This research note examines the use of depleted uranium weapons in contemporary military interventions and the hazardous effects of their use. It also demonstrates attempts made by the United States and the United Kingdom to block any international efforts to ban the use of these weapons. Although there is no laboratory evidence, experiential evidence from Iraq indicates that depleted uranium weapons are dangerous to human health and the environment. This research note argues that the United Nations should play a leading role in seeking a ban on the use of these weapons in military interventions.

The history of Australia’s attempts to acquire a nuclear deterrent capacity transpired both within and outside the spirit of the international Atoms for Peace program. While this article reprises a range of scholarship to provide a historical overview, it provides for the first time a level of detail not previously disclosed concerning the mechanisms, costs, and approaches of successive Australian governments in their estimations of obtaining an indigenous nuclear capacity. One such revelation concerns Australia’s “back-door” acquisition option by hosting Peaceful Nuclear Explosions, ostensibly for civil engineering purposes, and their provision of preassembled thermonuclear technologies and devices. During the international and bilateral negotiations for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Australia was deeply concerned that the draft Treaty would limit or deny this option.