The discussions on peace in Japan have significantly changed since the end of the Second World War. This can be clearly illustrated by the development of the peace studies field, which has been strongly influenced by the pacifism of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and the experiences of the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This article traces the historical development of Japanese peace studies and analyzes its characteristics. Since pacifism has been accepted as the key element for understanding political culture in Japan since 1945, peace research, the practice of peace education, and peace museums are also regarded as important factors that constitute Japanese peace studies and peace culture.

Japan is a world leader in peace education, and Hiroshima is one of the world’s centers for peace. While the peer-reviewed literature on Japanese peace education is growing, few studies address how present-day peace educators in Hiroshima conceptualize peace education. This study aims to better understand how peace educators in Hiroshima (re)conceptualize, adapt, and apply their work. Using a grounded theory approach, we answer the following research questions: (a) How do contemporary peace educators in Hiroshima conceptualize their work? (b) How has this conceptualization changed or evolved over time? Interviewees presented convergent and divergent insights around three main themes: definitions of peace as a collective identity and constructivist process, metaphors for peace as informing pedagogy, and efforts to challenge taboos through a social justice lens.

Territorial disputes are complicated by the long-term vicious cycle of “rival” identities constructed by continuous interactions. The purpose of this study is to analyze how Japan’s commitments to certain types of collective identities affect bilateral relations with Russia, using two case studies that analyze how Russian political elites perceive Japan’s position on sensitive issues of international politics. By doing so, the study argues that Japan’s commitments to “Western” collective discourses in the international arena over the past decade have largely undermined relations with Russia, reducing the likelihood of significant progress on critical issues.

This article revisits the role that Ahn Jung-geun plays in Korean collective memory today and contrasts this with the Moon administration’s foreign policy. An analysis of Korean collective memory shows that Ahn’s assassination of Ito Hirobumi is heavily emphasized but Ahn’s ultimate goal of bringing peace to Northeast Asia is overlooked. This emphasis is understood through Jan Assmann’s model of collective memory. Based on Aleida Assmann and Linda Shortt’s proposition, it is argued that the historical figure of Ahn can instead play a constructive role. Shifting the focus of collective memory toward Ahn’s ambition for peace in Northeast Asia may serve as a positive nudge for Seoul’s Japan policy, thus helping to ameliorate Korea-Japan relations in the medium term.

Civil society organizations have warned that if “lethal autonomous weapons systems” (LAWS) are created, such weapons would cause serious problems with regards to human rights. Although “fully autonomous” weapons do not exist at this stage, several countries are thought to have developed “semi-autonomous” weapons equipped with artificial intelligence. LAWS related issues have been a part of international discussions in the United Nations, and the Japanese government has actively participated in these conferences. Japanese politicians have also discussed issues related to LAWS in the National Diet since 2015. This article provides multiple paradigms of Japan’s policy toward LAWS from the perspectives of international relations theory, and attempts to explore possible solutions to the international regulation of LAWS in international law.

Contrary to its humanist image, Hidankyo, the Japan Confederation of Atomic and Hydrogen Bomb Sufferers Organizations, has engaged in contentious politics against the state for decades. This article traces the little-known history of the Hidankyo movement from the mid-1950s to the early 1980s, introducing how this organization formed in relation to the movement to ban nuclear bombs in the mid-1950s and how it grew into an independent social movement organization with clear policy demands after overcoming an organizational crisis triggered by the Cold War politics of the 1960s. The movement slogan for Hidankyo, “no more hibakusha,” did not naturally emerge from the sufferers’ experience with the atomic bombings, but was substantiated through their struggles to confront their adversaries, most importantly the Japanese government.

This article seeks to add to the existing literature on Japan’s peacebuilding by examining its involvement in the psychosocial reconstruction of children in conflictaffected regions. It demonstrates that to this end Japan has implemented creative, recreational activities, and, to a lesser extent, community-building strategies. This article argues that there are three important implications of Japan’s involvement in psychosocial reconstruction for its own foreign policy: (1) psychological reconstruction can enhance its non-military approach to peacebuilding; (2) this field can potentially be another area of expertise in its own peacebuilding policy; and (3) in so doing, Japan may be able to carve out a niche in the field of international peacebuilding. This article concludes by identifying some limitations that can be developed into areas for future research.

Using the framework of centripetal and centrifugal force, this article analyzes alternating periods of peace and conflict in South Korea-Japan mutual perceptions since 1998 when the two nations took unprecedented conciliatory actions. Centripetal force is comprised of political leaders’ reconciliation initiatives, restrained historical/territorial disputes, and common security threats. Centrifugal force incorporates heated historical/territorial disputes, political leaders’ use of those disputes for their political purposes, and divergent security priorities. This article suggests that top political leaders in both nations can play a significant role in improving or aggravating mutual perceptions between the two neighbors. However, political leaders’ conciliatory initiatives are a necessary but insufficient condition in reconciling the two former adversary states.

Controversial and insufficient post-accident measures implemented by the Japanese government after the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident in 2011 have caused prolonged anxieties over radiation. These anxieties resulted in multiple insecurities, including health, economic, food, environmental, community, personal, and political insecurities. The Fukushima disaster shows that threats to human security may come not only from the manifest “enemy” outside, but from “dysfunction of the state” supported by peoples’ choices to sacrifice the victims for the sake of the interests of the “majority,” which is called a “sacrificial system.” At the same time, people are still patiently trying to restore their human security by means of voluntary actions.

This article addresses the question of what has contributed to the difference between German and Japanese nuclear politics in the post-Fukushima era. Germany has decided to phase out nuclear energy, but Japan has done the opposite. The origin of this difference can be traced back to the development of the anti-nuclear peace movement in the early 1980s. West Germans turned against nuclear energy as well as nuclear weapons, whereas Japanese peace activists carefully avoided the nuclear energy issue because of their concern over U.S.-Japan relations. The West German peace movement in the following years was in a position to foster cooperation between East and West Germans, whereas the Japanese movement missed the chance to go beyond the Cold War mentality.

Although Southeast Asia was brutally occupied by Imperial Japan during World War II, the region has reconciled with postwar Japan. That Southeast Asia is not hostile to Japan today is due to several reasons: the relatively short duration of the Japanese occupation, the pragmatic needs of the Southeast Asian states to deal with immediate security and economic problems rather than to dwell on the past, and the efforts of Japan to be a good neighbor to Southeast Asia since the enunciation of the 1977 Fukuda Doctrine. Public opinion surveys of Southeast Asians towards Japan today and the content analysis of the history textbooks of various ASEAN states show little hostility towards Japan.

The Japanese and Australian governments supported the establishment of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND) in 2008. During its two-year mandate, the ICNND organized international conferences in Sydney, Washington, Moscow, and Hiroshima. The commission made specific proposals in a final report entitled Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policy Makers. This research note examines the significance of the report, while paying special attention to its limitations. In particular, this study criticizes the nuclear policies of Japan and Australia that have depended upon U.S. extended nuclear deterrence and peaceful use of atomic energy. Finally, it suggests five alternatives for Japan and Australia so that both countries can resume further endeavors towards a world free of nuclear threats.

The institution of nuclear power in Japan appears to be drifting; nevertheless it persists. For the past 60 years, conservative politicians, technologists, and electric companies have acted in concert, for different reasons, to achieve a full nuclear fuel cycle: specifically technology for reprocessing and uranium enrichment. Their pursuit has eroded the bottom-line spirit of peaceful use; to be sure, it has been excessively ambitious for Japan’s status as a non-nuclear-weapon state. The mastering of the full nuclear fuel cycle has resulted in a competency trap, excluding or delaying development of alternatives to nuclear power. Furthermore, this situation has heightened nuclear power’s sunk costs. The critical conjuncture of the March 11, 2011 incident has had a limited impact only. Anti-nuclear activists, the weakest concerned actor, try to dramatize their movement for “exit from nuclear,” but they have failed to bring about electoral changes.

Reconciliation between the Japanese people and those of China and Korea may have better prospects for advancement through a new cultural approach that is experience-based, starting at individuals’ levels and interests, rather than focusing solely on victimization and confining activism to more conventional organizationbuilding and public protests. The peace movement opposed to nuclear weapons has continued to center around the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but in the past has not fully dealt with Korean and Chinese forced labor by Imperial Japan. However, the alternative experience-based cultural approach by a number of individuals and relatively small organizations has combined these two historical issues. This article highlights examples of two Japanese who directly witnessed Chinese and Korean forced labor in wartime Japan, but who also opposed the atomic bombings. They became activists themselves in the postwar era and utilized traditional cultural forms (tanka poetry and sumi drawing) to help create awareness of the full dimension of Japan’s wartime history. There is strong potential for extending this alternative social movement model, which may be more effective in achieving reconciliation of unresolved historical injustices, to younger generations.