Peace and security studies in Southeast Asia show a rich array of theoretical and policy-oriented research that highlights key themes in the prevention and management of conflicts. These themes also highlight salient concepts that define approaches to peace and security. Two themes are noteworthy. First, while peace and security are not mutually exclusive, security cannot be assured by focusing on negative peace alone but also by a purposeful pursuit of positive peace, hence comprehensive security is critical. The second theme is the importance of regional institutions like ASEAN in managing intra-state relations. Given the fluid state of the global security environment, there is now greater scope for new thinking on how approaches to peace and security can be made more responsive to achieve shared goals.

Member-states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) support the norms of nuclear disarmament and nuclear security through diplomatic efforts at the global level and regional efforts to promote nuclear safety and security. This is demonstrated in how ASEAN helped push for negotiation of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and its eventual passage, as well as ongoing efforts to promote regional cooperation in advancing nuclear security and nuclear safety. Regional frameworks and mechanisms like the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy (ASEANTOM), the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the East Asia Summit provide the platforms for ASEAN to advance its diplomacy in promoting the norms of nuclear governance.

This article unpacks the dynamics of group hedging in international relations by examining the Southeast Asian states’ collective efforts to use ASEAN-led multilateral institutions as a platform to hedge against a range of risks surrounding intensifying big-power rivalry and increasing global uncertainties. It argues that ASEAN’s collective hedging is a converged but not necessarily coordinated act. Despite the states’ diverging attributes and outlooks, they converge on shared vulnerabilities, collective memories, and disadvantaged positions. Southeast Asian states thus view ASEAN-based multilateralism as an indispensable, albeit insufficient, means to engage big powers and manage other challenges. Through the functions of institutional binding, buffering, and building, ASEAN’s group hedging serves to mitigate and offset risks while shaping Asian order amid deepening uncertainties in the age of the Indo Pacific.

This article examines the outcomes of collective forms of engagement in the ASEAN region. By examining how convening power in these south-south engagements has worked since the Bandung Conference, the paper reviews how the mode of consensus building adopted in 1955 has been channelled into regional cooperation. In particular, the paper considers the implications of these forms of cooperation for the consensus building that characterizes ASEAN today. The paper uses the processes evident in the ASEAN Development Outlook to set out the consequences of these findings for how the UN system can set out more effective criteria for global South cooperation. This has direct implications for institutional mechanisms for advancing capacity and expertise in new forms of cooperation between the global North and global South.

The aim of the present study is to shed light on the diplomatic achievements of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), by exploring the way in which it has dealt with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) implemented by China. ASEAN is little more than an association of minor powers with insignificant military and economic capabilities. However, in its dealings with the BRI, it has proactively advanced its own interests by skillfully conducting equidistant diplomacy with China and the US, without becoming too remote from or too close to either one of them, thereby reaping benefits from its favorable relations with each of them.

North Korea’s unchecked missile and nuclear program is one of the most pressing global security concerns. This article evaluates the multilateral engagement efforts that have been pursued by regional stakeholders, specifically assessing the Six-Party Talks vis-a-vis the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and explaining why these multilateral efforts have failed to resolve the nuclear crisis. Given the poor performances of these two multilateral platforms, this article seeks to assess the feasibility and policy implications of defusing the longstanding nuclear crisis through multilateral engagement. Despite stalling and a myriad of obstacles, the Six-Party Talks has a better chance than the ARF at curbing the nuclear crisis. At best, the ARF can contribute by playing a complementary role by helping deescalate tensions or cultivating better diplomatic ties.

Although Southeast Asia was brutally occupied by Imperial Japan during World War II, the region has reconciled with postwar Japan. That Southeast Asia is not hostile to Japan today is due to several reasons: the relatively short duration of the Japanese occupation, the pragmatic needs of the Southeast Asian states to deal with immediate security and economic problems rather than to dwell on the past, and the efforts of Japan to be a good neighbor to Southeast Asia since the enunciation of the 1977 Fukuda Doctrine. Public opinion surveys of Southeast Asians towards Japan today and the content analysis of the history textbooks of various ASEAN states show little hostility towards Japan.

The concept of human security gained prominence in Southeast Asia in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998. In a rapidly changing ASEAN, the list of human insecurities covers issues of both development and security, and fall within the ambit of both freedom from want and freedom from fear. But while human security has gained traction 20 years since the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report, more needs to be done to translate discourse into action. This article argues that in order to advance human security ASEAN states must be imbued with the political will to act decisively in addressing human insecurities and to work with other actors in promoting protection and empowerment of people and communities.

This article seeks to make a contribution to the existing literature on the South China Sea issue by focusing on the impact of regional institutions on conflict management and resolution as well as the limits these institutions face when seeking to de-escalate disputes. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has attempted to preserve its neutrality and unity over sovereignty disputes and has focused on the establishment of a conflict management mechanism with China-the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. However, ASEAN’s efforts have been undermined by an escalation of the situation in the disputed waters and by rising China-U.S. competition in the region. The article concludes by discussing various scenarios regarding the future of ASEAN’s South China Sea policy.

In 2008, the Thai-Cambodian conflict over the Preah Vihear Temple was reignited after the issue became politicized by political groups in Thailand. The opposition accused the Samak Sundaravej government of aspiring to achieve its private interests in exchange for Thailand’s support for Cambodia’s bid to have the Preah Vihear listed as a UNESCO World Heritage Site. In Thailand, there was a belief that if Cambodia’s bid was successful, the country would lose the disputed 4.6-square-kilometer area surrounding the temple. This pushed elements in Thailand to unofficially declare a state of war with Cambodia. This crisis also had a serious impact on ASEAN. Thailand rejected ASEAN’s mediating role, thus revealing its distrust in regional dispute settlement mechanisms. For ASEAN, it unveiled its weakness in exercising authority over its members, and its incompetency in the management of regional disputes. This article argues that ASEAN was caught between the need to be a key player in regional politics, especially in tackling territorial disputes in the region, and the need to maintain the region’s status quo by appearing subservient to the members’ self-interest in protecting their national sovereignty at the expense of progress on regionalization.