This article unpacks the dynamics of group hedging in international relations by examining the Southeast Asian states’ collective efforts to use ASEAN-led multilateral institutions as a platform to hedge against a range of risks surrounding intensifying big-power rivalry and increasing global uncertainties. It argues that ASEAN’s collective hedging is a converged but not necessarily coordinated act. Despite the states’ diverging attributes and outlooks, they converge on shared vulnerabilities, collective memories, and disadvantaged positions. Southeast Asian states thus view ASEAN-based multilateralism as an indispensable, albeit insufficient, means to engage big powers and manage other challenges. Through the functions of institutional binding, buffering, and building, ASEAN’s group hedging serves to mitigate and offset risks while shaping Asian order amid deepening uncertainties in the age of the Indo Pacific.

Set amidst growing global challenges and great power politics, this article asks how middle powers might best promote global collective action. Adopting a historical approach, it explores four case studies on middle power multilateralism in (1) post-1974 UN New International Economic Order; (2) post-1989 Bretton Woods institutions; (3) post-1992 European Union expansion; and (4) post-2003 UN South- South cooperation. These inform a policy framework and an ensuing alternative termed “resilient multilateralism.” Adopting a foreign policy standpoint, this alternative entails principles on context specificity, complementarity, consensus building, and non-confrontation. By opening space for global action, it offers a timely approach to countering future shocks and coordination failures—whether wrought through nature or through hands of our own.

The effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime is no longer as sturdy as it once was and new infusions of creativity are greatly needed. Concentrating on positive incentives may better promote non-proliferation. Incentives targeting industry have a higher chance of success due to their vast influence in multiple governments. The IAEA’s ElBaradei Report is one conceptualizatoin of an intergovernmental nuclear fuel supply bank. As a multilateral approach, nuclear fuel banks promote more opportunities for diplomacy amongst states. While it is only one approach to overcoming the current crisis of the non-proliferation regime, it has the potential to make a huge difference in how the world handles nuclear power on a supranational basis.

North Korea’s unchecked missile and nuclear program is one of the most pressing global security concerns. This article evaluates the multilateral engagement efforts that have been pursued by regional stakeholders, specifically assessing the Six-Party Talks vis-a-vis the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and explaining why these multilateral efforts have failed to resolve the nuclear crisis. Given the poor performances of these two multilateral platforms, this article seeks to assess the feasibility and policy implications of defusing the longstanding nuclear crisis through multilateral engagement. Despite stalling and a myriad of obstacles, the Six-Party Talks has a better chance than the ARF at curbing the nuclear crisis. At best, the ARF can contribute by playing a complementary role by helping deescalate tensions or cultivating better diplomatic ties.