The discussions on peace in Japan have significantly changed since the end of the Second World War. This can be clearly illustrated by the development of the peace studies field, which has been strongly influenced by the pacifism of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and the experiences of the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This article traces the historical development of Japanese peace studies and analyzes its characteristics. Since pacifism has been accepted as the key element for understanding political culture in Japan since 1945, peace research, the practice of peace education, and peace museums are also regarded as important factors that constitute Japanese peace studies and peace culture.

Member-states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) support the norms of nuclear disarmament and nuclear security through diplomatic efforts at the global level and regional efforts to promote nuclear safety and security. This is demonstrated in how ASEAN helped push for negotiation of the Treaty on the Prohibition of nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and its eventual passage, as well as ongoing efforts to promote regional cooperation in advancing nuclear security and nuclear safety. Regional frameworks and mechanisms like the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy (ASEANTOM), the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the East Asia Summit provide the platforms for ASEAN to advance its diplomacy in promoting the norms of nuclear governance.

India and hence modifies their strategic priorities. The prevailing security dynamics in the region, such as changing nature of conflicts, introduction of new technologies, evolving deterrent force postures, and suspension of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), have increased states’ reliance on arms build-up and decreased their inclination to arms control and disarmament. This paper offers a Pakistani perspective on how the prevailing regional environment seems less favorable to nuclear disarmament and more inclined to deterrent force modernization. To explain the above rationale, this study takes guidance from primary and secondary sources to assess disarmament challenges, and discusses the prospects for creating a new security environment in the region to promote a renewed consensus on nuclear disarmament.

Weaker parties in a negotiation can change the assumed structural outcome of the negotiation by using strategies such as time delay tactics, which lead to entrapment. In this article, the Six-Party Talks are evaluated empirically to explore the utility of applying this bargaining tactic insight into international relations. The article applies Galin’s (2015) five stages of time delay tactics to the fifth and sixth rounds of the Six-Party Talks, with a focus on the triangular relations between the United States, South Korea, and North Korea. The article shows how North Korea as the weaker negotiating party used the time delay tactic to affect the fifth and sixth rounds of the Six-Party negotiations in its favor. North Korea’s use of several tactics included slowing down negotiations as much as possible, avoiding reaching a final agreement, prolonging negotiations by diversion, dragging out the negotiation process until some external or internal change occurs, and exhausting opponents until they are ready to concede. These tactics ultimately entrapped North Korea’s opponents resulting in the unsuccessful outcome of the Six-Party Talks.

South Asia as a security zone is full of puzzles. The enigmatic character of South Asia is comprised its evolving nature, the complex conceptualization of its dominant security challenges, and the difficulty of finding solutions to these challenges. Some common security challenges that South Asian countries face require global solutions. The nuclear conundrum of India and Pakistan can only be solved by global solutions because of the complexity posed by the nuclear weapon countries located outside South Asia. Similarly, cyber security is a borderless problem. South Asian countries may manage their security challenges like terrorism with a cooperative framework, yet the increasing global connection to these regional problems complicates the search for solutions.

With the North Korean waves of armament race in 2017-19, noted by the diplomacy of the Trump Administration, de-nuclearization has become a top priority for the Korean peninsula. In the meantime potentials for economic reforms in North Korea, perhaps even to the point of systemic change, are still open issues, as the need to feed people and improve the dismal economic performance remains high on the agenda. What lessons might be learned from the systemic change of Central and Eastern Europe for the context of East Asia? Implications based on International Relation (IR) theory are suggested.

In 2001, the Finnish Parliament approved the plan for a high-level nuclear waste (HLW) repository in Finland, the first move of its kind worldwide. This article analyzes the historical background of radioactive waste policy formation in Finland, comparing it to that of (West) Germany in the Cold War context and after. Military ambitions and non-proliferation, political culture and civil society, and energy policy are considered. In Germany, reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel (SNF), which could make nuclear armament possible, was pursued until 1989 and often spurred opposition movements. Finland, in contrast, renounced reprocessing around 1980. In addition, there was a notable absence of a strong nationwide anti-nuclear movement in Finland against the backdrop of the Cold War.

“Wismut” was the code name of the uranium mine located in the East German provinces of Saxony and Thuringia. It was founded to supply the Soviet Union with materials for nuclear weapons. Under harsh conditions, miners received various material benefits. However, the work at Wismut led to health problems for workers and caused environmental damage. After German reunification, the Wismut GmbH Company was founded to carry out a clean-up operation. Despite spending enormous amounts of time and money, the restoration and decontamination of the area is not complete. The discourse over Wismut should not be mere nostalgia of hard mining work or the success of decontamination. A perspective is needed that connects the victims of Wismut with that of other nuclear sites as “Global Hibakusha.”

French nuclear research began for military purposes and then further developed for business. This article traces the history of French nuclear development from the establishment of the French Atomic Energy Commission in 1945 to the present by dividing this period into six phases. Contrary to previous studies which focus on certain periods, seventy years of French nuclear history is investigated here. It describes the transition from military to civilian use, the development of the nuclear fuel cycle including the fast breeder reactor, spent nuclear fuel reprocessing, and disposal research. Additionally, based on a historical case study of the Marcoule site, the oldest nuclear site in France, this article shows that France will rely on back-end nuclear technology to survive in the twenty-first century.

This article traces the history of the development and construction of the first prototypes and operating nuclear power plants, all as part of the Manhattan Project. Beginning with CP-1, the first self-sustained nuclear chain reaction in 1942, it details subsequent Manhattan Project reactors and then examines the construction and operation of the first modern nuclear power plants built at Hanford, Washington. These were built for the sole purpose of manufacturing plutonium for nuclear weapons. The article argues that nuclear power was born violent: it was invented as part of the manufacturing process of nuclear weaponry. This argument goes beyond previous historiography focusing on the technological development of nuclear power to emphasize the purpose of its development, the mass and indiscriminate killing of human beings.

This article serves as the introduction to the special issue “Legacies of nuclear Power, Future of nuclear Politics” of the Asian Journal of Peacebuilding.

Following the 2010 nuclear deal between Russia and Turkey, several consequent revelations of administrative deficiencies in the Turkish nuclear program, the Fukushima accident, and waste issues all spurted widespread protests across Turkey. This study analyzes how groups opposing nuclear power plants have framed the Akkuyu nuclear project as a dangerous, risky, disadvantageous, and irrational policy choice. Through analysis of empirical data from a range of sources such as in situ observation, semi-structured interviews, articles, and websites, the study considers the core issues raised and arguments given by the opponents.

The effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime is no longer as sturdy as it once was and new infusions of creativity are greatly needed. Concentrating on positive incentives may better promote non-proliferation. Incentives targeting industry have a higher chance of success due to their vast influence in multiple governments. The IAEA’s ElBaradei Report is one conceptualizatoin of an intergovernmental nuclear fuel supply bank. As a multilateral approach, nuclear fuel banks promote more opportunities for diplomacy amongst states. While it is only one approach to overcoming the current crisis of the non-proliferation regime, it has the potential to make a huge difference in how the world handles nuclear power on a supranational basis.

The aim of this paper is to examine the reasoning behind the ongoing U.S. policy of, in effect, ignoring Israel’s nuclear capability. By law, the American administration is obligated to impose sanctions on every country that joins the “nuclear Club.” Despite this, not only has the United States not imposed sanctions on Israel, but the latter enjoys the lion’s share of U.S. foreign aid. This article tries to follow the logic of this policy. My hypothesis is that by ignoring Israel’s nuclear policy (of ambiguity), the United States can continue to declare her ongoing commitment to the security of Israel, while not having to anchor it in a formal pact. By adopting such a policy, both sides can “have their cake and eat it too.”

This article interprets and analyzes the role of China in and the prospects of denuclearization of North Korea. Driven by its ruling party’s peculiar political interest of resisting, reducing, and replacing American power at the expense of its national interest of cooperating with the United States, Beijing has been alternatively facilitating (somewhat) and fettering (mostly) North Korean denuclearization to make the cause unavoidably long and arduous, if doable at all. The latest resumption of Beijing-Pyongyang ties, in reaction to the Trump-Kim summit, suggests that a fundamental change in Beijing’s strategic stance on the North Korean nuclear issue has taken place, making genuinely enabling peaceful denuclearization of the DPRK rather difficult as it would require literally a political change-of-heart in Beijing.

Turkey’s interest in nuclear technology has increased over the years. The aim of this article is to summarize, synthetize, update, and contextualize Turkey’s nonproliferation policies and link it to the broader discussion on nuclear latency. The article first attempts to show the shortcomings of several latency arguments by overviewing the factors that affect Turkey’s latency status. The main finding of the article is that Turkey’s latency in terms of technology will increase, yet that increase cannot be predicted as potent enough to result in latency potential in terms of a nuclear weapons program in the short- and medium-term without a serious change in international and domestic politics.

Contrary to its humanist image, Hidankyo, the Japan Confederation of Atomic and Hydrogen Bomb Sufferers Organizations, has engaged in contentious politics against the state for decades. This article traces the little-known history of the Hidankyo movement from the mid-1950s to the early 1980s, introducing how this organization formed in relation to the movement to ban nuclear bombs in the mid-1950s and how it grew into an independent social movement organization with clear policy demands after overcoming an organizational crisis triggered by the Cold War politics of the 1960s. The movement slogan for Hidankyo, “no more hibakusha,” did not naturally emerge from the sufferers’ experience with the atomic bombings, but was substantiated through their struggles to confront their adversaries, most importantly the Japanese government.

North Korea’s unchecked missile and nuclear program is one of the most pressing global security concerns. This article evaluates the multilateral engagement efforts that have been pursued by regional stakeholders, specifically assessing the Six-Party Talks vis-a-vis the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and explaining why these multilateral efforts have failed to resolve the nuclear crisis. Given the poor performances of these two multilateral platforms, this article seeks to assess the feasibility and policy implications of defusing the longstanding nuclear crisis through multilateral engagement. Despite stalling and a myriad of obstacles, the Six-Party Talks has a better chance than the ARF at curbing the nuclear crisis. At best, the ARF can contribute by playing a complementary role by helping deescalate tensions or cultivating better diplomatic ties.

Controversial and insufficient post-accident measures implemented by the Japanese government after the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident in 2011 have caused prolonged anxieties over radiation. These anxieties resulted in multiple insecurities, including health, economic, food, environmental, community, personal, and political insecurities. The Fukushima disaster shows that threats to human security may come not only from the manifest “enemy” outside, but from “dysfunction of the state” supported by peoples’ choices to sacrifice the victims for the sake of the interests of the “majority,” which is called a “sacrificial system.” At the same time, people are still patiently trying to restore their human security by means of voluntary actions.

This article addresses the question of what has contributed to the difference between German and Japanese nuclear politics in the post-Fukushima era. Germany has decided to phase out nuclear energy, but Japan has done the opposite. The origin of this difference can be traced back to the development of the anti-nuclear peace movement in the early 1980s. West Germans turned against nuclear energy as well as nuclear weapons, whereas Japanese peace activists carefully avoided the nuclear energy issue because of their concern over U.S.-Japan relations. The West German peace movement in the following years was in a position to foster cooperation between East and West Germans, whereas the Japanese movement missed the chance to go beyond the Cold War mentality.

The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime once again faces a serious challenge in the run-up to the NPT Review Conference scheduled for April 27 to May 22, 2015. This can be attributed to the perceived delay in implementation of commitments made by the states parties at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Although the 2015 Review Conference is still half a year away, shaky U.S.-Russia relations, the armed conflict directly involving the Israelis and Palestinians, and the outcome of the U.S. mid-term elections will not be conducive to the review process. Both the nuclear-weapon states and the non-nuclear-weapon states should redouble their efforts to narrow their differences on key issues.

The Japanese and Australian governments supported the establishment of the International Commission on nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND) in 2008. During its two-year mandate, the ICNND organized international conferences in Sydney, Washington, Moscow, and Hiroshima. The commission made specific proposals in a final report entitled Eliminating nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policy Makers. This research note examines the significance of the report, while paying special attention to its limitations. In particular, this study criticizes the nuclear policies of Japan and Australia that have depended upon U.S. extended nuclear deterrence and peaceful use of atomic energy. Finally, it suggests five alternatives for Japan and Australia so that both countries can resume further endeavors towards a world free of nuclear threats.

This article sheds light on the foreign policies of China, Russia, and Turkey towards the controversial Iranian nuclear program and analyzes to what extent their policies are indicative of a security culture that resists hegemony. While advocating a nonhegemonic security culture discursively, China, Russia, and Turkey still partially adhere to hegemonic power structures on a behavioral level. These states’ policies are the outcome of a balancing act between resistance to hegemony and hegemonic accommodation. The analysis in this article nuances the idea that counter-hegemonic discourses of rising powers always herald a revisionist power transition. The article thereby makes a contribution to the scholarly debate about emerging powers and the coexistence between declining hegemonic powers and norm-shapers in the making.

The history of Australia’s attempts to acquire a nuclear deterrent capacity transpired both within and outside the spirit of the international Atoms for Peace program. While this article reprises a range of scholarship to provide a historical overview, it provides for the first time a level of detail not previously disclosed concerning the mechanisms, costs, and approaches of successive Australian governments in their estimations of obtaining an indigenous nuclear capacity. One such revelation concerns Australia’s “back-door” acquisition option by hosting Peaceful nuclear Explosions, ostensibly for civil engineering purposes, and their provision of preassembled thermonuclear technologies and devices. During the international and bilateral negotiations for the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Australia was deeply concerned that the draft Treaty would limit or deny this option.

How would North Korea’s development of the capability to target the United States with nuclear weapons influence its foreign policy? I argue that it would cause more dangerous crises than those of the last decade, and predict that these crises would eventually cause Kim Jong Un and his senior military associates to experience fear of imminent nuclear war or conventional regime change. I show that the effect of such fear would depend on whether or not Kim believes that he has control over the occurrence of these events. I argue that if he experiences fear and believes that he has some control over whether these extreme events actually happen, he will moderate his nuclear threats and behave more like other experienced nuclear powers. But if he experiences fear and believes that he has no control, he will likely pursue policies that could cause nuclear war. I use this insight to prescribe and proscribe policies for Washington, Seoul and the regional community.

The history of nuclear weapon testing by the major nuclear powers during the Cold War is intimately tied to the history of military colonialism in the 20th century. For each of the first five nuclear powers (U.S., USSR, UK, France, and China) the process of selecting a site for nuclear weapon testing was driven more by the location of a small group of politically marginalized people unable to object to being exposed to dangerous levels of radioactive fallout, to the loss of their homes, and the contamination of the land and seas providing their primary food sources, than it was by scientific and military requirements. Invariably these populations were constituted of people of a different racial, ethnic or religious group than that of the colonial power. This article examines the selection of nuclear test sites for each of the five major nuclear powers both in the reaches of their military empires and their own domestic landmasses.

This article examines the issue of coercively preventing states from acquiring and possessing nuclear weapons. In questioning whether such coercion is morally legitimate, I argue that Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) political theory contains important resources compared with three rival perspectives: Realpolitik, the Just War Tradition, and Deontological Pacifism. I also argue that coercive anti-proliferation measures are conditionally legitimated by three distinctive Kantian concepts: First, his concept of International Justice allows for coercion against genuinely aggressive states engaged in nuclear aspiration. Second, given the imperfections of international justice institutions, his concept of a State of Peoples – an authorized global governance body – seems to provide a better guarantee of just forms of coercive nuclear anti-proliferation. Third, supplementing the first two concepts, Kant discusses a Cosmopolitan Right to share the earth’s surface. This concept justifies coercive anti-proliferation when a people’s right to existence as citizens of the earth is threatened by nuclear weapons.

The institution of nuclear power in Japan appears to be drifting; nevertheless it persists. For the past 60 years, conservative politicians, technologists, and electric companies have acted in concert, for different reasons, to achieve a full nuclear fuel cycle: specifically technology for reprocessing and uranium enrichment. Their pursuit has eroded the bottom-line spirit of peaceful use; to be sure, it has been excessively ambitious for Japan’s status as a non-nuclear-weapon state. The mastering of the full nuclear fuel cycle has resulted in a competency trap, excluding or delaying development of alternatives to nuclear power. Furthermore, this situation has heightened nuclear power’s sunk costs. The critical conjuncture of the March 11, 2011 incident has had a limited impact only. Anti-nuclear activists, the weakest concerned actor, try to dramatize their movement for “exit from nuclear,” but they have failed to bring about electoral changes.