

- **Some observations about Pyonyang's perspective on resuming talks**
- **Changes in the international environment have had a strong impact on DPRK ever since its foundation.**
- **It is true that on some occasions the events have given the leadership an opportunity to improve their position, but also that most events have had a basically negative impact.**
- **New events have had an impact today**
- **The liberal reforms 2002 had a background in some reforms during the 1980ies, which bore the trademark of Kim Jong Il**
- **The liberal reforms have now been reversed and the regime tries to neutralize their results, but that causes contradictions in the system.**
- **For the time being liberalization is out of question and possibly negotiating the nuclear program as well**
- **The reasons are**
 - No real improvement in industry, no growth that can generate capital formation**
 - **Global economic downturn and serious doubts about the merits of China's and Vietnam's economic experiments**

- **China and USA have agreed to cooperate about the economic crisis but China's intentions with building a blue-water navy appear to possibly have to do with its claim to military control over the South China Sea. US reactions so far restrained but obviously "disturbed".**
- **Before stabilization of the economic situation and Sino-US relations as well as other regional insecurity factors and its own domestic situation the regime is likely to resist attempts to make it negotiate again**
- **Maybe invitations can be (unwillingly) accepted, but serious talks are likely to take much more time and efforts to achieve, not to speak of results**