Peace and security studies in Southeast Asia show a rich array of theoretical and policy-oriented research that highlights key themes in the prevention and management of conflicts. These themes also highlight salient concepts that define approaches to peace and security. Two themes are noteworthy. First, while peace and security are not mutually exclusive, security cannot be assured by focusing on negative peace alone but also by a purposeful pursuit of positive peace, hence comprehensive security is critical. The second theme is the importance of regional institutions like ASEAN in managing intra-state relations. Given the fluid state of the global security environment, there is now greater scope for new thinking on how approaches to peace and security can be made more responsive to achieve shared goals.

This introductory article illustrates the development of peace studies and then reviews the Asian context in it. Peace studies has developed through three approaches state-centered, human-centered, and structure-critical—the origins of which can be traced back to Kantian federalism and republicanism, Tolstoy’s criticism of institutionalized violence, and Marx’s critique of capitalism, respectively. In the post-Cold War era, the theories of security community, human security, and ecosocialism have developed separately. At the same time, the three approaches have competed and merged with one another in the face of increasingly complex global problems, resulting in the birth of “responsibility to protect” (R2P) and differing but simultaneous responses to climate change. Both ASEAN as a multifaceted community and development-based human security characterize the Asian context.

Member-states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) support the norms of nuclear disarmament and nuclear security through diplomatic efforts at the global level and regional efforts to promote nuclear safety and security. This is demonstrated in how ASEAN helped push for negotiation of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and its eventual passage, as well as ongoing efforts to promote regional cooperation in advancing nuclear security and nuclear safety. Regional frameworks and mechanisms like the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy (ASEANTOM), the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the East Asia Summit provide the platforms for ASEAN to advance its diplomacy in promoting the norms of nuclear governance.

This article unpacks the dynamics of group hedging in international relations by examining the Southeast Asian states’ collective efforts to use ASEAN-led multilateral institutions as a platform to hedge against a range of risks surrounding intensifying big-power rivalry and increasing global uncertainties. It argues that ASEAN’s collective hedging is a converged but not necessarily coordinated act. Despite the states’ diverging attributes and outlooks, they converge on shared vulnerabilities, collective memories, and disadvantaged positions. Southeast Asian states thus view ASEAN-based multilateralism as an indispensable, albeit insufficient, means to engage big powers and manage other challenges. Through the functions of institutional binding, buffering, and building, ASEAN’s group hedging serves to mitigate and offset risks while shaping Asian order amid deepening uncertainties in the age of the Indo Pacific.

The immediate cause of the East Asian states’ pursuit of new economic statecraft, which has led to changes in the regional order, was the rise of US-China strategic rivalry. However, one structural factor behind the adoption of this statecraft is the economic network formed in East Asia. The emergence of new economic statecraft has had systemic effects, such as the spread of network sanctions, the adoption of divergent strategies, and the dual dynamics of cooperation and competition between states.

The US-China strategic competition, combined with other structural changes such as the global spread of COVID-19, climate change, and competition for technological innovation has dramatically increased uncertainty in Asia. Against this backdrop, the strategic competition between the US and China in the 21st century shows profound differences from the hegemonic competition in the past. The systemic consequences of hyper-uncertainty, as we are witnessing, are protectionism, nationalism, and the proliferation of conflicts and disputes between states. A collection of four papers in this special issue systematically examine the way in which the US-China strategic competition combined with other factors amplify the instability of the regional order, and explain the dual dynamics of competition and cooperation that Asian countries demonstrate in responding to US-China strategic competition and redesigning the regional order.

East Asia has been dominated in theory and practice by state-centric policy considerations heavily influenced by the great powers. This perspective is threatened by the rise of non traditional security (NTS) challenges and undermined by great power irresponsibility. These challenges can also, however, represent avenues of opportunity for other actors. The central research question addressed by this article, therefore, is what role can and should be played by newly empowered or recognized actors in addressing NTS challenges, according to policy prescription from more reflectivist approaches to international relations theory? This article utilizes social constructivism and related perspectives to identify how regional middle powers and civil societies can be empowered as agents with a responsibility to innovate in the construction of institutions responsive to NTS challenges.

India and hence modifies their strategic priorities. The prevailing security dynamics in the region, such as changing nature of conflicts, introduction of new technologies, evolving deterrent force postures, and suspension of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), have increased states’ reliance on arms build-up and decreased their inclination to arms control and disarmament. This paper offers a Pakistani perspective on how the prevailing regional environment seems less favorable to nuclear disarmament and more inclined to deterrent force modernization. To explain the above rationale, this study takes guidance from primary and secondary sources to assess disarmament challenges, and discusses the prospects for creating a new security environment in the region to promote a renewed consensus on nuclear disarmament.

South Asia as a security zone is full of puzzles. The enigmatic character of South Asia is comprised its evolving nature, the complex conceptualization of its dominant security challenges, and the difficulty of finding solutions to these challenges. Some common security challenges that South Asian countries face require global solutions. The nuclear conundrum of India and Pakistan can only be solved by global solutions because of the complexity posed by the nuclear weapon countries located outside South Asia. Similarly, cyber security is a borderless problem. South Asian countries may manage their security challenges like terrorism with a cooperative framework, yet the increasing global connection to these regional problems complicates the search for solutions.

The conflict between India and Pakistan is a major source of crisis which must be resolved if peace and development are to prevail in this region. One approach for identifying the costs of conflict and the strategies for minimizing them is the conflict resolution curve model formulated through regret analysis (based on costs). The application of this model in the present context suggests alternative strategies, one being that India should encourage more formal bilateral trade. However, this solution is not feasible given the repeated terrorist attacks on India from Pakistani soil and the suspension of trade ties between the two nations. Another alternative is for India to strengthen its preparedness diplomatically, and this is happening through the Financial Action Task Force and other channels.

With the North Korean waves of armament race in 2017-19, noted by the diplomacy of the Trump Administration, de-nuclearization has become a top priority for the Korean peninsula. In the meantime potentials for economic reforms in North Korea, perhaps even to the point of systemic change, are still open issues, as the need to feed people and improve the dismal economic performance remains high on the agenda. What lessons might be learned from the systemic change of Central and Eastern Europe for the context of East Asia? Implications based on International Relation (IR) theory are suggested.

The aim of the present study is to shed light on the diplomatic achievements of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), by exploring the way in which it has dealt with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) implemented by China. ASEAN is little more than an association of minor powers with insignificant military and economic capabilities. However, in its dealings with the BRI, it has proactively advanced its own interests by skillfully conducting equidistant diplomacy with China and the US, without becoming too remote from or too close to either one of them, thereby reaping benefits from its favorable relations with each of them.

This article addresses the underexplored question of why some state violence cases in Asia are not followed by transitional justice even during a democratic transition. It explicates the two factors that obstruct or delay seeking truth and accountability and thus bring impunity for perpetrators. One is the context in which the violence took place, and the other is longevity of the violent regime. If the violence occurs during a period of conflation of state construction and regime building, and if the perpetrators’ power persists long enough to be institutionalized, transitional justice is least likely to take place. Five cases of violence violence which were committed by anticommunist regimes during the Cold War in four Asian countries are explored.

East Asia is a region deeply affected by colonial, ideological, and national wars. At the level of international governance, security organizations in the region have looked to minimize the worst manifestations of interstate conflict through emphasizing non-intervention; while domestic governance has emphasized national interest and strength in terms of security and economic growth. East Asian challenges to normative universalism can be defined in cultural, economic, and political terms. This article, however, considers not only the threats to human security in East Asia, but also the roles that East Asian actors play in protecting and promoting human security, noting that under certain conditions, East Asian perspectives may be able to secure, in terms of human security, better results than could be achieved through extra-regional intervention.

This article examines the state of the global food problem, food security in East Asia, and the opportunity for Russia to prevent a food deficit in North Korea. The authors analyze the symptoms of the global food problem, the theoretical approaches to food security, the transformation of food consumption in Asia, and the food trade between Russia and the Korean Peninsula. One major conclusion is that Russia is in the best position among all countries to increase food exports to Asia-and especially to North Korea-as the people of Asia’s food consumption habits shape the new structure of food trade between that region and the rest of the world.

Art increasingly appears at “dark” museums and related formal sites to balance the traditional exhibits of war. This article explores how art might contribute a peace education perceptive in differing countries and a globalizing context. Case studies from the United Kingdom, Europe (West and East), and Southeast Asia (Cambodia and Vietnam) are analyzed. The former deploys new technologies and supports wellknown artists who appeal to art markets. Asian curation relies more on creativity, including children’s and victim’s art. Both deploy artistic devices to symbolize the scale of atrocities and create aesthetic depth-juxtaposition, prominence, perspective, repetition, patterning, and soundscapes. The analysis provides tools and checklists to assist curation and inform artists, and concludes that critical educational processes are as important as the art.

Timor-Leste will celebrate the twentieth anniversary of its independence on May 20, 2022. As we approach this milestone, it is worthwhile to look back on the history of Timor-Leste’s state-building, examining the efforts of its governmentand people and the roles played by the international community. In this special issue, twenty years of state-building in Timor-Leste is examined, from the preindependence period, when the foundations and basic frameworks of the state were envisaged and laid out by the United Nations (UN), up to the present. In those two decades, a wide range of state-building initiatives were implemented. For example, a series of elections were held, including the 2001 election for a constitutional assembly, presidential elections (in 2002, 2007, 2012, and 2017), general elections (in 2007, 2012, 2017, and 2018), and elections of suco (village) chiefs and councils (in 2004-5, 2009, and 2016). The constitution and other laws, including the law on the veterans’ pension scheme, were drafted and enacted, the parliament was inaugurated, and national languages and a currency were selected. Statutory institutions such as the Falintil Defense Force of Timor-Leste (F-FDTL), the National Police Force of Timor-Leste (PNTL), the public administration, the suco councils, and the Petroleum Fund were established. The recruiting and training of civil servants was carried out. In addition, directions and visions for state-building were set, including the establishment of national symbols for integration and nationally shared myths through the construction of the resistance museum and the memorial to heroes (and victims), commemorating their suffering and devotion to the liberation struggle.

South Korea (Korea) lacks the compulsory power of regional and global great powers, but still strives to play a major role in the fields of peacebuilding and development. It is a middle power which, due to geopolitical constraints, is unable to play the neutral or brokering role of traditional middle powers, and thus must turn to other areas of agenda setting and niche diplomacy. This article examines policy arenas for which Korea is particularly well suited to playing such a role, and in which Korea can have a major impact, significantly to the mutual advantage of Korea and its regional partners. In order to do so to the best of its ability, Korea needs to shift its policy emphasis from bilateral to multilateral endeavors.

The processes of making foreign policy decisions and forming assumptions about the nature of the “other” comprise major challenges to the transformation of conflictual relationships and construction of an enduring peace in Northeast Asia. In this article, in order to make progress towards these goals, methodologies for unpacking the “black box of decision,” understanding the “other,” deconstructing the relationship between positions and interests, and increasing the role played by non-state and substate actors are explored. The paper first assesses theoretical and practical tools used for addressing the problems. It then considers other conflictual relationships that have faced similar obstacles, and the processes which were employed in an attempt to ameliorate them. It concludes with a policy prescription for breaking the vicious cycle of hurt, blame, and rising nationalism in the region.

Building peace to prevent the recurrence of conflict is an inevitable role of United Nations peacekeeping operations today. As this activity increasingly occurs in populated, low-intensity conflict areas, relations between peacekeepers and civil communities become significant. Peacebuilding cannot achieve any level of success unless it is directly relevant to the communal needs of the local people. Building an alliance for peace in civil communities is vital not only for strengthening civil community-peacekeeper relations but also for fostering a sense of ownership and responsibility in local minds. By examining the peacebuilding experience of South Asian states, this article shows that the complex, sensitive and volatile nature of today’s operational environments have necessitated employing soft aspects of military science as part of a community-centered approach to peacebuilding.

Although Southeast Asia was brutally occupied by Imperial Japan during World War II, the region has reconciled with postwar Japan. That Southeast Asia is not hostile to Japan today is due to several reasons: the relatively short duration of the Japanese occupation, the pragmatic needs of the Southeast Asian states to deal with immediate security and economic problems rather than to dwell on the past, and the efforts of Japan to be a good neighbor to Southeast Asia since the enunciation of the 1977 Fukuda Doctrine. Public opinion surveys of Southeast Asians towards Japan today and the content analysis of the history textbooks of various ASEAN states show little hostility towards Japan.

The concept of human security gained prominence in Southeast Asia in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998. In a rapidly changing ASEAN, the list of human insecurities covers issues of both development and security, and fall within the ambit of both freedom from want and freedom from fear. But while human security has gained traction 20 years since the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report, more needs to be done to translate discourse into action. This article argues that in order to advance human security ASEAN states must be imbued with the political will to act decisively in addressing human insecurities and to work with other actors in promoting protection and empowerment of people and communities.

It is a pleasure and an honor to be addressing all of you today. First of all, I must thank the University for conferring this honorary degree on me, and I hope that I will be able to do enough for education in Burma to deserve such an honor. There is much that we have to do and there is much support and help that we need from our friends.