Peace and conflict studies in Thailand is considerably influenced by the security narrative prescribed by the state and manipulated for political purposes. The field of study consequently promotes the interests of the Thai state rather than exploring the socio-political factors that have sustained the longevity of conflicts in the first place. This outcome is most evident in the cases of violence in the three southernmost provinces of Thailand—Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat—and the ongoing political conflict between royalists and their opponents. Because the focus is on national security, the field often overlooks the human aspect of peace and conflicts. This state-centric focus has influenced Thai peace and conflicts studies to take an inwardlooking approach, raising the possibility of it disconnecting from international scholarship.

The concept of Human Security argues that the improvement of people’s wellbeing and livelihoods is a vital component in the stability of the state. What happens, however, when the state is not viewed as the only (if at all) source of influence on people’s everyday security? This article argues for a particular vernacular of human security that recognizes a social contract between the living with spirit actants, in ways that can often compete with or challenge state-building efforts. In Timor-Leste, ancestral spirits (matebian sira) can directly intervene in the physical safety of their living descendants, and livelihoods (in terms of food security) often depends on engagement between the living and their ancestors as well as nature spirits (rai-nainsira).

Several jihadist groups sought a safe haven in the Sahel region following the defeat of Daesh in Syria and Iraq, making it a hotbed of terrorist activities. These groups have relied on crime, amongst other strategies, to survive and expand. Such strategies serve as the groups’ lifeblood and help them forge alliances with local actors. The appeal of radical jihadist discourse capitalizes on human insecurities as manifested in political, environmental, and demographic challenges. This article considers not only the new threats to Human Security in the Sahel, but also the need for a multidimensional, inclusive, dialogue-based solution. Promoting development and social cohesion centered on Human Security could achieve better results in the region than resorting to external military intervention.

This article seeks to answer the questions of whether sanctions are ‘smart’ as designed and why if they are not. Evidence appears to suggest that smart sanctions are not ‘intelligent’ enough to change political leaders’ alleged violent behavior or to protect innocent civilians from direct or physical as well as indirect or structural violence. Targeted government officials can always find ways to outsmart the sanction sender actors by resisting the latter’s coercive efforts because of their willingness and ability to take repressive action against their people and find alternative trading partners as well as support from powerful undemocratic states. Instead of minimizing human suffering, sanctions tend to exacerbate regime insecurity and perpetuate international alliance politics. The cases of Myanmar and North Korea validate this proposition.

Human Security should not be considered as a mere academic rhetoric-it is, in fact, a political tool aimed at transforming individuals from conditions of exploitation and domination to that of political participation and accountability. This paper adopts political governance perspectives to analyze Human Security in Africa. It argues that without accountable democratic governance, the expressed objectives of Human Security would be difficult to achieve in Africa. By this focus, the paper adopts a broader view of Human Security, satisfying both the governance and development prerequisites of the concept, which has underpinned [in] security in Africa. The overall estimation of Human Security in Africa is that only a marginal improvement has been made in the region, especially over the last decade.

East Asia is a region deeply affected by colonial, ideological, and national wars. At the level of international governance, security organizations in the region have looked to minimize the worst manifestations of interstate conflict through emphasizing non-intervention; while domestic governance has emphasized national interest and strength in terms of security and economic growth. East Asian challenges to normative universalism can be defined in cultural, economic, and political terms. This article, however, considers not only the threats to Human Security in East Asia, but also the roles that East Asian actors play in protecting and promoting Human Security, noting that under certain conditions, East Asian perspectives may be able to secure, in terms of Human Security, better results than could be achieved through extra-regional intervention.

After 25 years, the global vision for Human Security as a concept and a policy commitment remains unfulfilled in most parts of the world. In fact, more and more evidence points to the growing reality that the idea of securing people has once again succumbed to the traditional concepts of state security and regime security, as it did after World War II. Part of the problem can be found in some major policy instruments adopted by proponents of Human Security. Military intervention for human protection, economic sanctions and judicial punishment or threats thereof, which have been regarded as policy instruments to protect people or promote Human Security, have proved to be either insufficient or ineffective, and at worst counter-productive.

Controversial and insufficient post-accident measures implemented by the Japanese government after the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident in 2011 have caused prolonged anxieties over radiation. These anxieties resulted in multiple insecurities, including health, economic, food, environmental, community, personal, and political insecurities. The Fukushima disaster shows that threats to Human Security may come not only from the manifest “enemy” outside, but from “dysfunction of the state” supported by peoples’ choices to sacrifice the victims for the sake of the interests of the “majority,” which is called a “sacrificial system.” At the same time, people are still patiently trying to restore their Human Security by means of voluntary actions.

The concept of Human Security gained prominence in Southeast Asia in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998. In a rapidly changing ASEAN, the list of human insecurities covers issues of both development and security, and fall within the ambit of both freedom from want and freedom from fear. But while Human Security has gained traction 20 years since the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report, more needs to be done to translate discourse into action. This article argues that in order to advance Human Security ASEAN states must be imbued with the political will to act decisively in addressing human insecurities and to work with other actors in promoting protection and empowerment of people and communities.

The concept of Human Security has evolved in two directions: (1) a comprehensive vision of security and development, and (2) a concretization of the concept tied to protection of civilians in armed conflict. This article discusses the two approaches and their relative merits. Starting with the Lysøen Declaration of 1998 and Canada’s subsequent introduction of the concept of Human Security in the Security Council, the article argues that a concretization is necessary today. One way to do this is to link Human Security to campaigns for protection of civilians against the U.S. use of drones in targeted killings outside recognized war zones. This strategy would revitalize Human Security as a relevant policy concept, and also create greater security for people living in exposed communities.

In the years immediately before and after the 1998 Lysøen Declaration, a striking feature of the initiatives associated with the Human Security agenda was the prominent role of civil society coalitions, which was widely regarded as indispensible to the signal successes of this period. However, the dramatic breakthroughs of this “new diplomacy” were the products of a propitious conjuncture of conditions that contained the seeds of their subsequent loss of momentum. Yet the Human Security work of civil society organizations (CSOs) continues, in less prominent but still important ways, to be woven into the fabric of the more cosmopolitan practices promoted by the agenda. In the meantime, their setbacks contain important lessons-both for CSOs and for the policymakers inclined to collaborate with them.

This article discusses the role of the United Nations in the development of the concept of Human Security since the 1998 Lysøen Declaration. The UN’s role in the evolution of understandings of Human Security in international society is examined, emphasizing conceptual development, the incubation of ideas, consensus building, legitimation and codification, and practice. It also considers the limitations on the organization in promoting Human Security, given its state-centric character and substantial contestation of the idea of sovereignty in international society. The analysis suggests that the organization has played a significant role in the effort to define, promote, legitimize and implement elements of Human Security, but faces serious constraints given its state-centric nature.

Japan’s development assistance to conflict-affected areas in Mindanao, southern Philippines, opened new pathways for the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to support multilateral peacebuilding efforts. JICA, in collaboration with Universiti Sains Malaysia, organized a series of Consolidation for Peace Seminars as Track One-and-a-Half mediations. Two aspects of Japan’s assistance to Mindanao enabled JICA to engage in peacemaking. First, Japan’s assistance to Mindanao formed a unique tripartite cooperation mechanism consisting of the International Monitoring Team, Mindanao Task Force, and Japan-Bangsamoro Initiative for Reconstruction and Development. JICA took part in all three modes of assistance. Second, providing assistance under a volatile cease-fire agreement in Mindanao motivated JICA to become involved in peacemaking outside the traditional function of development assistance.

The overall record of peacebuilding as a post-Cold War liberal project has proved to be more positive than negative, especially in conflict termination. However, the peacebuilding agenda has had its limits in terms of progress in democratization, judicial institution-building and economic development, despite potential for greater success. Peacebuilders are more likely to succeed in transforming societies torn by armed conflict if they can avoid making the process excessively competitive. Democratization and capitalist development are already competitive processes, and the pursuit of retributive justice takes the form of judicial punishment. Together these strategies can form a recipe for competition and conflict, especially in institutionally weak states where the history of distrust among warring factions or former enemies is long and intractable.