As the Indo-Naga peace process nears its finality, the longstanding competing territorial and identity claims between Nagas and Kukis in India’s northeastern state of Manipur remain unabated, with no earnest efforts to reconcile the two groups. The Kukis have a foreboding that the future Naga peace Accord will be imposed on them as a fait accompli. Given the high stakes on both sides, New Delhi’s quest for durable peace in the region cannot afford to focus only on the Nagas—as though the concerns of the already beleaguered Kukis, or any other stakeholder, are dispensable at the altar of the Naga peace talks. Instead, New Delhi must display willingness, sensitivity, and finesse to consider how both groups’ legitimate concerns could be assuaged and reconciled.

The survey for practical consideration is crucial in social and policy science inquiries. Several systematic reviews in the post-conflict peacebuilding literature have thus far ignored its efficaciousness. This knowledge gap motivated in developing ConflictAffected Population Survey technique to survey the conflict-ravaged Chittagong Hill Tracts indigenous peoples for the purpose of examining peace hybridity in Bangladesh, as the quantitative part of the study. This article outlines guidelines for designing probabilistic sampling and survey procedures for a robust sequential explanatory mixed-methods case study research in a terrain where an accurate sample frame is difficult to define. The systematic methodological strategy adopted herein enabled the compilation of a comprehensive cross-sectional case study where findings are generalizable, especially the concept and model central to our thesis on indigeneity dilution.

Lived experiences of conflict-affected locals are an important source of local knowledge that should be incorporated into peacebuilding. However, the national project of peacebuilding in post-war Sri Lanka has failed to consider local knowledge and voices. Utilizing a grassroots perspective, this study examines the experiences of grassroots activists in north and east Sri Lanka to understand the various challenges that have hindered their attempts to share experiences and narratives of war and cultural practices across communities. The findings show that a “context of denial,” identified variously as institutional denial, fear-based denial, and community denial, has prevented grassroots activists from engaging in a meaningful dialogue about peace, reconciliation, and justice. This study helps build an understanding of how grassroots activism functions and is challenged.

peace and security studies in Southeast Asia show a rich array of theoretical and policy-oriented research that highlights key themes in the prevention and management of conflicts. These themes also highlight salient concepts that define approaches to peace and security. Two themes are noteworthy. First, while peace and security are not mutually exclusive, security cannot be assured by focusing on negative peace alone but also by a purposeful pursuit of positive peace, hence comprehensive security is critical. The second theme is the importance of regional institutions like ASEAN in managing intra-state relations. Given the fluid state of the global security environment, there is now greater scope for new thinking on how approaches to peace and security can be made more responsive to achieve shared goals.

This article traces the development of peace studies in Mindanao, arguing that Mindanao’s distinct multicultural context ensured the field’s tight linkage to Islamic and Mindanao studies. In all, the search for peaceful resolution of the armed conflicts in these parts of the Philippines provided the activist-inspired impetus for the field’s growth and determined the highly localized focus of formal and nonformal peace education, research, and publications in and on Mindanao. peace studies practitioners— from the academe, non-governmental organizations, and religious institutions—contributed to the shaping of national policies and programs for Mindanao, with government policy, in turn, buttressing the institutionalization of their initiatives. This article also provides comparative insights on the nature and evolution of Mindanao peace studies and that of Western peace studies.

Expectations that the end of Suharto’s thirty-two years of authoritarian rule in Indonesia in 1998 would usher in an era of political reform, including the end to separatist rebellions, human rights abuses, and military impunity, were dashed by the intensification of old conflicts and outbreak of new forms of violence. Despite initial optimism, efforts to address human rights violations during the New Order stalled. This article surveys the various forms of conflict in Indonesia over the past twenty years and the major trends in scholarship, together with the smaller body of literature framed specifically in terms of peacebuilding. It concludes that much of the literature on peacebuilding has been driven by institutional interests and the incentives created by the funding of these institutions.

This article surveys the trajectory of peace and conflict studies in Myanmar—from its early focus on civil war and insurgency, to state institutions and ethnic armed actors, and later broadening into relational and networked approaches covering formal peace processes, regional geopolitics, conflict economies, and everyday peacebuilding. It suggests that the widening of peace and conflict studies was brought about by the opening of the country from the early 2010s, which both granted scholars and researchers more access to the country and introduced new foreign specialists, discourses, and developmental actors into the political sphere. The peace agenda and directions of peace studies have been upended by the military coup of 2021; how reconciliation, justice, and federal democratic reform will look like in the future remains to be seen.

peace and conflict studies in Thailand is considerably influenced by the security narrative prescribed by the state and manipulated for political purposes. The field of study consequently promotes the interests of the Thai state rather than exploring the socio-political factors that have sustained the longevity of conflicts in the first place. This outcome is most evident in the cases of violence in the three southernmost provinces of Thailand—Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat—and the ongoing political conflict between royalists and their opponents. Because the focus is on national security, the field often overlooks the human aspect of peace and conflicts. This state-centric focus has influenced Thai peace and conflicts studies to take an inwardlooking approach, raising the possibility of it disconnecting from international scholarship.

peace studies in China has had meaningful initial developments, but the sustainability of the field’s development has been constrained by an authoritarian political atmosphere. Rights and justice are core issues in peace studies, but these remain unaddressed in China. Thus, this article highlights studies on rights movements as de facto peace studies in an authoritarian setting and compares the movement among the middle class and that of peasants/workers, which can help us understand current contradictions and disharmony in Chinese society. Maintaining the stability of a turbulent society is becoming a crucial agenda for the Chinese state. Accordingly, studies on rights movements will become increasingly important.

The discussions on peace in Japan have significantly changed since the end of the Second World War. This can be clearly illustrated by the development of the peace studies field, which has been strongly influenced by the pacifism of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and the experiences of the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This article traces the historical development of Japanese peace studies and analyzes its characteristics. Since pacifism has been accepted as the key element for understanding political culture in Japan since 1945, peace research, the practice of peace education, and peace museums are also regarded as important factors that constitute Japanese peace studies and peace culture.

The purpose of this article is to study the characteristics and patterns of the field of peace and conflict studies in South Korea by tracing its history. A reflection on peace and conflict studies in Korea shows that the 1987 democratization was a critical moment, and that the subsequent end of the global Cold War initiated the full-blown development of the field. The Korean case shows that the advancement of peace and conflict studies is linked to real-world changes. The recent inclusion of human rights and transitional justice issues is meaningful since rights and justice were core but unaddressed issues in Korea. It is time for peace and conflict studies in Korea to leap forward, and this new attention to human rights and transitional justice can be a way to lead this development.

This introductory article illustrates the development of peace studies and then reviews the Asian context in it. peace studies has developed through three approaches state-centered, human-centered, and structure-critical—the origins of which can be traced back to Kantian federalism and republicanism, Tolstoy’s criticism of institutionalized violence, and Marx’s critique of capitalism, respectively. In the post-Cold War era, the theories of security community, human security, and ecosocialism have developed separately. At the same time, the three approaches have competed and merged with one another in the face of increasingly complex global problems, resulting in the birth of “responsibility to protect” (R2P) and differing but simultaneous responses to climate change. Both ASEAN as a multifaceted community and development-based human security characterize the Asian context.

Japan is a world leader in peace education, and Hiroshima is one of the world’s centers for peace. While the peer-reviewed literature on Japanese peace education is growing, few studies address how present-day peace educators in Hiroshima conceptualize peace education. This study aims to better understand how peace educators in Hiroshima (re)conceptualize, adapt, and apply their work. Using a grounded theory approach, we answer the following research questions: (a) How do contemporary peace educators in Hiroshima conceptualize their work? (b) How has this conceptualization changed or evolved over time? Interviewees presented convergent and divergent insights around three main themes: definitions of peace as a collective identity and constructivist process, metaphors for peace as informing pedagogy, and efforts to challenge taboos through a social justice lens.

Economic aid and peacebuilding efforts to transform the Northern Ireland conflict impact grassroots, civil society organizations (CSOs) and vulnerable people of concern. Brexit is an example of how democracies privilege white, cisgender, heterosexual, able-bodied voices, exclude marginalized voices from peacebuilding efforts, and maintain structural violence that exacerbates sectarian identity conflicts. A qualitative methodology was used to interview 120 participants who shared their experiences of grassroots peacebuilding efforts to transform the Northern Ireland conflict. Findings revealed that community audits are critical to inclusion of local needs, and helped to assess what escalates conflict, British job cuts create needs that overwhelm CSOs and youth who feel hopeless are attracted to sectarian paramilitary groups. They reject peace and trigger further conflict as a result.

Myanmar has undergone democratic transition since 2010 when the country introduced elections and a parliamentary form of government. The country has now had two successive governments, the first led by President Thein Sein and the second by Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy. Both governments have made the ethnic peace process, based on the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, a key policy issue. Nonetheless, only limited success has been obtained thus far, and important structural and agency factors inhibit greater progress. These factors, termed “democracy deficits” in this article, suggest that the peace process has limited scope for further success in the medium term, and that the interactions between these two factors has only worsened the situation. A postscript brings the article up to date.

What is missing from the ongoing Afghan peace talks is public opinion: whether the Afghan people are in broad agreement with the peace process and its potential outcomes. The current study is based on the opinions of 704 people from across twenty-five provinces of Afghanistan. The study uses a quantitative and qualitative approach to delve into public opinion on the process. The general finding of this study is that while almost all Afghans want peace, most are unwilling to accept a peace deal that would cost them their constitutional gains, including human rights, minority rights, gender equality, and an Islamic republic. Besides this, most Afghans would be unwilling to vote for the Taliban in any elections.

This article aims to explain why recent tensions between religious groups in Papua, Indonesia, did not develop into ethnoreligious conflicts such as those which broke out in Ambon and Poso. Such tensions are likely to occur because of the migration of Muslim ethnicities from elsewhere in Indonesia that leads to political, racial, religious, and economic divisions. Migrant populations are generally Malay, Muslim, and prosperous, while native Papuans are Melanesian, Christian, and impoverished. The Christian indigenous Papuans feel threatened by the influx of Muslim migrants. Based on Lederach’s concept of peace agents, we argue that the adoption of cultural mechanisms driving peace agencies is central to preventing ethnoreligious conflict. The curricula of local schools should include such local wisdom in order to reach all ethnoreligious groups.

We re-evaluate Burmese history from the perspective of Thai philosopher Prawase Wasi who asserts that the basis for society is not simply individuals but the “selfforming group.” He discusses the essential nature of a self-forming group which is embodied in the Thai Buddhist concept of taam, which are sacred virtues emerging from self-organizing groups. In between the taam and self-forming groups are institutions of the state, economy, and education, etc. Prawase Wasi’s approach has been used in Thailand to guide government policies for the last twenty years. In this article, we apply this model to the history of conflict in Burma. We contrast this approach with the more traditional focus on individualism and utilitarianism in western high modernism which typically shapes development policies.

This article explores the prospect of theorizing unarmed civilian peacekeeping as a transformative justice concept. Utilizing the principles of transformative justice theory as a framework of analysis, it finds that unarmed civilian peacekeeping produces an environment of everyday justice, thereby contributing to transformative peacebuilding. Crucial to this proposed concept of everyday justice is the ability of an unarmed civilian peacekeeping approach to form a link between the elite-level negotiating panels in a peace process and the grassroots constituency in a postconflict society. The case of voluntary and mandated nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) involved in the Bangsamoro peace process in Mindanao is used to corroborate these conceptual suggestions.

This article focuses on the concept of “fragility,” which gained prominence in literature on conflict-driven countries and serves as an analytical tool for policy analysis. Using this concept, this article provides a review of Timor-Leste since its independence in 2002. The country has achieved high economic growth, though the economy has remained fragile in terms of its high dependence on external factors, namely oil revenues. This study suggests that foreign aid and investments do not automatically improve fragility in resource-dependent economies unless they help diversify the monoculture economy, based upon democratic consensus-building among stakeholders.

This paper provides a mid-term assessment of externally-led Security Sector Reform (SSR) during the United Nations (UN) led peacebuilding intervention in Timor- Leste. Despite initial difficulties, several core institutions, introduced by the UN, remain effective and were integrated into local practices. These initial security problems of the new-born Timor-Leste state, included the radical reconfiguration of the power balances within elites and an unfamiliarity with new approaches to security governance by the indigenous actors themselves. The lack of contextual knowledge and insensitivity to local political dynamics by external actors exacerbated these issues. Nonetheless, Timor-Leste has found ways to achieve some measure of political stability and physical security, both of which were always overarching goals of SSR.

The transitional justice policies employed in Timor-Leste are among the most multifaceted and comprehensive ever attempted. However, what these mechanisms have collectively accomplished has not been adequately evaluated. The long-term effectiveness of transitional justice should be judged in terms of the multidimensional relationships between the many policies and programs relevant to redressing the legacy of the past. The impunity of those most responsible for human rights violations casts a sizable shadow over the transitional justice efforts; however, analysis of the establishment of the Chega! National Centre (CNC) shows that the gradual development of transitional justice in Timor-Leste has broken through a structural bottleneck. This is due to persistent calls for transitional justice from civil society and the slow but steady implementation of relevant programs.

This article contributes to the discourse on hybridity by reviewing the development of the legal framework related to traditional governance mechanisms in Timor-Leste in the twenty years since independence in 2002. It analyzes how this framework has contributed to nurturing governance in the country and argues that traditional governance mechanisms have had a considerable role in improving governance since independence. It is also argued that with regulation and proper support from stakeholders, a traditional governance system can facilitate democratization, and that the host community can become the driver of positive change.

The people of Muslim Mindanao in the southern Philippines overwhelmingly approved, in a plebiscite in 2019, the creation of a new and more autonomous region, raising hopes that the decades-long conflict in Mindanao would soon end. This article asserts that the Mindanao peace process is not just about peace talks between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, but it should also include the effective participation of grassroots organizations and community-based peace advocates in resolving local conflicts. It evaluates four significant contributions of grassroots-level, local organizations and NGOs to the peace process: (1) combating violent extremism, (2) broadening peacebuilding by local women’s organizations, (3) solving local conflicts and rido (clan wars), and (4) ceasefire monitoring and civilian protection.

This article explores how a leading Korean literary critic, Kim Kirim (1908-?), understood the controversial term “fascism” in his writings. If we associate fascism with wartime Japanese totalitarianism, it is difficult to understand why and how he warned against fascism in liberated Korea. By interpreting his use of the term “fascism” from the colonial to the liberation period, we are able to gain a better understanding of the international relations between imperial Japan and colonial Korea, as well as of the internal relations between North and South Korea from 1945 to 1950. Such an approach allows us to see the struggle for mutual respect among Korean writers experiencing the ideological conflict and exclusive sectarianism immediately before the outbreak of the Korean War.

As contemporary armed conflicts become increasingly complex, peacebuilding actors have been unable to prevent or respond effectively to related crises. Considering the policy trends evoked by the United Nations sustaining peace agenda and contextspecific peacebuilding theories, this article examines peacebuilding initiatives amid complex contexts in Syria and Mozambique. It argues that the adaptive approaches of the National Agenda for the Future of Syria and the architecture of the negotiations surrounding the new peace process in Mozambique represent examples of contextspecific, innovative, and non-linear peacebuilding methods that foster the selforganization capabilities of the respective conflict-affected societies. It concludes by asserting that through pragmatism, local and national ownership, and process facilitation, there is an increased potential for the effectiveness of peacebuilding interventions in complex conflict-affect situations.

The conflict between India and Pakistan is a major source of crisis which must be resolved if peace and development are to prevail in this region. One approach for identifying the costs of conflict and the strategies for minimizing them is the conflict resolution curve model formulated through regret analysis (based on costs). The application of this model in the present context suggests alternative strategies, one being that India should encourage more formal bilateral trade. However, this solution is not feasible given the repeated terrorist attacks on India from Pakistani soil and the suspension of trade ties between the two nations. Another alternative is for India to strengthen its preparedness diplomatically, and this is happening through the Financial Action Task Force and other channels.

This research article explains why Cambodia’s dual transition of peacebuilding and democratization after the civil war led to peace but not democracy. The research finds that democratization often threatened peacebuilding in Cambodia. Particularly elections led to political instability, mass protests, and renewed violence, and thus also blocked reforms to democratize Cambodia’s government institutions. By applying the war-to-democracy transition theory and theories of political reconciliation to Cambodia’s dual transition, the following research article finds that a lack of political reconciliation between Cambodia’s former civil war parties is the main reason why the dual transition failed. This article argues that peace-building and democratization are only complementary processes in post-civil war states when preceded by political reconciliation between the former civil war parties.

The main assumption of this article is that the essence of the sixty-five year-long ‘Korean question’ is to replace the Korean Armistice Agreement with a new security order, often referred to as a Korean Peninsula peace Regime. As such, this article explores elements considerable for a stable order on the Korean Peninsula. First, this article reviews relevant literature on the concept of ‘order’ in the discipline of international relations mainly from Henry Kissinger. Second, this article analyzes the elements of the Armistice Agreement as a ‘living precedent.’ Furthermore, this article offers a preliminarily study of a post-war order cases such as 2+4 Treaty and Austrian State Treaty. In conclusion this article experimentally proposes an outline of elements of a new security order on the Korean Peninsula.

This study seeks to assess how the conflict in Somalia has transformed over the years and examines the merits of adopting a hybrid approach to peacebuilding. The article argues that given the changes experienced in the conflict and the sociopolitical and cultural characteristics of the Somali Society, a hybrid peace strategy which combines the traditional Xeer approach and contemporary counter-terrorism strategies can fill the gaps previous peace efforts failed to achieve. This approach has the potential to re-establish the horizontal and vertical social contracts between the people themselves and with the government which had been lost prior to and during the conflict.

The official end of armed hostilities between insurgents and the Bangladesh military in 1997, post-conflict development interventions by international donors and the Government of Bangladesh, along with a greater emphasis on local ownership over peacebuilding interventions, as expressed in the Rangamati Declaration (1998), have given birth to the onset of NGO peacebuilding in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). This article argues that the aid flow has not only transformed community-based organizations into project-based local NGOs, but has also bred a new generation of profit-oriented and donor-driven local NGOs. This article concludes that NGO implementation of development projects and advocacy for human rights, despite being mostly effective in its identification of local needs, is severely affected by three major risk factors: legitimacy, security, and sustainability.

East Asia is a region deeply affected by colonial, ideological, and national wars. At the level of international governance, security organizations in the region have looked to minimize the worst manifestations of interstate conflict through emphasizing non-intervention; while domestic governance has emphasized national interest and strength in terms of security and economic growth. East Asian challenges to normative universalism can be defined in cultural, economic, and political terms. This article, however, considers not only the threats to human security in East Asia, but also the roles that East Asian actors play in protecting and promoting human security, noting that under certain conditions, East Asian perspectives may be able to secure, in terms of human security, better results than could be achieved through extra-regional intervention.

After 25 years, the global vision for human security as a concept and a policy commitment remains unfulfilled in most parts of the world. In fact, more and more evidence points to the growing reality that the idea of securing people has once again succumbed to the traditional concepts of state security and regime security, as it did after World War II. Part of the problem can be found in some major policy instruments adopted by proponents of human security. Military intervention for human protection, economic sanctions and judicial punishment or threats thereof, which have been regarded as policy instruments to protect people or promote human security, have proved to be either insufficient or ineffective, and at worst counter-productive.

Successfully reintegrating former rebels into civil society is a crucial task in postconflict countries. In the aftermath of a decade-long conflict (1996-2006) in Nepal, management of arms and armies became a major issue in the domain of post-conflict peacebuilding. “From Combatants to peacemakers” was an initiative to promote peace and harmony among the former ex-combatants and host communities. In this context, this article highlights the role of social dialogue, which proved effective in promoting social harmony, peace, and reconciliation among ex-combatants and community members in Nepal. Also, the article explicates the worth of social dialogue that may be used in other parts of the world to successfully reconcile former antagonist groups into the same communities.

This article analyzes the role of the Justice and peace Commission (JPC) of the Archdiocese of Bamenda in the management and prevention of inter-ethnic conflicts in the Northwest Region of Cameroon. It demonstrates that the active participation of this institution in peacebuilding is marked by partial success. There is much belief in the capacity of faith-based institutions to manage conflicts. However, evidence on the role of this Catholic Commission in terms of engagement and mediation in peacebuilding among warring ethnic communities is not encouraging. While its dialogue approach has significantly checked violence, its peace Education Programme has failed to build an entrenched culture of peace. It operates in a context of significant obstacles and direly needs to beef up its operations.

This study investigates the effects of a peace education camp, designed and organized by women peace advocates, in shaping the beliefs and attitudes of youth leaders after a violent incident that threatened the gains of a peace process in the Philippines. The study uses quantitative methodology and a two observation (pretest-posttest) design. Seventy students participated in the research. The Beliefs and Attitudes toward peace Issues (BATPI) scale developed by the researcher was employed. Data analysis procedures used the t-test for paired samples. Results showed that beliefs and attitudes of participants toward peace and the peace process significantly improved after the peace education camp. Implications and applications of findings are discussed and recommendations are offered.

The Third Panglong peace Conference convened in Naypyitaw in July 2018 has led to the accession of two more armed groups to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement bringing the total number of signatories to ten groups now. Conversely, this development has weakened the United Nationalities Federal Council that previously housed the non-signatories collectively. There were far less agreements this time around and major sticking points include the military’s insistence that the armed groups agree not to secede from the Union of Myanmar which the latter have refused thus far. The military is also interested in discussing disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration while the armed groups are keen on broader security reforms. China again facilitated the Northern Alliance’s attendance of the meeting.

Contrary to its humanist image, Hidankyo, the Japan Confederation of Atomic and Hydrogen Bomb Sufferers Organizations, has engaged in contentious politics against the state for decades. This article traces the little-known history of the Hidankyo movement from the mid-1950s to the early 1980s, introducing how this organization formed in relation to the movement to ban nuclear bombs in the mid-1950s and how it grew into an independent social movement organization with clear policy demands after overcoming an organizational crisis triggered by the Cold War politics of the 1960s. The movement slogan for Hidankyo, “no more hibakusha,” did not naturally emerge from the sufferers’ experience with the atomic bombings, but was substantiated through their struggles to confront their adversaries, most importantly the Japanese government.

Art increasingly appears at “dark” museums and related formal sites to balance the traditional exhibits of war. This article explores how art might contribute a peace education perceptive in differing countries and a globalizing context. Case studies from the United Kingdom, Europe (West and East), and Southeast Asia (Cambodia and Vietnam) are analyzed. The former deploys new technologies and supports wellknown artists who appeal to art markets. Asian curation relies more on creativity, including children’s and victim’s art. Both deploy artistic devices to symbolize the scale of atrocities and create aesthetic depth-juxtaposition, prominence, perspective, repetition, patterning, and soundscapes. The analysis provides tools and checklists to assist curation and inform artists, and concludes that critical educational processes are as important as the art.

In this article, the limits and possibilities of Korean unification education is critically examined and compared with the peace process on the Korean Peninsula for overcoming division from the perspective of peace education. For the purpose of becoming a single unified Korea, the direction of unification education has been presented within a hostile frame to cultivate attitudes and values for its own sake. peace education in a divided society refers to a collective effort to transform the situation of hostile division into peaceful coexistence and rapprochement. In this context, unification education for overcoming the division of the Korean Peninsula should be established as the subject of critical peace education according to the global standards of Sustainable Development Goal 4.7.

The introduction of civic education in Serbia in 2001 marked a beginning of an allencompassing reform that set the tone for future changes designed to support the country’s democratization. This article draws on documentary and elite interview data to unpack the conceptualization of this policy, revealing it to be a multi-level positioning exercise in the national and international political space. It argues that, by using favorable political and international policy conditions, Serbian policymakers created a version of civic education that significantly drew on grassroots peace education programs developed during the 1990s, recognizing the priority of needs in building a democratic society. The latter offered Serbian policymakers agency in the context of what critical literature perceives as a transfer/imposition of policies in societies facing “Westernization.”

Since the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, there has been greater interest in countering violent extremism. Due to the U.S.-led “War on Terror,” madrassas in Pakistan have received international attention for initiating peace education programs through international NGOs. The motivation to work in madrassas is that erstwhile studies have blamed the madrassa education system for the lack of critical thinking and the vulnerability of madrassa students to extremist ideologies. While peace education interventions in Pakistan have continued for over a decade, there is a scarcity of scholarly assessments. This article aims to bridge that gap by analyzing the causes and consequences of extremism, particularly violent extremism in Pakistan, to make a case for and critically examine the application of peace education.

In the present article, I discuss current and past peace and reconciliation educational efforts conducted between Palestinians and Israelis. I concentrate on the educational initiatives conducted for Jewish- and Palestinian-Israeli citizens and not on those less common taking place between Israelis and Palestinians in the Palestinian Authority. In the first section of this article I describe the Israeli sociopolitical and educational context. I then review the main theoretical perspectives which underwrite the educational work undertaken. The third section is dedicated to reviewing the main existing programs and offering information regarding research results where research has been conducted, and in the fourth and last section I offer critical insights on the educational initiatives portrayed.

Twenty-four years into democracy, South Africa remains a country searching for peace. High levels of interpersonal, gender-based, and political violence together with structural violence continue to plague the country. Schools are sites of regular violent conflict, mirroring problems in the wider community. Despite this, peace education has not received priority attention. This article discusses a context of endemic violence in South Africa and links this to its history. This prompts discussions of the need for peace education and the range of interventions that have occurred. Specific examples of peace education programs are offered to illustrate their content, philosophy, and pedagogy. A critique of such interventions is provided. Explorations of constraints and potential enablers of peace education in an expanded society-wide program conclude the article.

peace education in conflict affected societies has achieved widespread popularity amongst international aid agencies seeking to find a place for education in supporting peacebuilding since the 1990s. However, its aims, content, and effectiveness have been critiqued particularly for its failures to address structural causes of grievances. This article draws on empirical research exploring a UNICEF supported peace education related curriculum reform in Sierra Leone developed in 2008 called “Emerging Issues.” The article draws on a critical discourse analysis of its content and qualitative interview data with key informants. It argues that while “Emerging Issues” was well-intentioned, its lack of regard for contextual dynamics generating conflict and a tendency to pathologize the nation served to undermine its transformatory goals.

This article analyzes the role of schools in helping to build peace in post-conflict countries in Africa. It argues that schools cannot be built back the same after a violent conflict because they have often been complicit in the violence in the first place. Thus the need to “build back better.” There is much belief in the potential of schools to contribute to peace in post-conflict societies. However, evidence on the role of schools in terms of the introduction of courses in peace education and attempts to change the structures, relationships, and practices of schools in a more peaceful direction is not particularly encouraging. Many significant obstacles remain to schools successfully contributing to peace.

Timor-Leste will celebrate the twentieth anniversary of its independence on May 20, 2022. As we approach this milestone, it is worthwhile to look back on the history of Timor-Leste’s state-building, examining the efforts of its governmentand people and the roles played by the international community. In this special issue, twenty years of state-building in Timor-Leste is examined, from the preindependence period, when the foundations and basic frameworks of the state were envisaged and laid out by the United Nations (UN), up to the present. In those two decades, a wide range of state-building initiatives were implemented. For example, a series of elections were held, including the 2001 election for a constitutional assembly, presidential elections (in 2002, 2007, 2012, and 2017), general elections (in 2007, 2012, 2017, and 2018), and elections of suco (village) chiefs and councils (in 2004-5, 2009, and 2016). The constitution and other laws, including the law on the veterans’ pension scheme, were drafted and enacted, the parliament was inaugurated, and national languages and a currency were selected. Statutory institutions such as the Falintil Defense Force of Timor-Leste (F-FDTL), the National Police Force of Timor-Leste (PNTL), the public administration, the suco councils, and the Petroleum Fund were established. The recruiting and training of civil servants was carried out. In addition, directions and visions for state-building were set, including the establishment of national symbols for integration and nationally shared myths through the construction of the resistance museum and the memorial to heroes (and victims), commemorating their suffering and devotion to the liberation struggle.

In democracies, the media plays a pivotal role in post-election peacebuilding. Beyond setting the political agenda, the media in Africa also addresses the challenges of electoral conflict and violence, security, and post-election peacebuilding. This article examines the role of the media in the electoral process in relation to post-election peacebuilding in Nigeria since 1999. Specifically, it highlights the Nigerian media experience with reflections on windows of opportunities for post-election peacebuilding. Content analysis is used to discuss the peacebuilding objectives of the Nigerian media election coverage, editorials, and media programs. The article concludes that the media undermines the impact of its role on conflict dynamics because of selfish interests. It is, therefore, recommended that the media re-embrace professionalism to prevent election violence and ensure peacebuilding.

South Korea (Korea) lacks the compulsory power of regional and global great powers, but still strives to play a major role in the fields of peacebuilding and development. It is a middle power which, due to geopolitical constraints, is unable to play the neutral or brokering role of traditional middle powers, and thus must turn to other areas of agenda setting and niche diplomacy. This article examines policy arenas for which Korea is particularly well suited to playing such a role, and in which Korea can have a major impact, significantly to the mutual advantage of Korea and its regional partners. In order to do so to the best of its ability, Korea needs to shift its policy emphasis from bilateral to multilateral endeavors.

The decade-long low-intensity armed conflict in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) that surfaced soon after the independence of Bangladesh (1971) due to the failure of the state-building project ended with the CHT Accord which was signed in 1997 between the government of Bangladesh and the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Sanhati Samiti (PCJSS). This study uses qualitative research methods to explore the fundamental research question of who is in the driver’s seat of the post-accord CHT peacebuilding process. A mostly top-down approach to peacebuilding has been used in the CHT due to an entirely donor-driven peacebuilding partnership between local and international stakeholders. Under this asymmetric power structure, the marginalization of local ownership is expected to produce unintended results in the peace process.

Liberal missteps have paved the way for the local turn in post-conflict peacebuilding. However, localized peacebuilding does not always produce peaceful outcomes. Several scholars have previously demonstrated that unresolved tensions from international-local encounters result in a negative hybrid peace in which political and social hierarchies are preserved and conflict and violence persist. To add to existing analyses on the local turn in peacebuilding, this article analyzes some of the causes and consequences of negative hybrid peace using the case of Timor-Leste. Exclusive and superficial local involvement, political cleavages within the local leadership, and unresolved tensions from international-local encounters were roadblocks in Timor-Leste’s post-conflict peacebuilding. These characteristics prelude a return to a status quo dominated by the local elite and plagued with governance and socio-economic issues.

The pursuit of retributive justice in war-torn countries with extremely weak state institutions may not necessarily advance the causes of peace, democracy, and the rule of law. Win-lose electoral competition and judicial retribution may not necessarily be a recipe for peace and security. The case of Cambodia and others show that the pursuit of retributive justice has not proved to be the immediate or direct cause of peace, democratic, and rule-of-law institution building.

Nepal is in a long political transition. This article focuses on the complex practices and concepts of political consensus in Nepal, and an effort is made to capture the political dynamics of different stakeholders of consensus politics with insights into the complex political reality. This article argues that the practice of consensus has contributed to easy resource distribution, containing overt violence, and accommodating diverse political parties, and made more progress in consolidating peace than in promoting democracy. Established democratic norms were monopolized by a few leaders in the name of consensus, sometimes even leading to political tensions. Thus, the consociation model falters in Nepal and the proper adoption of a democratic contestation model may be a solution for ongoing socio-political tensions.

This article argues for a relational and historical understanding of the violent conflict in Muslim Mindanao, the Philippines that goes beyond treating this region as a violent “space of exception,” but instead points at similarities and congruities with other parts of the Philippines. The consequences of this observation are discussed in relation to the ongoing peace negotiations in the region. Rather than seeing these as efforts potentially transforming Muslim Mindanao into a peaceful “space of normality,” it is argued that the impact of these negotiations will remain confined, as they solely tackle the national conflict scale and remain confined to only one type of armed organization.

The case of East Timor is distinct in that it offers both its own specifics and a common perspective widely shared among peacebuilders. Its unique trajectory of developments could be more succinctly understood through a four-dimensional taxonomy: “givens,” the past, the present, and the future. Three “givens” represent the unique historical, political, and geographical dimensions of the country. Its distinct position in the historical context of UN peace operations is marked not only by reaffirmed relevance as a “success” model despite its increasingly complicated form, but also by unprecedented challenges for consent of the host country and adoption of local wisdom. However, East Timor is subject to pitfalls in the progress of peacebuilding. Also, as time passes it may face changing agendas and disquieting woes.

This article seeks to add to the existing literature on Japan’s peacebuilding by examining its involvement in the psychosocial reconstruction of children in conflictaffected regions. It demonstrates that to this end Japan has implemented creative, recreational activities, and, to a lesser extent, community-building strategies. This article argues that there are three important implications of Japan’s involvement in psychosocial reconstruction for its own foreign policy: (1) psychological reconstruction can enhance its non-military approach to peacebuilding; (2) this field can potentially be another area of expertise in its own peacebuilding policy; and (3) in so doing, Japan may be able to carve out a niche in the field of international peacebuilding. This article concludes by identifying some limitations that can be developed into areas for future research.

Cross-Strait relations over the past eight years have witnessed noticeable improvement and contributed to peace and stability in the region. This article argues that Beijing and Taipei have yet to tackle more fundamental issues and move forward with political negotiations on the status of cross-Strait relations. The growing military imbalance over the past decade has eroded Taiwan’s security and undermined its ability to negotiate with Beijing from a position of strength. With the DPP’s Tsai winning the 2016 election and her refusal to formally embrace the “1992 Consensus,” tensions could flare up again. Washington remains committed to Taiwan’s security through defense cooperation and arms sales, but its willingness to do so will be tested by a rising China determined to resolve the issue on its own terms.

Nepal adopted a unique post-conflict development framework for mobilizing international support and government resources to facilitate its peace process. The main focus of this paper is the role played by the Nepal peace Trust Fund (NPTF) in Nepal’s transition. The paper concludes that the main strengths of this model were its success in keeping ex-combatants in cantonments by creating a conducive environment, its harmonization of funds from donors and the government, and its contribution to national elections. However, the NPTF’s defects were many, including weak monitoring mechanisms, an inability to prepare for successful rehabilitation and to initiate projects to support transitional justice, and failure to stop the misuse of funds and corruption. Having taken stock of these failures, the paper explores a core reason for them: the NPTF’s isolation from the political process.

The “rise of China,” especially within U.S. academic and policy circles, has been increasingly analyzed through a geopolitical lens. Yet geopolitics alone cannot account for the complex political mobilization of historical memory and how it frames any discussion of peace and cooperation in the region. Drawing on the concept of geobody, or how space and people are connected in a biopolitical manner, this article examines how the territorial disputes in the South China Sea are remaking the identity and interests of China. It develops an alternative theoretical understanding of China’s rise that focuses on identity (or geobody) politics, and explores the risks involved in a further escalation of tensions for peace and cooperation in the area, and in East Asia more generally.

The processes of making foreign policy decisions and forming assumptions about the nature of the “other” comprise major challenges to the transformation of conflictual relationships and construction of an enduring peace in Northeast Asia. In this article, in order to make progress towards these goals, methodologies for unpacking the “black box of decision,” understanding the “other,” deconstructing the relationship between positions and interests, and increasing the role played by non-state and substate actors are explored. The paper first assesses theoretical and practical tools used for addressing the problems. It then considers other conflictual relationships that have faced similar obstacles, and the processes which were employed in an attempt to ameliorate them. It concludes with a policy prescription for breaking the vicious cycle of hurt, blame, and rising nationalism in the region.

On October 15, 2015, the government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar signed a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) with eight of the sixteen ethnic armed groups it had been negotiating with. The aim of the Thein Sein government had been to sign the agreement with all sixteen groups, but this was not realized. One reason why eight of the groups have been left out is the ongoing fighting between the Myanmar military and some of the groups, and the army’s unwillingness to involve them in the ceasefire process. Similarly, some of the ethnic armed groups have also indicated that they are unwilling, or not ready, to sign the NCA at this time.

Since the mid-1990s the development community has focused significant attention on the potential and actual impact of development interventions on conflict resolution and peacebuilding in conflict-ridden and post-conflict zones. This has included the formulation and deployment of diverse concepts and tools of conflict sensitivity, including peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA). Over the last 15 years the intent and application of PCIA has varied across the world. Mindful of this diversity, this article draws lessons from the application of PCIA in Pakistan, arguing that context-specific lessons are required to inform and shape the next phase of PCIA’s development and application, thus ensuring that it is increasingly beneficial to all stakeholders.

Building peace to prevent the recurrence of conflict is an inevitable role of United Nations peacekeeping operations today. As this activity increasingly occurs in populated, low-intensity conflict areas, relations between peacekeepers and civil communities become significant. peacebuilding cannot achieve any level of success unless it is directly relevant to the communal needs of the local people. Building an alliance for peace in civil communities is vital not only for strengthening civil community-peacekeeper relations but also for fostering a sense of ownership and responsibility in local minds. By examining the peacebuilding experience of South Asian states, this article shows that the complex, sensitive and volatile nature of today’s operational environments have necessitated employing soft aspects of military science as part of a community-centered approach to peacebuilding.

This article examines the impact of a natural disaster on the political dynamics of an ethno-nationalist conflict. The humanitarian space generated by the 2004 tsunami could have revived the peace process between the Sri Lankan state and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), as evidenced by the joint mechanism that was formed for rehabilitation and reconstruction. However, the impact of the tsunami carried a potential for both peacebuilding and escalation of the conflict. The growing securitization of South Asia, led by the United States, upheld a militaristic approach and strengthened the Sri Lankan state against the LTTE. The militaristic approach to the decades-long conflict was advanced and eventually resulted in a massive war which claimed thousands of lives. The tsunami was a missed political opportunity.

Martial arts groups in Timor-Leste have a nationwide reach and have offered a resource of physical and social engagement for youth and adults for several decades. Yet, their involvement in crime, politics, and violent clashes, and their notorious reputation as troublemakers posing a threat to security and peace, have caused the government to permanently ban three major groups. Based on intensive fieldwork and qualitative interviews with members and leaders of illegalized groups, this analysis explains why the young democracy’s decision is not contributing to building peace. The three main findings from the interviews are that root causes of violence are not addressed by the ban, criminalization draws more people into illegality, and the positive aspects of these groups, which could potentially contribute to peace, are neglected.

This article addresses the question of what has contributed to the difference between German and Japanese nuclear politics in the post-Fukushima era. Germany has decided to phase out nuclear energy, but Japan has done the opposite. The origin of this difference can be traced back to the development of the anti-nuclear peace movement in the early 1980s. West Germans turned against nuclear energy as well as nuclear weapons, whereas Japanese peace activists carefully avoided the nuclear energy issue because of their concern over U.S.-Japan relations. The West German peace movement in the following years was in a position to foster cooperation between East and West Germans, whereas the Japanese movement missed the chance to go beyond the Cold War mentality.

This article examines the prospects for the realization of the agreement signed at the 2007 inter-Korean summit to transform the conflict-susceptible Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the West Sea into a border area where South and North Korea jointly promote peace and prosperity. To realize this agreement the two Koreas must integrate new ideas and plans by viewing the NLL as a space of common benefit rather than a line of military confrontation. The establishment of the West Sea Special Zone for peace and Cooperation focuses on security and economic issues. Implementation of the agreement requires particular attention to development of a comprehensive plan, including promotion of ecological, environmental, historical, and cultural assets, as well as inter-Korean fishery cooperation.

Time is the most precious resource we have. It is irreversible and nonrenewable. It makes the difference, more than ever, between the best and worst scenarios of climate change, energy competition, economic development, poverty, and security. Despite this, an incredible amount of time is wasted, especially the time of others and of nature. These latter resources are needed to prevent violence, build sustainable security, and ensure the well-being of all. Therefore, it is high time to radically change the way we deal with time and to develop a more adaptive “temporament.” This article defines time, surveys temporal deficiencies, and presents the parameters of a more responsible way of dealing with time in conflict transformation.

In 2012, two well-established international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) in the peacebuilding field, Conciliation Resources and Saferworld, published a joint report entitled “From Conflict Analysis to peacebuilding Impact” (Hiscock and Dumasy 2012). This report was based on 18 conflict studies across a broad range of contexts, all focused on building the capacities of local actors to engage in participatory forms of conflict analysis as well as utilizing the insights gained for strategizing peacebuilding initiatives. The report’s main conclusion was that adequate conflict analysis is a key precondition for all types of effective peacebuilding initiatives. Two other notable conclusions were that the process and the ownership of the conflict analysis are as important as the results of the analysis.

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime once again faces a serious challenge in the run-up to the NPT Review Conference scheduled for April 27 to May 22, 2015. This can be attributed to the perceived delay in implementation of commitments made by the states parties at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Although the 2015 Review Conference is still half a year away, shaky U.S.-Russia relations, the armed conflict directly involving the Israelis and Palestinians, and the outcome of the U.S. mid-term elections will not be conducive to the review process. Both the nuclear-weapon states and the non-nuclear-weapon states should redouble their efforts to narrow their differences on key issues.

The Myanmar peace Center (MPC) is one of the newest organizations with a focus on peace in Asia. It was initially formed in October 2012 with a core group of 13 members. Since then it has gone on to become a much larger and also much more institutionalized organization. The nature of its work differs from that of most other peace research centers in that it is the organization appointed by the Myanmar President and government to bring an end to ethnic and sectarian conflict in the country.

The Japanese and Australian governments supported the establishment of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND) in 2008. During its two-year mandate, the ICNND organized international conferences in Sydney, Washington, Moscow, and Hiroshima. The commission made specific proposals in a final report entitled Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policy Makers. This research note examines the significance of the report, while paying special attention to its limitations. In particular, this study criticizes the nuclear policies of Japan and Australia that have depended upon U.S. extended nuclear deterrence and peaceful use of atomic energy. Finally, it suggests five alternatives for Japan and Australia so that both countries can resume further endeavors towards a world free of nuclear threats.

Japan’s development assistance to conflict-affected areas in Mindanao, southern Philippines, opened new pathways for the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to support multilateral peacebuilding efforts. JICA, in collaboration with Universiti Sains Malaysia, organized a series of Consolidation for peace Seminars as Track One-and-a-Half mediations. Two aspects of Japan’s assistance to Mindanao enabled JICA to engage in peacemaking. First, Japan’s assistance to Mindanao formed a unique tripartite cooperation mechanism consisting of the International Monitoring Team, Mindanao Task Force, and Japan-Bangsamoro Initiative for Reconstruction and Development. JICA took part in all three modes of assistance. Second, providing assistance under a volatile cease-fire agreement in Mindanao motivated JICA to become involved in peacemaking outside the traditional function of development assistance.

The overall record of peacebuilding as a post-Cold War liberal project has proved to be more positive than negative, especially in conflict termination. However, the peacebuilding agenda has had its limits in terms of progress in democratization, judicial institution-building and economic development, despite potential for greater success. peacebuilders are more likely to succeed in transforming societies torn by armed conflict if they can avoid making the process excessively competitive. Democratization and capitalist development are already competitive processes, and the pursuit of retributive justice takes the form of judicial punishment. Together these strategies can form a recipe for competition and conflict, especially in institutionally weak states where the history of distrust among warring factions or former enemies is long and intractable.

The history of Australia’s attempts to acquire a nuclear deterrent capacity transpired both within and outside the spirit of the international Atoms for peace program. While this article reprises a range of scholarship to provide a historical overview, it provides for the first time a level of detail not previously disclosed concerning the mechanisms, costs, and approaches of successive Australian governments in their estimations of obtaining an indigenous nuclear capacity. One such revelation concerns Australia’s “back-door” acquisition option by hosting peaceful Nuclear Explosions, ostensibly for civil engineering purposes, and their provision of preassembled thermonuclear technologies and devices. During the international and bilateral negotiations for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Australia was deeply concerned that the draft Treaty would limit or deny this option.

In recent years, scholars have discovered that the American public responds to foreign policy issues on the basis of fairly stable broad orientations toward international affairs, influenced by a number of demographic, ideological, and partisan factors. Although there has been much recent speculation about the role that religion plays in shaping such orientations, there are very few empirical analyses of that influence. In this article, I use the 2012 Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey to classify American religious groups on Wittkopf ‘s (1990) classic dimensions of foreign policy attitudes: militant internationalism and cooperative internationalism. I find rather different religious constituencies for each perspective, with Evangelical Protestants and religious traditionalists from other faiths most supportive of militant internationalism, while ethnoreligious minorities and religious modernists are most likely to back cooperative internationalism.

China has underscored its intention for peaceful development with the vision for a “harmonious world.” But at the same time China is keen to play a more proactive role in the international rule-making process, addressing its dissatisfaction with the existing international system. This article examines whether China’s energy diplomacy vis-횪-vis Sudan and Iran has helped or hindered its ambition for peaceful development. China’s dealings with Sudan have departed from its long-standing principle of non-interference in internal affairs to one of active intervention, a change intended to help build China’s image as a “responsible power.” China has also demonstrated its ambition and determination to play a more assertive role in dealing with Iran’s nuclear crisis to facilitate safeguarding China’s energy and economic interests. Yet Beijing has been willing to sacrifice its energy interests when necessary in order to be perceived as a responsible stakeholder within the current international establishment. While it might be natural for China to aspire to a more active international role that befits its economic status, China’s objective of building a harmonious world and its peaceful rise ambition will remain unattainable dreams unless Beijing is prepared to accept some universal principles to guide its energy diplomacy.

How would North Korea’s development of the capability to target the United States with nuclear weapons influence its foreign policy? I argue that it would cause more dangerous crises than those of the last decade, and predict that these crises would eventually cause Kim Jong Un and his senior military associates to experience fear of imminent nuclear war or conventional regime change. I show that the effect of such fear would depend on whether or not Kim believes that he has control over the occurrence of these events. I argue that if he experiences fear and believes that he has some control over whether these extreme events actually happen, he will moderate his nuclear threats and behave more like other experienced nuclear powers. But if he experiences fear and believes that he has no control, he will likely pursue policies that could cause nuclear war. I use this insight to prescribe and proscribe policies for Washington, Seoul and the regional community.

The institution of nuclear power in Japan appears to be drifting; nevertheless it persists. For the past 60 years, conservative politicians, technologists, and electric companies have acted in concert, for different reasons, to achieve a full nuclear fuel cycle: specifically technology for reprocessing and uranium enrichment. Their pursuit has eroded the bottom-line spirit of peaceful use; to be sure, it has been excessively ambitious for Japan’s status as a non-nuclear-weapon state. The mastering of the full nuclear fuel cycle has resulted in a competency trap, excluding or delaying development of alternatives to nuclear power. Furthermore, this situation has heightened nuclear power’s sunk costs. The critical conjuncture of the March 11, 2011 incident has had a limited impact only. Anti-nuclear activists, the weakest concerned actor, try to dramatize their movement for “exit from nuclear,” but they have failed to bring about electoral changes.

Despite the relative uniqueness of peace education in contexts of intractable conflict, research on peace education carried out in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be instructive, to a greater or lesser extent, in other contexts. Six researchbased lessons are presented: (1) The short life of peace education’s positive effects and so the need for continuous reinforcement; (2) ways of restoring the eroded effects; (3) the benefits of learning about another conflict; (4) the differential effects of peace education on different groups of participants; (5) the limitations of peace education; and (6) joint projects with common important goals as an alternative approach to peace education. In addition, two common challenges facing peace education and other kinds of programs are presented: the challenge of maintaining the attained positive effects, and the challenge of spreading the effects to wider realms of society.