Member-states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) support the norms of nuclear disarmament and nuclear security through diplomatic efforts at the global level and regional efforts to promote nuclear safety and security. This is demonstrated in how ASEAN helped push for negotiation of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and its eventual passage, as well as ongoing efforts to promote regional cooperation in advancing nuclear security and nuclear safety. Regional frameworks and mechanisms like the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy (ASEANTOM), the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the East Asia Summit provide the platforms for ASEAN to advance its diplomacy in promoting the norms of nuclear governance.

The effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime is no longer as sturdy as it once was and new infusions of creativity are greatly needed. Concentrating on positive incentives may better promote non-proliferation. Incentives targeting industry have a higher chance of success due to their vast influence in multiple governments. The IAEA’s ElBaradei Report is one conceptualizatoin of an intergovernmental nuclear fuel supply bank. As a multilateral approach, nuclear fuel banks promote more opportunities for diplomacy amongst states. While it is only one approach to overcoming the current crisis of the non-proliferation regime, it has the potential to make a huge difference in how the world handles nuclear power on a supranational basis.

Turkey’s interest in nuclear technology has increased over the years. The aim of this article is to summarize, synthetize, update, and contextualize Turkey’s nonproliferation policies and link it to the broader discussion on nuclear latency. The article first attempts to show the shortcomings of several latency arguments by overviewing the factors that affect Turkey’s latency status. The main finding of the article is that Turkey’s latency in terms of technology will increase, yet that increase cannot be predicted as potent enough to result in latency potential in terms of a nuclear weapons program in the short- and medium-term without a serious change in international and domestic politics.