This article unpacks the dynamics of group hedging in international relations by examining the Southeast Asian states’ collective efforts to use ASEAN-led multilateral institutions as a platform to hedge against a range of risks surrounding intensifying big-power rivalry and increasing global uncertainties. It argues that ASEAN’s collective hedging is a converged but not necessarily coordinated act. Despite the states’ diverging attributes and outlooks, they converge on shared vulnerabilities, collective memories, and disadvantaged positions. Southeast Asian states thus view ASEAN-based multilateralism as an indispensable, albeit insufficient, means to engage big powers and manage other challenges. Through the functions of institutional binding, buffering, and building, ASEAN’s group hedging serves to mitigate and offset risks while shaping Asian order amid deepening uncertainties in the age of the Indo Pacific.

This article probes the British and missionary misinterpretation and presentation of the role of Ekpe, Nfam, and Obasinjom cultural institutions as irrelevant in the governance of people of the Cross River Basin of Cameroon. The British colonial enterprise in the area was sustained on a seemingly conscious yet uncritical effort to label these institutions as mainly ceremonial and food consuming in nature. This impression notwithstanding, these institutions remained popular and continuously spread into the nooks and crannies of the Cross River Basin of Cameroon and beyond.

Did the Arab Spring effect democratic transition in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries? What are the implications for institutional transformation? This article focuses on legislative autonomy vis-à-vis the executive branch. The authoritarian regimes have continued their strategy of resistance amidst a modicum of reform, within the twin policies of institutional restructuring and security control, which reveals four trends: institutional preservation, status quo concessions, stalled power-sharing, and repressive countermeasures. There has been a growing sectarian dimension to the opposition. Frustrated and disillusioned, the younger generation has infused energy into the protest movement both in the streets and in cyberspace. With a firm hold on the security services by rulers, incremental policy shifts in the social realm will outpace institutional transformation in the political arena.

The institution of nuclear power in Japan appears to be drifting; nevertheless it persists. For the past 60 years, conservative politicians, technologists, and electric companies have acted in concert, for different reasons, to achieve a full nuclear fuel cycle: specifically technology for reprocessing and uranium enrichment. Their pursuit has eroded the bottom-line spirit of peaceful use; to be sure, it has been excessively ambitious for Japan’s status as a non-nuclear-weapon state. The mastering of the full nuclear fuel cycle has resulted in a competency trap, excluding or delaying development of alternatives to nuclear power. Furthermore, this situation has heightened nuclear power’s sunk costs. The critical conjuncture of the March 11, 2011 incident has had a limited impact only. Anti-nuclear activists, the weakest concerned actor, try to dramatize their movement for “exit from nuclear,” but they have failed to bring about electoral changes.