With the benefit of almost 20 years of hindsight, in this article we evaluate the legacy of state-building in Timor-Leste. We find that much of the academic critique of the state-building mission has proven to be largely accurate: political and economic development has indeed been challenged by the legacy of key decisions made during the early state-building process. First, the focus on centralised state institutions has led to the underdevelopment of administrative, political, and economic decentralization. Second, the partisan nature of the constitution-making process has facilitated the continued concentration of political and economic power in the hands of certain elites. Third, the ambiguous—and at times conflictual—division of powers between state institutions has facilitated the emergence of political clientelism and undermined broad-based economic diversification and development.

This study discusses social accountability in Timor-Leste by scrutinizing the patterns of state-society interactions and the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Analyzing five case studies in peacebuilding and development, it highlights NGOs’ multiple positions—from oversight and advocacy, to their role in facilitating statesociety relations in service delivery, suggesting alternative forms of public services, and conveying citizens’ views on government performance to the state. It elaborates how NGOs are closely associated with suco (village) and community authorities and bridge the gap between the state and society. In a fledging state, these dynamics emerge from the state’s attempts to formalize this relationship into law and society’s accommodation of its citizens within the local context. The study also addresses international actors who strive to support NGOs.

Timor-Leste’s extractive industry became economically and politically important during the post-conflict transition period. The government established the Petroleum Fund in 2005 to protect the economy from a “resource curse.” However, the management of the Fund has since become a source of controversy as it created opportunities for corruption and unsustainable spending practices. We argue in this article that political dynamics, in addition to if not more than weak institutions, engendered corruption, clientelist rule, and economic disenfranchisement in postconflict Timor-Leste. Using the Political Settlements approach as an analytical framework, we demonstrate that patronage, rivalry, and rent seeking in the management of petroleum revenues are associated with economic and political challenges in Timor-Leste’s state-building process.

This article focuses on the concept of “fragility,” which gained prominence in literature on conflict-driven countries and serves as an analytical tool for policy analysis. Using this concept, this article provides a review of Timor-Leste since its independence in 2002. The country has achieved high economic growth, though the economy has remained fragile in terms of its high dependence on external factors, namely oil revenues. This study suggests that foreign aid and investments do not automatically improve fragility in resource-dependent economies unless they help diversify the monoculture economy, based upon democratic consensus-building among stakeholders.

This paper provides a mid-term assessment of externally-led Security Sector Reform (SSR) during the United Nations (UN) led peacebuilding intervention in Timor- Leste. Despite initial difficulties, several core institutions, introduced by the UN, remain effective and were integrated into local practices. These initial security problems of the new-born Timor-Leste state, included the radical reconfiguration of the power balances within elites and an unfamiliarity with new approaches to security governance by the indigenous actors themselves. The lack of contextual knowledge and insensitivity to local political dynamics by external actors exacerbated these issues. Nonetheless, Timor-Leste has found ways to achieve some measure of political stability and physical security, both of which were always overarching goals of SSR.

The transitional justice policies employed in Timor-Leste are among the most multifaceted and comprehensive ever attempted. However, what these mechanisms have collectively accomplished has not been adequately evaluated. The long-term effectiveness of transitional justice should be judged in terms of the multidimensional relationships between the many policies and programs relevant to redressing the legacy of the past. The impunity of those most responsible for human rights violations casts a sizable shadow over the transitional justice efforts; however, analysis of the establishment of the Chega! National Centre (CNC) shows that the gradual development of transitional justice in Timor-Leste has broken through a structural bottleneck. This is due to persistent calls for transitional justice from civil society and the slow but steady implementation of relevant programs.

This article contributes to the discourse on hybridity by reviewing the development of the legal framework related to traditional governance mechanisms in Timor-Leste in the twenty years since independence in 2002. It analyzes how this framework has contributed to nurturing governance in the country and argues that traditional governance mechanisms have had a considerable role in improving governance since independence. It is also argued that with regulation and proper support from stakeholders, a traditional governance system can facilitate democratization, and that the host community can become the driver of positive change.

The concept of human security argues that the improvement of people’s wellbeing and livelihoods is a vital component in the stability of the state. What happens, however, when the state is not viewed as the only (if at all) source of influence on people’s everyday security? This article argues for a particular vernacular of human security that recognizes a social contract between the living with spirit actants, in ways that can often compete with or challenge state-building efforts. In Timor-Leste, ancestral spirits (matebian sira) can directly intervene in the physical safety of their living descendants, and livelihoods (in terms of food security) often depends on engagement between the living and their ancestors as well as nature spirits (rai-nainsira).

Liberal missteps have paved the way for the local turn in post-conflict peacebuilding. However, localized peacebuilding does not always produce peaceful outcomes. Several scholars have previously demonstrated that unresolved tensions from international-local encounters result in a negative hybrid peace in which political and social hierarchies are preserved and conflict and violence persist. To add to existing analyses on the local turn in peacebuilding, this article analyzes some of the causes and consequences of negative hybrid peace using the case of Timor-Leste. Exclusive and superficial local involvement, political cleavages within the local leadership, and unresolved tensions from international-local encounters were roadblocks in Timor-Leste’s post-conflict peacebuilding. These characteristics prelude a return to a status quo dominated by the local elite and plagued with governance and socio-economic issues.

Martial arts groups in Timor-Leste have a nationwide reach and have offered a resource of physical and social engagement for youth and adults for several decades. Yet, their involvement in crime, politics, and violent clashes, and their notorious reputation as troublemakers posing a threat to security and peace, have caused the government to permanently ban three major groups. Based on intensive fieldwork and qualitative interviews with members and leaders of illegalized groups, this analysis explains why the young democracy’s decision is not contributing to building peace. The three main findings from the interviews are that root causes of violence are not addressed by the ban, criminalization draws more people into illegality, and the positive aspects of these groups, which could potentially contribute to peace, are neglected.