The Japanese and Australian governments supported the establishment of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND) in 2008. During its two-year mandate, the ICNND organized international conferences in Sydney, Washington, Moscow, and Hiroshima. The commission made specific proposals in a final report entitled Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policy Makers. This research note examines the significance of the report, while paying special attention to its limitations. In particular, this study criticizes the nuclear policies of Japan and Australia that have depended upon U.S. extended nuclear deterrence and peaceful use of atomic energy. Finally, it suggests five alternatives for Japan and Australia so that both countries can resume further endeavors towards a world free of nuclear threats.

The history of Australia’s attempts to acquire a nuclear deterrent capacity transpired both within and outside the spirit of the international Atoms for Peace program. While this article reprises a range of scholarship to provide a historical overview, it provides for the first time a level of detail not previously disclosed concerning the mechanisms, costs, and approaches of successive Australian governments in their estimations of obtaining an indigenous nuclear capacity. One such revelation concerns Australia’s “back-door” acquisition option by hosting Peaceful Nuclear Explosions, ostensibly for civil engineering purposes, and their provision of preassembled thermonuclear technologies and devices. During the international and bilateral negotiations for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Australia was deeply concerned that the draft Treaty would limit or deny this option.