This study investigates the extent to which the benefit levels of the North Korean Defector Settlement Support System (NKDSSS) have changed and differentially impacted the various groups of North Korean Defectors (NKDs). It employs a historical approach to policy analysis and uses datasets compiled, summarized, and converted with the Consumer Price Index by the author. Findings suggest a portion of Unconditional Cash Transfers decreased through the first pro-work reform period (2005-2014) and Conditional Cash Transfers conditioned on job preparation decreased through the second pro-work reform period (2015-2019). The changes may generate a blind spot of poverty and enhance inequality among the NKDs. For the NKDSSS to accomplish its goals of promoting socio-economic integration of NKDs in South Korea and preparing for a peaceful Korean unification, supplemental policies are required.

With around 34,000 North Korean defectors having arrived in South Korea (as of June, 2021), perceptions toward them remain ambiguous and unbalanced. The dominant discourse about North Korean defectors centers on adaptation, and cultural difference is often identified as one of the most challenging obstacles. This article examines how a specific conceptualization of culture is utilized to alienate North Korean defectors, while securing the belief in a single ethnicity of all Koreans. As a result, North Korean defectors are rendered as cultural other in South Korean society. While cultural difference is often believed to be the basis of discrimination for North Korean defectors, this article argues that social prejudice and discrimination reproduce and reinforce the discourse about cultural difference of North Korean defectors.

Weaker parties in a negotiation can change the assumed structural outcome of the negotiation by using strategies such as time delay tactics, which lead to entrapment. In this article, the Six-Party Talks are evaluated empirically to explore the utility of applying this bargaining tactic insight into international relations. The article applies Galin’s (2015) five stages of time delay tactics to the fifth and sixth rounds of the Six-Party Talks, with a focus on the triangular relations between the United States, South Korea, and North Korea. The article shows how North Korea as the weaker negotiating party used the time delay tactic to affect the fifth and sixth rounds of the Six-Party negotiations in its favor. North Korea’s use of several tactics included slowing down negotiations as much as possible, avoiding reaching a final agreement, prolonging negotiations by diversion, dragging out the negotiation process until some external or internal change occurs, and exhausting opponents until they are ready to concede. These tactics ultimately entrapped North Korea’s opponents resulting in the unsuccessful outcome of the Six-Party Talks.

The transnational ethnic networks developed by North Korean defectors are factors in the (de-)bordering of North Korea. Ethnographic fieldwork in two destinations—London and Los Angeles—demonstrates, first, that through their practices of financial and social remittances, the defectors have proved that North Korea’s border control is porous, and second, that the defectors have developed global and regional networks to challenge North Korean sovereignty. In the interaction between the defectors’ daily lives and the geopolitical environment, these geopolitical ethnic networks play important roles. This contribution to the debate on borders and defectors encourages us to shift our attention from nation-states’ laws and policies on border-crossers to the agency of the border-crossers themselves.

Deforestation is a severe environmental problem in North Korea. Beginning in 2001, the government implemented ten-year reforestation projects with few positive outcomes. Inter-Korean forestry cooperation began in 1999. Local governments and NGOs were the main implementers of cooperative projects from South Korea. The two Koreas had also been seeking financial and technical support from international organizations. This study examines the cooperative networks between government agencies, NGOs, and international organizations and financing possibilities to identify the reasons why so little has been accomplished. It also provides a meaningful contribution to the understanding of comparative relationships among the stakeholders and practical recommendations to improve the effectiveness of cooperative forestry programs in North Korea.

This article looks into how media representations of North Korean defectors reproduce the images of North Korean defectors, while paying particular attention to the contrasting voices of North Korean defectors which reflect self-presentation. The media-perpetuated image of North Korean defectors as displaced victims whose memories are mostly clustered around the oppressive regime fails to grasp the intersection of aspiration, determination, and agency of North Korean defectors. The self-presentation of North Korean defectors reveals that they are eager to be in charge of constructing and controlling their own images, which goes beyond hitherto nationalized, gendered, and ethnicized identities. Self-presentation, at the same time, is a product of strategic choices conditioned by social discourse and media representation.

The main assumption of this article is that the essence of the sixty-five year-long ‘Korean question’ is to replace the Korean Armistice Agreement with a new security order, often referred to as a Korean Peninsula Peace Regime. As such, this article explores elements considerable for a stable order on the Korean Peninsula. First, this article reviews relevant literature on the concept of ‘order’ in the discipline of international relations mainly from Henry Kissinger. Second, this article analyzes the elements of the Armistice Agreement as a ‘living precedent.’ Furthermore, this article offers a preliminarily study of a post-war order cases such as 2+4 Treaty and Austrian State Treaty. In conclusion this article experimentally proposes an outline of elements of a new security order on the Korean Peninsula.

With the North Korean waves of armament race in 2017-19, noted by the diplomacy of the Trump Administration, de-nuclearization has become a top priority for the Korean peninsula. In the meantime potentials for economic reforms in North Korea, perhaps even to the point of systemic change, are still open issues, as the need to feed people and improve the dismal economic performance remains high on the agenda. What lessons might be learned from the systemic change of Central and Eastern Europe for the context of East Asia? Implications based on International Relation (IR) theory are suggested.

This article seeks to answer the questions of whether sanctions are ‘smart’ as designed and why if they are not. Evidence appears to suggest that smart sanctions are not ‘intelligent’ enough to change political leaders’ alleged violent behavior or to protect innocent civilians from direct or physical as well as indirect or structural violence. Targeted government officials can always find ways to outsmart the sanction sender actors by resisting the latter’s coercive efforts because of their willingness and ability to take repressive action against their people and find alternative trading partners as well as support from powerful undemocratic states. Instead of minimizing human suffering, sanctions tend to exacerbate regime insecurity and perpetuate international alliance politics. The cases of Myanmar and North Korea validate this proposition.

This article interprets and analyzes the role of China in and the prospects of denuclearization of North Korea. Driven by its ruling party’s peculiar political interest of resisting, reducing, and replacing American power at the expense of its national interest of cooperating with the United States, Beijing has been alternatively facilitating (somewhat) and fettering (mostly) North Korean denuclearization to make the cause unavoidably long and arduous, if doable at all. The latest resumption of Beijing-Pyongyang ties, in reaction to the Trump-Kim summit, suggests that a fundamental change in Beijing’s strategic stance on the North Korean nuclear issue has taken place, making genuinely enabling peaceful denuclearization of the DPRK rather difficult as it would require literally a political change-of-heart in Beijing.

North Korea’s unchecked missile and nuclear program is one of the most pressing global security concerns. This article evaluates the multilateral engagement efforts that have been pursued by regional stakeholders, specifically assessing the Six-Party Talks vis-a-vis the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and explaining why these multilateral efforts have failed to resolve the nuclear crisis. Given the poor performances of these two multilateral platforms, this article seeks to assess the feasibility and policy implications of defusing the longstanding nuclear crisis through multilateral engagement. Despite stalling and a myriad of obstacles, the Six-Party Talks has a better chance than the ARF at curbing the nuclear crisis. At best, the ARF can contribute by playing a complementary role by helping deescalate tensions or cultivating better diplomatic ties.

This article analyzes the overturning of time and space in the daily lives of North Koreans during the Korean War. The overturning was caused by the aerial bombings by the United States Air Force that lasted for three years. In particular, after the execution of the scorched earth policy, in November 1950, which destroyed all the cities and villages in North Korea, most people lost their dwellings and had to endure living underground, in dugouts or mud-huts; they were also mobilized at night to restore industries and transportation facilities. This article describes the miserable daily lives of North Korean civilians during the war, a topic that has rarely been discussed, and explains how this experience continues to affect the worldview of the North Korean people.

How would North Korea’s development of the capability to target the United States with nuclear weapons influence its foreign policy? I argue that it would cause more dangerous crises than those of the last decade, and predict that these crises would eventually cause Kim Jong Un and his senior military associates to experience fear of imminent nuclear war or conventional regime change. I show that the effect of such fear would depend on whether or not Kim believes that he has control over the occurrence of these events. I argue that if he experiences fear and believes that he has some control over whether these extreme events actually happen, he will moderate his nuclear threats and behave more like other experienced nuclear powers. But if he experiences fear and believes that he has no control, he will likely pursue policies that could cause nuclear war. I use this insight to prescribe and proscribe policies for Washington, Seoul and the regional community.