Peace and security studies in Southeast Asia show a rich array of theoretical and policy-oriented research that highlights key themes in the prevention and management of conflicts. These themes also highlight salient concepts that define approaches to peace and security. Two themes are noteworthy. First, while peace and security are not mutually exclusive, security cannot be assured by focusing on negative peace alone but also by a purposeful pursuit of positive peace, hence comprehensive security is critical. The second theme is the importance of regional institutions like ASEAN in managing intra-state relations. Given the fluid state of the global security environment, there is now greater scope for new thinking on how approaches to peace and security can be made more responsive to achieve shared goals.

Peace and conflict studies in Thailand is considerably influenced by the security narrative prescribed by the state and manipulated for political purposes. The field of study consequently promotes the interests of the Thai state rather than exploring the socio-political factors that have sustained the longevity of conflicts in the first place. This outcome is most evident in the cases of violence in the three southernmost provinces of Thailand—Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat—and the ongoing political conflict between royalists and their opponents. Because the focus is on national security, the field often overlooks the human aspect of peace and conflicts. This state-centric focus has influenced Thai peace and conflicts studies to take an inwardlooking approach, raising the possibility of it disconnecting from international scholarship.

Member-states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) support the norms of nuclear disarmament and nuclear security through diplomatic efforts at the global level and regional efforts to promote nuclear safety and security. This is demonstrated in how ASEAN helped push for negotiation of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and its eventual passage, as well as ongoing efforts to promote regional cooperation in advancing nuclear security and nuclear safety. Regional frameworks and mechanisms like the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy (ASEANTOM), the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the East Asia Summit provide the platforms for ASEAN to advance its diplomacy in promoting the norms of nuclear governance.

Why has the United States (US) changed its stance toward China and kept it in the digital economy domain, despite the change in its government? The extant literature finds causes from China yet barely addresses perceptual factors. This study, however, argues that the strategy and policy of the US have undergone a process whereby the US has securitized the domain by designating China as a threat instead of a risk. Furthermore, the US has internationalized securitization to include its allies and close partners among the Indo-Pacific countries. Analytical narratives examine the US’ economic statecraft, including commercial, industrial, and investment policies. A close examination reveals that the US-China technology competition has been undergoing partial decoupling in global supply chains of critical technologies.

East Asia has been dominated in theory and practice by state-centric policy considerations heavily influenced by the great powers. This perspective is threatened by the rise of non traditional security (NTS) challenges and undermined by great power irresponsibility. These challenges can also, however, represent avenues of opportunity for other actors. The central research question addressed by this article, therefore, is what role can and should be played by newly empowered or recognized actors in addressing NTS challenges, according to policy prescription from more reflectivist approaches to international relations theory? This article utilizes social constructivism and related perspectives to identify how regional middle powers and civil societies can be empowered as agents with a responsibility to innovate in the construction of institutions responsive to NTS challenges.

The geographical environment is believed to be one of the most important elements influencing the expansion of human civilizations along watercourses. The contiguity of Gwadar Port to the dominant trading routes and energy chokepoints of the world contributes to its prominence in the regional framework. Gwadar will turn Pakistan into a regional corridor due to its geographic location in relation to the enormous supply and consumer market economies of different regions. This study is explanatory and qualitative, and it emphasizes the geostrategic imperatives driving the development of Gwadar Port, including those connected with Pakistan’s economy and its position in the region, military strategy, and the development of Baluchistan Province, and concludes that the opening of the port has substantially enhanced the economy and security of Pakistan.

This paper provides a mid-term assessment of externally-led security Sector Reform (SSR) during the United Nations (UN) led peacebuilding intervention in Timor- Leste. Despite initial difficulties, several core institutions, introduced by the UN, remain effective and were integrated into local practices. These initial security problems of the new-born Timor-Leste state, included the radical reconfiguration of the power balances within elites and an unfamiliarity with new approaches to security governance by the indigenous actors themselves. The lack of contextual knowledge and insensitivity to local political dynamics by external actors exacerbated these issues. Nonetheless, Timor-Leste has found ways to achieve some measure of political stability and physical security, both of which were always overarching goals of SSR.

The concept of human security argues that the improvement of people’s wellbeing and livelihoods is a vital component in the stability of the state. What happens, however, when the state is not viewed as the only (if at all) source of influence on people’s everyday security? This article argues for a particular vernacular of human security that recognizes a social contract between the living with spirit actants, in ways that can often compete with or challenge state-building efforts. In Timor-Leste, ancestral spirits (matebian sira) can directly intervene in the physical safety of their living descendants, and livelihoods (in terms of food security) often depends on engagement between the living and their ancestors as well as nature spirits (rai-nainsira).

South Asia as a security zone is full of puzzles. The enigmatic character of South Asia is comprised its evolving nature, the complex conceptualization of its dominant security challenges, and the difficulty of finding solutions to these challenges. Some common security challenges that South Asian countries face require global solutions. The nuclear conundrum of India and Pakistan can only be solved by global solutions because of the complexity posed by the nuclear weapon countries located outside South Asia. Similarly, cyber security is a borderless problem. South Asian countries may manage their security challenges like terrorism with a cooperative framework, yet the increasing global connection to these regional problems complicates the search for solutions.

Several jihadist groups sought a safe haven in the Sahel region following the defeat of Daesh in Syria and Iraq, making it a hotbed of terrorist activities. These groups have relied on crime, amongst other strategies, to survive and expand. Such strategies serve as the groups’ lifeblood and help them forge alliances with local actors. The appeal of radical jihadist discourse capitalizes on human insecurities as manifested in political, environmental, and demographic challenges. This article considers not only the new threats to human security in the Sahel, but also the need for a multidimensional, inclusive, dialogue-based solution. Promoting development and social cohesion centered on human security could achieve better results in the region than resorting to external military intervention.

This article examines Iran-Uzbekistan relations within the regional security context, and the new efforts undertaken in 2019 to solve the security problems via bilateral and regional multinational institutions. It argues that the aggravation of the existing security situation, including geopolitical tensions in the region, contributes to the consolidation of the Iran-Uzbekistan partnership. The anti-Iran measures facilitate the process of reintegrating the region along the historical lines as part of the response to the growing global challenges. There are signs of positive regional dynamics, which can further boost Iran-Uzbekistan cooperation, and presuppose future regional connectivity among all pacified neighbors.

The official end of armed hostilities between insurgents and the Bangladesh military in 1997, post-conflict development interventions by international donors and the Government of Bangladesh, along with a greater emphasis on local ownership over peacebuilding interventions, as expressed in the Rangamati Declaration (1998), have given birth to the onset of NGO peacebuilding in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). This article argues that the aid flow has not only transformed community-based organizations into project-based local NGOs, but has also bred a new generation of profit-oriented and donor-driven local NGOs. This article concludes that NGO implementation of development projects and advocacy for human rights, despite being mostly effective in its identification of local needs, is severely affected by three major risk factors: legitimacy, security, and sustainability.

This article seeks to answer the questions of whether sanctions are ‘smart’ as designed and why if they are not. Evidence appears to suggest that smart sanctions are not ‘intelligent’ enough to change political leaders’ alleged violent behavior or to protect innocent civilians from direct or physical as well as indirect or structural violence. Targeted government officials can always find ways to outsmart the sanction sender actors by resisting the latter’s coercive efforts because of their willingness and ability to take repressive action against their people and find alternative trading partners as well as support from powerful undemocratic states. Instead of minimizing human suffering, sanctions tend to exacerbate regime insecurity and perpetuate international alliance politics. The cases of Myanmar and North Korea validate this proposition.

Efforts to “operationalize” the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) continue to encounter resistance from key member states. Where it matters most, among vulnerable civilian populations caught up in war, the R2P appears to be making scant difference. Rising geopolitical tensions have added to a growing sense of pessimism among R2P advocates. Unsurprisingly, the most contentions aspect of the R2P concept continues to revolve around the question of the use of force for humanitarian purposes. It is a subject on which states, for an admixture of historical and political reasons, remain deeply divided. Nonetheless, as a politically significant norm, the R2P has come to command growing support from states, even though the degree to which the R2P norm has been truly internalized across international society varies greatly.

Human security should not be considered as a mere academic rhetoric-it is, in fact, a political tool aimed at transforming individuals from conditions of exploitation and domination to that of political participation and accountability. This paper adopts political governance perspectives to analyze human security in Africa. It argues that without accountable democratic governance, the expressed objectives of human security would be difficult to achieve in Africa. By this focus, the paper adopts a broader view of human security, satisfying both the governance and development prerequisites of the concept, which has underpinned [in] security in Africa. The overall estimation of human security in Africa is that only a marginal improvement has been made in the region, especially over the last decade.

East Asia is a region deeply affected by colonial, ideological, and national wars. At the level of international governance, security organizations in the region have looked to minimize the worst manifestations of interstate conflict through emphasizing non-intervention; while domestic governance has emphasized national interest and strength in terms of security and economic growth. East Asian challenges to normative universalism can be defined in cultural, economic, and political terms. This article, however, considers not only the threats to human security in East Asia, but also the roles that East Asian actors play in protecting and promoting human security, noting that under certain conditions, East Asian perspectives may be able to secure, in terms of human security, better results than could be achieved through extra-regional intervention.

After 25 years, the global vision for human security as a concept and a policy commitment remains unfulfilled in most parts of the world. In fact, more and more evidence points to the growing reality that the idea of securing people has once again succumbed to the traditional concepts of state security and regime security, as it did after World War II. Part of the problem can be found in some major policy instruments adopted by proponents of human security. Military intervention for human protection, economic sanctions and judicial punishment or threats thereof, which have been regarded as policy instruments to protect people or promote human security, have proved to be either insufficient or ineffective, and at worst counter-productive.

This article examines the state of the global food problem, food security in East Asia, and the opportunity for Russia to prevent a food deficit in North Korea. The authors analyze the symptoms of the global food problem, the theoretical approaches to food security, the transformation of food consumption in Asia, and the food trade between Russia and the Korean Peninsula. One major conclusion is that Russia is in the best position among all countries to increase food exports to Asia-and especially to North Korea-as the people of Asia’s food consumption habits shape the new structure of food trade between that region and the rest of the world.

The aim of this paper is to examine the reasoning behind the ongoing U.S. policy of, in effect, ignoring Israel’s nuclear capability. By law, the American administration is obligated to impose sanctions on every country that joins the “Nuclear Club.” Despite this, not only has the United States not imposed sanctions on Israel, but the latter enjoys the lion’s share of U.S. foreign aid. This article tries to follow the logic of this policy. My hypothesis is that by ignoring Israel’s nuclear policy (of ambiguity), the United States can continue to declare her ongoing commitment to the security of Israel, while not having to anchor it in a formal pact. By adopting such a policy, both sides can “have their cake and eat it too.”

Post-war reconstruction in Sri Lanka, which is aided by many countries, is aimed at consolidating the unitary state structure as part of a geo-strategic security complex in the Indian Ocean Region. In this process, discourses of democratization and human rights have been reconfigured to contain or totally remove any threat to the unitary state emerging from the Tamils in the North and East whose claim to self-determination is seen as a major challenge to the geo-strategic complex in South Asia. In such a context, the bio-politics of the development-security nexus and neo-liberal governmentality operates by strengthening the hegemony of the Sinhala state against the Tamils and weakening or destroying the essential foundations of Tamil nationhood. Without recognizing these local and global dynamics every peacebuilding attempt will fail.

Cross-Strait relations over the past eight years have witnessed noticeable improvement and contributed to peace and stability in the region. This article argues that Beijing and Taipei have yet to tackle more fundamental issues and move forward with political negotiations on the status of cross-Strait relations. The growing military imbalance over the past decade has eroded Taiwan’s security and undermined its ability to negotiate with Beijing from a position of strength. With the DPP’s Tsai winning the 2016 election and her refusal to formally embrace the “1992 Consensus,” tensions could flare up again. Washington remains committed to Taiwan’s security through defense cooperation and arms sales, but its willingness to do so will be tested by a rising China determined to resolve the issue on its own terms.

Controversial and insufficient post-accident measures implemented by the Japanese government after the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident in 2011 have caused prolonged anxieties over radiation. These anxieties resulted in multiple insecurities, including health, economic, food, environmental, community, personal, and political insecurities. The Fukushima disaster shows that threats to human security may come not only from the manifest “enemy” outside, but from “dysfunction of the state” supported by peoples’ choices to sacrifice the victims for the sake of the interests of the “majority,” which is called a “sacrificial system.” At the same time, people are still patiently trying to restore their human security by means of voluntary actions.

Martial arts groups in Timor-Leste have a nationwide reach and have offered a resource of physical and social engagement for youth and adults for several decades. Yet, their involvement in crime, politics, and violent clashes, and their notorious reputation as troublemakers posing a threat to security and peace, have caused the government to permanently ban three major groups. Based on intensive fieldwork and qualitative interviews with members and leaders of illegalized groups, this analysis explains why the young democracy’s decision is not contributing to building peace. The three main findings from the interviews are that root causes of violence are not addressed by the ban, criminalization draws more people into illegality, and the positive aspects of these groups, which could potentially contribute to peace, are neglected.

The concept of human security gained prominence in Southeast Asia in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998. In a rapidly changing ASEAN, the list of human insecurities covers issues of both development and security, and fall within the ambit of both freedom from want and freedom from fear. But while human security has gained traction 20 years since the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report, more needs to be done to translate discourse into action. This article argues that in order to advance human security ASEAN states must be imbued with the political will to act decisively in addressing human insecurities and to work with other actors in promoting protection and empowerment of people and communities.

The concept of human security has evolved in two directions: (1) a comprehensive vision of security and development, and (2) a concretization of the concept tied to protection of civilians in armed conflict. This article discusses the two approaches and their relative merits. Starting with the Lysøen Declaration of 1998 and Canada’s subsequent introduction of the concept of human security in the security Council, the article argues that a concretization is necessary today. One way to do this is to link human security to campaigns for protection of civilians against the U.S. use of drones in targeted killings outside recognized war zones. This strategy would revitalize human security as a relevant policy concept, and also create greater security for people living in exposed communities.

In the years immediately before and after the 1998 Lysøen Declaration, a striking feature of the initiatives associated with the human security agenda was the prominent role of civil society coalitions, which was widely regarded as indispensible to the signal successes of this period. However, the dramatic breakthroughs of this “new diplomacy” were the products of a propitious conjuncture of conditions that contained the seeds of their subsequent loss of momentum. Yet the human security work of civil society organizations (CSOs) continues, in less prominent but still important ways, to be woven into the fabric of the more cosmopolitan practices promoted by the agenda. In the meantime, their setbacks contain important lessons-both for CSOs and for the policymakers inclined to collaborate with them.

This article discusses the role of the United Nations in the development of the concept of human security since the 1998 Lysøen Declaration. The UN’s role in the evolution of understandings of human security in international society is examined, emphasizing conceptual development, the incubation of ideas, consensus building, legitimation and codification, and practice. It also considers the limitations on the organization in promoting human security, given its state-centric character and substantial contestation of the idea of sovereignty in international society. The analysis suggests that the organization has played a significant role in the effort to define, promote, legitimize and implement elements of human security, but faces serious constraints given its state-centric nature.

Japan’s development assistance to conflict-affected areas in Mindanao, southern Philippines, opened new pathways for the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to support multilateral peacebuilding efforts. JICA, in collaboration with Universiti Sains Malaysia, organized a series of Consolidation for Peace Seminars as Track One-and-a-Half mediations. Two aspects of Japan’s assistance to Mindanao enabled JICA to engage in peacemaking. First, Japan’s assistance to Mindanao formed a unique tripartite cooperation mechanism consisting of the International Monitoring Team, Mindanao Task Force, and Japan-Bangsamoro Initiative for Reconstruction and Development. JICA took part in all three modes of assistance. Second, providing assistance under a volatile cease-fire agreement in Mindanao motivated JICA to become involved in peacemaking outside the traditional function of development assistance.

The overall record of peacebuilding as a post-Cold War liberal project has proved to be more positive than negative, especially in conflict termination. However, the peacebuilding agenda has had its limits in terms of progress in democratization, judicial institution-building and economic development, despite potential for greater success. Peacebuilders are more likely to succeed in transforming societies torn by armed conflict if they can avoid making the process excessively competitive. Democratization and capitalist development are already competitive processes, and the pursuit of retributive justice takes the form of judicial punishment. Together these strategies can form a recipe for competition and conflict, especially in institutionally weak states where the history of distrust among warring factions or former enemies is long and intractable.