This corpus-based study scrutinizes South Korean media’s portrayal of North Korean defectors (NKDs), especially women. Analyzing data from five leading newspapers (Chosun Ilbo, DongA Ilbo, JoongAng Ilbo, Hankyoreh, and Kyunghyang Sinmun) and Women News, this article explores power and gender dynamics in media language shaping NKD identities. Using corpus tools, statistical analysis of keywords, and collocations, the study integrates critical discourse analysis of narratives obtained through concordance search. Key findings reveal the significant underrepresentation and misrepresentation of NKD women, often stereotyping them only as victims of violence. The research advocates for a broader gender perspective in media coverage and diverse portrayals of NKD women and men as integral members of the community, emphasizing the need for gender-sensitive and inclusive language in South Korean media.

Utilizing data from South Korea’s National Health Insurance Database, which covers the entire population, this study investigates the health-seeking patterns of North Korean defectors in South Korea, focusing on mental health issues. We find that female North Korean defectors utilize mental healthcare services significantly more than male defectors and more than their matched counterparts among either South Korean natives or other immigrants. Regarding the long-term effects of residing in South Korea, indicators of both the prevalence and seriousness of mental health issues do not appear to decrease over time, for up to fifteen years after migration. We recommend more active medical support and intervention by the government to alleviate the difficulty of adjustment among female North Korean defectors that arises from mental health issues.

This article examines the spatial and temporal changes of North Korean (NK) migration by analyzing the interactive process between NKs’ efforts to cross borders amidst changing geopolitical and economic circumstances and the activities at the domestic, local, state, and international levels to manage displacement from a gender perspective. In doing so, I argue that the border between North Korea and China became violent and that NK migrations became spatially gendered and class-stratified. The proportion of NK women entering South Korea remains high, primarily due to the secondary migration of those who have long resided in China in de facto marriage relationships with Chinese men. In contrast, among recent direct defectors, NK men constitute a significant proportion and they often play an active role in family migration.

This article serves as an introduction to this special issue, which focuses on the current situation of North Korean (NK) migration and the safety and resilience of NK migrants from a gender perspective. This introduction highlights the importance of this topic by examining debates about the influence of China as a transit space on gendered mobility and security, the geopolitical implications for the daily lives of NK migrants, and the agency of NK women. We anticipate that the provision of up-to-date data and the application of multidisciplinary analysis based on different research methodologies will deepen the understanding of the changing landscape of NK migration and the (in)securities experienced by these migrants, and contribute to the discovery of possible and critical ways to empower them.

Peace and conflict studies in Thailand is considerably influenced by the security narrative prescribed by the state and manipulated for political purposes. The field of study consequently promotes the interests of the Thai state rather than exploring the socio-political factors that have sustained the longevity of conflicts in the first place. This outcome is most evident in the cases of violence in the three southernmost provinces of Thailand—Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat—and the ongoing political conflict between royalists and their opponents. Because the focus is on national security, the field often overlooks the human aspect of peace and conflicts. This state-centric focus has influenced Thai peace and conflicts studies to take an inwardlooking approach, raising the possibility of it disconnecting from international scholarship.

Peace studies in China has had meaningful initial developments, but the sustainability of the field’s development has been constrained by an authoritarian political atmosphere. Rights and justice are core issues in peace studies, but these remain unaddressed in China. Thus, this article highlights studies on rights movements as de facto peace studies in an authoritarian setting and compares the movement among the middle class and that of peasants/workers, which can help us understand current contradictions and disharmony in Chinese society. Maintaining the stability of a turbulent society is becoming a crucial agenda for the Chinese state. Accordingly, studies on rights movements will become increasingly important.

The purpose of this article is to study the characteristics and patterns of the field of peace and conflict studies in South Korea by tracing its history. A reflection on peace and conflict studies in Korea shows that the 1987 democratization was a critical moment, and that the subsequent end of the global Cold War initiated the full-blown development of the field. The Korean case shows that the advancement of peace and conflict studies is linked to real-world changes. The recent inclusion of human rights and transitional justice issues is meaningful since rights and justice were core but unaddressed issues in Korea. It is time for peace and conflict studies in Korea to leap forward, and this new attention to human rights and transitional justice can be a way to lead this development.

This introductory article illustrates the development of peace studies and then reviews the Asian context in it. Peace studies has developed through three approaches state-centered, human-centered, and structure-critical—the origins of which can be traced back to Kantian federalism and republicanism, Tolstoy’s criticism of institutionalized violence, and Marx’s critique of capitalism, respectively. In the post-Cold War era, the theories of security community, human security, and ecosocialism have developed separately. At the same time, the three approaches have competed and merged with one another in the face of increasingly complex global problems, resulting in the birth of “responsibility to protect” (R2P) and differing but simultaneous responses to climate change. Both ASEAN as a multifaceted community and development-based human security characterize the Asian context.

The immediate cause of the East Asian states’ pursuit of new economic statecraft, which has led to changes in the regional order, was the rise of US-China strategic rivalry. However, one structural factor behind the adoption of this statecraft is the economic network formed in East Asia. The emergence of new economic statecraft has had systemic effects, such as the spread of network sanctions, the adoption of divergent strategies, and the dual dynamics of cooperation and competition between states.

As it witnesses rising China’s assertive diplomacy and growing military might, Washington is seeking to restrain Beijing’s economic growth and technological development. The Biden administration’s digital-liberal coalition initiative resonates with liberal states which have growing concerns about democratic backsliding all over the world and China’s undue influence on other countries’ domestic politics and civil society. The United States and its liberal allies are increasingly likely to cooperate in technological innovation, the development of standards and norms, and the protection of human rights, resisting this authoritarian threat to their interests and values. However, it is unclear whether and how China will adjust its foreignpolicy strategy and which option non-liberal and/or developing states will prefer in this uncertain era of Sino-US order competition in global politics.

The US-China strategic competition, combined with other structural changes such as the global spread of COVID-19, climate change, and competition for technological innovation has dramatically increased uncertainty in Asia. Against this backdrop, the strategic competition between the US and China in the 21st century shows profound differences from the hegemonic competition in the past. The systemic consequences of hyper-uncertainty, as we are witnessing, are protectionism, nationalism, and the proliferation of conflicts and disputes between states. A collection of four papers in this special issue systematically examine the way in which the US-China strategic competition combined with other factors amplify the instability of the regional order, and explain the dual dynamics of competition and cooperation that Asian countries demonstrate in responding to US-China strategic competition and redesigning the regional order.

With around 34,000 North Korean defectors having arrived in South Korea (as of June, 2021), perceptions toward them remain ambiguous and unbalanced. The dominant discourse about North Korean defectors centers on adaptation, and cultural difference is often identified as one of the most challenging obstacles. This article examines how a specific conceptualization of culture is utilized to alienate North Korean defectors, while securing the belief in a single ethnicity of all Koreans. As a result, North Korean defectors are rendered as cultural other in South Korean society. While cultural difference is often believed to be the basis of discrimination for North Korean defectors, this article argues that social prejudice and discrimination reproduce and reinforce the discourse about cultural difference of North Korean defectors.

This study illustrates collaborative platforms and diversifying partnerships for South-South and triangular cooperation in development. The English School’s pluralism-solidarism spectrum is applied as a tool to explain transformative features of the changing international society in times of crisis. The study focuses on the intermediary pluralist-solidarism phase that shows dynamics of middle power coalitions using nation branding and collaborative governance as key strategies. The transitional phase is exemplified by two approaches. One is the bilateral approach to coalition shown through the case of China, whereas the other is the inclusivemultilateral approach demonstrated through the case of South Korea. Implications are given toward relatively loose networks that have the potential to evolve into platforms with institutional grounds, especially for middle powers seeking opportunities in the new normal.

This article aims to explain why recent tensions between religious groups in Papua, Indonesia, did not develop into ethnoreligious conflicts such as those which broke out in Ambon and Poso. Such tensions are likely to occur because of the migration of Muslim ethnicities from elsewhere in Indonesia that leads to political, racial, religious, and economic divisions. Migrant populations are generally Malay, Muslim, and prosperous, while native Papuans are Melanesian, Christian, and impoverished. The Christian indigenous Papuans feel threatened by the influx of Muslim migrants. Based on Lederach’s concept of peace agents, we argue that the adoption of cultural mechanisms driving peace agencies is central to preventing ethnoreligious conflict. The curricula of local schools should include such local wisdom in order to reach all ethnoreligious groups.

Deforestation is a severe environmental problem in North Korea. Beginning in 2001, the government implemented ten-year reforestation projects with few positive outcomes. Inter-Korean forestry cooperation began in 1999. Local governments and NGOs were the main implementers of cooperative projects from South Korea. The two Koreas had also been seeking financial and technical support from international organizations. This study examines the cooperative networks between government agencies, NGOs, and international organizations and financing possibilities to identify the reasons why so little has been accomplished. It also provides a meaningful contribution to the understanding of comparative relationships among the stakeholders and practical recommendations to improve the effectiveness of cooperative forestry programs in North Korea.

This article explores how a leading Korean literary critic, Kim Kirim (1908-?), understood the controversial term “fascism” in his writings. If we associate fascism with wartime Japanese totalitarianism, it is difficult to understand why and how he warned against fascism in liberated Korea. By interpreting his use of the term “fascism” from the colonial to the liberation period, we are able to gain a better understanding of the international relations between imperial Japan and colonial Korea, as well as of the internal relations between North and South Korea from 1945 to 1950. Such an approach allows us to see the struggle for mutual respect among Korean writers experiencing the ideological conflict and exclusive sectarianism immediately before the outbreak of the Korean War.

This article looks into how media representations of North Korean defectors reproduce the images of North Korean defectors, while paying particular attention to the contrasting voices of North Korean defectors which reflect self-presentation. The media-perpetuated image of North Korean defectors as displaced victims whose memories are mostly clustered around the oppressive regime fails to grasp the intersection of aspiration, determination, and agency of North Korean defectors. The self-presentation of North Korean defectors reveals that they are eager to be in charge of constructing and controlling their own images, which goes beyond hitherto nationalized, gendered, and ethnicized identities. Self-presentation, at the same time, is a product of strategic choices conditioned by social discourse and media representation.

The arrival of many Yemeni people on Jeju Island in 2018 to seek asylum became a mega-political issue in South Korea. This article investigates two questions. First, how and why have Yemeni asylum seekers suddenly become the focus of securitization concerns in South Korea? And second, how have these concerns affected the government’s responses? We argue that three key factors—the influence of media on the refugee crisis in Europe, the Yemenis’ race, gender, and religious background, and South Korea’s internal political and economic situation—have intersected with each other and produced the securitization of Yemeni migration. Amidst highly contested political debates on the protection of forced migrants in South Korea, the state has strictly controlled the border but showed contradictory refugee policies.

The definition of refugee status and the right to seek asylum is based on international law and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. After the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Statues of Refugees removed the geographic and temporal restrictions of the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention, these international conventions have been widely accepted and ratified by 147 countries(as of September 2019). While the principles were established half a century ago,the actual practice of granting refugee status has shown variability in different parts of the world, with continuous changes and transformations. Although transfigurations in the political conjuncture and changes in the implementation of international law—as well as alternating policy trends in international politics—represent significant contexts and undercurrents for migration and refugee studies, there are social practices which cannot be sufficiently comprehended exclusively with static insights on laws, rules, or principles.

This research article explains why Cambodia’s dual transition of peacebuilding and democratization after the civil war led to peace but not democracy. The research finds that democratization often threatened peacebuilding in Cambodia. Particularly elections led to political instability, mass protests, and renewed violence, and thus also blocked reforms to democratize Cambodia’s government institutions. By applying the war-to-democracy transition theory and theories of political reconciliation to Cambodia’s dual transition, the following research article finds that a lack of political reconciliation between Cambodia’s former civil war parties is the main reason why the dual transition failed. This article argues that peace-building and democratization are only complementary processes in post-civil war states when preceded by political reconciliation between the former civil war parties.

This article addresses the underexplored question of why some state violence cases in Asia are not followed by transitional justice even during a democratic transition. It explicates the two factors that obstruct or delay seeking truth and accountability and thus bring impunity for perpetrators. One is the context in which the violence took place, and the other is longevity of the violent regime. If the violence occurs during a period of conflation of state construction and regime building, and if the perpetrators’ power persists long enough to be institutionalized, transitional justice is least likely to take place. Five cases of violence violence which were committed by anticommunist regimes during the Cold War in four Asian countries are explored.

Art increasingly appears at “dark” museums and related formal sites to balance the traditional exhibits of war. This article explores how art might contribute a peace education perceptive in differing countries and a globalizing context. Case studies from the United Kingdom, Europe (West and East), and Southeast Asia (Cambodia and Vietnam) are analyzed. The former deploys new technologies and supports wellknown artists who appeal to art markets. Asian curation relies more on creativity, including children’s and victim’s art. Both deploy artistic devices to symbolize the scale of atrocities and create aesthetic depth-juxtaposition, prominence, perspective, repetition, patterning, and soundscapes. The analysis provides tools and checklists to assist curation and inform artists, and concludes that critical educational processes are as important as the art.

Timor-Leste will celebrate the twentieth anniversary of its independence on May 20, 2022. As we approach this milestone, it is worthwhile to look back on the history of Timor-Leste’s state-building, examining the efforts of its governmentand people and the roles played by the international community. In this special issue, twenty years of state-building in Timor-Leste is examined, from the preindependence period, when the foundations and basic frameworks of the state were envisaged and laid out by the United Nations (UN), up to the present. In those two decades, a wide range of state-building initiatives were implemented. For example, a series of elections were held, including the 2001 election for a constitutional assembly, presidential elections (in 2002, 2007, 2012, and 2017), general elections (in 2007, 2012, 2017, and 2018), and elections of suco (village) chiefs and councils (in 2004-5, 2009, and 2016). The constitution and other laws, including the law on the veterans’ pension scheme, were drafted and enacted, the parliament was inaugurated, and national languages and a currency were selected. Statutory institutions such as the Falintil Defense Force of Timor-Leste (F-FDTL), the National Police Force of Timor-Leste (PNTL), the public administration, the suco councils, and the Petroleum Fund were established. The recruiting and training of civil servants was carried out. In addition, directions and visions for state-building were set, including the establishment of national symbols for integration and nationally shared myths through the construction of the resistance museum and the memorial to heroes (and victims), commemorating their suffering and devotion to the liberation struggle.

Building peace to prevent the recurrence of conflict is an inevitable role of United Nations peacekeeping operations today. As this activity increasingly occurs in populated, low-intensity conflict areas, relations between peacekeepers and civil communities become significant. Peacebuilding cannot achieve any level of success unless it is directly relevant to the communal needs of the local people. Building an alliance for peace in civil communities is vital not only for strengthening civil community-peacekeeper relations but also for fostering a sense of ownership and responsibility in local minds. By examining the peacebuilding experience of South Asian states, this article shows that the complex, sensitive and volatile nature of today’s operational environments have necessitated employing soft aspects of military science as part of a community-centered approach to peacebuilding.

It is a pleasure and an honor to be addressing all of you today. First of all, I must thank the University for conferring this honorary degree on me, and I hope that I will be able to do enough for education in Burma to deserve such an honor. There is much that we have to do and there is much support and help that we need from our friends.

The institution of nuclear power in Japan appears to be drifting; nevertheless it persists. For the past 60 years, conservative politicians, technologists, and electric companies have acted in concert, for different reasons, to achieve a full nuclear fuel cycle: specifically technology for reprocessing and uranium enrichment. Their pursuit has eroded the bottom-line spirit of peaceful use; to be sure, it has been excessively ambitious for Japan’s status as a non-nuclear-weapon state. The mastering of the full nuclear fuel cycle has resulted in a competency trap, excluding or delaying development of alternatives to nuclear power. Furthermore, this situation has heightened nuclear power’s sunk costs. The critical conjuncture of the March 11, 2011 incident has had a limited impact only. Anti-nuclear activists, the weakest concerned actor, try to dramatize their movement for “exit from nuclear,” but they have failed to bring about electoral changes.

In 2008, the Thai-Cambodian conflict over the Preah Vihear Temple was reignited after the issue became politicized by political groups in Thailand. The opposition accused the Samak Sundaravej government of aspiring to achieve its private interests in exchange for Thailand’s support for Cambodia’s bid to have the Preah Vihear listed as a UNESCO World Heritage Site. In Thailand, there was a belief that if Cambodia’s bid was successful, the country would lose the disputed 4.6-square-kilometer area surrounding the temple. This pushed elements in Thailand to unofficially declare a state of war with Cambodia. This crisis also had a serious impact on ASEAN. Thailand rejected ASEAN’s mediating role, thus revealing its distrust in regional dispute settlement mechanisms. For ASEAN, it unveiled its weakness in exercising authority over its members, and its incompetency in the management of regional disputes. This article argues that ASEAN was caught between the need to be a key player in regional politics, especially in tackling territorial disputes in the region, and the need to maintain the region’s status quo by appearing subservient to the members’ self-interest in protecting their national sovereignty at the expense of progress on regionalization.