the border. But the rise to power of the Hamas which, in turn, resulted in greater restrictions from Israel on the passage of goods into the Gaza Strip, resulted in the construction of hundreds of tunnels under the Philadelphi Line, some of them large enough for the transportation of heavy goods, including missiles and armor. Following the return to power of the Egyptian military leadership and the banning of the Moslem Brotherhood in 2013, the Egyptian government once again clamped down on the tunnel regime, destroying most of them. For their part, Israel discovered and destroyed tunnels which were being constructed under the border from the Gaza Strip into Israel – and which could have enabled the infiltration of terrorism or the kidnapping and capture of Israeli soldiers and their being transported through the tunnels into Gazan captivity. Even sophisticated infra-red technology is not always able to detect the tunnels, or the storing of weapons, underground. This means that tunnels can still challenge the security dimensions of even the most sealed borders.

yayımlanan bir karikatür...

Kanalizasyon uzlaşmasından sonra Türk basınında yayımlanan
Musa Kayra'nın karikatürü...

BETHLEHEM

Polyp

III. Visibility and Knowledge Beyond Borders

Another dimension of border security concerns the perceived, rather than the real, threat emanating from the "other" side. The construction of new fences and walls as barriers to movement can, on the one hand, prevent the physical movement of terrorists or weapons and thus enhance the feeling of "safety", while at one and the same time can create another form of structural insecurity. Fences and walls create invisibility whereby people on each side of the border are no longer aware of what is happening on the other side. Invisibility in turn creates a ignorance and a lack of awareness of what happens on the other side of the border and it is easy for this to be manipulated by governments who wish to construct a sense of threat which may, or may not, be based in reality. The opening of borders and the discovery that people residing just hundreds of meters away on the other side of a sealed border, have similar lifestyles with the same daily problems as the self, go a long way to destroying the constructed sense of threat which sealed borders can create.

Education can give you a better perspective...

It is in this sense that satellite technology and cyber space on the one hand, and the creation of cross-border regions prior to the opening of a border, within which people can meet and interact go a long way to removing the sense of threat which has arisen out of ignorance and invisibility. Crossing the border becomes a positive experience, in which difference is not removed but becomes an enjoyable experience which can then be recounted to one's family and friends.

IV. Borders and Conflict Resolution

Border and territorial issues do not figure prominently in contemporary conflicts. The world has been mapped and there is general agreement and mutual recognition concerning most State territories and issues relating to sovereignty. This has not changed as a result of global transformation from a world of territorial fixation to one which centers around political networks, flows and nodes. The dimensions of sovereignty and the ability to influence states and their populations across borders is of major significance in the changing geopolitical patterns of global influences and dominations. But, with a few notable exceptions, this has not brought about any major changes in the basic territorial ordering of the world. This would indicate that the territorial patterns are not, as such, the key factors which influence global political and economic processes and that they neither contribute to, or hinder, the dynamics of geopolitical change.

The twentieth century witnessed a great deal of border and territorial changes, resulting from warfare, conquest and the imposition of borders within multi-ethnic regions. Many of the European and Middle Eastern borders which we recognize today were the result of post World War I territorial divisions, superimposed by the victorious on the vanquished. It is these borders which has shaped much of our territorial thinking in the ensuing period, borders which were re-established as a default following the break up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, borders which have finally proved their artificiality in the ethnically heterogeneous countries of the Middle East – a region which, due to ignorance, was always perceived in the western world as constituting a homogeneous region with few intra-ethnic differences or animosities.

Although the final section of this paper focusses on the Israel–West Bank border, but there have been other border demarcation hot spots elsewhere in the globe in recent years. for example, recent cases of boundary demarcation and conflict include Cyprus (Peristianis and Mavris 2011), the Balkans (Klemencic 2000; Meha and Selimi 2010), east Timor (Abuza 2010; Clad 2010) and the newly created state of South Sudan. In the Balkans, most of the border disputes arose with the demise of Yugoslavia, although some of them have been smoldering for a century, from the Balkan Wars and the end of World War I. Becoming independent states, the former Soviet Union provinces accepted the old administrative boundaries to avoid opening historical territorial claims, but they have not been immune to their revival. The former Yugoslav federal units have been obliged by the Badinter Arbitration Commission to keep the old administrative boundaries as one of the conditions for being internationally recognized as newly independent states. Despite that, negotiations over where to draw borders concretely reflect how these new states define their national interests. Border issues have increased tensions and often served as a fundamental stumbling block to wider regional cooperation in economics, security and ethnic relations.

There are well-known agreements and disagreements that have lasted for decades between Turkey and Greece over territorial waters, national airspace and continental shelves in the Aegean Sea. Some Turkish boundary disputes that date back to the time of the Ottoman empire wait to be solved after the ongoing normalization of relations between the two countries. Romania still considers some parts of Moldova and Ukraine, including Bessarabia, to belong historically to its territories. However, most of the actual problems regarding border corrections and demarcations in the Balkans belong to the

countries that emerged from the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

There, other regional border conflicts include Slovenia and Croatia, where the main issue for both countries is an area of around 20 square kilometers in the Slovenian Bay of Piran. Croatia insists the border should be drawn down the middle of the bay, while Slovenia wants the whole bay because it is the only direct access for its merchant ships to international waters. An old tavern on the small Bregana River, which borders both Slovenia and Croatia, has become more crowded by customers and people from the media than ever before in its 150-year history. The line of demarcation between the two countries after the dismemberment of Yugoslavia divided a small restaurant, Kalin, as well, so that one part belongs to Slovenia, and the other to Croatia. Not to confuse guests, who have their meal and drink in one country and pay the bill in another, the owner painted a fluorescent line along the floor to delineate his property. The line even goes over the billiard table, so that billiard balls illegally and regularly cross the frontier between two sovereign countries. From May 2004 on, this table became part of the border of the European Union at which the Croatian side was left out.

In Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina there is a similar problem to the Slovenia– Croatia dispute because of Bosnia's problems with Croatia regarding sea access. Slovenia has around 45 kilometers of Adriatic coastline and Bosnia and Herzegovina only around 22 kilometers, while Croatia is blessed with almost 2,000 islands and a coastline longer than 1,700 kilometers. Due to its claim on a few hundred square meters of rock in the Bay of Neum, Croatia's plan is to build a bridge over the tiny

Bosnian seaside resort to connect its mainland with its southernmost enclave, including the famous tourist center of Dubrovnik. This is not acceptable to Bosnia, where the authorities and the public complain that such a design will disturb Bosnia's only access to the sea.

Croatia and Serbia are also in dispute over borders, where Croatia liberated – partly by force and partly by international mediation – territories that were under Serbian occupation during the early 1990s. Serbia, however, still refuses to return two small islands in the Danube, explaining that they are nearer to the Serbian side of the river. The Croatian maps also show their border as passing through some Serbian villages and fields. Serbia is also in dispute with Macedonia because Serbia denies the independence of Kosovo, thus failing to recognize the border between Kosovo and Macedonia, which was earlier part of the border between Serbia and Macedonia. Additionally, the authorities in Belgrade believe the self-proclaimed government in Pristina has given part of Serbia's territory to Macedonia. The border between Macedonia and the rest of the former Yugoslavia was demarcated in 2001. Although Skopje recognized Kosovo as independent, the two have been unable to solve the dispute over a border area where Albanians staged protests against the demarcation in 2001, when escalating conditions at the Tanusevci–Debalde border with Kosovo also prompted the Macedonian Army to prepare for war. There two villages, situated only 100 meters apart on opposite sides of a steep mountain, had been the focus for Albanian incursions into Macedonia. In October 2009, Kosovo and Macedonia ratified an agreement over the border between the two countries. The document resolves an eight-year dispute over the region, used by Albanian guerrillas in 2001 to launch attacks during Macedonia's rebel Albanian insurgency. The document was supported by 83 members of Kosovo's 120-seat parliament, and by 72 members of Macedonia's 120-seat parliament.

Kosovo Serbs blocked roads leading to two disputed border crossings with Serbia, as Pristina announced it would take control of the posts. These border clashes erupted when the Pristina government dispatched special police to take over the two posts to enforce a ban on imports from Serbia that was imposed in retaliation for an earlier Belgrade ban on goods from Kosovo. The Serbian ban was imposed in protest at Kosovo's 2008 declaration of independence from Belgrade, which Serbia, backed by Russia, has refused to recognize. The European Union's law-enforcing mission in Kosovo assumed control of the two contested border crossings amidst escalating tensions in the volatile ethnic Serbian enclave in the north of the new republic.

Finally, in the Balkans there is also the border dispute between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia where there is a small territorial conflict that has remained unresolved from the time of Yugoslavia. The River Lim, a tributary of the Drina River, comes from Montenegro, runs through the northern part of Sanjak and enters Bosnia, but only for a few kilometers. Then it flows back to Serbia and then again to Bosnia at Rudo, leaving several small villages physically out of Serbia's territory.

Other border conflicts, outside of Europe, also offer parallels to what is happening in the Middle east. Among them is the most recent border challenge at the contentious new boundary between Sudan and Southern Sudan. Sudan's authorities managed to agree that the new border would be drawn along existing administrative boundaries, but many regions of this border remain disputed. The new atlas will acknowledge the disputed region of Abyei, where 1,000 Ethiopian troops, deployed by the United Nations Security Council, arrived in November 2011 in an attempt to keep a level of peace. But this atlas will not acknowledge the struggle in Sudan's Nuba mountains, close to the newly redrawn border, where many of the Nuba people still believe in the vision of a democratic and united Sudan propagated by the late Sudan People's Liberation Army.

## V. Israel Palestine Border Demarcation

Israel is unique amongst States in the contemporary world system in that only two of its five potential borders with neighbouring political entities are formally recognized. The borders with Egypt to the south and Jordan to the east were only formally agreed in the respective peace agreements which were negotiated and agreed between these countries in 1979 and 1995 respectively. As part of the Peace Agreements, the maps depicting the precise delimitation of the borders were ratified by the signees. In the case of Egypt, the area of Taba, immediately to the south of Elat, remained under dispute and went to international arbitration, as a result of which it was awarded to Egypt. In the case of Jordan, the part of the border which separates the West Bank from Jordan was not ratified, as Jordan argued that this could only be ratified in a future agreement with an independent State of Palestine and that Israel did not have the right to sign such an agreement. The border to the north of the West Bank extending to the Syrian border, and to the south of the West Bank extending to Elat-Aqaba were agreed and ratified as part of the Israel-Jordan peace agreements.

Three other borders remain to be determined. In the case of Israel's border with Lebanon, the course of the border is defined, based on the line which was drawn u between the British and French mandate authorities almost one hundred years ago when they were awarded the respective Mandates for the region by the league of Nations in the period following the end of World War I and the final demise of the Ottoman Empire. Following the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2000, the default point of return was the same border line and it is to be expected that if and when there is ever a peace agreement between the two countries, the boundary will follow the same line.

The cases Israel's borders with Syria and a future state of Palestine are more complicated. Israel's occupation of the Golan heights in the Six Day War of June 1967 shifted the border to the east. Syria has insisted that any future negotiations between the two countries will include a complete withdrawal of Israel from this strategic region and a return to the pre-1967 boundary line. This is a position which is rejected by Israel, given the strategic importance to Israel of the Golan region. This has become an irrelevant question during the past three years as the Syrian civilian war has taken precedence to any form of negotiations with Israel. The war has remained strictly confined to the Syrian territory, although Israel has allowed a limited number of Syrians wounded in the fighting to cross into Israel for medical treatment. The borders between Syria and Jordan and Syria and Turkey have become transformed into places for refugee camps, with tens of thousands crossing the border for refuge into the neighboring countries.

The most complicated of Israel's borders is that which will one day determine the territorial shape and extent of an independent State of Palestine in that region which is currently defined as the West Bank, a territorial entity which does not fall under Israeli or Jordanian sovereignty and whose territorial jurisdiction remains to be finally determined. The border known as the "Green Line" was drawn up as part of the armistice agreements negotiated between Israel and Jordan in 1948-49 following Israel's War of Independence, and which served as the closed border between Israel and the Jordanian administered West Bank until 1967. During the 45 year period which has passed since the 1967 War, the Green Line has remained the administrative border between Israel and the West Bank, even though for the first thirty years there was no wall or fence separating the two areas. During the past decade, the construction of the Separation Barrier as a direct response to incidents

of violence and terrorism has resulted in the re-creation of a physical and visible border. With the exception of the settler population on the one hand, and the relatively small number of Palestinians who have permits to work inside Israel, this new physical border is rarely crossed by the vast majority of both Israelis and Palestinians. The latter are prevented from entering into Israel, while the former choose not to enter the West Bank either because they fear for their physical safety or because they refuse, on moral and ethical grounds, to enter the territory which is occupied by Israel.

The separation barrier deviates from the course of the Green Line along twenty five percent of its course, always deviating to the east, in effect annexing parts of the West Bank in close proximity to the Green Line, to Israel. These are the micro regions within which the major Jewish settlement blocs are to be found, encompassing approximately 60 percent of the 300,000 settler population (not including East Jerusalem), enabling the settlers to maintain their functional links to Israel rather than having to go through the daily practice of crossing a boundary. It is to be expected that this indicates the form of border changes which Israel would demand as part of a re-demarcated border in a future Peace Agreement, although this would also necessitate land exchanges or land swaps in other parts of the border, in those areas which are relatively devoid of Israeli settlements inside Israel and

which would compensate the Palestinian state for those areas which would be annexed to Israel. This is not an impossible scenario given the fact that the Green Line was never a perfect line, that it reflected the political and military situation on the ground in 1948, and that since 1967 many changes have taken place along the course and in close proximity to the line, such that a border reflecting todays realities (which would also not be a perfect border) would make more sense rather than an automatic return to the default Green Line just because it existed in the past – for a relatively short period of time.

The construction of the Separation Barrier was, first and foremost, a unilateral Israeli response to the worsening of its national security and the infiltration of suicide bombers from the West Bank and Gaza into Israel's main population centers. Although the security barrier has become transformed into an international border, with electrified fences, sophisticated surveillance technology and a limited number of crossing points, its initial rationale was, as far as the vast majority of Israelis were concerned, to prevent the movement of potential security risks (terrorism) from entering into Israel. It is for this reason that it enjoyed the support of most Israeli citizens, regardless of their positions along the right–left political spectrum, and that it was initially implemented by a right-wing prime minister, Ariel Sharon, who – at that time – was opposed to the idea of creating a political border between Israel and the West Bank. It continues to be opposed by the settler community, who now find themselves on the "wrong" side of the security barrier, which has rapidly become associated in the minds of most Israelis as a future political border between two independent states, within which the settlers will have no place. It has also transferred incidents of violence and terrorism from inside Israel proper to the settlements, as perpetrators of violence are no longer able to cross into Israel. for most Israelis, the construction of the separation fence has indeed resulted in a significant decrease in the incidents of violence and terror, and it is for this reason that they see a peace agreement as containing a clear commitment to boundary demarcation, and a closed, almost sealed, boundary between the two countries, at least in the first stages of implementation.

Prior to the 1990s, the return of the entire West Bank to Palestinian control was portrayed, mostly by right-wing politicians, as constituting a major security threat. It was common to show maps of the region with the missile radius from points along the Green Line border into the major Israeli cities and population centers. It was argued that the return of the area to the Palestinians would put almost

the whole of Israel under threat of missile attack. This discourse has developed in two contrasting ways in the intervening period. On the one hand, following the first Gulf War in the early 1990s when, for the first time, long-range ballistic missiles from Iraq were fired into the heart of Israel, it was understood that the border played little significance in preventing such attacks from taking place, since the origin of the missiles was hundreds, even thousands, of kilometers distant. As weapon technology developed, so too would the long-range accuracy of such missiles and, as such, the precise location of the border would have little significance for this dimension of the securitization discourse. On the other hand, the return of the Gaza Strip to Palestinian control resulted in the firing of small-scale missiles from close range into the towns of southern Israel, such as Sderot, Ashqelon and even Be'er Sheva, causing damage to the civilian infrastructure which had not previously been experienced in Israel's wars.

This was repeated with the firing of missiles from southern Lebanon into the towns of northern Israel, reaching the major metropolitan center of Haifa and its oil refineries. In both cases, Israel undertook major reprisal actions in both Lebanon and the Gaza Strip, raising questions in the minds of many Israelis concerning the need to control (occupy) areas just beyond the border so as to prevent them from becoming transformed into missile launching sites, whether of the Iran-supported Hezbollah in the north, or Hamas-supported groups in the south. As such, the significance of the border vis-à-vis this aspect of securitization is an open question – while Israel's long-term strategy is to develop, in cooperation with the United States, a sophisticated "iron dome" policy, by which missiles can be detected and intercepted immediately after launching and before they hit any of their targets.

There has also been a major change in thinking concerning the security discourse of the country's eastern border. Following the June 1967 War, Israeli government policy until 1977 was governed by what became known as the "Allon Plan." This, prior to the mass settlement of the West Bank region, was aimed at returning large parts of the area to Jordanian control through the granting of autonomy to the Palestinian residents of the region, while at the same time maintaining direct Israeli control over the eastern border running along the Jordan Rift valley. The autonomy area would be linked to Jordan through a territorial corridor running from the West Bank town of Ramallah, north of Jerusalem, in a southeasterly direction to include the one Palestinian town in the Jordan valley,

Jericho. As such, Israel would not have to exercise direct control of the civilian population, while it would, according to security perceptions of that time, maintain control over what became known as its "defensive boundaries." This was part and parcel of Israeli political and security conceptions for over 30 years, but was brought into question following the first Gulf War and the firing of long-range ballistic missiles, and again following the signing of the peace agreement between Israel and Jordan in 1995. It was also increasingly understood by Israeli policy-makers that any attempt to reach a territorial solution to the conflict which would argue for the retention of the entire Jordan valley by Israel would be automatically rejected by the Palestinians. Such a solution would mean that the Palestinian state would be denied huge areas of land, much of it – despite its difficult climatic conditions – available for development and even the settling of potential refugee return, as well as turning the new state into a virtual enclave, surrounded on all sides by Israel.

The most recent round of talks, promoted by the United States Secretary of State John Kerry, has moved beyond the simplistic demarcations of a single line and has began to seek alternative territorial arrangements which could be implemented within the framework of two independent States. This goes beyond land swaps along the length of the Green Line boundary and has even began to discuss the possibility of cross-citizenship and ethnic exclaves of both Arabs and Jews within each others' state territory. Given the high levels of mutual animosity between the two sides, this appears to be an unlikely scenario at this stage.

VI. Concluding Comments

This final section of the paper focused briefly on the complexities of conflict resolution and border demarcation in Israel-Palestine. But as can be seen from this case, as well as the many cases in the Balkans, the issues at stake concern cross-border ethnicity, where groups find themselves on the "wrong" side of the border. This is reflected in localized conflicts in micro-areas, often in towns and villages which are located on both sides of the border. In the case of Israel-Palestine, there is no clean-cut divide between Israeli and Palestinian citizens, while each group is opposed to forceful evacuation in attempts to create forms of ethnic homogeneity, as was a common occurrence century ago, and even as recently as the division of Cyprus into homogeneous Turkish and Greek Cypriot areas following the Turkish invasion of 1974.

The redrawing of borders around ethnic groups may result in their forceful loss of the citizenship of one country and their adoption of an alternative citizenship without any actual physical movement or expulsion from villages and homes. This is almost as unacceptable as the forced ethnic cleansing of minority groups from one side of the border to the other, although where it is imposed from above by both governments, it is less of an infringement of the respective human rights than is the forced evacuation of refugees against their will by a single government.

In terms of the technical aspects of border demarcation, modern technologies such as GIS (geographic information system) and sophisticated computerized cartography enable negotiators to reach a resolution of meters, so that every house can be taken into account. Gone are the days when inaccurate maps, not widely known to the public at large, could be used as an excuse for the poor, or politically unequal, demarcation of the boundary. The data and information are available to all, much within the public domain, on memory sticks and laptop computers. Thus, politicians and diplomats have access to far more comprehensive data and cartographic knowledge than was the case even 50 years ago. This means that the ultimate decisions concerning the trade-offs involved with new border demarcations are even more political than in the past. In the case of the Balkans, of Sudan and of Israel-Palestine, the knowledge is available. It remains the responsibility of the politicians to show their desire for conflict resolution by drawing up borders which are equally satisfactory (or unsatisfactory) to the countries on both sides of the separation line.

At a wider level, it is clear that the borderless world which many of us were embracing 20 years ago has not arrived in many areas where ethno-territorial conflict and attempts at conflict resolution are still the order of the day. Borderless worlds may work in some ways and for some people inside an expanded European Union, but the combination of securitization discourses following the events of 9/11, attempts to prevent the entry of "illegal" migrants from the poorer parts of the globe into the richer areas, and the residual conflicts, some of which have been outlined in this chapter, mean that the closing and sealing of borders is as much part of contemporary border discourse as is their opening and removal. We live in a world where parallel border dynamics are going on at one and the same time, in different locations, and even in the same location, with competition between economic lobbies pushing for more porous and flexible borders, and securitization and conflict lobbies calling for the reclosing and sealing of borders. This is a dynamic process which characterizes much of the global geopolitical change of the twenty-first century.

Constructed Territories:
Featuring a Fantasy of East Asian Border Disputes

Akihiro Iwashita (Hokkaido University)

I. Introduction

Nowadays, territory is well-known as a kind of constructivist product in the context of nationalism. It is true that territorial issues in East Asia are also imaginarily and artificially demonstrated by a national discourse and politically fanned by media and education. Recent clashes over the disputed islands surrounding Japan are good cases to be testified by a tool of political geography such as "territorial trap" any other related concepts.

The East Asian cases must be comparatively researched for further theoretical development for the worldwide border studies. Border studies originated and developed from North American (US-Mexican and US-Canadian) empirical case studies and from European ones (particularly, the post-Cold War borderlands transformation in Eastern Europe, the Soviet and the EU spatial drift). Those cases, featured by the inland borderlands disputes, are well investigated, but the East Asian ones are distinguished because of the characteristics of maritime disputes. When we look at Japan, the significance of the cases is apparently understood. In the Cold War period, Japan, secured by the sea, had been a safe place thanks to the perpetual borderlands conflicts concentrated on the Eurasian continent such as the Soviet-Sino river disputes and the North-South Korean confrontation. As people were exhausted in the narrowed spatial disputes in the inland borderlands in Eurasia during the Cold War period, the major conflicts gradually turned frozen (even if it were not completely resolved as in the case of the Sino-Russian river disputes).

In contrast, since the 1970s the maritime order has been shuffled and encroached by the competitive powers: the range of territorial water was generally and acceptably widen from three to twelve miles and the exclusive economic zone was newly established by the law as 200 miles by the law. Competition for a wider maritime space became fashioned and the overlapped sea zone between the concerned parties should be regulated by mutual negotiations and arrangements. Factually, Japan faced challenges because it shared sea zones with Russia, Korea, China and Taiwan nearthe Eurasian side. A new framework for fishery with Russia and the temporary zones for exploiting fishery resource with Korea and China were set in the 1990s.

A territorial issue for Japan took on a new meaning in this context. Japan has numerous islets that dot the ocean, and can only be maintained at huge costs. However, these islets have turned into gifts, by which Japan can claim and exclude other countries from vast territorial waters and the related resources. Factually, Japan is now proud of the sixth largest EEZ holder in the world though the ranking of the territorial size is just at the 61th.

The opposite side of the coin always presents challenges. Long ignored small islets have become hot spots of territorial claims. Korea and China also have recognized the significance of Takeshima/Dokto and Senkaku/Diayu in the changing maritime order. Theses Logics of the historical claims over the islands may sound similar with the past ones, but the background of the claims has significantly changed in the interests-based context. Namely, acquiring the disputed islets would lead a country to gain a huge sea zone. It is one of the critical aspects behind the territorial issues in East Asia. Against this backdrop, the concerned parties begin to use any kind of historical discourse, especially Japan's past imperialist activities, in order to justify their own activities in the disputed territories. Particularly, the current Abe Shinzo administration's historical phobia (e.g. rejecting the existence of "comfort women," Abe's official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, revising textbooks and some pro-imperial orientations) gives China and Korea good reasons for criticizing Japan's non reflection on the WWII activities.

The IBRU at Durham University, a leading institute for the boundary research, covers the island disputes and the maritime demarcation. Regardless of the concerned party's assertions (such as Korea's argument that no territorial dispute with Japan exist Dokto), the international community

recognizes the Northern Territories/South Kurils, Takeshima/Dokto and Senkaku/Diaoyu territorial disputes. Let us feature the constructed aspects of the three border island disputes in the following sections.

II. South Kurile / Northern Territories

For Japan, the Northern Territories is directly memorized by the fact that the Soviet Union ignored the then-in-effect neutral pact with Japan and suddenly invaded and occupied the Kuril Islands at the end of WWII. In fact, the issue has its origins during the peace treaty negotiations between the two countries in 1955-56. The Soviet Union unexpectedly proposed a two-island transfer, Shikotan and Habomai, after signing the peace treaty and Japan almost accepted offer. In those days, Japan, however, had a couple of similar issues concerning Okinawa and Ogasawara that were controlled by the US. The territorial issue with the Soviet Union was not the only one.

It was true that the Japan's territorial claims over South Kuril was well linked with the ones over Okinawa islands: Indeed, the Soviet side planned to separate Japan from the US camp by using the territorial card. In turn, John Dulles of the US State Department countered that the US would not have an obligation to guarantee Japan's sovereignty over Okinawa if Japan accepted the two-island transfer offer. As a result, Japan changed its previous position and newly identified the four-island return option, which included Etorofu and Kunashiri, as the only acceptable solution for Japan. In sum, the Northern Territories were a kind of the product, if not direct one, of the Cold War process in the Japan, Russia and the US triangle.

The issue was mostly constructed in the context of the Cold War. The stances toward the issue became disruptive: Japan demanded the four islands return as a package, with the understanding that the Soviet Union would never accept it, while Russia insisted that the issue was nonexistent, recognizing that Japan would never break up their alliance with the US. Japan conducted a nationwide anti-Soviet campaign and the Japanese people were taught to view the Northern Territories as koyuno ryodo (which can be roughly translated as "inherent territory") while the Soviet side just ignored the issue and the Soviet people had little knowledge of the Japan's territorial

claims it. In the late 1960s and the early 1970s, the border conflict with China was much more critical for the Soviet Union and the military clash on Damanskii/Zhenbao Island was politically constructed as an anti-Chinese demonstration.

The situation in parallel lasted up to the Gorbachev era. His new thinking in foreign policy reshaped the Soviet Union. Factually, he accepted the compromise with China on the border disputes. Damanksii Island was, then, jurisdictionally recognized as part of China and hundreds of islands on the international rivers that Soviet had occupied were to be transferred to China on the basis of the 1991 boundary agreement. In addition, perestroika gave freedom and autonomy, allowing the people to activate their action beyond the Gorbachev's first plan. The fluid media and mass opinion easily constructed issues politically. The border disputes with China was one example of the constructed product (e.g. Gorbachev's "betrayer" image of selling territory to China) and the long ignored Southern Kuril issue was also revived in the process. Boris Yeltsin, who succeeded Gorbachev and had the responsibility of disintegrating the Soviet territory, cautiously addressed the territorial issue with Japan. After resolving the border issue with China and with the newly independent former Soviet republics, the Southern Kuril issue remained untouched partly because Japan did not change its claims on the four islands. The issue, as a result, became the last one that Russia has with its neighbors.

Indeed, the issue, even if the Cold War made at the beginning, had considerable substance for the local people and economic life on the site, though Tokyo could play up and construct the issue politically. The territorial scale was 5,000 km square and ten thousand residents once lived there. In comparison with a kind of "rocks" (e.g. Takeshima and Senkaku), the Northern Territories itself has been as large as islands per se (even if they were imagined and developed). Besides that, groups and a union of former residents were formed and grew into a territorial movement during the Cold War period, and pressed Tokyo to keep the "four island" claims against Russia. Therefore, when Russia showed some signs of compromise in the 1990s, Japan continued to enjoy the romantic but uncompromising idea of having all four islands returned.

Nevertheless, as the Cold War ended, relations between the two countries were transformed. The two countries were no longer enemies, but rather they became potential partners willing to

collaborate in various international fields beyond the bilateral rapprochement. Though the territorial issue blockaded the development of relations in the 1990s and 2000s, the new momentum has continued since 2010. Huge trade volumes, deepened energy interdependence and cooperation among atomic plants pushed Russo-Japan relations forward regardless of the Northern Territories/ South Kuril. Current relations move forward as though no territorial issue existed. Against the important background of this rapid development, Japan targeted the policy of "China as an No.1 enemy." Japan's action on "bashing China," or use of "China's threat" discourse in the international context, works well for the current foreign policy plan to cement the US-Japan alliance along with Russia's involvement.

In short, Russo-Japan relations are still in the process of making what to be done. This means that relations are still in state of flux but not drifting toward a negative orientation. The Northern Territories issue is already not a top priority in Japan's foreign policy toward Russia and the issue is now relatively deconstructed. On the other hand, for Russia, the issue is the last one remaining for the Russia's territorial issues, therefore Russia does not have full concerns for compromise's bad effect on the other disputes. Russia could also manage the issue as deconstructed: the Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov's latest message about a "non-territorial issue" with Japan could be interpreted more positively (keeping in mind this statement came on the eve of Russo-China's deal on Xeixiazi Island: Russia issued a statement that it was not a "territorial issue" but a "minor border regulation" to de-politicize the big challenges).

Still more problematic is Japan's current position on China. As far as Japan provokes a "China's threat" to engage Russia, Russia seems not to join it. And if Japan keeps the position of downsizing the territorial issue in the excuse of China, the prestige of Japan's sovereignty over other islands would be cast in doubt. It would be a dilemma that forces Japan to freeze any developments toward a territorial solution with Russia. In conclusion, the Northern Territories are seemingly in hibernation along with any constructivist aspects of the discourse.

III. Dokto / Takeshima

The Takeshima issue is the most misunderstood when we look back at historical incidents. No matter what story Korea and Japan tell about the small rocks, it has not been critical for the issue. It is easier to debunk the myths of the rocks: the originally proposed Korean "Syngman Rhee Line" forgot to include Dokto; Japan's long little interests in Kumi (Okinoshima) local seal haunting and abalone fishery. The realities on the small rocks were as the follows: Some local Japanese and Korean (coming from Jeonnam and Cheju Island) jointly used the rocks and the surrounding sea (precisely speaking, they used the water zone including the small rocks). A famous anthropologist at Seoul National University mentioned that Korea ignored the mainland Ulleungdo next to Dokto for a long time while placing much emphasis on Dokto. It is true that Dokto is a highly constructed territory in Korean perspectives.

For Japan, they have different stories. As I mentioned before, Japan's government conducted a nationwide campaign for the return of the Northern Territories, and all of the prefectures were asked to organize their own branch for the national movement but one prefecture, Shimane, resisted due to the existence of the Takeshima issue. As a result, Shimane joined it as the last prefecture but with a specific name as a branch of the Northern Territories and Takeshima movements. Nevertheless, Shimane prefecture's actions toward Takeshima never went far beyond the bureaucratic treatment. Up to the late 1990s, no official section for Takeshima within the administrative body in Matsue City though the City Hall had a small slogan sign on "Return Takeshim" at the front. Before "Takeshima Day" was created by the prefecture in 2005, little political construction on Takeshima had prevailed in Japan, though the concerned local parties complained about Korean control over the rocks and sea zone.

It is natural that a national political will work for the non-construction over the Takeshima issue in Japan. The Takeshima issue should be positioned as a problem caused by the process of decolonization of Imperial Japan. The issue is a spatial one where the suzerain and the colony was bordered. The elder generation in Japan recognized the point well and, therefore, was tolerant and kept special care and feelings for the Korean's claims. In addition, the Cold War regime supported the status quo after Korea occupied the rocks in the mid-1950s. Though Korea and Japan faced some

challenges over historical issues, they were frozen and put aside on a shelf in the challenges the communist camp in East Asia. Even if the Japan-Korea alliance were nonexistent the Japan-Korea relations factually worked in a similar sense in the context of the US-Japan and the US-Korean parallel alliances. Facing North Korea and China, both countries, particularly, Korea had little room to provoke and bash Japan over the territorial issue. Korea has much more physical challenges in the DMZ and NLL on the peninsula and adjunct sea.

In the 1990s, the East Asian regional order was totally reshaped: Democratization of Korea, establishment of Korea-Soviet diplomatic relations and of Korea-China diplomatic relations and joint joining the UN with its northern counterpart. Korea's international position was dramatically improved and did not necessary rely so much on the US and Japan as before. Then, Japan turned to be an easy target to bash. The main Korea's national legitimacy during the Cold War period was "anti-communism," but lost its persuasiveness and sought a new symbol of national unification to overcome regional, social stratum and economic challenges. "Anti-Japan" is one of the fittest slogans and is easily acceptable to the nation. Japan is very safe to criticize (in contrast with China) and there is no danger of Japan forcefully retaking Dokto. Dokto is now to be constructed as a symbol of the bad behavior of Japan's past imperialism.

The Dokto Museum, founded by the Northeast Asia History Foundation in 2012, is an excellent place illustrating how the issue is high-politically constructed. So many myths were exhibited: Dokto diorama appears as mountain alps (in reality it is 0.25 km square, the size of a small park), panels and a 3D film featuring the richest natural resources around Dokto sea (poor fishery resources in 2000 meter depth of the sea), wrong toponymic explanation on Dokto (It is said that Korea has a couple of islands that have a same name of the old Dokto but no direct proof). Particularly, a corner on Japan's provocations is misleading: They count thousands of provocation about the Dokto but the details are far from the provocation (they just show numbers of the article and papers on Takeshima, some politician's remarks and so on. If a Japanese uses the name of Takeshima and not Dokto, it is enough to include it in the list of the provocations). Objectively, the museum has the opposite effect on the persuasiveness of Korea's claims. A serious researcher belonging to the Foundation in charge of guidance for the museum is reluctant to explain the details of the exhibition when a professional researcher comes there. Almost 40,000 people visit per year. It means only a hundred visitors per day.

The number is relatively few because the museum targets a younger audience. It is not known how many ordinary Korean visit there.

The story debunking the myths comes from local perceptions. Korea's Pohang on the east coast is a center for the fishery near Dokto. Interestingly, they do prefer keeping the status quo to Japan's official recognition on Korea's sovereignty over Dokto. This is because the current temporary joint fishery zone around Dokto is very advantageous for them. If Japan accepts Korea's claims on Dokto and the zone disappears, they would lose the huge rich fishery zone near the Japanese coast. Therefore, it is not welcome for Japan to give up Takeshima, rather they would prefer Japan to keep the claims. It is true that they would never admit this in public. So, aren't they really a "betrayer" of Korea?

In turn, Japan began to construct Takeshima a bit seriously more than before when the Rhee Myonbaku's visit to Takeshima in 2010. Then Premier Yoshihiko Noda strongly protested against Korea's "provocation" and suggested that Japan was prepared for a unilateral submission of the case for the ICJ. The local people in Shimane and Okinoshima were excited to hear the DPJ's rapid decision and rushed to complete museum exhibitions that composed of the traditional local activities, past photographs and the material collections on Takeshima in the pre-war period. As the former suzerain, Japan has much more documentation on the rocks than Korea. They keep their own memory and seek to reconstruct a good image of Takeshim to the public. Succeeding the Abe administration, tougher confronting Korea in historical items such as "comfort women," downsize the Takeshima issue. For Abe, the territorial issue for Korea seems at a lower profile as well as for Russia. Japan will freeze this issue in the context of "China as the No. 1 enemy" as illustrated in the following case.

IV. Senkaku / Diaoyu

How Senkaku has been constructed in China's discourses sounds more typical. There is a lot of proof that China recognized Senkaku as a part of the Ryukyu/Japan terrain before 1968 when China first claimed the islands as its own: the Qing Dynasty issued an official letter to express gratitude that

Ryuku had saved the sufferers near Ryukyu's Senkaku; Chinese Communist issued a message that they supported Ryukyu's movement, including in Senkaku against the US in the 1960s and so on. The logics is simple: once Taiwan claimed sovereignty over Senkaku, Communist China followed suit as far as Taiwan is a part of China, and therefore Senkaku is a part of China.

For Taiwanese, the issue was not necessarily simple. The sea around Senkaku had been used by Taiwanese fishery on the east coast of Taiwan. Particularly, since 1895 Taiwan became a colony of Japan, the local Taiwanese worked there as well as with the people of Okinawa Yaeyama as a Jpapanse "national." When Japan was defeated, Taiwanese was also separated from Japanese (as well as Koreans) and they lost their past rights in excuse that "they are a foreigner." They were officially not allowed to use the territory as the Japanese (Okinawa Yaeyama people) were.

After effectuation of the San Francisco Treaty in 1952, Senkaku as well as other areas of Okinawa (a part of Senkaku was used by the US military to conduct exercises) was controlled by the US. However, US control over the far remote islets were loose and local Taiwanese entered the area easily. Often they and locals from Yaeyama enjoyed the use of the islets and surrounding sea sometimes with eating and drinking. Then, in the process of transferring Okinawa back to Japan and Taiwan's resistance to the one-sided US decision, the situation became complicated. Maritime exploitation boomed and the UN reports on the potential resource near Senkaku aggravated the situation. Taiwan claimed the territory and China followed suit, as mentioned before. Nevertheless, Taiwan's points of the view were more flexible as Lee Tenghui once recognized Senkaku as a part of Japan. Taiwanese locals, afraid of losing the islands and sea area that they thought as their traditional living sphere, were obliged to make a claim over them to maintain their rights in the area. In turn, even if Japan recognized the territory as its own, they also did not fully consider the significance of Senkaku. In those days, the islands were just remote dots on a map and maintaining them incurred huge costs. Japan naturally paid close attention to the main islands of Okinawa and concentrated on how they could be developed quickly. In this sense, Japan's "rediscovery" of Senkaku is relatively new.

Since then, China's moves toward Senkaku added a new dimension to the issue. Their stakes in the issue were developed in the process of the US transfer of Okinawa to Japan, the US-China

rapprochements and the Japan-China negotiations over the peace treaty between them. As the process was matched in the maritime order transformation in the 1970s, historical discussions intertwining the maritime interests complicated the negotiations. The time had come to construct Senkaku.

Nevertheless, the Cold War, namely, "the Soviet No.1 enemy" policy cemented China and Japan for cooperation and the Senkaku issue was shelved. This worked well, regardless of the existence of an official agreement on the matter. The regime was maintained in the late 1990s when the US-Japan alliance was redefined. Even Premier Koizumi Junichiro, regularly going and praying at Yasukuni Shrine, did not arrest the Chinese for "illegally" entering Senkaku and just deported them to China. A turning point came in October 2010, when Chinese fishermen were detained by the Japan Marine Coast Guard and the captain was arrested. It is well known that China reacted to this incident harshly and anti-Japanese demonstrations occurred throughout China.

China was said to congraturate this opportunity to turn over the remaining regime with Japan on Senkaku. Considering the geopolitical map of East Asia, Japan seems an "unsinkable fleet," which could deter China's advancement toward the Pacific Ocean. Now that Japan claims the vast EEZ on its own island dots, the freedom of the high sea would be limited: Some interpretations on the UNCLOS clauses prohibit naval exercises and investigations within the EEZ of other countries. If the white dots turn black as in a game of Othello, China could widen its own zone.

The Diaoyu (Senkaku) issue is critical for China's interests. So, how should the issue be constructed? The historical issue works well. Particularly, the Senkaku issue is closely related with the Taiwan issue and Japan's actions to incooperate the islands to Ryukyu was the year of the Sino-Japanese War. In the post-Cold War period, Chinese Communist's legitimacy gradually shifted more to an anti-Japanese (anti-colonial) orientation. Senkaku became one of its symbols and China has played up the "historical revisionist" image of Japan by use of the island issue. China tries to Japan as a "bad guy," to turn aside the criticism that China has been a critical revisionist for changing the regional order and geopolitical affairs. Abe's recent fantastic activities worked well for this China's counter and justification on its actions. Now the Diaoyu issue has become a historically constructed one, which has the potential of turning into a political monster.

For Japan, the bigger Senkaku issue is not necessary bad. This is because Japan can feature China as threat, further playing up the crisis of Senkaku. It partly functions to get the US to ally itself with Japan, thus offsetting China's recent offer on a new type of great power relations" with the US. Senkaku is on its way toward becoming a hyper constructed issue.

V. Compare the Cases on the Extent of Construction

Figures illustrate the three case studies as above are following:

The Japan's constructed image on Northern Territories is clearly down and on the path of demythologization. The reasons are: 1) long time non-productive discussions 2) no new facts to be discovered 3) boring and no-sensational 4) mutual understanding on the current dead-end and so on. The lowing the constructed image would be a good chance for solution. However, the challenges are. Even a national image can be manageable in both countries, the concerned parties are still stake. Factually, politicians should have a risk on some concessions on the disputes. Intersted groups including bureaucracy and business (some of them earn thanks to the territorial disputes) would disturb the way for solution. More challenges are the low priority of the territorial issue for both policy makers.

As far as the Northern Territories issue is now tranquilized (if not solved), the motivation for final solution is also low. Thought the Northern Teritories is one of the most important issue for the Japan-Russia relations, it is not so big in the entire foreign policy for both. Japan's focus must be on the US, China and Korea, first while Russia's eyes now is fixed on Ukraine, EU and the US.

Takeshima / Dokto

The Korean constructed image on Takeshima has been grown-up and the Japanese one follows. However, Takeshima is, though important, one of the issues of the Japan-Korean multiple relations. When Japan truly change the past-appraising policy in the current government, the situation could change. Particularly, the dynamism in the East Asia would affect the issue. If the North Korean regime was collapsed and the Korea and China shared the direct borderlands over rivers, the realities on confrontation would vanish as a ghost at the moment (though the ghost comes back later again).

In opposite of the two former cases, constructed images on Senkaku is very developing and dangerous because of the invisiblity. China and Japan have little experiences and sharing about the island claims. A newness sounds sensational and awaking for the rising nationalism. Lack of the real life and few stories of the past local and national activities makes a fuel to re-construct the issue freely and easily. In this sense, the border studies is just a test for the Senkaku issue discussion. How the border studies researcher can de-politicize the issue and also stop further mythologization.

Senkaku / Diaoyu

VI. Conclusion

These constructed territories act as a diplomatic tool for a state to maximize its interests in the international field. But sometimes this tool has its own path to threaten a country's interests, in turn, beyond the expected orientation. We have good examples: the Cold War history studies team, mainly based in the US, was enthusiastic about Mao Zedong's commitment to the Soviet-Sino military conflict and the Sino-US rapprochement from the late of 1960s to the early 1970s. Some argue, using documents on Mao's remarks that Mao provoked the Soviet Union in Zhenbao/Damanskii Island and caused the border conflict artificially to engage the US. From the vantage point of border studies, this hypothesis sounds naive. Because official records clarify the long historical debates over the 3,000 kilometer border river disputes. The Zhenbao issue was the tip of the iceberg, and many challenges over the serious deep confrontation between the two countries were hidden. When you imagine the huge cost that China was obliged to pay for the provocation (total conflict along the whole borderlands, sacrifices of soldiers and Soviet threats of nuclear attacks and so on), a conflict in the borderlands could have endangered the existence of China itself.

The current thinking of the leaders in East Asia may be similar with thinking of a Cold War historian who constructed the border artificially and regarded it as a tool for diplomacy. People should recognize where this thinking leads us: victimization of people in the borderlands, loss of territories and catastrophic results for nations. No Chinese, no Koreans, no Japanese would ever come out a winner in this game.

Dynamism of Trans-boundarization: From the Perspective of Critical Regionalism

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I. Introduction

In the year of 2014 marking the 100th anniversary of the outbreak of World War I, the 110th anniversary of the Russo-Japanese War, and the 120th anniversary of the First Sino-Japanese War, concerns over East Asia spring up here and there all over the world. One representative example is the recent comment by Henry Kissinger, saying "Asia today is like 19th-century Europe," and "the specter of war is wandering around Asia."[1] The prevailing and ever-intensifying climate of mistrust and confrontation in East Asia amplifies the anxiety that such apprehensions over the region may not turn out simply ungrounded.

East Asia faces mounting issues such as a wide range of political/military/security conflicts as well as historical/territorial nationalism disputes; for example, new US-China bipolar system structuralized under the neologism of 'New Type of Great Power Relations; Chinese hegemony aggressively emerging in this new paradigm; Japan's explicit rightward drift; Korean Peninsula under the threat of 4th Nuclear test etc. As for territorial disputes where historical awareness issue and reckoning with past wrongs overlap each other, the Russo-Japanese talks on 4 Kuril islands have reached a deadlock, the Korea-Japan conflict over Dokdo(Takesima), and the Sino-Japanese conflict over Senkaku islands (Diàoyúdǎo) have been escalating with tensions on the brink of boiling. Kissinger's concern over the

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[1] Kissinger's statement was made in the Global Security Conference in Munchen 1, Feb. 2014. Jung, Wook-Sik, "The Specter of War wandering around North East Asia, The Future of Korea?" Pressian, Feb. 11, 2014.

possibility of a 'contemporary version of the Sino-Japanese War' speaks volumes about how high tensions are in the region.

Furthermore, Russia's intervention in Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea give a sense of déjà vu with the nightmares of World War I and the Russo-Japanese War, and even the Cold War trauma all piled up on each other. The shared historic fate of Crimea and the Korean Peninsula in the journey of Russia's imperialist expanding to the south and to the west, the mistaken perception that the current turmoil in Ukraine is a consequence of denuclearization, and its negative impact on the North Korean nuclear crisis, this all constitute narratives completing a "story of two peninsulas."[2] The recent US-led Korea-US-Japan summit in Hague was interpreted as a move initiated against the current backdrop of crisis in Crimea.[3] If this analysis is any guide, the aggravating Russia-US relationship in the current US-China rivalry could cause a new Cold war structure where the Korea-US-Japan and the North Korea-China-Russia powers would be locked in confrontations and standoffs, which could even lead up to a possibility that the post-Cold War would be replaced with an inter-Cold War; a state in between the Cold War and a new-Cold War. [4]

As such, the ever-intensifying crisis in the East Asian region unfolds in sharp contrast with the ever-growing economic cooperation and cultural exchange in East Asia. The term 'Asia Paradox' is loaded with such overtones, and it is directly related to the issue of East Asian 'regionalism'. East Asian regionalism, which emerged in the process of rebuilding a new world order in the post-Cold War era, in particular, in an attempt for Asia to respond to global capitalism after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, has been widely spread not only in the sphere of economic cooperation but also in the political, security, energy, environmental and cultural sectors. It does not just refer to the limited context of top-down regionalism. Rather, in the realm of humanities and cultural studies, critical regionalism, more specifically, 'East Asia Discourses' as alternative discourses to overcome the threats and limitations of globalization have been actively presented, particularly in Korea. Nevertheless, the reality in East Asia only shows that such discourses co-exist with the extreme statism and they are simply powerless in easing extreme confrontation, isolation, and conflict between nation-states.

2) Georgy Toloraya, the Director of Korean Peninsula Program at the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Article titled "A Tale of Two Peninsulas: How will the Crimean Crisis Affect Korea?" 38 North, March 13, 2014.Georgy Toloraya)Gggggg
3) "Korea-US-Japan Trilateral Summit, its Background and Agenda", Yonhap News, Mar. 21, 2014; Lee Soo-Hoon, The Era of Northeast Asia, "Park, Geun Hye's Suggestion in Dresden, Lack of Awareness about North Korea", Pressian, Apr.2, 2014
4) D. Trenin, "The Meaning of the Crimea Crisis" Carnegie Moscow Center, 19 March, 2014.

This paper, with an aim to find a clue to the understanding of a abovementioned paradoxical reality, intends to theoretically examine the paradox of globalization itself as well as the characteristics, differences, and limitations of regionalism and critical regionalism closely tied to globalization, specifically, focusing on the concept 'boundary'. It is because the nature of the current crisis in East Asia is intertwined with the classic modern boundaries involving nation-states, nations, and territories, and also both globalization and regionalism represent the re-structuring of boundaries. Thus, the Chapter 2 of the paper is to delve into the ambivalence of globalization in the context of the ambivalence of boundary itself, using de-boudarization, re-boudarization and trans-boundarization as key words. Also, it is to explore the characteristics and differences of regionalism and critical regionalism in Chapter 3, and the essence and limitations of critical regionalism in Korea in Chapter 4, finally the meaning of trans-boundarization in the peace making process of Korean Peninsula and East Asia in conclusion.

II. Globalization as Trans-boundarization

General function of boundaries are divided into the following two aspects; One, as a fixed barrier that demarcates and differentiates between inside and outside, self and other; the other is as a function of contact which makes inside and outside, me and other face and meet each other for the first time. While the former is closely related to the 'identification' thinking which excludes the outside and others to affirm the identity of the inside of boundary, the latter provides the possibility of 'dis-identification' through dislocation of the value-hierarchy between self and other. Boundary, as said, is a concept that allows two mutually-exclusive moments such as exclusion vs. inclusion, and identification vs. dis-identification to coexist within itself. That is, it can be said that the possibility of self-negation is internalized in the concept of boundary itself. Thereby, the perception of boundaries should first begin with understanding of the "boundary's distinctive feature; ambivalence,"…which "constitutes the institutional fixed points of identities, at the same time, forms points where such identities become uncertain… and need to be redefined."[5] The understanding of boundaries' ambivalence enables the correct understanding of globalization, that is, understanding of globalization not as a phenomenon of de-boundarization where existing boundaries are eliminated or cancelled, but as a phenomenon of

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5) Étienne Balibar, "Identity/Normality", <We, the people of Europe?>, translated by Jin Tae-won, Humanitas 2010, p.74

trans-boundarization where de-boundarization and re-boundarization ambivalently coexist, constantly replacing with each other.

In fact, the understandings of boundaries have been locked in either one of the two aforementioned moments so far. For example, the process of modernization, which was marked by structuralization of countless demarcations, such as nations, nation-states, borders, races, and genders etc., has continuously promoted the representation of boundaries as an 'excluding barrier.' On the other hand, in the 21st century, the reality of globalization full of chances for free-flow, mobility, and crossing has been constantly encouraging imagination about boundaries as a moment of contact. In particular, this momentum is maximally reproduced through the "borderless world thesis"[6] which has completely wiped out the boundary's barrier function.

This trend has a great deal to do with the 'spatial turn', a much talked-about reference to the characteristics of the globalization era. The 'spatial turn' mainly refers to 'the reduction of spatial distance and the reinforcement of interconnectedness and simultaneity of the world', generated by the phenomenal advances of communication methods and information revolution, such as mass media boom, emergence of the Internet, and SNS, etc.[7] It is not a coincidence that various theories on globalization are filled with similar concepts such as 'technical invalidation of spatial distance'' (Bauman), 'sublation of distance and borders'' (Beck), and "compression of world" (Robertson). [8] Meanwhile, when viewed from an in-depth perspective, the spatial turn denotes the birth of a complete new sense of space; in other words, it refers to spatial subversion of the modern perception of the world which has been built around linear temporality like evolution and progress. The essence of the spatial turn is the extinction of space as a 'container', that is, destruction of automatic associations made between traditional spatial concepts such as a 'border', a 'territory' or a 'region' and

6)G. Popescu, "Producing Global Border Spaces," in Bodering and Ordering in the Twenty-first Century, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012, p. 72-73

7)As for spatial turn, M. Middell & K. Naumann, "Global history and the spatial turn: from the impact of area studies to the study of critical junctures of globalization," Refer to Journal of Global History (2010) 5, pp. 154-156; O. Kessler and J. Helmig, "Of Systems, Boundaries, and Regionalism," Geopolitics 12(4), 2007, pp. 574-575; C. Rumford, "Theorizing Borders," European Journal of Social Theory 9(2), 2006, pp. 160, 166.

8)Bauman, Zygmunt, <Globalization, The Human Consequences>, translated by Kim Dong-taek , Seoul: Hangilsa,, 2003, p. 15; Beck, Ulrich <Was ist Globalisierung>, translated by Cho Man-young, Seoul: Keorum, 2000, p. 76; R. Robertson, "Glocalization: Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity," in M. Featherstone, S. Lash and R. Robertson eds. Global Modernities, London, Thousand Oak, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1995, p. 35.

the community or identity categories represented by nations or nation-states etc. A key to the spatial turn is to "recognize the constructed nature of space, acknowledge the simultaneity of various spatial frameworks," and to decentralize "any form of centrism" well illustrated by nationalism, or statism.[9] An epistemic/value-driven turn derived from the spatial turn leads up to a wide range of discourses on running-away from modern boundaries, free flows and crossings 'between' such boundaries, and cultural plurality and differences arising therefrom. As a result, the image of boundaries newly established in this era of globalization is not the one of a passive rear line that cuts and blocks the flows, but takes the form of an active front line that allows contacts and encounters across borders, thereby highlights the de-boundarization feature of globalization. "Globalization is indeed essentially border-crossing, the breach of boundaries," thus, the assertion that any borders which have ceased to hold their constructive qualities differentiating the inside from the outside are no longer meaningful in this era of globalization,[10] would make valid sense in the logic that the extinction of space leads to the overcoming of boundaries.

The approach of understanding globalization as a de-boundarizing mechanism, as stated above, has enough theoretical and real grounds. However, such perception shall be combined with another dimension of understanding which perceives globalization as re-boundarization. Otherwise, we would not be able to understand the paradox asserted by many border researchers, more specifically, a renaissance in border studies prompted by globalization, or the recent intellectual enthusiasm about boundaries.[11] This, on the one hand, has much to do with the aforementioned ambivalence of boundaries; while, on the other hand, it is deeply related to the ambivalence of globalization.

As described before, globalization which is drawn on a totally new spatial sense, calls for a cultural diversity through the intersecting and crossing and a new sensibility towards 'differences'. However, as seen from the word formation of globalization, the assumed universality of the 'globe' and the process of homogenization implicitly indicated by '-ization' already implies that behind the postmodern appearance of dissimilation and differences there still exists an orientation for the assimilation towards something universal. Fukuyama's 'The End of History', or a thesis titled 'Capitalism without

9)M. Middell & K. Naumann, "Global history and the spatial turn," p.155.
10)Galli. Re-quoted by Mark B. Salter in "Theory of the /: The Suture and Critical Border Studies," Geopolitics 17, 2012, pp. 748-750
11)David Newman, "Borders and Bordering," European Journal of Social Theory 9(2), 2006, p. 171-172; Anssi Paasi, "Generation and the Development of Border Studies," Geopolitics, 10, 2005, p. 665

the Outside,' more specifically, all the affirmations on structures completed both at the spatial and temporal level are the discourses that thrive upon the homogenizing process of globalization. Thus, it can be said that the era of globalization is a time when the representation of exclusive boundaries appears weaker than ever, due to the phenomenal advancement of communication technologies as well as the fast flow and crossing of capital, labor, and information; but at the same time, a more in-depth look into the globalized era reveals that it presupposes a completed super-structure bigger than ever. The building of such super-structure, more specifically, the process of homogenizing, standardizing and integrating by global capital, which is referred to as a major re-boundarizing mechanism, further strengthens the similarities among elements that constitute the structure itself, while each and every element of the structure is distributed with its own difference as well in the name of multi-cultural coexistence. The sharp criticism, which argues that the 'cosmopolitanism of differences' promoted by globalization is nothing short of a strategy designed for a monolithic reorganization by global capital, and the slogan for 'multi-cultural tolerance' is only intended to cover up the process where the homogenizing mechanism of global capitalism violently wipes out meaningful differences, is indeed aimed at this kind of paradox of globalization.[12]

Further, the process of distributing and managing differences does produce lots of boundaries of discrimination and exclusion inside the structure of global capitalism. As explained by E. Balibar citing refugees, illegal aliens, and denationalized migrants, these internalized boundaries, which are transferred through the mechanism of 'inclusive exclusion' to the inside from the outside, to the center of public space from its edge construct an invisible boundary that exists 'everywhere but nowhere.' The "new ubiquity of boundaries" and the consequent "global Apartheid" place the "democratization of borders" at the center of "the reinvention of politics in the context of globalization."[13]

Meanwhile, the ambivalent duality of globalization is visualized in a more concrete form in 'the extinction of space.' Bauman asserts that the invalidation of spatial distance, which is an indispensible condition for globalization, often creates a polarization between a new global humanity free from

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12)Examples of this criticism; F. Jameson, "Notes on Globalization as a Philosophical Issue," in F. Jameson and M. Miyoshi eds., The Culture of Globalization, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1988, pp. 55-58; Slavoj Žižek , <Did somebody say Totalitarianism?>, translated by Han Bo-hee, Seoul: Saemulgyul, 2008; Žižek , Badiou, Eagleton et al, < Lenin Reloaded : Toward a Politics of Truth>, translated by Lee Hyunwoo, Seoul: Mati, 2010.

13)Étienne Balibar, "Borders of the World, Boundaries of Politics," <We, the People of Europe?>, pp. 217-226 Étienne Balibar, "What is Boundary?", <The Fear of the Masses>, translated by Choi Won/Seo Kwanmo, b-book, 2007, p.445-457

spatiality and those who are alienated from it, thereby, more constrained by spatiality than ever. The lack of communication between the two poles, and the sense of alienation and deprivation felt by the latter who are left out as 'wasted lives' weeded out by globalization are at times radicalized into fundamentalism and new ethnicism, which is the fact notably illustrated by ethnic disputes and terrorism occurring more frequently in the twenty-first century. This all bespeaks the return of space, furthermore, the reinforcement of space, not the extinction of space/distance.[14] It is not a coincidence that nationalism is often talked about as the only meta-discourse that has survived in the era of globalization, and as its paradoxical companion.

After all, the re-boundarization phenomena of globalization, that is, the establishment of a global capitalism system, lack of outside and other, internalization and infiltration of boundaries in all layers of society, the return of identity categories such as nations/races/ religions, and the reinforcement of security function of borders against the globalization of terrorism (referred to by Newman as "a battle of globalization versus globalization"[15]), have all reached a whole new level, so much so that it can be even called an "explosion of boundaries." A more notable fact here is that such re-boundarization is plugged into the aforementioned process of de-boundarization– i.e. the innovation and pluralization of forms of boundaries which are distinctly differentiated from traditional boundaries(non-territorial/non-visual/virtual/networked boundaries), thereby, fundamentally changing the meanings and functions of boundaries and preserving vitality of boundary issues in the era of globalization, too. In this vein, the 'battle of globalization vs. globalization' can be understood as a mutually-constitutive tension between ambivalent moments of globalization, more specifically, between de-boundarization and re-boundarization moments.

As stated above, globalization is a process of heterogenization based on contact and flow, but at the same time the process of homogenization towards a center that is much bigger than during the modern era. In other words, the era of globalization is a time when the interconnectedness of the world gets stronger than ever due to the invalidation of space, fundamentally threatening the substantiality of modern boundaries such as nation-states, but at the same time it is a time when

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14)Baumann, <Globalization: The Human Consequences>, p. 61; < Wasted Lives: Modernity and its Outcasts >, translated by Jung Il-jun, Seoul: Saemulgyul, 2008, pp. 119-170.
15)David Newman, "Borders and Bordering," p. 182

polarization and lack of communication go to extremes, thereby various boundary categories are newly called to secure an exclusive space for this asserted identity. Globalization allows seemingly conflicting, but self-explanatory moments to ambivalently coexist, and that's why globalization is intended to be portrayed as a trans-boundarization mechanism which represents ceaseless inter-determination between de-boundarization and re-boundarization. More fundamentally, it is closely related to the abovementioned ambivalence of boundary itself, thereby it can be said that the trans-boundarization takes on self-negating dynamism of boundary which has already internalized a de-boundarizing moment as its very nature. As highlighted, globalization is a two-way process of activating the moments of boundaries, more specifically, it is a process where 'escape' from and 'return' to the existing boundaries, and where the dislocation of modern structures and their postmodern relocation occur all at the same time, 'de-boundarization' and 're-boundarization' set each other off, cut each other off, and contradictorily coexist. In this sense it can be asserted that 'Asian paradox' is not a peculiar only to Asia feature, but commonly originated from the paradox of globalization itself.

III. Regionalism and Critical Regionalism as Trans-boundarization

1. Regionalism as Trans-Boundarization

The emerging regionalism highlighted by the EU in Europe, NAFTA and MERCOSUR in the Americas, ASEAN and EAS in East Asia, and the EAU plan in Russia and Central Asia has established itself as "one of the most visible new structural patterns of the contemporary post-national constellations."[16] Regionalism in general refers to a state-led top-down form of regional cooperation and integration. The biggest controversy over regionalism is whether it is a bulwark or a reaction against the globalization, or a natural part of process that facilitates and complements globalization. [17] A more realistic understanding of regionalism would be that it inherently requires both elements stated hereinbefore. More importantly, such kind of contradictory interdependency between

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16)O. Kessler and J. Helmig, "Of Systems, Boundaries, and Regionalism," p. 570.

17)R. Vayrynen, "Regionalism: Old and New," International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Mar., 2003), pp. 25-51; Adam Lupel, "Regionalism and Globalization: Post-Nation or Extended Nation?" Polity, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Jan., 2004), pp. 153-174; Yoo Ho-Guen, "The Paradox of Globalization: Coexistence and Deepening of Regionalism", The Korean Journal of Area Studies Vol.28, Issue3 (2010), pp. 85-103.

regionalism and globalization provides a basis upon which regionalism shares the trans-boundarizing characteristics of globalization.

The concept of 'region' in regionalism refers to a transnational unit, or a macro-space that exists in between nation-state and the globe, or global systems. So, the inherent trans-boundarizing tension in regionalism can be said to have its roots in the contradictory interconnectedness between nation-states and globalization.[18] Regionalism, on the one hand, has a de-boundarizing moment as it opens up the traditional nation-states, which are currently experiencing a serious functional and status crisis due to the global flows of capital/people/information, to a much broader spatial realm; But, on the other hand, regionalism also bears a re-boundarizing aspect as it offers a new unit enabling effective response to the neoliberal expansion of global capital.

Important is the fact that in the process of establishing regionalism, a so-called top-down political project, nation-states strategically make use of both de-boundarizing and re-boundarizing moments immanent in regionalism. In fact although the logic of transnational globalization and the function of traditional nation-states conflict with each other at first glance, relationship between them manifested in reality can never be explained by such a simplistic binary opposition. It is especially all the more so, given that globalization has not just a de-boundarizing moment but also has a strong re-boundarization-oriented aspect.

Nation-states are not only actively involved in globalization, but also take active lead in its whole process through modification of their sovereignty/governance type and diversification of their function and intervention patterns.[19] Regionalism is one of classic examples of their active involvement and these activities are realized in none other than the process of their strategic control of de-/re-boundarizing moments. One of its representative examples is constant negotiation led by nation-states for the delimitation of region itself. Nation states, in some cases depending on their political, economic, and security agenda, constantly disrupt and change regional boundary(de-boundarizing element); yet in other cases, they demand a solid boundary of region for identity

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18)R. Vayrynen, "Regionalism: Old and New," International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Mar., 2003), pp. 25-51; Adam Lupel, "Regionalism and Globalization: Post-Nation or Extended Nation?" Polity, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Jan., 2004), pp. 153-174; Yoo Ho-Guen, "The Paradox of Globalization: Coexistence and Deepening of Regionalism", The Korean Journal of Area Studies Vol.28, Issue3 (2010), pp. 85-103.
19)David Newman, "Borders and Bordering," p. 182

competition(re-boundarizing element). As such, the nation-states' strategic control over the de-boundarizing/re-boundarizing moments inherent in regionalism draws an unpredictable trajectory, as it clashes or competes with the de-boundarizing/re-boundarizing mechanisms of globalization.

But yet, or as a result of that, there is still a possibility that regionalism can be transformed into a form of reinforced statism, or extended statism of a particular nation-state that constitutes the region. A recent hegemonic discord over a region between US-led TPP (Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership) and China-led RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) is one good example of that. [20] In a case of this kind, regionalism functions as a unit that serves collaboration and cooperation between global capitalism and nations-states. Perhaps, this may be what the policy-driven practical regionalism ultimately pursues as its prime goal, as it aims for the ultimate enhancement of national interests in this changing international environment. And this, in turn, makes a value judgment of regionalism difficult. But what is clear is, for the top-down regionalism, it is not unusual to see the case of suppression of ambivalent dynamism between de-/re-boundarization through the particular political mechanism, more specifically, domination of re-boundarizing moment over re-boundarizing moment seen in the abovementioned example of 'reinforced/extended statism'.

2. Critical Regionalism as Trans-Boundarization

Unlike the top-down regionalism, in case where regionalism is suggested as an alternative discourse taking a critical view of the contradictory reality of globalization and aiming to overcome the globalization-derived threats and limitations, at stake is keeping the ambivalent tension between de- and re-boundarization and maintaining critical distance for that. This is exactly why that kind of regionalism brought up in the realm of 'humanities' or 'cultural studies', inside and outside of Korea, often emerges wrapped in the concept of 'critical' regionalism. Like policy-oriented pragmatic regionalism, critical regionalism also starts with recognition of and in response to the reality of globalization. They also share the fact that both contain the two facets of de- and re-boundarization. But what distinguishes critical regionalism, which contains various forms of discourse, is that it is centered around critical

20)David Newman, "Borders and Bordering," p. 182

reflection on historical processes surrounding the signification of a region and its political mechanisms.[21]

The regionalism which critical regionalism pursues, postulates a 'specific region' as a 'practical' unit that constantly disrupts and blocks the unlimited expansion of global capital and the rhetoric of free flows(re-boundarizing moment), while it tries to prevent a region from becoming a new exclusive boundary without demanding an invariably fixed regional identity, but rather to be opened towards a space of solidarity where the true differences and plurality are realized amid much reinforced contacts and exchanges(de-boundarizing moment). The crux of the matter in critical regionalism is to guard constantly against possible politicization of a specific region due to some political, economic, military and cultural interests, or a degeneration of it into extended statism or petit-imperialism by privileging a specific region based on an exclusive regional identity. Eventually it can be said that the essence of critical regionalism lies in a critical overcoming of the possible limitations of the existing regionalism.

Classic examples of critical regionalism overseas are the discourse on Europe by Balibar, a 'Philosopher of Border' and 'critical regionalism' by G. Spivak, a post-colonial thinker. First, Balibar's criticism is directed at the European Union, the most popular brand representing the global megatrend regionalism. Balibar, as a European intellectual, takes a critical stance otherizing and de-constructing euro-centrism and denotes that the process of establishing the European Union is no different at all from that of institutionalizing European racism. European citizenship, more specifically, the right to appeal to European Courts which is the higher than each member state's national court, the right to vote, international status as European citizens, and the right to enjoy common socio-cultural services, is in fact institutionalized as something additional to national citizenship of each EU member state. What this means to EU member states' citizen is the rights to broadened protection and recognition that surpass nation-states' national borders; however, to those immigrants from non-EU

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21)Scholars who assert critical regionalism (or its equivalent) in and outside of the country are ChangBi East Asia Discourse scholars including Baek, Yeong-Seo and Choi, Won-Sik, Marukawa Tetsushi of Japan, E. Balibar and J. Habermas(democratic regionalism) of Europe, G. Spivak and A. Dirlik as post-colonial theorists, R. Wilson and P. Jay as area studies researchers etc. Baek, Yeong-Seo, "Is there an 'Asia' in China?>, Jeong Mun-Gil, Choi, Won-Sik (eds.)," <East Asia, as a Discovery>, Seoul: Moonji Publishing, 2000, p. 71; M. Tetsushi, <Regionalism: Cultural geopolitics of East Asia >, p. 8; Étienne Balibar, <We, the People of Europe?>; J. Habermas, The Postnational Constellation, trans. Max Pensky, Cambridge, MA: MIT PRess, 2001; Gayatri Spivak, <Other Asias>, Translated by Tae, Hae-sook, Seoul: ulyuck 2011; Arif Dirlik < Waking to Global Capitalism >, Translated, Seoul: ChangBi Publishers, 1998, pp. 136-147; Rob Wilson, "Imaging Asia-Pacific" "Today: Forgetting Colonialism in the Magical Free Markets of the American Pacific" in Learning Places: The Afterlives of Area Studies, eds. M.asao Miyoshi & H. D. Harootunian, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2002, p. 248; Paul Jay, "Locating Disciplinary Change: The Afterlives of Area and International Studies in the Age of Globalization," American Literary History 18.1 (2006), p. 179.

member European states or non-European countries, this implies that the possibility of exclusion and deprivation has been doubly tightened. These internalized boundaries of discrimination and exclusion that proliferate on the hidden side of the fictional image of European universality are something that seriously threat the future of Europe as a democratic polity, yet at the same time those internal boundaries suggest the necessity of "the reinvention of politics" for a new political project called "democratization of borders" in the era of globalization.[22]

What Balibar suggests as one of the methods for the reinvention of politics is to think of Europe as a borderline (or borderland)" and "Europe as a vanishing mediator."[23] According to him, there is no absolute boundary between Europe and its outside, that is because Europe itself is a borderline representing the superposition of heterogeneous borders. Thereby, "no European "identity" can be opposed to others in the world," "Europe is everywhere outside Europe," and "there is no Europe anymore in this sense." [24] Yet at the same time, Europe has its own roles to play in the creation of 'democratic surplus' beyond nation-states, in the emergence of a new political culture in the era of globalization. In an effort to solve this aporia, that is, contradiction between the emphasis of 'European' roles and the negation of 'European' identity, Balibar borrows a figure of 'vanishing mediator'. More specifically, Balibar has postulated the following roles of Europe as vanishing mediator: Europe as a newly emerging polity in the era of globalization uses its current fragility, indeterminacy and transitory character as a mediation that facilitates the emergence of a newer and more democratic political possibility; Europe offers itself as a instrument that can be used by the world's other forces for their political transformations; and finally Europe "creates therefore the conditions for its own suppression and withering away."[25] Although Balibar has not directly used the term 'critical regionalism', he constantly de-substantializes Eurocentrism, and at the same time newly calls Europe as a political subject enabling the democratization of borders. This is why his discourse on Europe can be said to share the dynamism of trans-boundarization inherent in critical regionalism.

Next, in case of Spivak, she also suggests critical regionalism as a solution to issues arising out of post-statism in the era of globalization. She considers today's regionalism as resistance against US-led form of globalization and its regional projection as well. As a method to save regions from their collusive relationship with global capitalism, she calls for the need to imagine regions as a "total set

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22) Balibar, <We, the People of Europe?>, pp. 204-241; Balibar, "Boundaries of Europe", <The Fear of the Masses>, pp. 459-477
23) E. Balibar, "Europe, Vanishing Mediator," We, the People of Europe?: Reflections on Transnational Citizenship, trans., J. Swenson, Princeton and London: Princeton University Press, 2004, p. 219, 203. This chapter is available in Eng. Version only.
24) E. Balibar, "Europe, Vanishing Mediator," p. 219; Balibar, "Borders of Europe", p. 477.
25) E. Balibar, "Europe, Vanishing Mediator," p. 219; Balibar, "Borders of Europe", p. 477.

of fluid stances which do not have their own identities." In particular, Asia, a name that "jubilates the absence of a naturalized homogeneous identity," is the most-fitting subject for critical regionalism as a "shifter".[26] It resonates with Spivak's post-colonial positions, because the essence of post-colonialism is to reveal the violence of homogeneity which the West forced upon non-West. This is not just a matter of the past. What Spivak is most cautious about is the possibility of a new Orientalism-driven arrangement which post-colonialism itself could generate. In other words, she is concerned about a risk that the voice of 'the Others' which are restored by post-colonial approach could be fixed as one of plural voices advocated by global capitalism, thereby, they could help complete and justify a neo-colonial arrangement. By the same token, she criticizes the EU for its Eurocentrism disguised as cosmopolitanism. Facing such threats of the past and present, Spivak calls for the need to pluralize Asia incessantly, such as East Asia, Southwest Asia, and Central Asia, in other words, Asia 'as is known to them', furthermore, 'as is known to us'.

For Spivak, however, Asia is a space for dis-identification which refuses a fixed identity, at the same time, a subjectification unit for practical action. To actualize solidarity for justice what is indispensable is a structure of sharing, such as 'shared law, shared education, shared health, and shared welfare' etc. For that Spivak emphasizes "re-invention of nation-states", which is no different from a new political framework that can be brought in by critical regionalism. More specifically, "Critical regionalism is a mechanism that enables us to rectify practical constitutional injustice, as it works above or below nationalism and maintains an abstract structure similar to that of nation-states."[27]

And to conclude, like Balibar's discourse on Europe (critical Europeanism(?)), the essence of Spivak's critical Asianism also lies in tensions between de-subjectification "as a negation of fixed identity" and (re-)subjectification for practical action, that is, between de- and re-boundarization. Even though Balibar and Spivak have different philosophical backgrounds and speculate about completely different space, the commonality that Balibar and Spivak share - which is manifested even in conceptual similarities such as 'reinvention of politics,' 'reinvention of nation-states,' 'vanishing mediator,' and 'shifter'- is not something completely irrelevant to critical reflexivity which maximizes the self-negating dynamism of boundaries.

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26)Spivak, <Other Asias>, pp. 9-28,365-390. Quotes, p. 371, p. 22, p. 366 in order. In the Korean version, 'critical regionalism' is translated as critical '권역주의'; revised herein as critical '지역주의'
27)Judith Butler Gayatri Spivak, <Who sings the Nation-state>, Translated by Joo Hae-Yeon, San-Chaek-Ja, 2007, p. 76, 91.

IV. Critical Regionalism in Korea

The embodiment of critical regionalism in Korea, even further in East Asia requires particularly specific conditions, when compared with Balibar's Europe discourse and even with Spivak's critical Asianim. That's because of the historic particularity of regionalism in East Asia which was under double constraints derived from double layers of conflicts; one between the West and Asia, the other between Asia and Asia. During the formative period of modernity in East Asia, the binary opposition between the West and Asia turned into a mechanism that simply enabled the justification of logic of invasive Asian integration, that is, the postcolonial cause was artfully transposed into the colonial logic. The experience of catastrophe generated by these two processes did discourage not only such markedly imperialistic projects as 'East Asian Cooperativism' or 'The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,' but also any form of Asianism. Critical regionalism in East Asia needs to break out of such 'dual traps'; on the one hand is the most fundamental opposition between the West and Asia, and on the other hand is various types of hostility that accretes with opposition to the West and proliferates to the inside of Asia. In this vein, it is important for critical regionalism in East Asia to maintain the critical distance from the abovementioned limitations of regionalism, i.e. the degeneration of regionalism into reinforced/ extended statism, or regionalism deemed as a demand for fixed regional identity and thereby being blocked.

In Korea since the 1990s, a wide range of East Asia discourses have emerged with strong momentum, so much so that the phenomenon was even called an academic boom. It was mainly caused by a combination of multiple factors; the need for a renewed understanding of East Asian Economic Model, even further Asian civilizations, and their values in the wake of 'Asia's rise'; the need for a regional-level response to the paradigm shift driven by the end of the Cold War and the globalization of capitalism; and the inevitability to explore a new alternative discourse in connection with the collapse of Socialism and the rise of postmodern theories. The way that East Asia Discourses in Korea are categorized is closely related to the elements stated above, and they are classified into three categories, though may vary slightly depending on who does categorization. The first is Asian-values discourse which diagnoses and forecasts the development and crises of East Asia from the perspective of values and those falling in this category are Confucian capitalism discourses, Asian democracy discourses, and East Asian civilization discourses etc. The second category is represented by a broad

range of discourses on East Asia/ Northeast Asia Community such as theories on regional political and economic integration in response to globalization. In the last category is East Asia discourse representing those transformative alternative discourses that transcend nationalism and statism. The East Asia Discourse put forward by intellectuals from the <Changjak kwa Bipyeong> comes under this category.[28]

The question here is whether or not these three groups of East Asia discourses can be considered critical regionalism, and the answer depends on what nature of reflexive distance they maintain from the so-called 'dual traps' mentioned hereinbefore. When viewed in this light, those discourses on Asian-values and East Asian regional integration should be inevitably excluded from debates. That's because Confucian capitalism discourses, Confucian democracy discourses, and East Asian civilization discourses all start from the assumption of (East) Asianness as a feature up against the West. Thereby, they represent a sort of 'self-orientalism' or 'reverse orientalism', as Dirlik pointed out, which is far from being free of the West vs. Asia dichotomy, rather paradoxically reinforces it, at the same time, inherently bears a risk of privileging East Asia.[29] With respect to 'East Asian regional integration discourses', they also should be excluded, because they share the same risk of Asian-values discourses, at the same time, they do not count reflexivity about (East) Asianness as a crucial element due to their practical/policy-driven nature with much of their focuses placed on politics and economy.

The *ChangBi* 's Discourse on East Asia is distinguished from abovementioned two types because it maintains that "East Asia should be regarded not as something of fixed substance but as something constantly fluid in the midst of self-reflection". It essentially aims at "urging people to clearly recognize the role of East Asia as mediation between the global capitalistic system and…nation-states" in "a pursuit to be engaged in the transformation of global capitalism". [30] The reason that such idea can be distinguished from expansion of statism or privileged East Asia is because "(it) is not something intended to criticize the existing centrism and build a new center in its place, but its essence is to totally disintegrate centrism itself and adjust the balance point out of center or between

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28) Classification of East Asia Discourses in Korea after the 1990s: Lim, Woo-kyeong, "Development of Korea's East Asia Discourse as Critical Regionalism", < Chinese Modern Literature > No.40 (2007), pp. 1-7; Jang, In-sung, "'East Asia Discourse in Korea and East Asian Identity", <World Politics > Vol. 26, No. 2 (2005), pp. 6-7; Park, Seung-woo, "Discourses on East Asian Regionalism and East Asian Identity", <East Asian Studies>, No. 54 (2008), p. 22-34.
29) Dirlik, Arif, "Politics of East Asian Identity", <East Asia, as a Discovery>, Translated by Kim, Soo-Young, pp. 82, 94-112 .
30) Baek Yeong-Seo, "Is there an 'Asia' in China?" : "Perspective of Koreans", <East Asia as a Discovery>, Munji Publishing, 2000, p. 58, 71 in order.

centers."[31] Their claims on East Asia not as something with its unchanging essence, but "as an intellectual experiment," "as a discovery," or even further "as a realization" which communes with a concrete life-world, are all based on this.

Such claims enable us to confirm that ChangBi Discourse on East Asia does share the general trans-boundarizing dynamism of critical regionalism in principle. The ChangBi Discourse basically aims to open up the existing nation-states to a broader space of East Asia where active communication and exchanges constantly take place, thereby overcoming the limitations of nationalism and statism (de-boundarizing element), while at the same time conceptualizing East Asia, thereby such type of de-boundarizing expansion is not dissolved in the abstract space of globalism and secures its own historical context and practical foundation (re-boundarizing element). This kind of trans-boundarizing 'ambivalence' is something that exactly corresponds with the structure of "'dual tasks'; adapting to and overcoming modernity," which originated from Baek, Nak-Cheong's Division-System theory and runs through the ChangBi East Asia Discourse.

Yet, in spite of not a few productive results ChangBi 's East Asia Discourse its detailed developing process gives an impression that it remains nothing short of an idea for 'inter'-national relationship, rather than an idea for a 'trans'-national space of Asia. More specifically, in spite of its process of diversifying discourse objects (reconfiguration of "core sites" such as Taiwan, Okinawa and Gae-sung) and reinforcing the viewpoints(represented by "dual peripheral perspective"), East Asia as represented in its concrete theorization is just seen as the sum of existing state-units dominated by Korea, China and Japan being at the center, not as a new unit that goes beyond nation-state (and its limitations).
In this vein, it is necessary to pay attention to the following assertion by Baek, Yeong-Seo, one of the advocates for the ChangBi Discourse. While he accepts what it means to regard 'region' as something constituted, he asserts that "when it comes to East Asia, if not whole Asia," "there must be something that can even be called substance." [32] But, this directly conflicts with his earlier assertion which stressed the need for a discourse "entirely different from one that views East Asia as some kind of

31)Choi, Won-Sik, "Alternative originated in Korea or in East Asia?" < Post-imperial East Asia>, Seoul: ChangBi Publishers, 2009, p. 279.
32)Baek Yeong-Seo <Re-evaluation of East Asia in Core Areas>, p. 29. Revised abstract of "What it means to see East Asia from Peripheries", (<East Asia seen from the Peripheries>) published in 2004). The phrase "<When it comes to East Asia… there seems to be something which can even be called substance" in the 2004 thesis was revised in 2013 to "…There must be something that can even be called substance"

substance".[33] And a majority of elements he asserts as bases for substantiality ('common cultural heritage or continuous regional exchanges' etc) are the most conventional constituents of conventional discourses on regional identity which, in fact, 'criticism' in critical regionalism should be directed at (cultural kinship (like Chinese characters bloc/Confucianism), and geographic proximity etc). If these are viewed as valid grounds, there would be no reason to deny substantiality of Asia as a whole.

Of course, the assertions of this kind on East Asia's substantiality originate from the need for critical responses to concrete circumstances, not for privileging East Asia. He asserts that the perspective of viewing East Asia as something constituted needs to be revisited "because such perspective may cause a passive response to historical contexts and circumstances which are related to East Asia". This can be also verified by the fact that he quotes Sun Gu's following reference, saying "There definitely exists East Asia as substance. East Asians face a stern reality where they cannot defy the US without building solidarity among themselves in this post-Cold war world"[34] in the same context. Therefore, it may be said that claim on East Asia's substantiality are closely related to one aspect of the ambivalence of critical regionalism, to the re-boundarizing element which postulates a specific region as a 'subjectification unit for practical action'.

However, given that the essence of critical regionalism lies in mutually constitutive tensions between re- and de-boundarization, re-boundarization in this context is not a process that is concluded with a defining certain substantiality, but it represents a multiplied process where it is constantly replaced with de-boundarization, and permanently defers completion to exist as substance. As it is manifested in a 'vanishing mediator' of Balibar, or 'subject as a shifter' of Spivak, this is what is referred to as the essence of self-negating dynamism of critical regionalism. In particular, any form of assertions on East Asian regional identity, or its substantiality should be an object of ceaseless self-reflection in order to prevent the possibility that the West vs. Asia conflict becomes interlocked with the Asia vs. Asia conflict resulting in its internalization, which represents the dual traps that East Asian regionalism shall overcome. That's because any claims on substantiality would lead up to assertions on its essence, which would inevitably come down to the topology of center and periphery. If the presence of abovementioned East Asianness as substance is accepted, its essence would after all become either

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33)Baek Yeong-Seo, "Is there an 'Asia' in China?" p. 58.
34)Baek, Yeong-Seo, <Re-evaluation of East Asia in Core Area>, p. 29-30.

Korea-China-Japan or a sum of its nation-state units. Even if dual periphery like Taiwan, Okinawa, or Gaesung which remain a disruption or a crack of nation-states is relocated to become a "core site", it would not completely offset such risk. Turning Taiwan which is China, but not China, or Okinawa which is Japan, but not Japan, or Gaesung whick is Korea, but not Korea into a core sites could be one way of de-centalizing the Korea-China-Japan-centered or the existing nation-state units. Yet, in deeper level, it could also be a method of completing and extending Korea-China-Japan-centered Asianness, that is, the embodiment of 'exclusive inclusion', a mirror image of 'inclusive exclusion,' confirming presence by absence, or completing the structure by revealing a crack in it.

As stated in the introduction, East Asia these days is gripped by raging historical/territorial nationalism and hegemonic statism so much so that they even overshadow the achievements and roles of critical regionalism in the region. Hence, solidarity for the response to this reality doesn't need (impossible) imaginations of (non-existent) homogeneity. The foundation for such a solidarity already exists enough in the context of practical action of imploding each country's statism, which acts as a ground for thriving hegemony, expansionism, historic/territorial nationalism etc.

The ChangBi East Asia Discourse has consistently asserted the need to overcome the limitations of statism. That is exactly what represents the essence of critical regionalism which postulates region as a unit that transcends the exclusive boundaries such as nations and nation-states, as highlighted in this paper several times. The point this chapter intends to make is that the criticism for statism referred to in the ChangBi East Asia Discourse shall be consistently applied to critical introspection about 'East Asianness'. In other words, the paradox of mobilizing East Asianness to overcome statism, or the paradox of calling another substance simply to negate one substance should never be occurred. In addition to this it should be noted, if the reflexive distance from East Asianness is not maintained, criticism for statism cannot be accomplished consistently, too. This is exactly what it means when said that a pivotal point of critical regionalism is to maintain the ambivalent tension between de-boundarization and re-boundarization, and only by preserving such a tension, the ChangBi Discourse could be 'critical' regionalism, definitely distinguished from abovementioned two types of Korean Discourse on East Asia.

V. Conclusion

The biggest accomplishment of border studies that went into full swing in the era of globalization is the rediscovery of boundary as something continually constituted by political, economic, historical, and cultural variables, not as something given or as natural entity. The latest border studies are mainly aimed at the process of constituting boundaries, the inter-determinancy between de-boundarization and re-boundarization, de-bordering and re-bordering that run through that process, and the innovation of boundary functions and meanings arising therefrom. One of the primary outcomes in the studies is a more in-depth understanding of the ambivalence of boundaries as well as the ambivalence of globalization. If a discourse is referred to as "a description of reality and at the same time a conception that drives changes to reality",[35] critical regionalism as a conception trying to change the reality of globalization makes the ambivalence of de-/re-boundarization inherent in globalization itself its own driving force for overcoming global reality. 'De-subjectification' that negates exclusive identity, and 'subjectification' for practical action; simply put, the antinomy of critical regionalism where one is a region, not being a region; and one is not a region, being a region,' is the most powerful force that can break through the paradox of globalization. Such antinomy of critical regionalism or the ambivalence of de-/re-boundarization is particularly meaningful to the Korean peninsula and East Asia, the primary space subject to East Asia discourses.

First of all, this is fundamentally related to the aforementioned issue of overcoming the dual traps which East Asian regionalism is (was) inherently confronted with. Overcoming the dual confrontations, Asia vs. Asia on top of the West vs. Asia, and performing the dual tasks of adapting to and overcoming modernity may only be enabled when transcending a certain boundary and completing it, specifically, when de-/re-boundarization continually maintain the ambivalent tensions between each other. This can be linked to a new understanding of the Asian paradox seen from a completely different angle. Admittedly, the Asian paradox is closely related to the dual traps stated above. Yet at the same time, as the Asian paradox is entangled in the paradox of globalization that allows full-scale communication/contacts as well as extreme isolation/confrontation, the Asian paradox should never be overstated or pessimistically viewed as something inherent only in Asia.

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35)Jang, In-Sung, "East Asia Discourse in Korea, East Asian Identity", p. 4.

What it means to maintain the ambivalence of de-/re-boundarization is deeply involved with the unification of the Korean peninsula. The Korean unification can no longer be rooted in the logic of restoring national homogeneity or reinstating a unitary nation-state. But yet, if any type of structure or unit of integration, irrespective of whether that is a nation or a nation-state, is totally disintegrated, unification itself would not only be impossible but unnecessary. Hence, the challenge of overcoming the division on the Korean peninsula would require a vision that is based on nation-state at the same time beyond it. Without even bringing up the need for 're'-invention of politics or 're'-invention of nation-states as noted by Balibar and Spivak, the common aspect running through the wide-ranging unification discourses in Korea, such as 'Compound States Discourse' or 'Flexible and Complex Unification theory', can be said that they are all based on the insights into the coexistence of de-/re-boundarization.

Unification of the Korean peninsula and peace in East Asia in the 21st century require transnational cooperation beyond national boundaries, and broader perspectives free from nation-states' views. Even in this process, the tensions between de-/re-boundarization are essentially required. More specifically, any de-boundarizing attempt transcending nation-states shall never be dissolved into empty space, but rather be re-boundarized into a unit of concrete action (East Asia) that ensures concreteness and historicity, yet at the same time, the unit itself shall continually become the object of de-boundarizing reflection again, dynamically altering its own boundaries, Thereby, the rich experiences which have constituted East Asia shall be overlapped with one another as multiple subjects in multiple dimensions without leaving out or limiting any meaningful subject of solidarity or without letting solidarity itself become a privileged weapon. As such, multiplied different East Asia shall constantly cause one East Asia to vanish. In particular, this is what needs to be absolutely embodied when considering numerous internalized into Asia boundaries of discrimination and exclusion in this globalized era and also when taking into account the much enhanced state status of Korea-China-Japan and apprehension for their hegemony in Asia (particularly China and Japan). This is directly linked with such issues as democracy and human rights which would become the foundation of unification on the Korean peninsula and peace in East Asia. The expansion of democracy and the enhancement of human rights that continually transcend nation-states, even further the boundaries of East Asia, can only be enabled when the 'approval' of East Asia as a unit of 'practical action' and the 'disapproval' of East Asia as a unit of 'substance' coexist.

It is indeed very challenging to bring to reality the antinomy of critical regionalism, or the ambivalent paradox of de-/re-boundarization. However, in the era of globalization when an contradiction like 'locality not based on location' is no longer contradiction, for East Asia surrounded by dual traps and dual challenges, paradox can be thought of as a means and possibility.

Part II
De-bordering and Re-bordering on the Korean Peninsula

De-Bordering Korea: Beyond the Sunshine Decade
Koen De Ceuster (Leiden University)

The Border between the South and the North, and Peace Initiative
Jin Soon Doh (Changwon National University)

Political Economy of the Borderland: The Gaesong Industrial Complex
Young Hoon Song (Seoul National University)

Interface of Ecology and Security: Peace Park on the Inter-Korean Border
Chae-Han Kim (Hallym University)

De-Bordering Korea:
Beyond the Sunshine Decade

Koen De Ceuster (Leiden University)

I. Introduction

One's sixtieth birthday used to be an important marker in the lifecycle of a Korean, duly marked by family and friends in festive *hwan'gap* celebrations. As it goes with traditions, they come and they go. Nowadays, with life expectancy well beyond sixty, taking that hurdle is no longer a big deal in Korea and *hwan'gap* celebrations have unsurprisingly been considerably scaled down if not disappeared entirely. Although sixtieth birthdays may no longer have that symbolic aura of longevity, the cultural legacy lives on in sixtieth anniversary commemorations of historical events. Korea's eventful modern history has given us over the last decade a handful of such anniversaries: 15 August 1945, liberation and division (2005); 15 August / 9 September 1948, the establishment of separate governments in respectively Seoul and Pyongyang (2008); 25 June 1950, the beginning of the Korean War (2010); and 27 July 1953, the armistice agreement, as a historical date rather celebrated in North Korea (2013). As commemorations of historical events, these dates may well (and do) mean different things to different people, but the dates themselves are important national markers and an occasion for national leaders to reformulate the historical meaning of these events in light of the present and to project a vision for the future. At the same time, there is a real social relevance to sixtieth anniversaries as they also mark the passing from a generation for whom these dates referred to lived experience to a generation for whom these dates are merely part of cultural memory (Assmann 2011).

In Korea's case, this transition from lived experience to cultural memory has affected both the

meaning and the urgency of, if not the historical imperative for unification. The impact of this generational shift turned out to be all the more fundamental as it coincided with important diplomatic, political, economic and social developments on and surrounding the Korean peninsula in the wake of the end of the cold war in Europe. North Korea faced the death of its founding father, an acute famine and a system-threatening economic crisis at the end of the 20th century, while South Korea democratized and gradually came to terms with the multiple legacies of decades of authoritarian rule. The December 1997 election of Kim Dae-jung as president of the ROK, at a time when the country's economic infrastructure was severely rattled by the effects of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, was in this context an important turning point.

In terms of inter-Korean relations, Kim Dae-jung opted for a fundamentally different approach, exchanging decades of confrontation with a policy of unconditional engagement (Kim and Kang, eds. 2009). An often overlooked aspect of the Sunshine policy (and its successor Peace and Prosperity policy under President Roh Moo-hyun) was aimed at addressing decades of anti-communist demonizing of North Korea('s regime) through rediscovering the North Korean people as Korean and highlighting the enduring cultural homogeneity of the Korean nation. This backfired in so far that a surprising if admittedly counterintuitive legacy of the Sunshine decade was a growing North Korea fatigue in South Korean society (Campbell 2011). The (in-)direct exposure of ordinary South Koreans to the idiosyncrasies of North Korean society coupled with popular exasperation with what appeared to be North Korea's erratic politics of confrontation since the second nuclear crisis erupted in October 2002 eventually translated into weakening popular support for a policy of unconditional engagement. This weakening public support was fired by an unrelenting ideological challenge of the policy of unconditional engagement, linked to the rise of the neo-liberal New Right in South Korean politics. The ideological rift running through South Korean society, commonly known as the South-South divide (*nam-nam kaltŭng*), touches the core of what it means to be Korean.

The challenge posed by the New Right is one that affects the definition of Korean identity and is coated in a language of rationality, objectivity and historical determinism (De Ceuster 2010). Though formally unconstitutional, and therefore unspoken, the aim of the New Right is to recalibrate Korean identity away from an all-Korean national identity rooted in the undivided Korean nation/ *minjok*, to a South Korean national identity understood as a social contract between free rational

individuals and a state created by these individuals to serve their common interests (Yi 2007). This effort amounts to nothing less than a South Korean nation building process which in effect seeks to write North Korea out of the story of South Korea's past, present and future. That such an attempt could garner wide public support (as measured through election results) would have been unimaginable a decade ago. It also goes to testify that the decade of de-bordering Korea (1998-2008) may indeed have given way to a process of re-bordering (Gelézeau, De Ceuster, Delissen 2013, 9).

II. De-Bordering Korea, probing the North/South interface on the Korean peninsula

I take it that this workshop theme has been inspired by the volume I co-edited in 2013 with Valérie Gelézeau and Alain Delissen. The book, *De-Bordering Korea: Tangible and Intangible legacies of the Sunshine Policy,* was the outcome of a project originally entitled "North/South interfaces in the Korean Peninsula". Initiated in response to the rapidly developing inter-Korean relations since the turn of the century, the project sought to take stock of the impact of the Sunshine policy of engagement and cooperation with North Korea beyond the routine political and economic horizon. Valérie Gelézeau, who initiated the project, is a geographer whose interest was tweaked by the material impact the increased inter-Korean contacts had on the spatial organization of the inter-Korean border region. Zooming in on the border region, the border is no longer treated as a marker of separation but as a zone of contact, an interface, where that border is no longer understood as the outer limit of a self-contained spatial entity, but rather read as a pivot that directly impacts on the ordering of the adjacent space.

The project sought to expand the conceptual space of the North/South interface by bringing together a core group of researchers from various disciplines in the social sciences and humanities who looked at material and immaterial aspects of the North/South interface. While focusing on material and immaterial "zones of contact" between North and South Korea, the individual case studies sought to document the scale and scope of change brought about by the Sunshine policy. What made this project quite distinct and rewarding is the fact that it was not limited to the multiple facets of the North/South interface as they were singled out and dissected from various

disciplinary angles, but that the interface itself became an analytical concept applied to these different disciplines.

As an analytical concept, the North/South Interface project highlighted a number of methodological and epistemological hurdles. If the interface is like a two-sided coin, it goes without saying that both sides should be studied with equal rigour, attention and dedication. This attitude provided the perfect impetus for a stimulating exercise in critically assessing the inherent bias present in most research as a result of the particular perspective generated by the specific location in time and space of the researcher. This bias does not only stem from the failure to problematise the locus of the researcher, but also from the fact that the applied models and analytical frameworks often tend to be treated as unquestionably universal. Finally, there is an unacknowledged bias in the source materials that are used.

To put it simply, it is quite well possible for many (international) analysts to write about inter-Korean affairs without ever bothering to read anything North Korean. Even when North Korean materials are used in the raw – not in an abridged and/or edited form as it is on offer from Yonhap or any other international wire service – they are read differently from other sources. Rare are the cases when North Korean texts are read with a view to unearth the coherent argument they make. Most of the time, they are mined for the clues they may provide to questions that are alien to the texts themselves. There is nothing inherently wrong about the latter, but the balance is lost to the point that it does not matter any longer what the North Korean take on things is.

Methodologically and epistemologically, the challenge raised by the North/South interface project can be summarized by a simple question: how do we confront the DMZ running through our heads? How can we elope the ordering strictures of the division system? How can we think North Korea without being trapped in ideologically framed concepts and paradigms? One particularly poignant example of this challenge – because at first sight well-intended – is found in the naming of the decade of inter-Korean rapprochement. We are all familiar with Confucius' admonition in the Analects to use proper names (*zheng ming* 正名). Both the book and this paper define this decade of rapprochement as the Sunshine decade. Allow me to ask: how proper is it to use this explicitly South Korean reference when talking about this decade, keeping in mind that this specific name is inspired

by Aesop's fable "The North Wind and the Sun" and therefore explicitly implies the suggestion of not only South Korean agency, but conversely North Korean passive receptiveness. If one lifts this concern to a political level – and most research that is policy-oriented reflects this – it is striking to see how North Korea is all too often treated as a recipient of South Korean policy initiatives, while little to no concern is being given to North Korea's take on things, let alone to grant North Korea the right to decide its own future.

In the North/South interface project, North Korean agency was explicitly acknowledged. Initially, it was our intention to pay equal attention to both sides of the Korean divide. In the end, this proved elusive for several reasons that fundamentally can be summarized by the fact that it proved impossible to work with a similar set of North and South Korean data. There are various reasons for this, but they relate in one way or another to the issue of access. I hasten to add that access is all too often facetiously used as a disclaimer for sloppy research when it comes to North Korea. There is a lot of information available out there, but the nature of that information is fundamentally different from the information we have access to in the case of South Korea. The same applies to the alleged physical inaccessibility of North Korea. It is not difficult to gain physical access to North Korea, but the opportunities for doing research in North Korea are extremely limited and severely circumscribed. It is impossible to conduct fieldwork in North Korea in the way one is accustomed to in South Korea. This inevitably affects the kind of information one can gather, but it also impacts on the conclusions one can draw from that information. Simply put, fieldwork in North Korea is basically limited to a variation on participant observation, very often with interlocutors not even of one's own choosing. This imbalance in access to the subject of one's research inevitably results in an imbalance in the research findings one can generate. A consequence of this imbalance is an initially unwanted overrepresentation of South Korea in the chapters in the volume. Although it has been possible to study the material and immaterial impact of the new inter-Korean relationship during the Sunshine decade in South Korea, it proved impossible to do the same to the same extent in North Korea's case. Most chapters ended up studying the presence/representation of North Korea in South Korea, but could not equal this with an equally thorough analysis of the North Korean side of things.

Wrapping up the project and looking back at our initial intentions, we had to conclude that even

the interface itself proved in the end elusive. Despite all the hyperbole of the Sunshine decade, there was very little headway made in terms of fundamentally overcoming the legacy of alienation that resulted from 60 years of division. Despite the manifest material and immaterial de-bordering that did occur during the decade, its impact was at the same time very much restricted, both directly by the authorities that tried to streamline and micromanage the process of inter-Korean contacts and to contain its overflow, and indirectly by the enduring legacies of ideological confrontation and the fundamental mutual alienation that resulted from this. For all its good intentions, the de-bordering process failed to unhinge the reigning hegemonies. The changing discourses of the Sunshine decade were still caught in the existing paradigms of power and inequity. In the end, we had to conclude that what had initially looked like an interface, ultimately resembled more an enclave: pockets of the other present in the realm of the self, with synapses, both official and unofficial acting as the conduit from one to the other.

III. Re-bordering Korea: the Long Lost Dream of Unification

For all the promotional talk about national homogeneity that supported the Sunshine policy, the confrontation with the real North Korea proved a rude awakening. One decade of unprecedented and relatively unimpaired exposure to the real North Korea confronted South Koreans with the often conflicting images they had about the North. Half a century of anti-communist propaganda lingered as tentative steps were made into rediscovering North Koreans as Koreans. In the end, the emotional romanticism of national homogeneity did not stand the brutal confrontation with reality. The raw emotions seen during family reunions do not outweigh the sobering fact that behind the tears, there is a real distance that words somehow fail to overcome. The reality of over 60 years of division is that North and South Koreans have grown apart. They may speak the same language, but they certainly live different lives. Selling the dream of unification by stressing cultural homogeneity in a single Korean nation was no longer effective.

That would not have been an insurmountable handicap if politics had not gotten in the way.[1] [1]North

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1) During the Sunshine decade, unification education (t'ongil kyoyuk) was developed in order to counter the legacy of anti-communism. Following the political shift to a conservative government under Lee Myung-bak, the way unification was taught came under scrutiny and partly relapsed into raising the security awareness of younger generations on the one hand and the economic benefits unification might bring on the other (Kim 2009)

Korea does not operate in a void and the Korean peninsula is not a universe of its own. Inter-Korean relations do not operate in an international vacuum and the dynamics of inter-Korean relations do not necessarily coincide with the interests of the other players in the East Asian geo-political space. There is, in this respect, very little disagreement over the fact that the George W Bush presidency from 2001on had an adverse impact on the dynamics of inter-Korean rapprochement. More broadly, it is important to frame the Sunshine decade in the context of the shifting power balances in the wake of the end of the Cold War. Rarely acknowledged is for example the formidable security imbalance on the Korean peninsula in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, when North Korea lost the unconditional support of its ideological partners, confronted a system-threatening economic decline and saw South Korea power ahead economically. North Korean provocations are often shrugged off as nothing but that: provocations. Provocations though they may be, there is also always a context that goes often mis- and in most cases unrepresented. Reading provocations in their proper context certainly makes North Korea far less erratic. Seeing reason in North Korea's actions, I hasten to add, does not mean justifying, let alone agreeing with North Korea's actions. My argument is rather that only proper analysis – devoid of cold war self righteousness – can lead to proper (i.e. effective) policies. But I am digressing.

The asynchrony of ROK and US North Korea policies during a major part of the Sunshine decade meant that North Korea was sending out contradictory signals: pursuing engagement with South Korea while at the same time testing nuclear weapons. This contradiction irked a growing number South Koreans, who lost patience with North Korea, fired as they were by an ideologically radicalised neo-conservative opposition.

Both the social and political dynamics in South Korea mean that the momentum for unification has been lost. The same seems to be the case in North Korea, but for very different reasons. I would like to highlight two elements. The incidents of 2010 should also be read as the expression of a fundamental dissatisfaction with the intentional undoing of the principles that frame inter-Korean relations. How can one not understand the Yŏnp'yŏng-do shelling as Pyongyang's response to the disavowal by Lee Myung-bak of the October 2007 inter-Korean agreement? Where Roh Moo-hyun had the vision of redefining the West Sea from an area of military confrontation into a zone of economic cooperation, Lee Myung-bak backpedalled by making inter-Korean relations dependent

on a solution of the nuclear issue. In the eyes of Pyongyang, this meant that one of the core principles guiding inter-Korean relations no longer held: inter-Korean problems should be solved without foreign interference. From the perspective of Pyongyang, the nuclear issue is a problem it has with the US. South Korea is not a party in this dispute. Making progress in inter-Korean relations dependent on solving the nuclear issue is in essence making inter-Korean relations dependent on US policy towards North Korea. Another element, related to the nuclear issue, is the realization in Pyongyang that North and South Korea can no longer meet as equal partners. The balance of power (militarily, economically, diplomatically) is now so distorted that North Korea can no longer pretend to be a match for South Korea. The only thing that keeps North Korea from being crushed, is its nuclear arsenal. Kim Jong Un's *pyŏng jin* line is a very clear affirmation of this development.

Observers and analysts are very quick to point out that the Sunshine policy was a failure. Here again, I beg to differ. Admittedly, on the political front, there was no major breakthrough. But the idea behind the Sunshine policy was to divest advances in the political sphere from all other kinds of contact. What else but the impact of the Sunshine policy's de-bordering dynamic provoked The North Korean army's intervention in Kaesŏng in late 2008? Furthermore, if a re-bordering process began in 2008, it was not only because the political winds had turned in Seoul, but also because Pyongyang was since the late summer of 2008 absorbed by the sudden urgency of Kim Jong Il's succession in the wake of the latter's brain haemorrhage.

IV. Beyond the Sunshine Decade: Trustpolitik and the Denial of North Korean Historical Legitimacy

With the election of Lee Myung-bak, neo-conservatives came to hold power in Seoul. More than dismantling the Sunshine policy of inter-Korean rapprochement, considered by the New Right to be hardly more than appeasement, the neo-conservatives had a more fundamental project of redrawing the contours of what it means to be Korean. As obsessed as Roh Moo-hyun had been with the past, so too was the New Right concerned with history. Celebrating the 60th anniversary of the establishment of a separate government in the south of Korea, President Lee proposed the construction of a museum dedicated to the history of the Republic of Korea. Shrouded in controversy from the start

because of its challenge of well-established historical narratives, this museum and the ideas that feed it seeks to redefine Korean identity as South Korean identity. Lee Myung-bak's rallying cry was that Koreans should be proud, proud of the achievements of the Republic of Korea, the Miracle on the Han (*Han'gang-ŭi kijŏk*). New Right historians argued this more fundamentally. Kang Man'gil's definition of Korean post-liberation history as a history of division was not only attacked for being negative in nature: a history of loss, but also because it was a nationalist history that reified the nation as an absolute entity rather than acknowledging the nation as a historical phenomenon in its own right. They countered this by presenting a neo-liberal version of Korean history inspired by Francis Fukuyama's 1992 bestseller *The End of History and the Last Man*. Korean history responded to the universal pattern of historical development set in motion by the Enlightenment and the appearance of the free individual. Their history is a history of progress and the emancipation of the individual. South Korea as a liberal democracy is the historically legitimate expression of the social contract between free individuals. The end of the cold war is taken as a post factum justification of the vision of Syngman Rhee and his decision to push for the establishment of a South Korean state.

On the same note, North Korea in this reading is a historical oxymoron: history is believed to have proven North Korea wrong. Hence, in teaching unification, it is deemed important not only to show how North Korea is out of touch with the course of history, but more importantly to highlight how it infringes on universal values (Chŏng 2013). North Korea's cultural heterogeneity thus becomes an absolute heterogeneity. In terms of re-bordering Korea, this has important consequences.

If one looks beyond the immediate political message of Park Geun-hye's recent Dresden speech (28 March 2014) and probes for an understanding of the president's guiding principles on unification, one cannot but help noticing all the hallmarks of the New Right's historical discourse. Just as the ROK contemporary history museum depoliticizes history by telling the story of South Korea as a story of the people, so too did President Park talk about Germany's post-war history as a depoliticized history by the people. That is how she could talk about the West German Miracle on the Rhine in the city of Dresden (Frank 2014); that is how she could talk about the need for people-to-people relations as the lever that will contribute to propel inter-Korean relations forwards in the direction of unification. The latter ignores the political realities on the Korean peninsula, whereas the former indicates that German history, present and future is, was and will be West German. In the case of Korea, this

is more than a return to the inter-Korean stability of the cold war years under Park Chung Hee rule. It rather reeks of a return to the rollback ideology that motivated Syngman Rhee to push for the establishment of a separate government in 1948. People-to-people contacts are in the Dresden speech not a mere return to the Sunshine decade, but rather a tool for political subversion of the North Korean regime. The public expression of such a position is nothing short of giving up on political dialogue with the North Korea regime. This means nothing less than that the North Korean leadership has become irrelevant in the eyes of the current South Korean policy makers. Beyond the North Korean leadership, the way President Park talked about German unification ignores the lingering trauma of German unification. Applying this explicit economic understanding of German unification to Korea has serious colonial overtones. In this vision of unification, there is neither room for nor interest in the people in the north of Korea and their past. This vision of unification is not a unification of North and South Korea, this is a vision of South Korean reclaiming of territory momentarily given up in 1948.

V. De-bordering Korea: Is All Hope Lost?

Was the decade of de-bordering Korea then nothing but a passing phase of no meaningful historical consequence? Returning to the North/South interface project, I can say with confidence that despite the ongoing process of re-bordering, not all is lost. In particular the methodological insights from the North/South interface project may well have even more poignancy in this period of retrenchment. The research subject may be fading as the two entities are growing further apart, but in terms of methodological reconfiguration, the urgency of the project is still palpable. Nothing has changed to the need, if not need, for a critical appraisal of the ideological biases in much of the research dealing with inter-Korean relations (Delissen et.al 2010). The North/South interface project has shown the merit of expanding the field of inter-Korean studies beyond policy-oriented research. The theoretical and methodological richness of the social sciences and the humanities, in particular critical studies, should alert researchers to not only look intently at their research object, but to also question their own subject position. The "suspension of judgement" Roland Bleiker (2005) talked about as a prerequisite for meaningful inter-Korean dialogue to take place, equally applies to researchers who should bracket their ideological convictions. This touches upon the question of what it means to be

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The Border between the South and the North, and Peace Initiative

Jin Soon Doh (Changwon National University)

So far there have been various attempts to peacefully utilize the border between the two Koreas. This paper reviews major misunderstandings as to why such attempts failed, and also presents a few suggestions regarding the DMZ Transboundary Peace Park.

For peaceful use of the border between the two Koreas, it is necessary to have an accurate understanding of the Korean War Armistice Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the KAA). According to the agreement, the border is formed of land, river and sea, three components that are significantly different from one another. Without fully acknowledging the difference, any number of mistakes may occur.

Fig. 1. Inside the DMZ, Special Exhibition Commemorating the 60th Anniversary of the Korean War, hosted by *Chosunllbo* in July 2010.

For example, look at the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) and the De-militarized Zone(DMZ) marked on the map in Figure 1. The point here is that the MDL and DMZ on this map was incorrectly drawn all across land, the Han River Estuary and the West Sea. Because this sort of error is repeatedly made, it seems necessary to more closely examine such errors.

I. Han River Estuary: DMZ without the MDL

Fig. 2. Inside the DMZ

Fig. 3. The MDL and DMZ, Map1 attached to KAA

Fig. 4. The Western end of the MDL, Map1 attached to KAA

Fig. 5. The Han River Estuary (in blue), Map 2 attached to KAA

In the map 'Inside the DMZ,' the MDL runs all across land, the Han River Estuary and the West Sea (Fig. 1, 2). However, according to Map 1 attached to KAA (Fig. 3, 4), the MDL ends where the two rivers Han and Imjin meet. Starting from that point to the waters around Buleum Island(South) and Guldangpo(North) is what the KAA defines as the Han River Estuary (Fig. 4). The following are regulations involving the estuary.

The waters of the Han River Estuary shall be open to civil shipping of both sides wherever one bank is controlled by one side and the other bank is controlled by the other side. The Military Armistice Commission shall prescribe rules for the shipping in that part of the Han River Estuary indicated on the attached map. Civil shipping of each side shall have unrestricted access to the land under the military control of that side. (Article 1 Paragraph 5, KAA)

Unlike the DMZ on land, the Han River Estuary has no MDL, and is open to civil shipping according to the paragraph above. The line from A to B in the Fig. 5 is the old provincial boundary, not the MDL. Although civilians are currently restricted from approaching the riverside due to wire put up along it by both Koreas, civil shipping had originally been permitted.

1. Conservatives: MDL on the Han River Estuary

Fig. 6 & 7. "Nadeul Island" Development Project.

As in Fig. 1 above, most conservatives strongly tend to assume the MDL is on the Han River Estuary. Such a misunderstanding continued throughout Cold War conflicts and remained in plans for reconciliation between the two Koreas. A typical example is the 'Nadeul Island Development Project' proposed in 2007 by then presidential candidate Lee Myung-bak. Fig. 6 and 7 depict the MDL (the red line in Fig. 7) on the Han River Estuary and shows a "Nadeul Island" (colored in yellow) artificially constructed on waters south of the MDL for the purpose of becoming a base for cooperation between North and South Korea.

He boasted that the Nadeul Island would be a Manhattan of Korean Peninsula(No Cut News 2007. 6. 18). However, as previously examined, the Han River Estuary is a kind of condominium between the two Koreas, where the MDL does not exist. Furthermore, article no. 8 in the <Rules for Civil Shipping in Han River Estuary> (established on Oct 3, 1953 by the Military Armistice Commission) stipulates that any type of flotage including minor navigational aids or indicators cannot be installed by any party without ratification from the Military Armistice Commission (MAC). This applies to and therefore prohibits any party from independently constructing a large artificial island.

2. Progressives: No MDL, Not DMZ.

Fig. 8. Peace Boat Sailing at the Han River Estuary
(*The Hankyoreh* 2006. 07. 27)

Progressives are much more enthusiastic about the peaceful use of the Han River Estuary, which has been triggered by the Lee Young-hee's paper(1999). Focusing on the aforementioned Paragraph 5, which states that there is no MDL on the estuary, and civil shipping is possible there, Lee argued that the estuary is a sort of 'international water way' where the 'right of free passage' or the 'right of innocent passage' is granted to civil ships. Since then, progressives have hailed the Han River Estuary as a 'hole' or 'liberated area' in the KAA(Lee Shi-Woo, 2008, 358-465). During the Roh Moo-hyun administration, they held the event titled 'Peace Boat Sailing'(Fig. 8) at the estuary on July 27, the same day the armistice had been signed.

However, the MDL's absence or civilians being allowed to enter does not automatically mean that the Han River Estuary is not DMZ. Paragraph 5 stating that the estuary is open to civilian shipping is, also a part of Article I about the DMZ. According to the aforementioned rules, Article 4 clearly articulates that rules for the DMZ apply to the entire estuary, except for areas open to civilians, and Item (g) of Article 10 "bans any form of contact or communication except for navigational signals to avoid collisions." To conclude, the Han River Estuary is not a 'liberated area,' but a part of the DMZ.

II. The Five West Sea Islands, the NLL and Battlefield

1. Maritime Battlefield of 9 Nautical Miles

There is no mutually-agreed MDL or DMZ on the West Sea(Doh Jin-Soon, 2009). Yet, there is the Northern Limit Line (hereinafter NLL) that originated from a demarcation line established by the United Nations Command later on. When the KAA was concluded in 1953, North Korea argued to base the line on a 12 nautical mile(NM) limit as opposed to the 3 nautical mile limit proposed by the United Nations.

Fig. 9. Main Conflict Water Area   Fig. 10. Battles of Yeonpyeong(1999, 2002)

Since the west five islands are clearly defined to be under the control of the United Nations (and South Korea), and are at a short distance from the coastline of North Korea, there has been little dispute over an equidistant line from the five islands to the coastline due to different NM limits. However, when it comes to about 100 kilometers between Yeonpyeong Island and Socheong Island, the coastline(or islands) of North Korea is the only coordinate available for establishing a territorial line. In this area, there is a 9 NM difference between the NLL's 3 NM limit and North Korea's 12 NM limit. So, waters from NLL to 9 NM south of it has been a site of maritime clashes(the part traced in brown in Fig. 9). This is where the two battles of Yeonpyeong took place in 1999 and 2002 (see Fig. 10).

The bombardment of *Yeonpyeong* Island in 2010 is also closely related to the 12 NM line claimed

by the North. On November 23, 2010, North Korea fired artillery shells and rockets at *Yeonpyeong* Island in response to a South Korean artillery exercise that took place at the aforementioned waters. Ahead of the second artillery exercise scheduled for December 20 the same year, North Korea's Deputy ambassador to the UN, Pak Tok-hun noted that "the area the South plans to fire at is less than 12 NMs from North Korea's coastline on the West Sea"(*JoongAng Daily* 2010. 12. 21) Nevertheless, North Korea has not carried out another attack since South Korea's second artillery exercise on December 20, 2010 despite repeatedly declaring to do so. Could this be considered as the North's withdrawal from its 12 NM line? At the time, the Supreme Command of the North Korean People's Army remarked that "our revolutionary forces do not even feel the need to consider responding to cowardly military provocations that retaliate from behind after getting struck on the front"(*YonhapNews,* 2010. 12. 20; DongA *Daily,* 2010. 12. 21) The problem here lies with the expressions 'front' and 'behind'.

Fig. 11. Waters where the second artillery exercise took place on December 20, *DongA Daily*, 2010. 12. 21)

The exact circumstances of the second artillery exercise can only be determined when the precise coordinates of where the artilleries landed become disclosed. Yet, from the map in a newspaper (Fig. 11), the center of the target zone was almost 20 kilometers south of the NLL. This means the actual points of impact from the second artillery exercise are likely to be more than 9 NM (16.668km) south of the NLL. In the remarks by North Korea, the 'front' could then be considered as the first artillery exercise in waters within 9 NMs from the NLL, and the 'behind' as the second artillery exercise in waters more than 9 NMs south of the NLL.

2. Joint Maritime Peace Zone and Contention Over the NLL

Near the 2012 presidential election in South Korea, a heated controversy occurred over whether then President Roh Moo-hyun abandoned the NLL or not at the South-North Korea Summit in 2007.

The NLL issue that surfaced during the summit is intimately connected to the Marine Peace Park Project in the West Sea, which was steadily being prepared under the Korea Maritime Institute's lead during the Roh Moo-hyun administration(Jang Won-Geun *et al.* 2005).

On the morning of October 3, 2007, despite severely criticizing the NLL, President Roh Moo-hyun proposed several times to establish a joint maritime peace zone between the two Koreas based on the NLL. The proposal had been in accordance with official objectives that were devised through a planning committee meeting at the Blue House on August 18, 2007(Cho Seong-Ryeol, 2012, 218). The proposal came out of a naive notion that designating a large area as a peace zone would be able to soothe sharp conflicts from arising over the NLL. However, Chairman Kim Jong-il "obviously" rejected the proposal because accepting it would automatically be translated as the North's official acceptance of the NLL.

The main point of dispute arose from talks in the afternoon that same day. While President Roh had been the one to propose and Chairman Kim the one to respond in the morning, the roles were reversed in the afternoon. 1) As soon as talks resumed in the afternoon, Chairman Kim said "the South's proposal to establish a maritime peace zone can be accepted on the condition


Fig. 12. Joint Fishing Zone Plan by South(white) and North(Black) Korea

that both sides abandon self-established lines. President Roh agreed by saying that "the peace zone shall be a priority above all demarcation lines previously drawn." 2) Chairman Kim asked for confirmation saying "both sides would be making a resolute decision to abandon the lines previously demarcated and proclaim a peace zone," President Roh responded that the maritime peace zone in the West Sea can solve the NLL issue. 3) When Chairman Kim attempted to receive confirmation for a third time by saying that "the peace zone cannot be settled without solving maritime issues on the West Sea, so both sides must revoke their respective legal enforcements when talks enter the working-level." President Roh agreed by replying "yes, fine"(South-North Korea Summit Minutes, Oct. 3, 2007). This shows that on the afternoon of October 3, 2007, President Roh didn't voluntarily offer to abandon the NLL, but agreed to mutually abandon territorial lines over three exchanges initiated by Chairman Kim.

At the inter-Korean defense minister talks in November 2007, negotiations fell apart as the North stood by its proposal to create a joint fishing zone between the south of the NLL and north of its 12 NM limit, whereas the South offered to create the zone spreading north and south along the 3 NM NLL(Fig. 12). This proves that creating a joint peace zone across boundaries is impossible without determining a new boundary.

III. DMZ Peace Park and Peace Initiative

A joint maritime peace zone has been very difficult push ahead with due to the clear difference in defining territorial lines. In the meantime, joint use of the Han River Estuary may be pursued since there is no MDL and civil ships are allowed to pass. However, as it is a crucial spot in terms of security, joint usage will not be easy. Ultimately, the optimum location to seek a joint peace zone between the two Koreas would be on land at the DMZ.

Various efforts have been made to create a peace park on the DMZ and areas nearby. The one currently being discussed with North Korea is a Transboundary Peace Park (Fig. 13, 14). According to a statistic by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), as of April 2007, there were

227 transboundary peace parks worldwide, but not one of them were located in Asia where walls of national borders are too high.

Fig. 13. Common International Borders(Leo Braack, 2004)   Fig. 14. Transboundary Peace Park(Leo Braack, 2004)

Those who have actively participated in formulating the idea of creating a Transboundary Peace Park in the DMZ (DMZPP) include the DMZ Forum, Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela, Robert Edward Turner III, Clinton's Global Initiative, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN). After President Park Geun-hye ambitiously presented the initiative for a DMZPP in 2013, it is now time to start the engine. Due to spatial limits, only a few suggestions on the DMZPP will be made here.

1. Fundamental Concepts

The DMZPP could be spread across multiple locations or formations that are tied with a belt. Each location or formation could have unique characteristics that suit its circumstances, but the fundamental concept running throughout the DMZPP would still be PEACE. Of course, peace would have to be a more profound ideal than economic, political interests or passive peace as a means to deter war. The two kinds of peace Nelson R. Mandela suggested in 2004 for the DMZPP, "peace between human and human", and "peace between human beings and nature," could become the fundamental concepts(Nelson Mandela, 2004).

(1) Peace between Human Beings and Nature

After nearly seven decades of restricted human access, the DMZ has paradoxically become an internationally renowned natural repository. This represents nature's great capability to recover: that nature is not merely a target to protect, but can become a classroom that teaches nature's immaculate creativity and peace to human beings, thus enabling them to formulate new relationships with nature and among themselves as well. Then, the DMZPP could not only become an opportunity to proclaim peace between the two Koreas, but also, in the history of human civilization, a chance to proclaim a "Peace Treaty with Nature."

In this way, peace with nature can be both a profound destination for the DMZPP to reach, and a starting line where the two Koreas may stand together, even when the level of trust between them is low. For instance, it could take the form of ecologically connecting the Korean peninsula's backbone *Baekdudaegan*, create a "tiger corridor," and have it flow through the Chinese borders, thus turning it into a "tiger corridor" of Northeast Asia (Peter Hayes and Roger Cavazos, 2013).

(2) Peace between Human and Human

Unfortunately, peace between human beings and nature cannot move forward without achieving peace among human beings. In that sense, peace with nature alone can make the DMZPP a very weak or fanciful project. Hence, there is a dire need to have a space within the DMZPP for the purpose of facing memories of the Korean War.

There are the War Memorial of Korea in Seoul, the UN Memorial Cemetery in Busan, and Korean War memorials in Washington DC of the United States as well as at other countries. Also there are Memorial halls, monuments and mausoleums in North Korea and China. But a majority of such Korean War memorials remain as symbols of Cold War hostilities, that often become causes to other conflicts.

In severing the hostile connection made by the Korean War between the two Koreas and other nations that participated, the DMZPP should become a key memory bank through which death from war is transformed into life and peace, not further deaths or wars(Doh Jin-Soon, 2009).

2. Main Participants

(1) North Korea

North Korea's participation is pivotal to the DMZPP because the central significance of the park lies in the fact that it would be built by two parties hostile to one another. Most unfortunately, given the current conditions, it will be very difficult for the North to actively participate. Eliciting North Korea to participate as soon as possible would be best, but if that cannot be the case, how should we proceed? Would there be a way to trigger the North's participation instead of just waiting? This seems to be the matter most critical to actually launching the DMZPP.

One way could be to bundle the DMZPP with other forms of aid to the North. For instance, economic benefits could be provided by linking the peace park's "*Baekdudaegan tiger corridor*" to the tour of *Geumgang Mountain*. A "Green Détente" of assisting forest restoration in the North could also be something that could be tied to the peace park project.

(2) International Organizations and Powers of Peace

As witnessed from the recent crisis at Kaesong Industrial Park, an agreement between the two Koreas alone has its limits in solidly establishing peace. Moreover, matters concerning ecology require an international connection that transcends borders. As for historical connections, wars on the Korean peninsula have always closely involved external entities. In this sense, it would be desirable for international ecological organizations or international powers interested in preserving peace to participate in the DMZPP project. Formally inviting an international ecological organization to the DMZPP or enlisting the park as a world natural heritage through UNESCO is an example of inducing international engagement. More important is to create a system in which all nations that participated in the Korean War can collectively commemorate memories of the war dead.

IV. Reference to Other Cases Worldwide

Creating the DMZPP under the participation of the two Koreas as well as international entities is ideologically and artistically an enormous conception and experiment. To make it work, it will be

necessary to widely research not only transboundary peace parks around the world, but also cases where attempts have been made to transform histories of war into foundations of peace, such as the Okinawa Peace Memorial Museum in Japan, the Landmine Museum on Kinmen Island in Taiwan or the Valle de los Caídos (Valley of the Fallen) in Spain(Doh Jin-Soon, 2009).

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Abbreviation

DMZ Demilitarized Zone, 비무장지대

DMZPP DMZ Trans-Boundary Peace Park, DMZ평화공원

HRE Han River Estuary, 한강하구

IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, 국제자연보전기구

KAA Korean War Armistice Agreement, 한국전쟁 정전협정

MAC Military Armistice Commission, 정전위원회

MDL Military Demarcation Line, 군사분계선

NLL Northern Limit Line, 북방한계선

TBPA Trans-Boundary Protected Area

TRPP Trans-Boundary Peace Park, 국경을 넘는 평화공원

UNC United Nations Command, 유엔사령부

UNDP United Nations Development Programme, 유엔개발계획

UNEP United Nations Environment Programme, 유엔환경계획

EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone, 배타적 경제수역

Political Economy of the Borderland: The Gaesong Industrial Complex

Young Hoon Song (Seoul National University)

I. Introduction

What roles has the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) played in the development of inter-Korean relations? How might it have changed the entity-environment relationship in inter-Korean relations? Because the KIC was established with the (neo)functionalist motivation of the South Korean government, some studies have paid their attention to the economic influence of the KIC on inter-Korean relations as well as the development of legal frameworks to guarantee a stable collaboration of economic development between the two Koreas.[1] Some experts and politicians have argued that the KIC is likely to be exploited by North Korea as its hostage and/or a dollar box for its nuclear program and military build-up. Yet, very little attention has been paid to the political consequences of the KIC in inter-Korean relations even though the KIC is a notable achievement to shrink social space, cost space, and time space between the two Koreas.

After the first inter-Korean summit in 2000, the two Koreas held a series of talks at the various levels and reached many agreements on the re-connection of roads and railroads which were cut off during the Korean War, the reunion of separated families for the first time since the division of Korea, the reduction of military tension at the border, and economic investment of South Korean business sectors. The most phenomenal achievement was the two Koreas made an agreement to form a special administrative industrial region of North Korea in Kaesung, which located ten kilometers (six miles) north of the

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[1] Eul-chul Lim, "Legal Reform and Foreign Investment in the Inter-Korean Project: The Kaesong Industrial Park," *North Korean Review* 4, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 26-39; Chang Woon Nam, "Kaesong Industrial

Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), an hour's drive from Seoul, through direct road and rail access to South Korea. The two Koreas agreed to prevent double taxation on consumer goods, which are produced from South Korean private firms in the KIC since 2003.

The KIC have been operated within the territory under the North Korean sovereignty, but South Korean firms have developed critical economic interests and North Korean workers have become to rely upon the income paid by South Korean firms. By the end of 2013, more than 52,000 North Koreans were working at 123 South Korean business firms in the KIC. The total amount of goods reached 469.5 million dollars in 2012 and 223.8 million dollars in 2013. The decrease of the total amount of goods in 2013 resulted from the closure of the KIC from April 9 to September 16 due to North Korea's military provocations and South Korea's responses. Some reports from the positive perspective predict that the KIC will keep contributive to the economic collaboration of the two Korea although there are some political and security constraints. But what the KIC is has less attention in the most analyses.

How should we understand the consequences of the KIC in inter-Korean relations in terms of political and security concerns? How and to what extent has the KIC reshaped inter-Korean relations and will it continue to change social distance, cost distance, and time distance between the two Korea? This study explores the answers to these questions based on the lessons from border studies and the study of geopolitics. It should be noticed that the two Koreas tried not to completely close down the KIC even after the Cheonan incident and Yeonpyeong shelling and they actively involved in the reopening of the KIC in about five months.

This paper is organized into five sections. The next section addresses the conceptual development of borders using the discourses and findings of border studies. The DMZ has played an important role as a *de-facto* border between the two Koreas, but the KIC may have changed the image of borders and spaces of interactions. The third section discusses the meanings of the time and space in social and international relations. Time has received more attention in the field of academia and practice than space or the spatiality. Yet, it should be understood that all political events occur only when policy makers choose an alternative in response to the environment. The following section provides a descriptive analysis how we may understand the impact of the KIC on inter-Korean relations in terms of the time and space. The

concluding section discusses policy implications to enhance inter-Korean collaboration for economic development in North Korea and peacebuilding on the peninsula.

II. Border and Its Reconceptualization

Every international border has its own histories that affect current realities of bordered states and regions. North Korea and South Korea have histories of borders since the division in 1948 with the 38th parallel north. The Korean War has changed borderlines between the two Koreas with the DMZ, a *de-facto* border barrier, which cuts the Korean Peninsula roughly in half. Based upon the Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953, North and South Koreas moved their troops back two kilometer from the front line, the military demarcation line. Since then, the DMZ has played an important role as a border in inter-Korean relations, separating the sovereign territoriality of the two Koreas.

The primary function of borders is most commonly associated with the idea of territoriality, "the means by which humans create, communicate, and control geographical spaces, either individually or collectively, through some social or political entity."[2] The DMZ has created and differentiated North Korea and South Korea for more than sixty years. In other words, North and South Koreans have existed as geographical human beings on the divided peninsula. They have developed different ways of communication with other community members within their own half of the peninsula, separating themselves from other Koreans on the other side.

Traditionally borders are seen as "the physical and static outcome of a political decision-making process."[3] Borders used to be considered the living space marked by nature, but the idea of natural borders could not determine the territorial limits of states. Given the difficulties in defining and locating objective natural borders, border researchers concluded during the 1930s that all borders were arbitrary, subjective, and the result of human decision, not forces of nature because man, not nature, determines their locations. [4] During the Cold War era, international borders became frontiers of ideological world. Communist

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2)Alexander C. Diener and Joshua Hagen, *Borders: A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 4.

3)David Newman, "Borders and Bordering: Towards an Interdisciplinary Dialogue," *European Journal of Social Theory* 9, no. 2 (2006), p. 175.

4)Alexander C. Diener and Joshua Hagen, "Introduction: Borders, Identity, and Geopolitics." In Alexander C. Diener and Joshua Hagen eds., *Borderlines and Borderlands: Political Oddities at the Edge of the Nation-State* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), p. 8.

ideologues pursued a rule of the world' working class leading to the dissolution of international borders, and in the other hand, economic integration among capitalist states also made international borders less important. In the same vein, the DMZ has been a frontier of ideological competition between the two Koreas.

In international relations, borders, their functions, and meanings change over time. Since the late 1980s, borders are considered social constructions, reflecting both collective and individual practices, discourses and memory and possessing both material and symbolic aspects.[5] In this context, Oommen argues that "[t]he rise and fall, the construction and deconstruction of different types of boundaries … make up the very story of human civilization and of contemporary social transformation."[6] Thus, some studies examine how and to what extent contemporary globalization, nationalism, migration, or environmental change affect the processes involved in border construction.[7] Approaches to the concept of border in these studies may be characterized into four categories according to general questions, concerns, and themes.[8]

First, the 'borderless' claims raise a very important question of to what extent international borders become opening or closing. In one hand, goods and services are more likely to cross borders as the world economy becomes interdependent through regional integration and free trade agreements. In the other hand, international barriers alongside borderlines for human flows have increased since the September 11 terrorist attacks for each state's increasing security concerns. Each state, instead, puts more restriction on the flows of human beings crossing borders into its own territory by enhancing border control and visa system. David Newman describes this phenomenon as the following[9]:

[T]he globalization impact on borders is as geographically and socially differentiated as most other social phenomena – in some places, it results in the opening of borders and the associated creation of transition zone borderlands, while, in others, the borderland remains a frontier in which mutual suspicions, mistrust

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5)Anssi Paasi, "Boundaries as Social Processes: Territoriality in the World of Flows," *Geopolitics* 3, no. 1 (1998): 69-88.

6)T. K. Oommen, "Contested Boundaries and Emerging Pluralism," *International Sociology* 10, no. 3 (September 1995): 251.

7)David Newman, "The Lines That Continue to Separate US: Borders in Our 'Borderless' World," Progress in Human Geography 30, no. 2 (April 2006): 143-61; Vladmir Kolossov, "Border Studies: Changing Perspectives and Theoretical Approaches," *Geopolitics* 10, no. 4 (2005): 606-32; Alexander C. Diener and Joshua Hagen, "Theorizing Borders in a 'Borderless World': Globalization, Territory and Identity," Geography Compass 3, no. 3 (May 2009): 1196-216.

8)Alexander C. Diener and Joshua Hagen, "Introduction: Borders, Identity, and Geopolitics" (2010), pp. 10-11.

9)David Newman, "Borders and Bordering: Towards an Interdisciplinary Dialogue" (2006), p. 181.

of the other and a desire to maintain group or national exclusivity remain in place.

Borders become opening in an economic aspect, but at the same time, they become closing in a security concern.

Second, borders are likely to be re-conceptualized as a zone of transition and meeting. Consequently, borders are not immutable or deterministic anymore, but they are dynamic and changing through cultural interactions and exchanges. Borders become not sites for division of people into separate places with the development of identity against the others but sites for interaction between individuals as well as groups of individuals facilitating coalition, collaboration, and cooperation. For example, the KIC has also created spaces, which allow North Koreans and South Koreans to interact with each other within the complex. However, not always have borders with the increase of interactions among individuals and groups of individuals offered opportunities for cooperation. Increasing interactions may at the same time lead to the increasing possibilities of conflicts in economic interests, cultural animosity, and militarized disputes.

Third, regional and international organizations have made the borderless world more complicated and complex. As the regional economic integration goes deepened, each regional economic institution or organization creates a new border, separating member states from non-member states. For example, processes of EU integration and enlargement have transformed many certainties that have enshrined the nation-state as a locus of territorial identity. EU enlargement facilitate a sense of political community based on (geo) political, social, and cultural identity among member states, which have evolved into states with political actors exercising more limited sovereignty in terms of territorial governance.[10] The increasing level of "Europeanness" among EU member states offers opportunities for cooperation and collaboration while it is increasing the level of distrust and hatred among non-EU member states in Europe.

Finally, borders may affect and be affected by everyday individual experiences of local residents. From this perspective, local interactions between communities facing each other across borders have received increasing attention among scholars and experts. It must be noticed, however, that those interactions

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10)James Wesley Scott, "European Politics of Borders, Border Symbolism and Cross-Border Cooperation," in Thomas M. Wilson and Hastings Donnan eds., *A Companion to Border Studies* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2012), pp. 83-99.

may not guarantee collaboration or cooperation among local residents. Even when the government encourages local residents to effectively cooperate each other, they may resist cross-border cooperation with the others. This implies that interactions among North and South Korean workers in the KIC may not necessarily enhance mutually positive understandings of the others and, in some instances, interactions may also strengthen misunderstanding of the others.

III. Time and Space of Social and International Interactions

Human inquiry of border politics and international relations should take both time and space into serious consideration because time and space provide the fundamental contexts of social and international interactions. Yet, many analyses have been structured solely around time so that they can tell us half of the story without providing the contextual story. Space and the spatial dimension affect international interactions by reshaping the dynamics of opportunities and the structure of incentives and risk to choose an alternative.[11] Borders are not the dead, fixed, and immobile.

All human beings may locate themselves universally in one of three regions along the temporal dimension: the past, the present, and the future. The temporal dimension of human experience can be easily understood because it allows us to produce the universal, linear, ordered points of observation with standard units of measurement such as days, months, and years. This is one of the reasons why many studies of international relations, including inter-Korean relations studies, focus on the evolution of interactions along the temporal dimension. Interactions at the present are the most intense and intimate ones while interactions in the past may not tell us the context at the point of experience or interaction in the future may not tell us what context will be at the point of experience.

All human beings also must be located physically somewhere, but there is no universal reference point such that all location is somehow relative and non-formalized. [12] While human beings cannot control the time point, they move into some places voluntarily. Thus, standard units of measurement of space such as kilometers, latitude, and longitude by themselves do not reveal much information of interactions. The

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11) Harvey Starr, "On Geopolitics: Spaces and Places," *International Studies Quarterly* 57, no. 3 (2013): 433-39.
12) Klaus Dodds, Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 2-4; Harvey Starr, "On Geopolitics: Spaces and Places" (2013), p. 434.

context of space should be incorporated into our understanding of interaction as an important factor of social and international relations. For instance, the division of the peninsular has offered different environments for North and South Koreans and nourished different contexts of their social and international interactions.

Spatial distance from an actor's core area to that of the other affects each actor's behavior in their interactions. If a state wants to exercise its own power over the other, it should have capability to project its power over the greater distance. Thus, many studies demonstrate that there is an inverse relationship between power and distance.[13] In the *geopolinomic* or *geoeconomic* world, the relationship between geography and power is found in the ability to move goods, services, and information most efficiently and rapidly from one point to another.[14] In other words, absolute distance may be shrunk depending on the issues with which political actors are concerned.

All social and international interactions occur when humans respond to the environmental structures and make their choices upon their perception on the environment. With regard to the relationship between an entity and its environment, Sprout and Sprout proposed an analytical framework of the ecological triad to counter a deterministic view of space.[15] The basic idea of the Sproutian approach is that physical or non-physical international environments encompass decision makers and decision makers would be capable of making choices. In other words, political decision makers choose a policy based on their perception of opportunities and willingness.[16]

The Sprouts' approach distinguishes between the environment as the observer perceives it and the environment as it actually exists. Sprout and Sprout propose three alternatives to understanding the entity-environment relationship. First, they propose environmental possibilism with which the environment is conceived as a set of opportunities and limitations. Second, environmental probabilism is proposed. The environment provides decision makers not only with what is possible, but with what choices would be more or less likely under those particular circumstances. Third, they proposed cognitive behaviorism, the

13)Kenneth D. Boulding, *Conflict and Defense* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963).
14)James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey,* 5th ed. (New York: Longman, 2001), p. 157.
15)Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965).
16)Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr, *Inquiry, Logic, and International Politics* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina, 1989).

principle that a person perceives and interprets the environment in terms of the past experience. [17]

The Sprouts formulation of the ecological triad challenges the realist argument that Inter-Korean relations would be determined by geopolitical factors. Realist must argue that because the two Koreas located on the peninsula surrounded by major powers, there is not much that the two Koreas can do by themselves. However, from the Sprouts' perspective, geographical factors may provide possible alternatives but the possibility should not determine any decisions made by leaders of the two Koreas. Thus, all spatial contexts of the Korean peninsula should be permissive and actors must choose.

If space is also a concept that takes on meaning only as it is perceived by individuals or groups of individuals, borders and space on the Korean peninsula should also be a permissive concept. That is, the border of the DMZ may have different meanings over time and space. Until the mid-2000s, the meaning of the DMZ as a concept of border in inter-Korean relations should be invariant; but now, it may have different meanings since the border opened to persons who are working at the KIC. In other words, North and South Koreans may have different perceived concepts of border so that the KIC may have different meanings to each individual or group of individuals. Thus, location may be divided into two concepts such as absolute location and relative location. The most social, political meaning of border or space comes from political actors' perception.

Inter-Korean relations can be evaluated from the perspectives of relative space. Relative space should involve both time and physical location. In other words, we may investigate how the absolute space has been transformed into the relative space: social space, cost space, and time space. The economic achievement of the KIC may be evaluated and projected differently depending on what statistics you use, but what the KIC means and what happens in the space should be complementarily incorporated in the analysis of the past, present, and future of the KIC.

IV. Border, Time, and Space of the KIC in Inter-Korean Relations

The (neo)functionalist motivation of the South Korean government and economic needs of the North Korean regime made it possible to form the KIC despite a lot of obstacles at the various levels. While

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17)Sprout and Sprout, *op. cit.* (1965).

the KIC is expected to make spillover effects over other issue areas in inter-Korean relations, economic achievements of the KIC have not met up to the expectation of the proponents of for many reasons. Instead, Im and Choi argue that economic collaboration of the two Korea have never overcome a prisoners' dilemma such that any development for regional integration has been easily negated by political conflicts.[18] Yet, this analysis may not be incorrect but incomplete because it does not tell us the full story about the changing context.

Before the KIC was established, the de-facto border between the two Koreas had been only the DMZ on the Korean peninsula. However, the KIC may have changed the cognitive border between the two Koreas among South Koreans. Presidents, special governmental agents, or few of progressive activists visited North Korea until the KIC was established. Only the past Chung Ju-Young was able to open the North-South border on land with herds of cows in 1998. The KIC allows many individuals to go to North Korea and do their business with North Korean workers. To South Koreans, the borderline on land is not impermeable and mobile anymore.

The Institute for Peace and Unification Studies at Seoul National University surveyed a question, "How strongly do you agree (or disagree) with the following opinion: Even if small sacrifices have to be made, the Kaesong Industrial Complex should be maintained?"[19] The response of South Koreans is virtually evenly divided, but the proportion of South Koreans who agree to operate the KIC continuously is greater than that of those who disagree except in 2011 and 2012. However, if we consider the negative impact of the Cheonan incident and Yeonpyong shelling on inter-Korean relations, the margin of the response of the agreement and disagreement may be understood as negligible. Although the survey conducted in July 2013 when the KIC was closed after a series of North Korea's military provocations, about half of South Koreans answered the KIC should be maintained. This may illustrates that some South Koreans consider the KIC an importation space for South Korea's national interests and the KIC became their cognitive frontier or border.

18) Hyug-Baeg Im and Yu-Jeong Choi, "Inter-Korean and Cross-Strait Relations through the Window of Regional Integration Theories," *Asian Survey* 51, no. 5 (2011): 785-811.

19) The IPUS conducts the Unification Attitude Survey annually since 2007. The question as to the operation of the GIC was added for the first time in 2009.

Table 1. The KIC should be maintained

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Strongly Agree	11.5	12.2	10.6	11.4	11.9
Agree	37.2	37.5	35.6	34.3	38.5
	48.6	49.7	46.2	45.8	50.4
Strongly Disagree	31.0	32.3	33.7	33.9	31.6
Disagree	15.5	15.3	15.5	16.1	13.7
	46.6	47.7	49.2	50.0	45.3
I Don't Know	4.8	2.7	4.6	4.3	4.3
Total Observations	1,203	1,200	1,201	1,200	1,200

Data: IPUS at Seoul National University, Unifications Attitude Survey 2013.

The KIC has become the space in which North and South Koreans communicated one another, individually or collectively and directly or indirectly. After the Cheonan incident and the following 5.24 sanction against North Korea that does not allow a new investment in the KIC, 123 companies are doing their business with an increasing number of North Korean workers. Even in 2013, more than 52,000 North Korean workers get paid for their work at the KIC. The number of North Korean workers has increased every year until 2013 with a slight decrease of the number of North Korean workers due to the shut-down for more than five months.

Number of Companies Operating in the KIC and Production Volume

Units: number and ten thousand dollars

Type	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	total
Number of Companies	18	30	65	93	117	121	123	123	123	-
Production Volume	1,491	7,373	18,478	25,142	25,648	32,332	40,185		22,378	223,213

Source: Ministry of Unification.

Number of Companies Operating in the KIC and Production Volume

Units: persons

Type	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
North Korean Workers	6,013	11,160	22,538	38,931	42,561	46,284	49,866	53,448	52,329
South Korean Workers	507	791	785	1,055	935	804	776	786	786
total	6,520	11,951	23,323	39,986	43,496	47,088	50,642	54,234	53,086

What does these figures have political meanings? It is difficult to simply say the political implications of these statistics. The simple interpretation is that 52,400 North Korean workers communicated with South Korean workers or worked at the South Korean companies in 2013. Although their direct communication with South Korean workers has been limited, North Korean workers are exposed to the capitalist market system. They get paid, learn how to negotiate with the companies for their wages, and observe the capitalist process of producing goods.

The KIC becomes important for local residents. It may affect the identity or perceptions of local residents. North Korean workers may communicate with their families. North Korean workers may talk about their everyday experience at the KIC to their family members. The rest household members may learn from their conversations and see what their family member is doing and how he or she is being treated at the KIC. So if there are four members in each household, the number of North Koreans who are exposed, directly or indirectly, to South Korean business and market system can be estimated as around 210,000. But it must be acknowledged that this may overestimate the consequences because North Korean workers are selected by the North Korean government and always being under surveillance.

The closure and reopening of the KIC in 2013 may provide North Korean workers for opportunities that may facilitate the understanding of North Korean workers about a production process at the KIC. Given the uncertainty of the reopening of the KIC, North Korean works must have been requested to work at local collective farms. In the case, they could easily figure out their working environment at the KIC was much better than their newly assigned working place. According to South Korean workers, some former North Korean workers confessed in person that they appreciate it that they have an opportunity to work at the KIC again.

The North Korean regime also gets accustomed to the market system. At the beginning of the KIC establishment, North Korea intended to rotate North Korean workers at the KIC. However, the North Korean leaders seemed to understand that North Korean workers who already worked at the KIC are likely to figure out the strength and weaknesses of the North Korean economic and political systems. So the North Korean officials were reluctant to assign the former KIC workers to other local farms. In other words, the closure of the KIC might be an opportunity for North Korean workers and officials to understand what the KIC meant to them.

The KIC has also shrunk the time space between the two Koreas. Through the West Coast Corridor, South Korean cars, buses, trucks crossed borders 1,177,594 times between 2003 and 2013. Until Chung Ju-Young crossed the border for the first time as an ordinary citizen in 1998 it took the half century after the division. However, any cars crossed borders 682 times per working day in 2012 and about 29 cars crossed borders every hour. For ordinary South Koreans, the KIC opened the long-standing impermeable border.

Type	'03~'05	'06	'07	'08	'09	'10	'11	'12	'13
West Coast Corridor	10,334	94,506	143,450	183,085	145,802	166,181	162,848	177,211	110,000
East Coast Corridor	76,923	29,406	40,053	25,077	2,534	2,140	397	16	294
total	187,257	123,912	183,503	208,162	148,336	168,321	163,245	177,223	110,294

The KIC also has implications for military and security concerns. In building and maintaining the KIC, the two Koreas should have agreed that no side would exploit the KIC for the military purpose. North Korea's 6th division relocated 10-15 Kilometers back to North such that Seoul is now out of the range of the immediate attack of the 6th division. It has a symbolic implication that the KIC changed a North Korean army station. In the other hand, North and South military authorities with the United Nations Command (UNC) should take care of the KIC workers' security. In order to do so, they should hold a series of talks, exchange information, and deepen and widen their understanding of the others' needs and concerns. Because most South Korean workers commute, they are changing the space with which South Korean military authorities should be concerned.

The KIC has created a new social and economic border of inter-Korean relations. Borders are not only physical demarcation lines but also spaces in which interests and security of South Koreans should be protected from any threats. North and South Koreas have national interests, which may be in common or can be coordinated, in the KIC. Thus, military authorities should be cautious if they want to project their military power to the KIC. This might affected the decision that the South Korean government imposed an sanction in response to the Cheonan incident instead of military retaliation and the North Korean authorities did not send their army to control the KIC.

The KIC has continued for about a decade. The two Koreas have collaborated for the economic development and often come into conflict due to political and security issues. Thus, it is very difficult to evaluate success or failure of the KIC to facilitate inter-Korean cooperation. However, it must be apparent that the KIC changed an image of border. For South Koreans, the KIC became conceived of the frontier of communicating and meeting. At the local level, North Korean workers and South Korean workers construct and deconstruct their image of the others. Lastly the authorities of the two Koreas became cautious when they review military alternatives in a situation of crisis.

V. Conclusion

The study has explores what impact the KIC has put on inter-Korean relations using the lessons from the studies of borders and geopolitics. It is too early to tell whether the KIC has been successful in the development of economic collaboration between the two Korea. The achievement of the KIC may not meet up to the functionalist expectation, but the KIC has played important roles in opening the border that has been firmly closed for more than 50 years.

The KIC may be considered the space of experiments of interaction at the multiple layers by multiple actors. It may also extend the frontier of South Koreans' perceived border into the North Korean territory. Since Chung Ju-Young's visit with a herd of cattle in 1998, the time span that North and South Koreans meet and interact has dramatically shrunk so that about two cars cross border every hour and North and South Korean workers work together in the same space. Because the two Koreas have common interests in the KIC, they become more cautious to project military power to it.

The KIC have institutionalized the principles and practices of interaction among the two Koreas for the past ten years. There are many issues, including the stabilization and standardization of legal framework and internationalization of business practices, to be resolved to draw more foreign investment to the KIC. However, it is clear that it is much more difficult to establish a new institution of interaction among the two Koreas than to maintain the existing one. The KIC has shrunk time space, cost space, and social space; it has intensified interactions of the two Koreas; it has also extended the cognitive borderline of North and South Koreans. That is why we need to pay more strategic attention to the roles of the KIC in inter-Korean relations as a borderland and experimental place for the identity (de)construction as well as unification of the two Koreas.

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Interface of Ecology and Security: Peace Park on the Inter-Korean Border

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Abstract

Both of ecological environment and security are public goods. Non-rivalry of those goods lets their parties have common interests to produce them. Their non-exclusiveness, however, makes their parties having some troubles in their product cost sharing. While security is sought for by the unit of nation or alliance while ecological environment is across nations. Certainly, ecological environment and security may or may not be superimposed in each other and reciprocal. Conceptually, there are three different causal relationships between ecology and security. First, the improvement of security may make ecological environment better in such cases as détente followed by environmental cooperation while the degeneration of security deteriorates ecology in such cases as wars. Second, the military confrontation may make natural ecological system restored in such cases as the Korean Demilitarized Zone. Third, ecological cooperation results in politico-military cooperation while environmental conflict brings military conflict. This paper focuses on the third one. Though the causal path from ecology to security is limited, it needs to be considered as a means to build up security and confidence as long as there are no other alternative available. A peace park may belong to this category. A peace park may be set up for the purpose of making peace as well as keeping peace. Typical peace parks are located on disputed borders and their ecological values are conserved together by parties concerned. Post-modern contents need to be included in order to maximize the pacifying effects of peace parks.

I. Ecology and Security as a Public Good

Environmental problems as well as security are regarded one of major issues in current international relations. When a negotiated settlement cannot be found for a contentious issue, linking issues may often lead to a successful compromise (Kim 2005; Bueno de Mesquita 2014). The South Korean government has suggested various policies toward North Korea that link security issues to environmental issues. The proposal of a peace park on the inter-Korean border is an example of issue linkage between ecology and security.

In fact, the linkage between ecology and security has been long studied with such concepts as ecological security, environmental peacemaking, environmental security, human security, peace ecology, and green détente. This paper will discuss an interface between ecology and security in the following order. First, ecology and security will be accounted for as a public good. Second, how ecology and security influence each other will be analyzed. Third, ecological peace parks will be classified and be discussed as a pacifying effect of ecology. Last, some implications for peace parks will be made after comparing modern border and post-modern.

〈Figure 1〉 Ecology and Security as a Public Good

Non-rivalry	Non-exclusivity
▼	▼
Common interests	Free-rider

Security and ecology both have been treated as a public good. But the scopes of their pubic are different. The boundary of ecology and the boundary of security seldom coincide. The term of security means national security, not global security. National boundaries or alliances define the scope of security (Kim 1991). If a party's level of security is increased, then the other party may often feel insecure. In comparison, ecology may go beyond those boundaries. Indeed such ecological environments of the Korean peninsula as water and air can be neither controlled nor enjoyed by one side only.

Ecological benefits of a party may spread to other parties. Consumption of an ecological good by one consumer may not prevent simultaneous consumption by other consumers. This is called non-rivalry. Ecological aid to the opponent does not threaten but helps its aider. Even two countries hostile, in a context of security, to each other may agree on yielding ecological public goods. Non-rivalry justifies ecological cooperation.

Ecological projects have been assumed to be cooperative-induced by those who argue for them. While some ecological projects may contribute to cooperation, however, other ecological projects may cause mutual conflict. There are different views on state of nature. State of nature was described Arcadia or pastoral by romantic poets on one hand, and Gethsemane or site of suffering on the other. Indeed, Jan-Jacques Rousseau's view of natural state is different from Thomas Hobbes's of natural state bellum *omnium* contra *omnes* (war of all against all).

Most of environmental projects require collaboration. Joint projects may lead to cooperation because they cannot be achieved without cooperation, but may lead to conflict because agreements are frequently required in the process of joint promotion.

That conflict comes from non-exclusivity of public good. As free-riders as well as cost payers benefit from ecology, the problem of burden sharing arises in producing the ecological public good. For instance, the free rider problem is one of major reasons why little progress has been made in reducing greenhouse gas emissions despite a broad consensus that global warming is a significant threat to almost all (Bueno de Mesquita 2014). It is not easy to produce ecological public goods.

As shown in Table 1, ecological cooperation is distinguished from security cooperation. Two nations may come into conflict with each other in both of security and ecology. They may give ecological cooperation even during their military confrontation while there may be some ecological conflict between military allies. Or they may cooperate in both of ecology and security. The interface between ecology and security focuses on this last cell.

〈Table 1〉 Cooperation/Conflict in Ecology and Security

		Security	
		Conflict	cooperation
Ecology	conflict	ecological conflict / security conflict	ecological conflict / security cooperation
	cooperation	ecological cooperation / security conflict	ecological cooperation / security operation

II. Causal Paths between Ecology and Security

There might be three paths between ecology and security, depending on how cause and effect are identified, and on whether the effect is direct or adverse. As shown in Figure 2 and Table 2, we cannot observe cases in which ecological cooperation between two countries worsened their politico-military relations, or in which their ecological conflict improved their politico-military relations. The other paths, however, can be inferred and observed.

〈Figure 2〉 Causal Paths between Ecology and Security

A ➡ B : the direct effect of A on B
A ⇨ B : the adverse effect of A on B

〈Table 2〉 Causal Paths between Ecology and Security

	Security → ecology	Ecology → security
Direct effect	Ecological cooperation led by deténte (a positive case); Ecological environment destroyed by war (a negative case)	Politico–military cooperation led by ecological cooperation (a positive case); War or disputes initiated by environmental issues (a negative case)
Adverse effect	Natural ecosystem restored by military confrontation	No case

1. The Direct Effect of Security on Ecology

The interface between security and ecology may be negative as well as positive. As relations between two countries are aggravated, it may deteriorate the ecological situation across the two countries. Indeed, two World Wars destroyed European ecological environments. And the Korean War deteriorated the ecosystem of the Korean peninsula seriously. When the ecological environment is destroyed by war, it may be explained as a negative direct effect of political amity on ecology.

On the other hand, stable politico-military ties between two countries may produce their cooperation in ecological issues as well. This is a positive direct effect of political amity on ecological cooperation.

Political détente preceded ecological cooperation in some European cases including German ones. In 1975, 35 countries who participated in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe adopted the Helsinki Final Act. The act was not an international treaty which its signatories should obey, but focused on confidence-building measures. Basket II of the Helsinki Final Act prescribed environmental cooperation. And the end of the cold war has converted the Iron Curtin, which divided the European continent politically and militarily, to the European Green Belt for nature conservation. These are examples in which the improvement of political relations made ecological cooperation possible.

2. The Adverse Effect of Security on Ecology

Two neighboring countries in contraposition to each other do not perform many mutual interchanges. Then, the closed buffering border zone may suffer so less human interference that it may be preserved as is. While the military confrontation on the Korean peninsula has been a barrier to the exchange between North Korea and South, for instance, it has kept civilians out of their natural ecology areas. The Korean DMZ's ecosystem has been restored through restrictions on human access to border areas. This ecological resource is not intended but good consequence of the military confrontation. Many environmental activists are afraid that the DMZ ecosystem will be destroyed with frequent exchanges which may result from inter-Korean reconciliation or even

reunification. This is the adverse effect of political amity on ecology which is less common than its direct effect.

3. The Negative Direct Effect of Ecology on Security

One of paths from ecology to security is that ecological conflict decreases the level of national security. Environmental conflicts may bring a crisis in security or political affairs. Conflicts over the use and pollution of water and air often worsen politico-military relations between neighboring countries. This is an example in which security relations are worsened by ecological issues.

Generally speaking, the regimes of those nations who are short of food and energy tend to be more aggressive toward neighboring countries in order to provide their own people with food and energy. North Korean people have long struggled with starvation. Famine, however, looks less threatening to security of the Korean peninsula than expected. According to the selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita 2014), whether or not the entire North Korean population comes out to cheer for Kim Jong-Un, his winning coalition (those getting private rewards) is between 9 and 250 people out of a selectorate that has been several million strong (or, more appropriately, weak). Lack of food or energy has never toppled the North Korean regime which is concerned about its winning coalition, not about its whole population. Then, security of the Korean peninsula does not look threatened directly by such traditional environmental issues as population, water, food, fish, energy, forest fire, and air.

4. The Positive Direct Effect of Ecology on Security

Now, let's consider whether ecology has a pacifying effect on conflict. The positive direct effect of ecology on security and its negative direct effect have the same causal relationship in which ecology is a cause while security is an effect. Activities of such campaigning organizations as Greenpeace belong to this category. The disastrous environmental effect of war brings environmental pressure to avoid war. Of course, whether a specific ecological necessity has prevented a war is not confirmed.

Instead, literature concerning functionalism or integration theory has long argued that non-military

exchange promotes politico-military cooperation. The pacifying effect of tourism, however, seems to be overemphasized (Getmansky 2014). There are few cases of politico-military reconciliation initiated by ecological cooperation. Rather, détente or reconciliation made ecological cooperation promoted more easily. For example, the German Green Belt (*Grünes* Band Deutschland in German) was initiated on the inner German border after, not before, its political reunification.

These facts will disappoint those who believe that insecurity turns over a new leaf with ecology and becomes security, or that ecological cooperation recasts unstable military relations into secure ones. With ecological cooperation, however, political relations may get more deeply involved. In order words, ecology may not initiate security cooperation, but intensify it after its initiation.

East-West cooperation for the protection of the Baltic Sea is an example of instruments to bridge the East-West conflict and to maintain functional communication even in times of high political tension (Brock 1991). Since there was special interest in environmental cooperation for the very reason that East-West cooperation for the protection of the Baltic Sea could do more than handle specific environmental problem, environmental cooperation among Western European countries for the protection of the North Sea lagged behind the cooperation for the Baltic Sea.

In Asia, although such environmental cooperation as reforestation might not serve as a basis for a durable peace or a completer transformation of the China-Japan bilateral relations, it may serve as a substitute for the lack of confidence and security building measures in the traditional security sphere and contribute to the improvement of Chinese-Japanese relations (Courmont 2013).

The argument that ecological cooperation contributes to easing tension looks more persuasive in cases of trans-frontier biodiversity cooperation which provides more contacts and more dialogue between adversaries. The Kgalagadi Transfrontier Peace Park between Botswana and South Africa, and the Cordillera del Condor Peace Park between Ecuador and Peru are often cited as an example of ecological peace parks (Westing 2001).

Even when politico-military relations became worsened, the cooperation for protection of the Baltic Sea and trans-frontier peace parks continued. During the New Cold War after the Soviet military

intervention of Afghanistan in 1979, the collaborative project of the Baltic Sea was not withdrawn. Most trans-frontier peace parks between two neighboring countries were not closed even when their politico-military tension was mounted. This is because to discontinue the ecological cooperation does not cause more damage to the opponent. Even if ecological cooperation is initiated by politico-military détente, it may continue without détente. As ecological cooperation has long-term effects, it should be promoted from a long-term perspective.

III. Peace Parks as a Pacifying Effect of Ecology[1]

Peace parks, being a popular name, are easily found in Korea. As of December 2013, the search query on Naver Maps pulls up 145 South Korean places under the name 'peace park'. A few examples are located near the borderlands: the Dora Mountain Peace Park (Paju-si), the Peace Culture Park (Cheorwon-gun), Seohwa-myeon (Inje-gun), the Peace Dam (Hwacheon-gun), the Imjin River marshes (Yeoncheon-gun), and Imjingak (Paju-si). This is most likely the same in the North Korea, from what can be deduced by the name of the Peace Museum, which is located on the North's side of the Joint Security Area. The above parks may not be considered an ecological park. Then, we need to turn our eyes to trans-frontier bio-sanctuaries over the world.

Westing (2001) classified trans-frontier bio-sanctuaries by three political functions: (a) to cement and further cultivate existing amicable relations between two contiguous states, (b) to obviate conflict between two states over a contested border region, and (c) to help smooth the way for a pair of divided states eventually to reunite. The third function is not satisfied by any existing trans-frontier park. With the first category subdivided into two here, three functions of trans-frontier peace parks are following.

Figure 3 displays international ecological sanctuaries, post-reconciliation projects, and ends to border disputes. The left side of the spectrum represents the higher ratio of security compared to ecology while the right side does the lower ratio of security. We will find that a peace park as an ecological sanctuary tends to be made after establishment of peace while a peace park as an end to border

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1) Most of this section comes from Kim(2014b).

disputes does before reconciliation. A peace park as a post-reconciliation project is likely to be created in the interim between reconciliation and peace establishment.

〈Figure 3〉 Peace Parks over Combination of Ecology and Security

End to Border Dispute	Post-Reconciliation	Ecological Sanctuary
Security		Ecology

1. Peace Parks as an International Ecological Sanctuary

Peace parks, as discussed in such literatures as Ali(2007), generally refer to an ecological park near the border. Examples are the Biosphere Reserves (BRs) and Trans-boundary Biosphere Reserves (TBRs) which are located across the borders, as designated by UNESCO, and other trans-frontier biodiversity cooperation.

The East Carpathian Biosphere Reserve is, in fact, the sum of three separate national parks that were managed by Slovakia, Ukraine and Poland, respectively. In 1990, Poland suggested that the three countries assign BR status to their individual parks, followed by UNESCO approval of the requests submitted by Poland and Slovakia in 1992, and finally at the authorization of Ukraine's request in 1998, which led to the creation of the East Carpathian TBR. The region had experienced some territorial disputes. During World War II, residents of the area near the southern border of Poland were forcibly relocated by the Soviet Union for participating in the Ukrainian independence movement. In 1951, the area was returned to the Polish jurisdiction as a result of the Polish-Soviet territorial exchange. The fact that the region had been nationalized for collective farming under the communist regimes could contribute to a significant increase in the size of the national park.

Another oft-cited example is the German Green Belt for the reason that it was the boundary between two separated nations. The German Green Belt was formed to serve as a reminder of the history of opposition, and to perpetuate the present relationship of friendship and cooperation.

The thawing in the political climate, as evidenced by the introduction of the European Union and the reunification of East and West Germany, has lead to the transformation of the area previously known as the 'death strip' into a tourist destination and ecological safe haven. Since the German reunification, the buffer zone of 50m to 200m width (including the patrol path) has been a green belt area. The German environmental organization BUND (Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutchland) has pushed for this designation, in the interest of preserving wildlife and endangered species. The land consisting of the regions adjacent to the dividing line between East and West Germany, leading up all the way to Finland in a strip totaling the length of 15,000km, thus forms the major part of the European green belt.

The German Green Belt was first instated in 1989, after reunification. Given that the current state of the relationship between North and South Korea is much more antagonistic than even what was observed during the period of Germany's separation, it seems an unlikely scenario to be repeated, and therefore, appropriating the case would be severely limited. However, the Korean DMZ Peace Park project, which must necessarily imagine the possibilities after such a development, can certainly learn from the German case, which affected the 1,400km dividing line between East and West Germany.

The title of the world's first peace park goes to the Waterton-Glacier International Peace Park even though some other parks have been cited as the world's first one by some sources. The Waterton-Glacier Park was founded by the merging of the two separate parks of the United States and Canada to monumentalize the peace and good will between the two nations and their peoples. This was a regional state-to-state collaboration that was made official through a record of understanding. Canada and the United States are examples of neighboring countries with amicable relationships, and these parks were created as a manifestation of their relief. The park was made after, not before, the establishment of peace. For the DMZ Peace Park, which aims to bring peace before its establishment, they are unfortunately not useful benchmarks.

2. Peace Parks as a Post-Reconciliation Project

Germany and France, which were embroiled in continual warfare with each other throughout the

19th and 20th century, officially buried the hatchet in 1963 with the Élysée Treaty. The effort at friendship was further bolstered by ecological preservation projects such as the border biosphere collaboration which began in 1985. The movement aimed not only for ecological preservation, but also cultural exchange between youths to promote reconciliation and interaction between the two countries, and included such programs as information exchange, student exchange, and tourism in border areas, all of which were designed to promote the easing of the German-French relationship.

In 1988, UNESCO designated the Northern Vosges Regional National Park of France as a BR. In 1992, the nearby Palatinate Natural Park in Germany was also selected as a BR by the organization. The occasion led to greater interaction between Germany and France, and in 1998, the areas were together recognized as the first European TBR. The Palatinate Forest-North Vosges Biosphere Reserve is proof of the difficulty in sustaining a trans-border effort among nations which place a high value on private rights of property. The Franco-German TBR, however, is also seen to have aided in dialogue and exchange, which goes beyond their national border, and the relaxing of a relationship burdened by tension and history.

The Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park in Africa was founded in 1998 with the joining of the Gemsbok National Park in Botswana and the Kalahari Gemsbok National Park in South Africa, and is managed equally by the two countries while preserving sovereignty and responsibilities of each. It is lead by an NGO called Peace Parks Foundation, which has had a significant role in the creation of many other Transfrontier Parks (TPs) and Trans Frontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs) around Africa. The group's ultimate goal is to preserve biodiversity, energize the Southern African economy and loosen political relationships charged with hatred and violent histories.

In general, water resources are more influential upon peace and conflict than forest and mineral resources (Swatuk 2005). The Great Limpopo TP, which links the three parks of South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe and is located on a river, and the Delta du Fleuve Senegal TBR, which combines the Delta of the Senegal River between Moritani and Senegal, have greater potential for conflict than other areas without flowing water. With many interests at stake, there are high chances for both success and failure.

In September 2000, an agreement was reached at a ministerial summit between North and South Korea on a collaborative effort to prevent flood damage from the Imjin River. It was followed by several follow-up discussions, but with the exception of the adoption of that agreement, little has happened in the way of actual policy implementation. The case goes to show that environmental collaboration does not lead the direction for political and military reconciliation, but is rather lead by the reverse. The DMZ Peace Park program, which seeks the better relationship between the North and South, cannot replicate the German-French example, which came about as a result of an improved relationship.

3. Peace Parks as an End to Border Disputes

The Cordillera del Condor Peace Park between Ecuador and Peru was formed to celebrate peace after long decades of military clashes, and honor those who lost their lives as a result of such conflict. While it is demilitarized, the area upholds the sovereignty and jurisdiction of each country. NGOs such as the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and the Conservation International were highly involved in the park's founding.

The Red Sea Marine Peace Park is another example. The border between Israel and Jordan needed to prevent military skirmishes as well as preserve its ecology. It became a marine park after the 1994 Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty and the 1996 Agreement on Special Arrangements for Aqaba and Eilat, to protect the coral reef and put an end to discord. The United States was instrumental in the formation of the park. The Clinton administration offered Jordan normalization of relationships with the US, as well as the canceling of debts, to arrange the Treaty. The US government spearheaded not only attempts to establish the Red Sea Park, but continues to spearhead in the park's management, via the United States Agency for International Development and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

A peace park for the ending of conflict functions as a neutral buffer zone between two countries. Unlike the Northern Limit Line in the West Sea, the Korean DMZ is not the source of much territorial dispute. There is not much disagreement as to the exact definition of the perimeters. Tensions between the two Koreas are determined by many issues outside of the DMZ, such as North

Korea's nuclear program. As such, a peace park would not necessarily alleviate the situation on the Korean peninsula.

IV. Ecological Security as a Post-modern Value[2)]

1. Modern Border versus Post-modern Border

To build a peace park does not guarantee peace-making. The neorealist perspective of international affairs assumes that nations are interested in maximizing their security, being concerned with relative gains in their competition with other states (Waltz 1979; Grieco 1988; Powell 1991; Snidal 1991). Neorealism says that it does a nation no good to gain new resources if others gain more, leaving the first nation relatively worse off. Even the prospect of large absolute gains for both parties is argued not to elicit their cooperation so long as each fears how the other will use its increased capabilities (Waltz 1979).

Even though other perspectives of international relations such as liberalism and constructivism does not exclude common security in which nation A and nation B both feel secure together, they would accept that security for both parties is not guaranteed under the modern nation-state system. Indeed, the concept of security is of modern.

〈Figure 4〉 Modern Borders

As shown in Figure 4 of the modern era, nation-states have sought to expand their jurisdiction by making their boundaries clear (Kim 2014a). National borders have become clear as nation-states have tried to maximize the size of their jurisdiction. In modern border disputes, the issue of borders has been perceived as a zero-sum situation in which if one wins an amount then the other loses the same amount.

Maritime boundaries have not been fixed even in the modern era since the sea remained outside modern peripheries. Many current border disputes are maritime ones. Modern peripheries did not tend to be friendly to foreign nations. Even though some peripheries were forced to belong to a specific centralized nation, their residents did not feel a sense of belonging to their nation and tended to dismiss their central government as an outsider as well. This is because the interests of peripheries were not well represented by their central government. The term frontier is regarded as being positive and can be compared to the term pioneer by central governments, but it is seen negatively as an imperialistic penetration by local societies.

〈Figure 5〉 Post-modern Borders

Figure 5 symbolizes post-modern borders in comparison to modern ones (Kim 2014a). International flows are connected through borders and various governance works across borders. The interests and concerns of post-modern peripheries are well represented. Non-national actors such as international organizations and non-governmental organizations work as actors for peripheries, which have not been acceptable in the modern era. This change is called glocalization. The lives of peripheries belong to their local residents and are led by local as well as global interests without respect to their nationality.

This order of time-series sequence is not always true everywhere. The pre-modern, modern, and post-modern characteristics are mixed in current territorial issues. Ecological value is a sort of post-modern values while security is considered as a modern value by traditional views of international affairs.

2. Peace Parks as Periphery

Ecological cooperation may make national boundaries thin. How ecology may function for the purpose of security depends on how the boundary of security is defined. Trans-border efforts vary in type according to the four different modes of borders of demarcation, delimitation, march and periphery (Kim 2014).

〈Table 3〉 Four Conceptual Borders

	Line (Wall)	Area (Route)
	Delimitation	Periphery
Edge (Unilateral, Centripetal)		
	Demarcation	March
Boundary (Bilateral, Centrifugal)		

Table 3 distinguishes among four kinds of borders through two criteria. First, a border may be considered as either the edge of a political entity or as the boundary between two political entities. The edge is far from the center of a centripetal entity while the boundary distinguishes two different centrifugal entities.

Second, a border may be either a line or an area. A line may be an impassable wall or protector distinguishing between in and out while an area may be a passable route or window mixing in and

out. This wall is a jurisdiction over people, resources and money. The wall controls their passage and protects against disease and other damage. If a wall is said to be a modern border, a route may be a post-modern border.

A border between militarily or ideologically warring neighbors is a 'demarcation' as seen in Table 3. In some cases, residents of border districts show more of an adversarial attitude toward neighboring nations than do those of central districts. These are observed in border districts of on-going wars or ideological confrontations. For example, the Korean DMZ is space formed by demarcation, which has a concentration of both army and civilian populations. This is the phenomenon of 'demarcation'.

On the other hand, a border may yield mutual interests if it works as a path for human and ecological interchange instead of exclusive ownership. Inhabitants of a 'periphery' in Table 3 do not distinguish between their own nation and neighboring nations. Trans-boundary Biosphere Reserves containing sparse populations are an important route for ecological values. For example, the Crown of the Continent (Glacier National Park of the US and Waterton National Park of Canada) lies in the center of the Rocky Mountains where Albert, British Columbia, and Montana meet. Glacier-Waterton was designated in 1932 as the first international peace park in the world before Glacier and Waterton were registered as a Biosphere Reserve in 1976 and 1979, respectively. This is the case of a 'periphery' in Table 3. Similarly, the International Sonoran Desert Alliance is a successful border cooperation between the US and Mexico. The ISDA is not a bilateral, but a tri-lateral or tri-cultural organization with Native American (O'odham) Reservations included. The mountainous Cordillera del Condor Peace Park and the oceanic Red Sea Marine Peace Park are examples of periphery collaboration. Most peace parks, based in a remote area, belong to this category of periphery.

'Delimitation' and 'march' are intermediate modes of borders between 'demarcation' and 'periphery'. If a border as a clear boundary line has a strong characteristic of an edge differentiated from its center, then it may be called 'delimitation'. As more people are settled into a 'delimitation' border by some central governments, the border tends to take on a characteristic of 'demarcation'.

Last, if a border is a non-edge of a relatively large size across a boundary, then it may be called a 'march'. South African rivers are *de jure* borders. However, there are frequent trans-boundary

activities which may or may not be cooperative. A border of 'march' with a relatively dense population is not differentiated from its center.

Under this framework of border concept shown in Table 3, ecological security is more likely in the 'periphery' as an edge area. Such players as international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and local societies seem to play a more positive role in trans-border cooperation than do national governments. Ecological security is more likely to be achieved when local interests as well as global needs are satisfied. Such ecological cooperation may ease military confrontation between central governments.

3. Toward a Peace Park on the Inter-Korean Border

As according to the Korean Armistice Agreement, the DMZ is in itself a peace park. As the centre of heated battles day in and day out since the start of the war in June 1950, when the Armistice Treaty on July 27, 1953 put a complete halt to any more fighting, the area was symbolic of relative peace and a confidence building measure. As an operational arms control, it was created for reducing fear and suspicion of both sides against each other. Since the 1960s, however, a period that was marked by an arms race and numerous provocations, the DMZ is no longer demilitarized. At this moment, the DMZ Peace Park is required to perform tasks of making peace as well as of keeping armistice.

If the DMZ becomes truer to its name and remains demilitarized, it could truly be a peace park, but because our reality begs to differ, the argument is that certain segments should be demilitarized, turned into a peace park, and hopefully usher in a time of greater peace. The DMZ Peace Park may function as a confidence-building measure. The peace park, based on operational arms control, may reduce the possibility of misperception of the other's intention and success of surprise attack by showing military deployment and movement.

As seen earlier, there exists no precedent that the DMZ Peace Park may wholly imitate, for no existing peace park was created without some form of prior political and military resolution. The DMZ Peace Park project must therefore fuse various elements of previous parks to create a new

model, such as one that incorporates the exhumation of veterans' remains, preservation of ecological belt for the future following reunification, and the dual models of both demarcation and periphery.

A peace park for Korea, which has yet to resolve its conflicts, must transcend existing cases to search for creative resolutions to produce peace on the peninsula. A buffer zone of some sort is necessary, in order to reduce clashes and to open the door to reconciliation; the DMZ Peace Park may be just the solution. The park should buffer itself against human destruction of nature as well as against military provocation. The North Korean expression for such a concept is 'transitional zone.' North Korean propaganda says that the term of border should not be used since there is only one unified nation. In the South, 'transitional' is understood as more of a temporal than a geographical concept. The DMZ Peace Park needs to be designed with this transitional phase as well as with the geographical range, aiming towards greater peace.

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Appendix

Participant's Biography

Participant's Biography

Opening Speech   Myoung–Kyu Park

[Current Position]
• Director of Institute for Peace and Unification Studies
• Professor of Sociology at Seoul National University

[Education]
• B.A. Seoul National University
• M.A. Seoul National University
• Ph.D. History Sociology, Nation Sociology, Inter-Korean Relations, Seoul National University

[Career]
• Visiting Professor, University of California at Berkeley (US), 2004-05
• Visiting Professor, Kyushu University (Japan), 2003
• Visiting Scholar, University of California at Irvine (US), 1998-99
• Visiting Scholar, Harvard-Yenching Institute, 1989-1990

[Publications]
• *Sociology of Boundaries in Inter-Korean Relations (2012)*
• *Nation, People and Citizen: Korean Political Subjectivities from the Conceptual History (2009)*
• *North Korean Diaspora (2011)*
• *EU and North Korea: Humanitarianism or Business (2010)*

[Current Position]
• Professor, Economics at Seoul National University
• Vice Director of Institute for Peace and Unification Studies

[Education]
• B.A. Seoul National University
• M.A. Seoul National University
• Ph.D. The University of Oxford

[Career]
• Member of Policy Advisory Committee for Ministry of Unification and Evaluation Committee for Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[Publications]
• Financial Sector Reform in Transition Economies: Implications for North Korea (co-edited with Cheng Hoon Lim), IMF and SNU Press, 2009. 9.
• Scenarios for a Transition to a Prosperous Market Economy in North Korea (with Gerard Roland), International Economic Journal, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2012, 511-539.
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• The Possibility of Economic Reform in North Korea (with Keun Lee and Insook Lee), Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 39, No. 2, 2009, 279-294.
• Assessing the Economic Performance of North Korea, 1954-1989: Estimates and Growth Accounting Analysis (with S. Kim and Keun Lee), Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 35, No. 3, 2007, 564-582.

[Current Position]
• Professor at the Department of International Relations in Seoul National University
• Director of the Center for International Studies at Seoul National University.

[Education]
• B.A. Seoul National University
• M.A. Seoul National University
• Ph.D. Northwestern University

[Career]
• A member of Advisory Committee for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Reunification.
• Visiting professor at Keio University in Tokyo from 2010-2011.

[Publications]
• *East Asian International Relations: From History to Theory (Seoul, East Asia Institute, 2011)*
• *Is Politics Moral: Reinhold Niebuhr's Transcendental Realism (Seoul, Han Gil Sa, 2011)*
• *"U.S.-China relations after 2008 economic crisis," "Critique of constructivism from the perspective of postmodernism and realism," "The Rise of New Powers and the Responding Strategies of Other Countries"*

[Current Position]

• Dean of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences at Ben Gurion University

[Education]

• B.A. Geography, Queen Mary College at the University of London, England (1978)
• Ph.D. Geography, The University of Durham, England (1981).

[Career]

• Editor of the academic journal Geopolitics
• Founder of the Department of Politics and Government in 1997, and the Centre for the Study of Politics and Society (CSEPS)
• Member of the International editorial board of the Journal of Borderland Studies

[Publications]

• The Israeli-Palestinian conflict (2012)
• Weekly op-ed column in the Jerusalem Post

[Current Position]

• Professor of Russian foreign policy and Sino-Russian relations at the Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University

[Education]

• Ph.D. School of Law at Kyushu University

[Career]

• Leader of the Global COE Program "Reshaping Japan's Border Studies"
• Chief editor of Eurasia Border Review
• The Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Prize (2007)
• The Osaragi Jiro Prize (2006)

[Publications]

• *Toward a New Dialogue on Eurasia: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Its Partners* (2007)
• *Eager Eyes Fixed on Eurasia: Vol. 1 Russia and Its Neighbors in Crisis and Vol. 2 Russia and Its Eastern Edge.* Slavic Eurasian Studies No. 16-1, 2. (2007)
• Japanese Northern Territorial Issues: Neither Four nor Zero, nor Two. (2005)
• 4,000 Kilometer Journey along the Sino-Russian Border (2004)
• A Study on the Paradigm of Soviet Foreign Policy: Socialism, Sovereignty and International Law (1999).

[Current Position]
• Humanities Korea Professor at the Institute for Peace and Unification

[Education]
• B.A. Pharmacy, Seoul National University
• Ph.D. Philosophy, Moscow State University

[Career]
• Research professor at the Research Institute of Comparative History and Culture at Hanyang University
• Research professor at the Peace & Democracy Institute at Korea University

[Publications]
• *Deconstruction and Nostalgia* (2012)
• *The Contemporary Russian Society and Popular Culture* (2008)
• *Между жизнью и культурой: философско-эстетический прект М. М. Бахтина* (2008)

[Current Position]

• Professor, Department of Political Science and International Studies, Yonsei University

[Education]

• B.A. 1990, Political Science and Diplomacy, Yonsei University

• M.A. 1992, Political Science, Yonsei University

• Ph.D. 2004, Political Science, University of Chicago

[Career]

• 2004-2010 Assistant-Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii at Manoa

• 2003-2004 Visiting Assistant Professor (full-time), Department of Political Science, University of Oregon

[Publications]

• "Civil Society under Authoritarian Rule: Bansanghoe and Extraordinary Everydayness in Korean Neighborhoods," with Sungmoon Kim, *Korea Journal*, vol. 54, no. 4 (2014)

• "Dynamics of Ethnic Nationalism and Hierarchical Nationhood: Korean Nation and its Otherness since the late 1980s," with Donghoon Seol, *Korea Journal*, vol. 54, no. 3 (2014)

• "Rethinking Beijing's Geostrategic Sensibilities to Tibet and Xinjiang: Images and Interests," with Young Chul Cho, *Pacific Focus*, vol. 28, no. 2 (2013)

• "Failure to Democratize: Exclusive Parliamentary Politics in Nepal (1990-2002), *Korea Journal of International Studies*, vol. 11, no. 1 (2013)

• *North Korea in Transition*, with Scott Snyder et. al, Rowman and Littlefield, 2013

• "Post-1980s Multicultural Immigrant Neighborhoods: Koreatowns, Spatial Identities and Host Regions in the Pacific Rim," with James Spencer and Petrice Flowers, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 38, no. 3 (2012)

[Current Position]

• Humanities Korea Professor at the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, SNU (from 2012)

[Education]

• B.A. Chonnam National University, 1980

• M.A. Seoul National University, 1985

• Ph.D. University of California, Irvine, 1991

[Career]

• Senior Fellow, Korea Institute for National Unification, 1992-2003

• Visiting Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 2002-2003

• Professor, Hiroshima Peace Institute-Hiroshima City University, 2003-2012

[Publications]

• *North Korea under Kim Jong Il: From Consolidation to Systemic Dissonance* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2006)

• *Regional Cooperation and Its Enemies in Northeast Asia* (London: Routledge, 2006, with Edward Friedman)

• *Engagement with North Korea* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2009, with David Kang)

• *State Violence in East Asia* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2013, with N. Ganesan)

[Current Position]

• Humanities Korea Professor, Ewha Institute for the Humanities at Ewha Womans University

[Education]

• Ph.D. The Graduate School of humanities and Social Sciences, Tsukuba University

[Career]

Humanities Korea Research Professor, Institute for Japanese Studies at Seoul National University

[Publications]

• "Comeback of Chunhyangjeon as a play in Japanese to Chosun in 1938 and Booming Chosun Culture in Empire Japan"
• "Shigeharu Nakano and Korea: a Monologue of Thoughts Pursuing Solidarity"
• *Japan's Knowledge Landscape in the Post-War Era*

[Current Position]

• Professor, College of Liberal Studies, Seoul National University

[Education]

• B.A. Anthropology, Seoul National University, 1978

• M.A. Anthropology, Seoul National University, 1983

• Ph.D. Anthropology, Harvard University. 1991

[Career]

• Korean National Commission for UNESCO

• Head of the Policy and Planning Committee for the Korean Federation for Environmental Movement

• Member of the Presidential Commission for Sustainable Development.

[Publications]

• Korean Anthropology: Contemporary Korean Culture in Flux / 공저/ UNESCO & Hollym / 2002

• *Company as Community: An Anthropological Study of a Japanese Business Organization, Koreans in Asia and the Pacific Region, What Happened to the People of Lake Shihwa?*

• *My First Encounter with Cultural Anthropology*

[Current Position]

• Lecturer in Korean Studies, Leiden University

[Education]

• Ph.D. Japanese Studies, K.U. Leuven, Belgium (1994)

• M.A. (Licentiate degree) Sino-Japanese Studies, K.U.Leuven, Belgium (1986)

[Career]

• Chairman of the European Forum for Korean-Japanese History

• Chairman of the European Forum for Korean-Japanese History

• Managing co-editor of e-journal Korean Histories

• Member of the editorial board of the Bulletin de l'École française d'Extrême Orient

• Editorial board member Review of Korean Studies

• Editorial board member of Sungkyun Journal of East Asian Studies

• Researcher for Overseas Historical Materials, National Institute for Korean History (R.O. Korea)

[Publications]

• with Valérie Gelézeau and Alain Delissen, eds. *De-Bordering Korea: Tangible and Intangible Legacies of the Sunshine Policy* (Routledge, forthcoming)

• with J. Melissen, eds. *Ending the North Korean Nuclear Crisis – Six Parties, Six Perspectives* (The Hague: Clingendael Institute) 226p. (2008)

• with David Heather, *North Korean Posters. The David Heather Collection* (Munich: Prestel Verlag, 2008) 285p. (2008)

• *The World according to Kim Jong Il* (From the collection of W. van der Bijl and R.J.C.M. De Groen (private publication) 80p. (2004)

[Current Position]
• Professor, History Department, Changwon National University, Korea

[Education]
• B.A. Seoul National University, Korea
• M.A. Seoul National University, Korea
• Ph.D. Seoul National University, Korea

[Career]
• 2001. 1. ~ 2002. 12.: Visiting Scholar, Korea Institute of Harvard University.
• 2011. 3. - 2011. 8. : Visiting Scholar, History Dept. of Beijing University.
• 2011. 9. - 2012. 8. Visiting Scholar, International Research Center for Japanese Studies(kyoto)

[Publications]
• Jul. 1997. *Korean Nationalism and the Relationship between the North and South: Politics of Division and Reunification* (Seoul: Seoul National University Press). This book won *the Baeksang Award* for the best book of 1997.
• Aug. 1997. Annotated *Paikbum Diary*(Seoul: Tolbaegae); Selected at famous program "!, Let's Read Books", MBC(Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation, Korea), selected 100 Books of Korea in Frankfurt Book Fair 2005 and translated in Germay as Das Tagebuch von Baekbeom(Germany: Abera).
• Jul 2002. *Tomorrow of Division, and History of Reunification Movement in Korea* (Seoul: Dangdae), selected one of Excellent Academic Books, 2002 of Ministry of Culture, Korea.

[Current Position]

• Humanities Korea Research Professor at the Institute for Peace and Unification

[Education]

• B.A. Seoul National University

• M.A. Seoul National University

• Ph.D. Political Science, University of South Carolina

[Career]

• Senior researcher of the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies

[Publications]

• "International Humanitarianism and Refugee Protection: Consequences of Labeling and Politicization,"
  Journal of International and Area Studies Vol. 20, No. 2 (2013)

• *Inter-Korean Integration Index 2008~2013: Changes and Implication* (2013)

• *North Korean Diaspora* (2011)

[Current Position]

• Professor of Political Science at Hallym University

[Education]

• B.A. in Political Science (International Relations), Seoul National University, 1984

• M.A. in Political Science, University of Rochester, 1987

• Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Rochester, 1989

[Career]

• National Fellow, Hoover Institution 2008-2009

• Pre-doctoral Fellow, Stanford University 1987-1988

[Publications]

• More than 200 (books and articles)

[Current Position]

• Professor, Kyung Hee University, Graduate School of Pan-Pacific & International Studies

[Education]

• B.A. History, St. Meinrad College, Indiana, USA

• M.A. Agricultural Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA

• Ph.D. Development Studies, University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA

[Career]

• North Korea and Northeast Asia Representative, American Friends Service Committee (1991-97)

• North Korea Country Representative, World Vision International (1997-2000)

• Associate Director, Center for East Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin-Madison (2000-2004)

• Country Representative, Korea, The Asia Foundation (2004-2011)

[Publications]

• "Korean Unification: A Distant Dream," Enduring Issues Series, ABC-CLIO Publishers (Published online, December 2013).

• "Agricultural Development in South and North Korea: Common Challenges, Different Outcomes," presentation at international workshop on "Lessons from Asia's Economic Transitions," Hanoi, September 2013

• "Development Assistance and Humanitarian Aid," in Scott Snyder, ed., *The US–South Korea Alliance: Meeting New Security Challenges,* Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012.

• "Some Lessons based on U.S. Non-Governmental Engagement with North Korea," In Gi-wook Shin and Karin Lee, eds., *U.S.–DPRK Educational Exchanges: Assessment and Future Strategy*, Stanford University, Shorestein APARC, 2011.

• "From Charity to Partnership: South Korean NGO Engagement with North Korea." In Sung Chull Kim and David C. Kang, eds. *Engagement with North Korea: A Viable Alternative*, SUNY Press, 2009.

[Current Position]

• Professor of International Law and Vice Dean for External Affairs, Inha University Law School, Korea

[Education]

• B.A. (LL.B.) Korea University

• M.A. (LL.M.s) NYU, Minnesota, and Korea University

• Ph.D. Oxford University

[Career]

• Director of Inha Int'l Ocean Law

• Chairman of the Foundation for the Development of International Law in Asia (DILA)

• Executive Editor of *The Korean Journal of International and Comparative Law*

[Publications]

• *The Limits of Maritime Jurisdiction* (co-edited; Brill/Martinus Nijhoff (2014))

• *Ocean Resources: New Challenges and Emerging Regimes* (co-edited; Brill/Martinus Nijhoff (2013))

• *Northeast Asian Perspectives on International Law: Contemporary Issues and Challenges* (co-edited; Brill/Martinus Nijhoff (2013))

• *Asian Approaches to International Law and the Legacy of Colonialism and Imperialism: The Law of the Sea, Territorial Disputes and International Dispute Settlement* (co-edited; Routledge (2013))

• *Dokdo: Historical Appraisal and International Justice* (co-edited; Martinus Nijhoff (2011)).

• "A Tribunal Navigating Complex Waters: Implications of The *Bay of Bengal Case*", *Ocean Development & International Law* (2013) (co-worked)

• "Republic of Korea v. Araye: *Korean Supreme Court Decision on Universal Jurisdiction over Somali Pirates*", *American Journal of International Law* (2012) (co-worked)

• "DOKDO: The San Francisco Peace Treaty, International Law on Territorial Disputes, and Historical Criticism", *Asian Perspective* (2011)

• "The 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty and Its Relevance to the Sovereignty of Dokdo", *Chinese Journal of International Law* (2010) (co-worked)

[Current Position]

• Humanities Korea Professor at the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, SNU

Education]

• B.A. SungKyunKwan University, 1984

• M.A. Indiana State University, 1986

• Ph.D. Rutgers University, 1991

[Career]

• Senior Fellow (1993-2003) and Director (2002), Korea Institute for National Unification

• Assistant Professor, Asia United Theological University, 2003-2006

• Standing Committee Member, The National Unification Advisory Council, 2013-present

• Advisory Committee Members, National Intelligence Service, Ministry of Defense, Korea Broadcasting System, Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation

[Publications]

• *Division of Korean Peninsula and Peaceless Life* (2013)

• *Kim Jong Eun Succession System* (2011)

• *North Korean Diaspora* (2011)

• *Flexible and Complex Unification* (2010)

• *Formation and Structure of Socioeconomic Network between North Korea and China* (2008)

[Current Position]

• Professor, Duksung Women's University

[Education]

• Ph.D. The Department of Anthropology, University of Illinois

[Career]

• Professor, University of North Korean Studies

• Vice director of the Rainbowyouth Center, a South Korean NGO

[Publications]

• Education for Young North Korean Migrants:South Koreans' Ambivalent "Others" and the Challenges of Belonging. *The Review of Korean Studies* Volume 14 Number 1 (March 2011): 89-112.