This article examines the spatial and temporal changes of North Korean (NK) migration by analyzing the interactive process between NKs’ efforts to cross bOrders amidst changing geopolitical and economic circumstances and the activities at the domestic, local, state, and international levels to manage displacement from a gender perspective. In doing so, I argue that the bOrder between North Korea and China became violent and that NK migrations became spatially gendered and class-stratified. The proportion of NK women entering South Korea remains high, primarily due to the secondary migration of those who have long resided in China in de facto marriage relationships with Chinese men. In contrast, among recent direct defectors, NK men constitute a significant proportion and they often play an active role in family migration.

Why has the United States (US) changed its stance toward China and kept it in the digital economy domain, despite the change in its government? The extant literature finds causes from China yet barely addresses perceptual factors. This study, however, argues that the strategy and policy of the US have undergone a process whereby the US has securitized the domain by designating China as a threat instead of a risk. Furthermore, the US has internationalized securitization to include its allies and close partners among the Indo-Pacific countries. Analytical narratives examine the US’ economic statecraft, including commercial, industrial, and investment policies. A close examination reveals that the US-China technology competition has been undergoing partial decoupling in global supply chains of critical technologies.

The immediate cause of the East Asian states’ pursuit of new economic statecraft, which has led to changes in the regional Order, was the rise of US-China strategic rivalry. However, one structural factor behind the adoption of this statecraft is the economic network formed in East Asia. The emergence of new economic statecraft has had systemic effects, such as the spread of network sanctions, the adoption of divergent strategies, and the dual dynamics of cooperation and competition between states.

As it witnesses rising China’s assertive diplomacy and growing military might, Washington is seeking to restrain Beijing’s economic growth and technological development. The Biden administration’s digital-liberal coalition initiative resonates with liberal states which have growing concerns about democratic backsliding all over the world and China’s undue influence on other countries’ domestic politics and civil society. The United States and its liberal allies are increasingly likely to cooperate in technological innovation, the development of standards and norms, and the protection of human rights, resisting this authoritarian threat to their interests and values. However, it is unclear whether and how China will adjust its foreignpolicy strategy and which option non-liberal and/or developing states will prefer in this uncertain era of Sino-US Order competition in global politics.

The US-China strategic competition, combined with other structural changes such as the global spread of COVID-19, climate change, and competition for technological innovation has dramatically increased uncertainty in Asia. Against this backdrop, the strategic competition between the US and China in the 21st century shows profound differences from the hegemonic competition in the past. The systemic consequences of hyper-uncertainty, as we are witnessing, are protectionism, nationalism, and the proliferation of conflicts and disputes between states. A collection of four papers in this special issue systematically examine the way in which the US-China strategic competition combined with other factors amplify the instability of the regional Order, and explain the dual dynamics of competition and cooperation that Asian countries demonstrate in responding to US-China strategic competition and redesigning the regional Order.

The transnational ethnic networks developed by North Korean defectors are factors in the (de-)bOrdering of North Korea. Ethnographic fieldwork in two destinations—London and Los Angeles—demonstrates, first, that through their practices of financial and social remittances, the defectors have proved that North Korea’s bOrder control is porous, and second, that the defectors have developed global and regional networks to challenge North Korean sovereignty. In the interaction between the defectors’ daily lives and the geopolitical environment, these geopolitical ethnic networks play important roles. This contribution to the debate on bOrders and defectors encourages us to shift our attention from nation-states’ laws and policies on bOrder-crossers to the agency of the bOrder-crossers themselves.

This article is a study of the legacy of the Korean War, as well as being a case study on the first instance of regime transition in the Cold War era. This study compares the incorporation of “Reclaimed Areas” (subokjigu) by South Korea with the incorporation of “Newly Liberated Areas” (sinhaebangjigu) by North Korea comprehensively from the aspects of occupation, politics, economics, and national identity. Both South Korea’s transplantation of capitalism in the Reclaimed Areas and the expansion of North Korea’s “people’s democracy” (inminminjujui) took place unilaterally and in a Cold War fashion. Changes to the national identities in each region took place in silence and conformity, paradoxically illustrating the pain and suffering felt while each region was incorporated into an unyielding regime.

This article addresses the issue of schooling for refugees, as members of a stateless nation, in the context of Karen refugees in Thailand. The authors used ethnographic methods of in-depth, semi-structured interviews and participant observation with over 250 residents of Mae La refugee camp. Our conceptual framework draws on theories of pedagogy for liberation and grassroots development. We found that, due to overlapping sources of authority with divergent visions of the future for refugee learners, the existential crisis of being members of a stateless nation is the most pressing issue for education to address. We suggest that a top-down approach to refugee education relying on technical solutions, while ignoring issues of history, power, and meaning-making, will ultimately fall short of being fundamentally transformative.

The main assumption of this article is that the essence of the sixty-five year-long ‘Korean question’ is to replace the Korean Armistice Agreement with a new security Order, often referred to as a Korean Peninsula Peace Regime. As such, this article explores elements considerable for a stable Order on the Korean Peninsula. First, this article reviews relevant literature on the concept of ‘Order’ in the discipline of international relations mainly from Henry Kissinger. Second, this article analyzes the elements of the Armistice Agreement as a ‘living precedent.’ Furthermore, this article offers a preliminarily study of a post-war Order cases such as 2+4 Treaty and Austrian State Treaty. In conclusion this article experimentally proposes an outline of elements of a new security Order on the Korean Peninsula.

This article examines the prospects for the realization of the agreement signed at the 2007 inter-Korean summit to transform the conflict-susceptible Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the West Sea into a bOrder area where South and North Korea jointly promote peace and prosperity. To realize this agreement the two Koreas must integrate new ideas and plans by viewing the NLL as a space of common benefit rather than a line of military confrontation. The establishment of the West Sea Special Zone for Peace and Cooperation focuses on security and economic issues. Implementation of the agreement requires particular attention to development of a comprehensive plan, including promotion of ecological, environmental, historical, and cultural assets, as well as inter-Korean fishery cooperation.