The Myanmar military staged a coup against the elected civilian government in February 2021. Since then, the country has been in a state of emergency and ruled by a military junta. Resistance to the coup was swift and widespread, beginning with the Civil Disobedience Movement that has now morphed into the People’s Defense Forces. A state of civil war has remained for well over two years now, reversing the previous trend toward democratic transition. Nonetheless, the democratic interlude has spawned strong resistance to military rule. The armed conflict and contestation for power looks set to continue into the medium term and may eventually lead to domestic political changes toward democratization.

This article surveys the trajectory of peace and conflict studies in Myanmar—from its early focus on civil war and insurgency, to state institutions and ethnic armed actors, and later broadening into relational and networked approaches covering formal peace processes, regional geopolitics, conflict economies, and everyday peacebuilding. It suggests that the widening of peace and conflict studies was brought about by the opening of the country from the early 2010s, which both granted scholars and researchers more access to the country and introduced new foreign specialists, discourses, and developmental actors into the political sphere. The peace agenda and directions of peace studies have been upended by the military coup of 2021; how reconciliation, justice, and federal democratic reform will look like in the future remains to be seen.

During the 2015 refugee crisis, hospitality for migrants was frequently invoked as a European value, in both secular and religious contexts. Hospitality as a valued principle varies from actual instances of hospitality, which involve conditions and moral expectations. This article examines expectations of morality in humanitarian church organizations’ responses to the refugee crisis, based on a case study of an open café project for refugees in a German metropolitan city. Notions of hosting, being a guest, choosing a home, arrival, and integration play significant roles in considerations about the organization for this regular event. The line between volunteers and visitors becomes increasingly blurred with time, but moral discourses focusing on language, translation, self-formation, and personhood recur and reinforce the distinction of host and guest.

This article seeks to answer the questions of whether sanctions are ‘smart’ as designed and why if they are not. Evidence appears to suggest that smart sanctions are not ‘intelligent’ enough to change political leaders’ alleged violent behavior or to protect innocent civilians from direct or physical as well as indirect or structural violence. Targeted government officials can always find ways to outsmart the sanction sender actors by resisting the latter’s coercive efforts because of their willingness and ability to take repressive action against their people and find alternative trading partners as well as support from powerful undemocratic states. Instead of minimizing human suffering, sanctions tend to exacerbate regime insecurity and perpetuate international alliance politics. The cases of Myanmar and North Korea validate this proposition.

This article serves as the introduction to the special issue “Legacies of Nuclear Power, Future of Nuclear politics” of the Asian Journal of Peacebuilding.

Contrary to its humanist image, Hidankyo, the Japan Confederation of Atomic and Hydrogen Bomb Sufferers Organizations, has engaged in contentious politics against the state for decades. This article traces the little-known history of the Hidankyo movement from the mid-1950s to the early 1980s, introducing how this organization formed in relation to the movement to ban nuclear bombs in the mid-1950s and how it grew into an independent social movement organization with clear policy demands after overcoming an organizational crisis triggered by the Cold War politics of the 1960s. The movement slogan for Hidankyo, “no more hibakusha,” did not naturally emerge from the sufferers’ experience with the atomic bombings, but was substantiated through their struggles to confront their adversaries, most importantly the Japanese government.

Kashmir is a territorial dispute embedded in the politico-diplomatic events that shook the Indian subcontinent in 1947. The most immediate outcome of this dispute has been the human tragedy unfolding in Indian administered Kashmir, where a popular armed rebellion broke out in 1989. The brutalities of the rebellion reverberate across Kashmir, flashed in the common memories of people, especially the young who have been exposed to various socio-cultural vulnerabilities. Young Kashmiris have not known a stable and peaceful society and, therefore, rebelling has become part of the youth culture. They are politically hyper-engaged with more radical political views entailing revolutionary violence as a handy mechanism for preserving societal security, territorial fortification, and justice in Kashmir.

Post-war reconstruction in Sri Lanka, which is aided by many countries, is aimed at consolidating the unitary state structure as part of a geo-strategic security complex in the Indian Ocean Region. In this process, discourses of democratization and human rights have been reconfigured to contain or totally remove any threat to the unitary state emerging from the Tamils in the North and East whose claim to self-determination is seen as a major challenge to the geo-strategic complex in South Asia. In such a context, the bio-politics of the development-security nexus and neo-liberal governmentality operates by strengthening the hegemony of the Sinhala state against the Tamils and weakening or destroying the essential foundations of Tamil nationhood. Without recognizing these local and global dynamics every peacebuilding attempt will fail.

The “rise of China,” especially within U.S. academic and policy circles, has been increasingly analyzed through a geopolitical lens. Yet geopolitics alone cannot account for the complex political mobilization of historical memory and how it frames any discussion of peace and cooperation in the region. Drawing on the concept of geobody, or how space and people are connected in a biopolitical manner, this article examines how the territorial disputes in the South China Sea are remaking the identity and interests of China. It develops an alternative theoretical understanding of China’s rise that focuses on identity (or geobody) politics, and explores the risks involved in a further escalation of tensions for peace and cooperation in the area, and in East Asia more generally.

On October 15, 2015, the government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar signed a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) with eight of the sixteen ethnic armed groups it had been negotiating with. The aim of the Thein Sein government had been to sign the agreement with all sixteen groups, but this was not realized. One reason why eight of the groups have been left out is the ongoing fighting between the Myanmar military and some of the groups, and the army’s unwillingness to involve them in the ceasefire process. Similarly, some of the ethnic armed groups have also indicated that they are unwilling, or not ready, to sign the NCA at this time.

This article examines the impact of a natural disaster on the political dynamics of an ethno-nationalist conflict. The humanitarian space generated by the 2004 tsunami could have revived the peace process between the Sri Lankan state and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), as evidenced by the joint mechanism that was formed for rehabilitation and reconstruction. However, the impact of the tsunami carried a potential for both peacebuilding and escalation of the conflict. The growing securitization of South Asia, led by the United States, upheld a militaristic approach and strengthened the Sri Lankan state against the LTTE. The militaristic approach to the decades-long conflict was advanced and eventually resulted in a massive war which claimed thousands of lives. The tsunami was a missed political opportunity.

This article addresses the question of what has contributed to the difference between German and Japanese nuclear politics in the post-Fukushima era. Germany has decided to phase out nuclear energy, but Japan has done the opposite. The origin of this difference can be traced back to the development of the anti-nuclear peace movement in the early 1980s. West Germans turned against nuclear energy as well as nuclear weapons, whereas Japanese peace activists carefully avoided the nuclear energy issue because of their concern over U.S.-Japan relations. The West German peace movement in the following years was in a position to foster cooperation between East and West Germans, whereas the Japanese movement missed the chance to go beyond the Cold War mentality.

This article compares principled and strategic nonviolent movements. While pragmatic, strategic nonviolence is effective for movements seeking to overthrow corrupt repressive and dictatorial regimes, it is much less successful in the progressive transformation of state and political systems. This is because principled nonviolence and movements associated with such value systems are ambivalent about political power and the role of the Weberian state. Conversely strategic nonviolent movements are willing to utilize the coercive power of the state for their own political purposes and in doing so often become fatally compromised, as happened in Egypt, Palestine and Syria. The promise of principled nonviolence is social, political, and economic institutions capable of transcending Machiavellian politics because of a radical commitment to pacifism and emancipatory political processes.